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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A wide array of legal statutes, regulations, codes, laws, and constitutions constrain the 
objectives organizations may pursue and how they pursue them, and when these constraints are 
violated by an organization, the organization, its employees and its leaders may face punitive 
measures, including fines or prison sentences. While organizations retain a great deal of 
discretion in setting and pursuing objectives, many of their activities are nevertheless closely 
monitored and constrained by the proscriptions of national, state, and local governments 
(Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Laeven & Levine, 2009). Some industries, such as defense 
contracting, nuclear energy production, banking and finance, and healthcare, are heavily 
regulated and subject to multiple levels of regulations, which are often produced and enforced by 
government agencies specifically created to monitor a particular industry. For example, hospitals 
are constrained by regulations from several federal-level agencies, such as the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Administration, as well as state- and local-
level agencies. Even organizations in lightly regulated environments are still subject to complex, 
federal- and state-level proscriptions regarding how they hire, pay and fire employees, how they 
maintain workplace safety, and even how they build their buildings and install wiring, hot water 
tanks, and other hardware. Table 1 provides many more examples of industries and agencies that 
regulate them. 
-------------------------------- 
Please see Table 1 
---------------------------------
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These regulatory constraints, which are a type of formal institution (e.g., North, 1990; Scott, 
2001), constitute a critical part of the broader mosaic of the “rules of the game” that constrain the 
behavior of all individuals and organizations within society.1 Formal institutions are codified and 
enforceable constraints, which range from unwritten contracts to the written constitutions of 
states and nations. Organizations are compelled to obey formal institutions because they are 
enforced through the coercive power of the legal entities of state (Ostrom, 1986). Informal 
institutions may also be defined as constraints in that they limit the range of behavior that may 
characterize social interactions between actors. However, in contrast with formal institutions, 
informal institutions are not explicit or codified, they are not usually enforced through coercion, 
and they are less malleable than formal institutions because they are the outcome of generations’ 
worth of past interactions (North, 1990).     
 Entrepreneurs, who uncover and exploit opportunities to create customer value through 
introducing innovative products and services (Choi, Levesque, & Shepherd, 2008; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 2012) are constrained by extensive and complex regulatory 
environments. Regulations shape the environment in which entrepreneurs are embedded and 
influence the variety of opportunities entrepreneurs may uncover as well as limit their means of 
exploitation (Baumol, 1990; Meek, Pacheco, & York, 2010; Shane, 1993). Consider, for 
example, the opportunity to manufacture and sell roulette machines to casinos. Such an 
opportunity exists in Oklahoma for roulette machine manufacturers while it does not in Texas, 
                                                           
1 North (1990) draws sharp contrast between institutions, which he refers to as the “rules of the game,” and 
organizations. He writes: “what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players.” This dissertation takes 
into consideration both regulation and regulatory agencies; therefore, to avoid confounding both as “institutions,” I 
adopt herein a strict adherence to North’s definition of institutions as constraints on individual and organizational 
behavior, which are distinct from the organizations that create them. In other words, a regulation, law, or statute may 
be an institution, while an agency, political body, social movement, or any other organization are not institutions. 
Furthermore, to maintain this conceptual clarity for myself and for the reader, I will refer to institutions primarily by 
their function; hence, constraints, proscriptions, restraints or limits. 
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which is an outcome of the difference between regulatory environments across both states. Or 
consider the example of the front-yard lemonade stand. While the opportunity to have such a 
stand is not prohibited, entrepreneurs hoping to exploit the opportunity must first obtain licenses 
for food handling or risk being shut down. 
 While organizations may accept, acquiesce, and conform to their regulatory environments 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987), organizations that encounter constraints that are 
especially burdensome or costly may be more likely to attempt to alter their regulatory 
environments (Oliver, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002). Scholars have increasingly examined the 
relationship between firms and their regulatory or broader institutional environments. 
Institutional theorists have described the strategic approaches firms may adopt in relation to their 
institutional constraints, such as attempting to avoid, manipulate, or defy these constraints (e.g., 
Oliver, 1991; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Under the aegides of institutional entrepreneurship 
and corporate political activity, scholars have also cataloged the various tactics firms and other 
actors use to manipulate institutions or to create new ones (e.g., Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Pacheco, York, Dean, Sarasvathy, 2010; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). These tactics include 
a wide range of activities, including simple political advocacy to more complex activities such as 
framing and social movement organization. Scholars have also described the means through 
which these activities take place, especially the role discourse (i.e., spoken or written 
interactions) plays in creating and maintaining new or altered institutions (e.g., Lawrence & 
Phillips, 2004). And finally, scholars, in attempting to address the paradox constituted by the 
notion of constrained actors altering their constraints (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007; Leca & 
Naccache, 2006), have attempted to describe the conditions under which actors may nevertheless 
escape their restraints to effect change, such as the existence of conflicting or contradictory 
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constraints (e.g., Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire, 
Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), and the resources deployed by these actors, such as power and 
knowledge (e.g., Kahn, Munir, & Willmott, 2007; Levy & Scully, 2007).     
 Although past research has made notable progress regarding the tactics and strategies 
organizations may use to alter their institutional environments, scholars have largely examined 
issues related to the neoinstitutionalism of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and have therefore 
focused on explaining how new forms of organizations are created and institutionalized and how 
actors may surmount institutional pressures to effect this type of change. We have much less 
understanding regarding why and how already-established firms may pursue institutional change 
as a central component of obtaining and sustaining competitive advantage and why some firms 
may be better at wielding such influence than others. More specifically, no framework yet exists 
that describes firms’ routine activities to interact with and manipulate legal regulatory constraints 
and the role these routine activities play in facilitating regulatory change, despite scholars’ 
suggestion that such routine activities may be vital to firm performance (Bagley, 2008, 2010). In 
addition, the links between these routines and entrepreneurial outcomes, such as opportunity 
identification and exploitation, have not yet been established. 
 This dissertation tells the story of why and how firms may pursue the core entrepreneurial 
functions of opportunity identification and exploitation through developing capabilities to 
interact with and manipulate the legal regulatory institutions that constrain them. To tell this 
story, this dissertation integrates institutional theory, especially institutional entrepreneurship 
research, and organizational capabilities perspective. Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; North, 1990; Scott, 2001) concerns the relationship between formal and informal 
constraints and organizations’ behavior. Organizational capabilities perspective (Barney & 
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Ariken, 2001; Nelson & Winter, 1983; Winter, 2003) suggests that firms may develop routines 
related to producing products and services and that these routines may be a central component 
constituting firms’ ability to achieve lasting, above-average performance. 
 This is an important story to tell for two practical reasons and for several theoretical 
reasons. First, some industries are experiencing rapidly changing formal institutional 
environments and are coming under greater levels of regulatory control (e.g., Bargeron, Lehn, & 
Zutter, 2010). Understanding how firms successfully encounter such changes and even stymie 
regulatory changes may be an important tool for firms should some regulatory environments 
continue to exhibit considerable dynamism. Second, some firms are achieving greater levels of 
success due to their ability to interact with and manage their institutional environments (Lux, 
Crook, & Woeher, 2011). These trends suggest that firms are deliberately interacting with the 
formal institutions that regulate them as an important means for attaining sustainable competitive 
advantage. Understanding how and why these firms are pursuing these routine activities may 
establish a foundation of knowledge with which other firms may foster and deploy such routines.  
This dissertation intends to make several contributions to institutional theory and organizational 
capabilities perspective. As mentioned above, many of the strategies and tactics used by 
organizations to manipulate their institutional environments have been catalogued and explained. 
This dissertation complements existing theory synthesizing extant research on institutional 
entrepreneurship and capabilities into a cohesive framework that explains the role and 
importance of institutional capabilities, which are directed at interacting with and manipulating 
formal institutions. For example, while Oliver (1991) described several strategic postures firms 
may adopt regarding institutions, little research has explained why firms may be predisposed to 
assuming one posture over the other – the existence of institutional capabilities may inform this 
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choice. Institutional capabilities may also inform the debate on the paradox of embedded agency: 
for instance, firms that have developed certain routines may be more likely to manipulate 
institutions, regardless of the constraints they encounter. For organizational capabilities 
perspective, this dissertation will contribute to the growing literature regarding specific types of 
capabilities firms may deploy to obtain competitive advantage. While some scholars have begun 
moving toward integrating the capabilities perspective with institutional theory (e.g., Bagley, 
2008; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Crane, 2013), this research has not specifically conceptualized 
institutional capabilities nor synthesized existing research regarding the activities important for 
developing and deploying these capabilities (e.g., Hillman et al., 2004). Finally, this dissertation 
contributes to a greater understanding of why firms may use capabilities to interact with and 
manipulate their institutional environments. The framework presented in this dissertation relies 
on concepts and relationships established within individual-opportunity nexus perspective within 
entrepreneurship theory (i.e., opportunity and innovation) (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000; Short et al., 2010) as the central impetus of institutional capabilities. In 
other words, these capabilities, though directed at changing firms’ institutional environments, are 
used to capture a greater number of more valuable business opportunities. 
 The two research questions motivating this dissertation are 1) why do firms opt to 
manipulate their regulatory environments as a competitive strategy, and 2) what role do 
institutional capabilities play in facilitating their pursuit of this strategy? To address these 
questions, this research will employ a mixed, qualitative-quantitative method and examine the 
activities, regulatory environments, and entrepreneurial performance of commercial banks 
throughout the United States. The qualitative, interview portion of the study will help establish a 
stronger conceptualization of the concepts and relationships presented in the next two chapters. 
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The quantitative, survey-based portion of the study will establish the nature of the relationships 
between firms’ possession of institutional capabilities and their entrepreneurial performance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter will outline the concepts and relationships described by institutional theory 
and organizational capabilities perspective. As this dissertation explains how organizations seek 
to interact with and change regulatory constraints, which are a type of institution, it will first be 
necessary to define and describe institutions more broadly in their various types, describe how 
institutions compel organizations to conform to their expectations, describe the particular 
characteristics of regulatory institutions, describe how institutions change, and, finally, describe 
how organizations may influence and alter institutions through institutional entrepreneurship. 
The second section of this chapter will describe organizational capabilities generally and lay the 
foundation for institutional capabilities, which are a significant component of Chapter 3. 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 Describing institutions: definitions and types. Institutions are behavioral constraints that 
guide and influence individual and organizational behavior (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). 
Institutions exist in a variety of forms, such as social taboos, customs, traditions, rules, laws, and 
constitutions. Individuals and organizations tend to conform to institutions in order to obtain 
social approval, or legitimacy, which enables them to subsequently acquire other important 
resources (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Individuals and organizations also 
conform to institutions to reduce behavioral uncertainty. Research describes how institutions 
may constrain and enable behavior, by providing time-tested patterns of interaction, which actors 
may call up in new situations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jepperson, 1991). Finally, individuals 
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and organizations conform to institutions to avoid sanction or punishment, especially where 
institutions are enforced through coercive, governmental power (Scott, 2001).   
 Institutions are typically categorized into formal and informal types (North, 1990). 
Informal institutions are constraints erected by non-governmental social entities, such as the tacit 
rules perpetuated by culture, social tradition, and language. Informal institutions constrain 
behavior: consider, for example, the difference between rules guiding gender interactions in the 
United States and in Egypt. Behavior customary in one country may not be socially acceptable in 
the other. Organizations that do not conform to informal institutions are usually subject to social 
sanction and the loss of legitimacy (Scott, 2001). Informal institutions may also enable behavior. 
In this sense, institutions may act as routines, customs, and guidelines for how to act in any given 
situation (Gioia & Poole, 1984). These institutions, while fundamentally constraints, also equip 
actors with the ability to act appropriately (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Schutz, 1967). The use of 
language is an appropriate example. While language contains certain constraints, such as 
grammar and usage rules, communication itself would not be possible without language. 
Furthermore, the select use of sayings and idioms characteristic of a particular culture or region 
can help users garner social legitimacy: consider the southern politician who speaks without an 
accent while in Washington, D.C., while amplifying her accent in her home constituency. In 
addition, informal institutions also include cognitive constraints (Scott, 2001). Cognitive 
constraints include routine patterns of thought that individuals develop over time through 
repeated social interactions (Giddens, 1984; Weick, 1995).   
 In contrast to informal institutions, formal institutions usually are explicit constraints 
constituted by written laws, rules, regulations, and constitutions. They also include contracts and 
property rights, which are frequently unwritten (North, 1990). Similar to informal institutions, 
10 
 
formal institutions are fundamentally constraints, but they may also facilitate some forms of 
behavior that would otherwise be impossible. Formal institutions constrain behavior: consider, 
for example, traffic laws, which specify the maximum speeds people can drive on public roads, 
or zoning regulations, which prohibit certain types of buildings from being constructed without 
government permission. As opposed to informal institution, which are enforced through social 
sanction and loss of legitimacy, formal institutions are enforced through coercive means (Scott, 
2001), and specific punishments, fines, and other sanctions are attached to types of constraint 
violations. While fundamentally behavioral constraints, formal institutions may also enable 
behavior. For example, contracting allows two or more parties to enter into a business 
agreement, which they might not otherwise do in the absence of enforceable contracts and the 
possibility of opportunism (North, 1990). Also, certain constitutional rights guarantee that people 
are free to behave in certain ways, such as the First Amendment’s right to free religious 
association. However, formal institutions are able to enable behavior due to the likelihood of 
coercive enforcement (Ostrom, 1986): contracting would be pointless without an independent 
third party (i.e., the government) ensuring contracts were fulfilled (North, 1990), and the First 
Amendment successfully enables free religious association by constraining other types of 
behavior (i.e., specifically, governmental action; the amendment is clearly framed as a constraint: 
“Congress shall pass no law …”). 
 Institutions do not always fall squarely into informal or formal categories. North (1990) 
suggests instead that institutions lie along a continuum, from the most informal (e.g., cognitive 
patterns of thought and cultural norms) to the most formal (e.g., vigorously enforced federal or 
state regulations and codes of law). It may be possible that some institutions possess informal 
characteristics and formal characteristics. Table 2 presents an institutional continuum and 
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provides examples. For example, legal tradition allows for spoken, tacit agreements between two 
individuals to be enforced as contracts; another example might include churches that have highly 
developed codes of canon law, such as the Roman Catholic or Orthodox churches; yet another 
example might include regulations that are written with a particular intent but enforced with 
another. Each of these examples contain mixes of formal (i.e., written, codified, or coercively 
enforced) characteristics and informal (i.e., tacit, value/norm-based, unwritten) characteristics. 
------------------------------- 
Please see Table 2 
------------------------------- 
 
 Before moving to the next section, two other issues remain to be discussed regarding 
characteristics of institutions. First, enforcement is a critical component of any institution. While 
formal institutions, especially regulatory institutions, are often predicated on written rules and 
policy, not all written rules and policies constitute institutions. Written rules or policies that are 
unenforced or weakly enforced are ineffective at constraining behavior and may not be 
considered institutions at all (Ostrom, 1986). Enforcement takes several forms, which are also 
presented in Table 3 based on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) typology. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) describe three types of enforcement, which they call isomorphism: coercive isomorphism, 
or the compulsion through force (e.g., usually legal, such as state police power or regulatory 
supervision); mimetic isomorphism, or mimicry meant to surmount uncertainty (e.g., 
organizations in highly dynamic or uncertain environments may attempt to copy the behaviors of 
similar organizations); and normative isomorphism, which is the outcome of high 
professionalization (e.g., firms that employ high numbers of certified public accountants or 
registered nurses or college professors tend to conform to certain constraints placed by the 
professions themselves).  
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-------------------------------- 
Please see Table 3 
-------------------------------- 
 
The second remaining issue important for this discussion is distinguishing institutions 
from other concepts, which, through scholarly usage, have also come to be considered 
institutions. This dissertation strictly follows North (1990) and Scott (2001), who argue that 
institutions are constraints on individual or organizational behavior and are distinct from 
organizations. Given the work of leading current institutional theorists, such a statement seems to 
contradict the current conceptualization of institutions. For instance, Greenwood and Suddaby’s 
(2006) work on new forms of accounting firms describes the formation of new organizations as 
does Maguire et al.’s (2004) description of the emergence of HIV/Aids advocacy groups in 
Canada. Table 5, which is presented later in this chapter, lists examples of institutional 
entrepreneurship published from 2000, and the majority of these articles discuss institutions as 
either organizations, social practices, or other types of recurrent routines.  
Elsewhere, such as in developing economies literature, institutions may also refer to the 
infrastructure of society. Such infrastructure is commonly understood to include property rights, 
which North (1990) recognizes as an important formal institution, but it may also include roads, 
utilities, and access to banking services (e.g., Webb, Kistruck, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2010). While 
roads and utilities are not institutions in the strictest form of the definition used in this 
dissertation, infrastructure nevertheless has characteristics that resemble institutions, insofar as 
they constrain behavior, and they may be considered the means of institutions. For instance, 
roads may be seen as establishing the preferred market priorities of a country: cities connected 
by roads are freer to trade than those not connected. That such connections are usually the 
outcomes of political decisions suggests that roads themselves may be used as a tool to enforce 
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approved travel and trading patterns. Table 4 attempts to parse out and distinguish the three 
concepts: organizations, institutions, and means. For example, a family is a type of organization 
that is characterized by certain institutions (e.g., such as patriarchy, motherhood, generational 
respect, etc.), and that uses certain means to establish and maintain these institutions (e.g., living 
conditions within the home, decisions regarding who goes to school, and other, more serious 
tactics, such as female circumcision).   
-------------------------------- 
Please see Table 4 
-------------------------------- 
 
This broadening of the definition of institution is likely an outcome of DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) paper and later work that suggests successful organizations can influence the 
behavior of other, less successful organizations through mimetic isomorphism. This trend may 
also be a result of the recognition that organizations and routines themselves are fundamentally 
sets of constraints, or the physical manifestations of shared cognitive institutions (e.g., Weick, 
1995). Nevertheless, this dissertation strictly adheres to the conceptualization of institutions as 
constraints, in an effort to avoid conceptual murkiness and present a clearer argument.  
 What institutions do. As mentioned earlier, isomorphism is the mechanism through which 
institutions wield their power over organizations. Specifically, isomorphism is defined as a 
“constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the 
same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 149). Institutional theory 
presents isomorphism as the mechanism responsible for creating so many similar organizations – 
organizations within the same environments tend to conform to the same sets of institutional 
pressures and behave within similar constraints; therefore, such organizations tend to resemble 
each other over time (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The three types of 
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isomorphism were described above: coercive, mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983).  
Although isomorphism is a powerful force, institutions may nevertheless be ignored 
without an added inducement to conform: legitimacy. Legitimacy is the “generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). 
Organizations derive legitimacy when they conform to institutional expectations (Scott, 2001). 
As Zimmerman and Zeitz note, “legitimacy is a relationship between the practices and utterances 
of the organization and those that are contained within, approved of, and enforced by the social 
system in which the organization exists” (2002: 416). In other words, an organization may be 
characterized as legitimate when it appears to behave in ways that are congruent with how 
institutions define appropriate behavior.  
 Organizations conform to institutions to acquire legitimacy, but legitimacy itself is not 
the goal. Organizations desire to survive, and with legitimacy, they are able to unlock access to 
other resources, such as human capital, financial capital, social capital and technology (Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Legitimacy is particularly relevant to new or 
innovative organizations, which tend to first demonstrate institutional conformity before 
ultimately achieving growth (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002).  
How institutions change: gradual, non-purposive. There are two broad processes through 
which institutions change. The first process is gradual, non-purposive (i.e., social actors are not 
seeking to achieve deliberate change outcomes), and it is based on very broad shifts in social 
characteristics, such as demographics (Oliver, 1992; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Scott, 
1987). Generally, this process occurs through the perpetual acquisition and use (or revision) of 
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scripts. Scripts are the fundamental constitutive units of institutions and are defined as 
“observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting” 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997: 98). Individuals and organizations acquire scripts through interacting 
with others and store them in their memories or written records to use again (Gioia & Poole, 
1984; Phillips et al., 2004). Scripts create efficiencies in interaction: individuals and 
organizations can rely on and trust scripts to appropriately guide their behavior with other actors 
(Chiasson & Saunders, 2005). Alternatively, without scripts, actors would necessarily have to 
devise new ways of interacting with each subsequent interaction, which takes more time and 
risks error. Many institutions exist in the balance between cost and efficiency (North, 1990). 
Insofar as institutions are efficient – and reduce costs – they will likely persist. However, when 
institutions create more cost than efficiency, they may be subject to change. However, actors 
may occasionally revise scripts, through accident or purposeful innovation. Sometimes, these 
innovations may prove to be more useful than those that already exist, and others will adopt 
them. The degree to which new scripts are adopted across a set of actors equals the degree of 
institutionalization. Practices change over time, whether it is in the adoption of business planning 
at non-profit museums (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998), individuals’ collective recognition 
that a multinational Europe is emerging (Sweet, Sandholtz, & Fligstein, 2001), or the 
dissemination of total quality management practices across U.S. hospitals (Westphal, Gulati, & 
Shortell, 1997).  
 This first process of change is connected to the widespread rejection or adoption of 
scripts. Informal institutions may be particularly susceptible to this first process of change: as 
informal institutions are taken-for-granted and largely self-enforced, individuals may be less 
likely to deliberately target these sorts of institutions either because they are not aware they exist 
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or because their widespread social acceptance makes them very hard targets to change. The most 
current fashion trends, traditional or cultural rituals (e.g., shaking hands), and dialect are 
examples of such institutions. In contrast to informal institutions, formal institutions are less 
taken-for-granted, frequently enforced by independent third-parties, and frequently only regulate 
small portions of society; therefore, they are much more likely to be altered through the second 
process of change, or deliberate change, which I will describe next. However, formal institutions, 
even regulatory institutions, may be susceptible to this first process of change. For example, 
broad-based social trends frequently have a profound, if delayed, influence on formal 
institutions. The constitutional amendments banning slavery occurred only after a decades-long 
abolitionist effort, the creation and election of an abolitionist party, and finally a civil war. 
Further evidence of this gradual, unintentional change process may be found in the numerous 
unenforced, outdated laws that hide in city and state codebooks, recalling that unenforced laws 
lack the constraining power of institutions (Ostrom, 1986). Many states still regulate how horse-
drawn carriages should be driven and parked, or regulate the particulars of the relationships 
between two men, or set the rules of how U.S. senators are appointed (i.e., the normal course of 
senatorial representation was established by appointment in the 19th century).  
   How institutions change: quickly, with deliberate action. Institutions may also be 
changed through a second process, referred to as institutional entrepreneurship. Institutional 
entrepreneurs are individuals (or organizations) that seek institutional change in order to obtain 
some sort of favorable outcome (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002). Institutional 
entrepreneurs engage in various behaviors to obtain the change they desire, such as by building 
social movements (e.g., Fligstein, 1997) and reframing old issues in new and different ways to 
generate public support (e.g., Rao, 1998).    
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 Actors are willing to conform to institutional constraints because doing so can help the 
actor acquire legitimacy. However, conformity can also create inefficiencies as actors divert 
time, attention, and money away from more value-productive activities in order to meet 
institutional expectations (Oliver, 1991; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). In addition to creating 
inefficiencies, institutions can also perpetuate hierarchy structures, to the benefit of some actors 
and at the expense of other actors. For example, in apartheid South Africa, some businesses were 
severely disadvantaged by laws that placed limits on non-white citizens while white-owned 
businesses benefited from the shackles placed on their potential competition. Hierarchy 
structures tend to limit access to resources, favoring those with status and constraining those 
without status (Bourdieu, 1990; Lawrence, 1999). Therefore, some actors may be motivated to 
alter institutions where the costs of conformity to an institution are too high or where an 
institution perpetuates an unequal hierarchy (e.g., Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004).  
 Much of the debate within institutional entrepreneurship has concerned the paradox of 
embedded agency – that is, how do actors who are embedded within institutions and are, in many 
cases, required to conform to these institutions, affect institutional change? Some scholars have 
criticized the notion of the institutional entrepreneur and suggested that their role in institutional 
change has been exaggerated (Delmestri, 2006; Meyer, 2006); others argue that the notion of 
institutional change agents is incongruent with institutional theory and may require the use of 
other theoretical perspectives (Suddaby, 2010). This position is contrasted with research, 
including that conducted by scholars foundational to institutional theory, that suggests that 
individuals may play a vital role in changing institutions. Max Weber, whose research describing 
the development of Western-style bureaucracies established the superstructure upon which much 
of institutional theory currently hangs, argued that irrational, charismatic individuals may be 
18 
 
among the only means of creating institutional change (Weber, 1989, 1994). Indeed, if 
institutional conformity and the pursuit of legitimacy are rational, then it may well take irrational 
actors to shape old and create new institutions. More recently, scholars have suggested that 
certain institutional conditions would have to exist that freed institutional actors to manipulate 
institutions. This second approach has gained traction within the literature as scholars have 
outlined what conditions tend to foster institutional entrepreneurship. This approach suggests that 
the characteristics of an institutional field and actors’ social positions can enable institutional 
entrepreneurship to take place (e.g., Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009; Strang & Sine, 2002).  
 An institutional field is characterized by the homogeneity of the institutions within it. 
Fields are “key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). 
Fields that are institutionally homogeneous are characterized by few institutions, with few intra-
institutional overlaps and contradictions. Institutionally heterogeneous fields are characterized by 
the existence of many institutions, some of which may claim overlapping jurisdiction and 
proscribe conflicting norms, rules, and values (Ostrom, 2005). Heterogeneity within an 
institutional field creates conflict between institutions, and this conflict reduces their taken-for-
granted nature. In homogeneous fields, institutional entrepreneurs bear a great deal of risk as 
those institutions are stronger due to their widespread social acceptance. In heterogeneous fields, 
institutional entrepreneurs may find less risk in changing institutions (Clemons & Cook, 1999; 
Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Sewell, 1992). 
 Fields are also characterized by limited resources, and actors fight to acquire access to 
these resources while limiting others’ access (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). Some actors find 
themselves, over time, to have claimed central posi
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to resources, while other actors are at the periphery with little access (Shils, 1975). Therefore, an 
actor’s social position can influence whether they engage in institutional entrepreneurship as well 
as their motivations for doing so (Battilana et al., 2009). Actors on the periphery may be 
motivated to obtain greater access to resources for themselves and less hesitant to engage in 
institutional entrepreneurship due to the perception that they have little to lose. For example 
Maguire and his colleagues (2004) describe how HIV-infected Canadians were able to create a 
social movement to obtain greater recognition and resources despite their initial, marginalized 
starting point. Other peripheral actors may attempt to carve out spaces within these fields, by 
claiming areas that are of little interest to central actors or by working with powerful actors in a 
way that minimizes their threat (e.g., Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Actors in the center of 
institutional fields may find themselves either more powerful than the institutions that initially 
constrained them or actually assuming institutional roles themselves. These actors may attempt 
to alter institutions in such a way to obtain even greater advantages for themselves (e.g., 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  
 Table 5 lists the research conducted on institutional entrepreneurship since 2000 in 
academic journals, including Academy of Management Review, Organization Science, Journal of 
Business Venturing, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Journal of Management, and 
Organization. In reading this research, at least two trends emerge: 1) research tends to focus on 
the creation of wholly new institutions, and in many of these instances, the new institutions in 
question are actually organizations or social practices, and 2) although institutional 
entrepreneurship scholars occasionally draw on concepts found within entrepreneurship theory, 
such as opportunity, innovation, and risk, no paper has thoroughly integrated topics central to 
entrepreneurship scholars within institutional entrepreneurship research. In the next section, I 
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attempt such an integration, which will establish a foundation for the research model presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Please see Table 5 
-------------------------------- 
 
 Institutional entrepreneurship, redefined, constrained, and conceptualized. DiMaggio 
(1988) defined the institutional entrepreneur as an actor who may attempt to alter institutions to 
obtain a favorable outcome. The institutional entrepreneurship described in this dissertation 
places some constraints on that definition; specifically, I define institutional entrepreneurship as 
any deliberate effort by an individual or organization to alter institutional constraints in such a 
way as to obtain access to new business opportunities or enhance the value of opportunities they 
are already exploiting. For entrepreneurs, a “favorable outcome” is related to the discovery and 
pursuit of business opportunities (e.g., Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  
--------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 1 
--------------------------------- 
 
As shown in Figure 1, a given realm of entrepreneurial activity, in which many 
opportunities exist, is bisected by a formal institutional boundary, or a constraint beyond which 
behavior is not permitted (e.g., Webb et al., 2009). The entrepreneur or the firm exists on the left 
side of the figure and is embedded within both formal and informal institutional fields. 
Opportunities within the formal constraint are legally and socially sanctioned while opportunities 
without the constraint are illegal but socially sanctioned.2 The organization may be embedded in 
                                                           
2 No opportunities lie outside of the informal institutional boundary as all opportunities must be based on some 
degree of social acceptance. However, the informal institutional boundary may be deliberately moved inward or 
outward by what others have called “moral entrepreneurs” (e.g., Becker, 1963, 1984). For example, the temperance 
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one or two or dozens of such fields, and the aggregate effect of such fields would be to limit the 
attainment and exploitation of a wider number of business opportunities. However, for the sake 
of simplicity, Figure 1 presents a single formal institutional constraint and the institutional 
entrepreneur’s options for changing that boundary. Institutional entrepreneurs may expand 
constraints to obtain access to new business opportunities. Institutional entrepreneurs may retract 
constraints to limit access to opportunities by others and thereby enhance the value of the 
business opportunities they are already exploiting. Finally, institutional entrepreneurs may clarify 
ambiguous institutional constraints. Institutions are frequently ambiguous, which creates fuzzy 
institutional boundaries. Ambiguity reduction facilitates either constraint expansion or constraint 
retraction because the end result is a clearer idea of which side of a constraint an opportunity lies. 
Constraint expansion or retraction need not involve rewriting policy or law. As described earlier, 
enforcement is a requisite component of any regulatory constraint; therefore, merely seeking an 
exemption from a constraint or asking for a constraint to be more strictly enforced constitute 
institutional entrepreneurship efforts. Finally, while written policy or regulations may be 
constant across a wide group of firms, in actuality, constraints change on a firm-by-firm basis. 
Regulatory constraints are often enforced by agents with a wide range of discretion and the 
predicate rules and regulations are often written with wide latitude (Endicott, 2001). Therefore, 
regulations are rarely enforced consistently from firm to firm, resulting in unique, if only 
incrementally different, regulatory environments for each firm.    
 Given my definition and conceptualization of institutional entrepreneurship as the 
                                                           
movement of the 19th century found some success in framing alcohol as an immoral substance, reducing the social 
acceptability and, thus, the value of that opportunity (e.g., Hiatt et al., 2009). However, these actors are not 
institutional entrepreneurs in the sense I use the term because they are not necessarily pursuing business 
opportunities but are instead driven to label some behaviors deviant in the broader pursuit of “normalcy” (Goffman, 
1963). Therefore, this type of institutional change lies outside the scope of this research.  
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deliberate effort toward institutional change to obtain access or increase the value of business 
opportunities, not all behavior directed at altering formal institutions would classify as 
institutional entrepreneurship. Local, state, and federal lawmaker-initiated policy outcomes do 
not necessarily have any relationship to those lawmakers’ pursuit of business opportunities. 
Lobbying firms also may not always count as institutional entrepreneurs insofar as their business 
opportunities are related to the process of institutional boundary change rather than the outcomes 
of such changes. Some ideologically motivated individuals and organizations, such as advocacy 
groups (e.g., the Sierra Club) and think tanks (e.g., the Heritage Foundation) may also not 
qualify as institutional entrepreneurs, given that they may pursue an institutional change, 
regardless of an existence of a potential business opportunity.3 Also not institutional 
entrepreneurs are individuals who benefit from others’ institutional entrepreneurship efforts or 
those who may inadvertently alter institutions but do not intentionally set out to do so.  
 Institutional entrepreneurship is also a type of entrepreneurship, insofar as it is a process 
of identifying opportunities to create market value (e.g., Shane, 2003, 2012). The market value 
institutional entrepreneurs create is related to the access they obtain to business opportunities by 
shifting and clarifying formal institutional boundaries. The process involves discovering and 
exploiting opportunities, which institutional entrepreneurs do by developing innovations and 
assuming risk. Institutional opportunities represent the potential that formal institutional 
boundaries can be changed or clarified. Innovation constitutes the content of the new or changed 
institution, which is reflected in a moved or clarified boundary. And risk embodies the 
unexpected downside costs associated with trying to move a boundary.  
Institutional opportunities may be defined as situations in which individuals or 
                                                           
3 However, some notable exceptions exist, such as Charles and David Koch, whose political ideology is directly 
related to the pursuit of business opportunities.  
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organizations can introduce new means-ends frameworks to resolve a systematic disequilibrium 
and create value for themselves and others (cf. Eckhardt & Shane, 2003). Disequilibrium exists 
when the benefits provided by institutions are outweighed by the costs of conformity, such as 
when institutions begin to fail, cause confusion, or otherwise become outmoded; therefore, 
institutional opportunities – or moments ripe for deliberate institutional change – exist whenever 
the costs of conformity exceed the costs of attempting to change the institution plus the costs of 
conforming to the new institutional order. There are three types of conformity cost: 1) financial 
costs (e.g., creating and staffing divisions within an organization to comply with regulatory 
standards; elsewhere, these can constitute opportunity costs – financial resources spent on 
conformity that could have been better spent elsewhere); 2) legitimacy costs (e.g., institutional 
fields may enforce unequal power and resource distributions, which leaves some actors at a 
constant disadvantage [e.g., Bourdieu, 1977, 1990]); and 3) behavioral costs (e.g., organizations 
that develop routines based on institutional expectations may be less able to learn and adapt in 
rapidly changing environments [Adler & Borys, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kelly & 
Amburgey, 1991]). There are two sets of costs on the other side of the equation. The first set is 
composed of the costs listed above and constitute the costs of conforming to the new institutional 
order. The second set of costs is related to an act of institutional entrepreneurship and is 
composed of two types of cost: 1) the resource commitment necessary to obtain the desired 
institutional change and 2) the resource commitment necessary to develop the ability to change 
institutions (e.g., firms may not instantly lobby or make donations to congress members; in some 
instances, they must first hire lobbyists or create and staff political action committees before 
engaging in the direct work of obtaining favorable institutional outcomes).  
 An institutional innovation consists of two dimensions: 1) instrumental (e.g., the 
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functional institutional content of the innovation) and 2) symbolic (e.g., the framing tactics used 
by the institutional entrepreneur to obtain social acceptance for the innovation) (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991). In other words, the instrumental constitutes the “what” and the symbolic 
constitutes the “how.”4 The instrumental dimension is akin to problem solving: the entrepreneur 
must devise a way to alleviate the friction between their activities and an institutional constraint. 
Therefore, institutional entrepreneurs select specific solutions to specific problems and are not 
merely motivated by ideology (Colomy & Rhoades, 1994).  The symbolic dimension helps the 
entrepreneur spread the message – simultaneously advocating for an innovation while arguing 
against the existing institutional order (Colomy, 1995). In attracting support for an institutional 
innovation, entrepreneurs draw stark contrasts between their proposed solution and the status quo 
because delegitimizing the targeted institution is a critical element of institutional 
entrepreneurship. Status quo institutions are not merely labeled ineffective or inefficient; they are 
cast as “evil” or “fundamentally unjust” (Colomy, 1995: 272; Turner & Killian, 1987). In place 
of these corrupt and failing institutions, entrepreneurs portray their projects as just and equitable 
solutions, and they tout the widespread social agreement that there is a flaw in the system 
(Eisenstadt, 1995; Turner & Colomy, 1998).  
 Institutional risks are the unpredictable variances in the outcome of institutional 
entrepreneurship projects, especially to the downside, and they negatively moderate the 
likelihood that an institutional entrepreneur will exploit an opportunity to change the institutional 
order. There are three types of institutional risks: 1) legitimacy (e.g., the entrepreneur may lose 
any legitimacy derived from the existing institutional order), 2) costs of failure (e.g., institutional 
innovations, especially formal or regulatory innovations, are frequently voted on or approved by 
                                                           
4 The institutional opportunity would represent “why.” 
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lawmakers, and such either/or outcomes eliminate the chance of even a partial success), and 3) 
costly success (e.g., an entrepreneur successfully caused the rejection of an existing institution 
but finds greater difficulty attracting support for the preferred innovation, leaving room for other 
entrepreneurs to promote their own innovations).  
 Lastly, research (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2010; Pacheco et al., 2010) has described a 
number of specific activities institutional entrepreneurs may use to change institutions. For 
clarity, these activities are listed in Table 6. These activities do not necessarily constitute 
organizational routines, which will be described in the next section of this chapter, nor do they 
outline the reasons organizations may use such tactics, which was described in this section. 
However, they provide a starting point from which the conceptualization and integration of 
institutional capabilities may begin.  
------------------------------- 
Please see Table 6 
------------------------------- 
 
 Regulatory institutions. The last necessary discussion regarding institutions concerns the 
unique nature of regulatory institutions, with which this dissertation is particularly concerned. 
Past this point, the discussion of institutions will be limited to regulatory institutions, or 
constraints. Regulatory institutions are a subset of formal institutions. Regulatory institutions are 
those constraints created and actively enforced by regulatory agencies and are frequently, but not 
always, targeted toward monitoring and policing specific industries (e.g., Bonardi & Keim, 2005; 
Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2008). Regulatory constraints have several unique characteristics that 
distinguish them from other formal institutions. First, unlike contracts, in which one organization 
constrains the behavior of another organization in the course of discrete transactions, regulatory 
institutions constrain simultaneously the behavior of all actors across all transactions, usually in a 
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particular industry. Second, regulatory constraints are frequently created and enforced by 
governmental agencies, compared to other formal institutions, such as contracts or property 
rights, which are usually enforced by the contracting parties through the use of civil court 
procedures, or legal codes, which are enforced by the broader police powers of the city, state, 
and nation. Third, the relationship between regulatory agencies and the organizations subject to 
their constraint is frequently closer than the relationships between other agencies and political 
bodies for two reasons: 1) because regulatory agencies create rules regarding occasionally 
complex and sophisticated processes, they frequently hire individuals with experience in the 
industries they regulate, and 2) agencies will frequently interact with organizations during 
inspection processes.  
Regulatory agencies are themselves subject to the same types of institutional forces that 
constrain all organizations and individuals. As evidenced above, regulatory agencies solicit and 
incorporate feedback from the firms they regulate, which may serve to reinforce informal 
industry rules and norms. Since agencies often regulate highly complex and sophisticated 
industries, they may hire knowledgeable industry members to become regulators. In addition, 
regulators may rely on industry feedback as a means of becoming aware of new regulatory 
priorities and writing new rules. Some scholars have suggested that this feedback process from 
industries to agencies serve as an efficiency mechanism: instead of relying on lawmakers or 
other governmental actors to propose new rules, for which they may have little knowledge, 
opening the rule-creation process to industry actors helps cut costs and may make the regulatory 
process more efficient (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2004; Spiller, 1990).  
In addition to the influence on regulatory agencies by industries, regulatory agencies are 
also influenced by legislative entities and executive oversight. Legislatures pass laws that compel 
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regulatory agencies to write new rules, and agencies are often overseen by a politically appointed 
commission or board that ensures that agencies behave according to lawmakers’ expectations. 
Scholars often presented this relationship through the lens of agency theory and the principle-
agent interaction, in which lawmaking bodies are the principle and regulatory agencies are the 
agents (e.g., Shapiro, 2005). Through this lens, regulatory agencies may pursue interests different 
than those of the lawmaking bodies, agents may extract perquisites from the agencies, and they 
may behave opportunistically (e.g., accepting bribes, shirking responsibilities, etc.) (Shapiro, 
2005). Monitoring costs for principles can be very high. As stated above, agencies regulate 
highly complex industries, and many of the actors within agencies may be former industry 
members and have detailed, content-specific knowledge. This information asymmetry may make 
it difficult for principles to thoroughly monitor regulatory agencies. Also increasing monitoring 
costs is the tenure differences between the principle and agent: lawmakers are often transient, 
leaving office at the end of a political term, while regulatory actors may be less transient and 
remain in their jobs through several political administrations. As a consequence of principles’ 
high monitoring costs and agencies’ close relationship with the industries they regulate, 
regulatory agencies are at risk of “institutional capture,” a situation in which the influence 
industry wields over an agency is more powerful than the influence wielded by lawmakers (Bo, 
2006; Laffont & Tirole, 1991). For example, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2009 has been 
partly blamed on lax regulatory supervision of British Petroleum’s deep-see drilling operations. 
Legal scholars have suggested that this lax supervision was an outcome of the close relationship 
between BP and the U.S. secretary of energy, Steven Chu, a researcher who previously had 
received almost $500 million in grant money from BP to create a “Energy Biosciences Institute” 
(Grant, 2010).   
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 One last unique characteristic of regulatory agencies and the constraints they create and 
enforce is the deliberative process through which institutions are created. Rules are often 
proposed and influenced with heavy involvement of industry. For example, rules proposed by the 
Federal Accounting Standards Board are posted online and open to comment for a period of at 
least six months before being adopted as a generally accepted accounting procedure. The 
comment period, during which anyone or any organization may offer opinions, potentially 
influences the nature of the proposed rule or even whether the rule is adopted. Other regulatory 
agencies follow similar processes. The period of time between a rule’s proposal and adoption has 
been referred to as a “zone of discretion,” which organizations may use to wield influence and 
obtain favorable outcomes (Ackerman, 1973; Silverstein & Hohler, 2010). Other opportunities 
exist for organizations to influence regulatory institutions and will be described in the section 
describing institutional capabilities.  
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
Capability overview 
A capability is a “high-level routine (or collection of routines) that, together with its 
implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision options 
for producing significant outputs of a particular type” (Winter, 2003: 991). Organizations are 
filled with routines, which Nelson and Winter (1983) liken to genetic codes of the firm. 
Organizations rely on routines to guide everything from the processing of payroll checks, to the 
ordering of new inventory, to hiring and evaluating employees, even to establishing how janitors 
best clean an office or a bathroom. Organizations are resource-limited, and they rely on routines 
to free up resources that may dedicated elsewhere to assist in encountering environmental change 
and solving problems. Therefore, organizations will develop and maintain routines for 
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everything from the most mundane tasks to those most central for value creation. The routines 
most central to value creation are called capabilities (Winter, 2003). Not all routines constitute 
capabilities: for example, the accounts receivable clerk processing invoices is enacting a routine, 
but this routine is unlikely to deliver sustained competitive advantage to the firm. However, 
some routines may become truly unique to an organization as a central component of its 
competitive strategy. In extreme cases, an organizational capability may become so valuable it 
can serve as the foundation for a new, stand-alone organization (e.g., American Airline’s 
electronic customer service platform, called SABRE, eventually became the independent 
company Travelocity).   
 Scholars have described several types of capabilities. Market capabilities are those that 
enable organizations to anticipate customer wants and competitor actions, managing customer 
relationships (Day, 1994). Organizations with market capabilities may be better able to detect 
external or environmental changes and feedback. Others have described capabilities related to 
linking engineering functions and legal functions in the firm (i.e., leading to better contracting) 
(e.g., Argyres & Mayer, 2007); capabilities related to establishing lean manufacturing production 
and managing cost efficiencies (e.g., Corbett & Campbell-Hunt, 2002); and fostering and 
utilizing experimental problem solving within organizational divisions, which are then spread 
throughout the firm as common practices (Salvato, 2009). Dynamic capabilities are higher-order 
capabilities used by firms to quickly react to changing environmental conditions and improve the 
firm’s underlying value-creating capabilities (Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 2011; Eisenhardt, & 
Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003).  
Institutional capabilities are those capabilities developed and leveraged by the firm to 
perceive their institutional environment, interact with, and manipulate the formal institutions in 
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which they are embedded. As with other capabilities, institutional capabilities enable a firm to 
obtain competitive advantage; firms are able to wield these capabilities to manipulate boundaries 
and obtain access to business opportunities not available to other firms. While a number of firm 
capabilities may constitute a broad institutional capability, these capabilities may be separated 
into three sub-categories: 1) capabilities that enable a firm to perceive its regulatory 
environment, 2) capabilities that enable a firm to interact with its regulatory environment, and 3) 
capabilities that enable firms to manipulate its institutional environment. These capabilities will 
be described in much greater detail next.  
Perception capabilities 
Perception capabilities are those through which firms detect and comprehend institutions. 
Firms will not necessarily be aware of the constraints in which they are embedded. Larger firms 
or ventures that experience rapid growth may extend into new formal institutional jurisdictions 
and encounter wholly new sets of formal institutions. While older firms may have become 
familiar with their original formal institutional environment, they may be less likely to be fully 
aware of the characteristics of the new environment. New firms or young entrepreneurial 
ventures may also be unfamiliar with the constraints placed upon the industries they enter. Firms 
that encounter unexpected constraints may be subject to costs, such as fines and other penalties, 
and in other cases, strict constraints may make firm activities completely unfeasible. Therefore, 
firms may obtain advantage over their competitors by developing capabilities related to 
perceiving formal institutions. Perception capabilities may be composed of a number of routine 
activities, such as constantly scanning their regulatory environments (i.e., content detection), 
seeking out and detecting other actors with regulatory interests (i.e., field awareness), and 
comprehending the substantive meaning and requirements of regulatory constraints (i.e., 
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ambiguity reduction).  
Content detection. That actors perceive and understand regulatory constraints is a 
common assumption made by institutional theorists (e.g., Oliver, 1991). Oliver writes that firms’ 
ability to determine appropriate strategic responses to institutional pressure is, at least in part, 
dependent on firms’ awareness that an institution even exists or that such existence has 
implications for firms. Institutional awareness itself remains little studied, although it may be the 
lynchpin with which the rest of institutional theory hangs together. Firms cannot conform to, 
interact with, or manipulate institutions that they do not perceive.  
Executives, managers, and entrepreneurs’ ability to perceive their institutional 
surroundings may be related to their ability to share similar structures of thought with actors 
embedded within formal institutions, or what Hinthorne (1996: 259) calls the ability to “sense 
and utilize a potential congruency of perceptions between [firms] and other stakeholders.” By 
other stakeholders, he means regulators, judges, and other formal institutional actors. Hinthorne 
(1996) argues that actors within firms rely on “intuitive processes” or a general awareness of the 
law to infer where institutional boundaries may lie and where there is room for action. These 
intuitive processes, which are related to understanding formal institutions, may be combined with 
regular scanning behaviors targeted toward a firms’ institutional environment (e.g., Elenkov, 
1997; Hambrick, 1982) to accurately detect the existence and content of formal institutions. 
Examples of these sorts of capabilities would include firms that regularly incorporate 
their legal counsel’s office while determining broader strategic directions for the firm. A firm’s 
attorneys have, through access to human capital (i.e., their education and experience), acquired 
the structures of thought and intuitive processes described by Hinthorne (1996), and they also 
likely stay up-to-date in legal issues pertaining to their firm and serve as their organization’s 
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scanning mechanism (e.g., Nelson & Nielson, 2000). Other examples may also include firms that 
more readily use courts to settle business competition issues. For example, Hinthorne (1996) 
describes how Continental Airlines would regularly turn to legal means for settling competitive 
disputes or supply chain disputes before using other means. Such repeated use of formal 
institutions may, in and of itself, contribute to firms’ perception of formal institutions it was 
previously unaware of.  
Field awareness. Fields contain the “key suppliers, resource and product customers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Fields are also characterized by social hierarchies, in which some 
firms may possess high status and others low status. Fields are also highly political arenas, rife 
with content, in which some actors may fight for institutional change and others defend it 
(Battilana, 2006; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Brint & Karabel, 1991). Firms are able to use 
field awareness capabilities to detect and understand the relationships, overlaps, and conflicts 
among the multiple institutions within the field (e.g., Battilana et al., 2009). Conflicting 
institutions tend to de-legitimize each other, creating opportunities for actors to affect 
institutional change. As field heterogeneity increases, characterized by greater degrees of 
overlapping institutions and conflicting institutions, individual or organizational actors are more 
likely to be successful in efforts to alter institutions in their favor (e.g., Bonardi, Hillman, & 
Keim, 2005; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).  
Ambiguity reduction. Regulations are frequently opaque and complex (Edelman & 
Suchman, 1997). While firms may accurately perceive the existence of a regulatory constraint, 
the substantive meaning of these constraints is not always immediately clear (Endicott, 2001; 
Sorenson, 2001). First, the words or phrases that constitute a particular regulation acquire, over 
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time, meanings that are different from when they were originally written. One of the more 
obvious examples would be the meaning of the word “people” in the United States Constitution, 
which is much more inclusive today than it was when written in 1787. In addition to changing 
meaning, formal institutions contain stipulations that are substantively ambiguous – that is, a 
regulation may be deliberately ambiguous in order to allow for a wider discretion of an enforcing 
agent. For example, Endicott (2001) describes driving laws as being necessarily vague because 
lawmakers are unable to write precise enough laws to cover the infinite range of how people may 
drive dangerously; therefore, law is written so that a police officer has latitude in determining 
what behavior is dangerous. Third, regulations are themselves constantly being proposed, 
repealed, and revised. Regulatory agencies do not necessarily publicize every change, although 
they may have great effect on how firms conduct business. Fourth, and lastly, institutional 
overlap or conflict can create ambiguity. For example, Colorado and Washington passed laws in 
2012 that legalize the possession of marijuana, while such possession is still illegal under the 
federal Controlled Substances Act (Tarm, 2013). For entrepreneurs contemplating exploiting 
opportunities related to drug legalization, the institutional environment is certainly ambiguous 
and entails risk.     
To reduce this ambiguity, firms may use routines that leverage their human and social 
capitals. Like the other two types of perception capabilities, this capability is based on the 
routinized acquisition of information regarding formal institutions. Therefore, firms that have the 
requisite human capital to know what laws say and how to resolve vague meaning and firms that 
have acquired the social capital, such as establishing relationships among actors within formal 
institutions, may lend these firms a competitive advantage. A recent example in Oklahoma 
involves a winery, which, upon reading the regulation that wine may be served by the glass at 
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“festivals and trade shows,” contacted the state alcohol regulatory agency. The term evidently 
contained some ambiguity: in 2011, the winery asked if malls fell under the definition, and the 
commission agreed that they did. However, the next year the commission reversed its decision, 
stating that they hoped the state legislature would more clearly define the term (Palmer, 2012).  
Interaction capabilities 
Interaction capabilities are those routines that firms develop to obtain, maintain, and 
benefit from relationships with the regulatory agencies that create institutions. While the 
perception of institutions is a critical component of managing the institutional environment, 
interaction capabilities unlock additional value for the firm. Formal institutions emerge as a 
result of the political processes that occur between lawmakers, regulators, and private or 
constituent interests, and regulated entities (Wilson, 1980). Therefore, firms that are able gain 
access to and influence these processes may be able to obtain an advantage over firms that do not 
(e.g., Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; Ferguson & Voth, 2008). Firms may develop three 
types of capabilities that enable them to successfully interact with their institutional environment: 
capabilities related to obtaining institutional access (i.e., securing a legitimate and useful “seat at 
the table” with which to wield influence); capabilities related to mitigating risk (i.e., reducing 
institutional uncertainty through actions aimed at maintaining the institutional status quo), and 
capabilities related to domain maintenance (i.e., fending off institutional challenges to control 
how firms produce value).  
 Obtaining access. Firms that pursue competitive advantage through institutional means 
without access to the political processes involved may face a daunting path. In some instances, 
firms may simply elect not to engage in activities that would bestow access. For example, firms 
may be too small to sacrifice capital for campaign donations, firms may operate in lightly 
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regulated environments, or some regulatory agencies are so inimical to business interests that 
they may deny access to firms (e.g., Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Kelman, 1980). For 
example, Kelman (1980) describes how the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), which regulates workplace and employee safety, is staffed by individuals who come 
from public health backgrounds and who often have philosophies or shared values that may be 
opposite of those entities regulated by OSHA. 
 However, where firms are able and willing to obtain access to regulatory agencies, access 
itself may be an important source of competitive advantage. One of the primary activities firms 
use to obtain access and that is described in the literature involves placing former political and 
regulatory actors on firm boards or by having firm executives placed within high governmental 
positions (Hillman et al., 2009; Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 
2009). As popular examples of this activity, Goldman and colleagues offer Vice President Dick 
Cheney, who served on the board of Halliburton in between stints as secretary of defense and 
vice president, and Vernon Jordan, a Clinton confidant who has served on at least 10 boards. 
These connections enable firms to navigate the complex political regulatory environment. At 
least in the Halliburton example, their political connection paid off: the company was awarded 
contracts to rebuild the Iraq oil infrastructure after the second gulf war, and its subsidiary, KBR, 
was awarded more government contracts in Iraq than any other private firm (Goldman, et al., 
2009; Miller, 2007). This activity has proven successful in helping firms manage their 
institutional environment as more than half of all publically traded firms have appointed 
individuals with political experience on their boards (Goldman et al., 2009).  
 Firms may also simply purchase access (Hart, 2001; Langbein, 1986). That money buys 
influence is not necessarily a given – money does not carry messages regarding a firm’s policy 
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preference. However, money may be useful in buying face time. Empirical evidence suggests 
this is so: Langbein (1986) was able to show that contributors spent significantly more time with 
lawmakers than non-contributors, leading to the conclusion that money at least unlocks doors. 
Firm giving patterns are congruent with the finding that money buys access and not policy 
outcomes. According to FEC records, the three companies among the top 11 most politically 
giving firms – Honewell, AT&T, and Northrup Grumman – almost evenly split their donations 
among Republicans and Democrats, giving to both parties fairly equitably (OpenSecrets.org, 
2013). If firms were pushing policy agendas with their cash reserves, giving patterns would 
likely be less even.  
Capitals that are deployed by access obtainment strategies would be the firm’s social 
capital, produced capital, and cultural capital. Human capital may play a role, as individuals 
acquire relationships through their prior experience working within formal institutions, but its 
role is indirect and likely fully accounted for by social capital. Social capital provides firms with 
access to knowledge held by formal institutions as well as the ability to influence such 
institutions through the exchange of information (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Produced capital, 
such as the cash firms acquire, political action committees they launch, the government contracts 
they possess, and the lobbyists they hire, are critical resources deployed by access obtainment 
capabilities. Finally, cultural capital, or the accrued legitimacy of a firm, may also be leveraged 
by access obtainment strategies. Firms that have a great deal of legitimacy, such as that achieved 
through means such as their selective appointment of directors, signal to formal institutions their 
willingness to play (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).   
 Risk mitigation. Firms bear risk when they are aware of the possible outcomes of an 
action or event but remain unaware of the probabilities associated with each outcome. One of the 
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roles of institutions is to reduce part of this risk by establishing rules that are constant through 
time and applied equally to all organizations. Economic actors can largely count on institutions 
to exist some distance into the future, which reduces their uncertainty, and risk, regarding future 
outcomes (North, 1990). However, in some instances, institutions may fail to reduce risk. 
Institutions may fail to reproduce themselves for a number of reasons, such as changing social 
conditions or shifting political demands (Oliver, 1992). Formal institutions may also fail to 
reduce risk in one other aspect, such as when they change laws, add regulation, deliberately 
create ambiguity, and practice capricious or arbitrary enforcement. When institutions arbitrarily 
exercise power (e.g., North & Weingast, 1989), they increase the risk firms face by reducing 
their ability to predict future outcomes.  
 Firms that develop risk mitigation strategies are not able to reduce the amount of social 
and political change inherent in the vibrant realm of human activity, but they might be able to 
reduce institutional change to perpetuate certain conditions into the future and reduce risk (cf. 
Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). When institutional changes are perceived by firms as threats, these 
firms may use risk mitigation capabilities to support the status quo. For example, Oklahoma-
based Hobby Lobby is currently suing the federal government to prevent the implementation of 
parts of the Affordable Care Act (e.g., the requirement that employee-provided health insurance 
cover birth control), which may increase costs for the company and which the company argues 
goes against its core values as a Christian-oriented firm (Bailey, 2013).  
 Oliver and Holzinger (2008) argue that risk mitigation capabilities depend heavily on the 
social capital of the firm: firms that are able to acquire and foster trust among regulatory actors 
are more likely to be able to successfully influence institutional outcomes. Trust reduces the 
costs of ascertaining the veracity of new information for both sides in a relationship but, in this 
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situation, most importantly for actors embedded within institutions (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). With lower information costs, firm advocacy is 
more likely to influence institutional outcomes. Therefore, advocacy is a primary activity that 
constitutes risk mitigation strategies and could include lobbying against regulatory changes and 
asking lawmakers to support industry- or firm-friendly rules. Legal action may also constitute a 
type of risk mitigation activity – such as that used by Hobby Lobby to stymie the implementation 
of new law. Here, human capital is an important resource that may be brought to bear. Just as in 
the description of perception capabilities, human capital may be just as important in enabling 
firms to detect institutional changes and resisting them. 
 Domain maintenance. Risk mitigation capabilities are one type of defensively oriented 
capability – they protect the firm against the risks created by changing institutions. Domain 
maintenance capabilities are another type of defensively oriented capability – they protect firms 
from intrusive actions by regulatory agencies that may increase the costs related to value creation 
(Baysinger, 1984; Crane, 2013). Changing institutions create uncertainty, which increases risk 
for the firm. Some institutional changes are certain, clear, and lasting, and they may have 
detrimental effects on firms’ performance. For example, in a recent talk5 given at OSU, Richard 
Scrushy, the founder of HealthSouth, described the deleterious impact on the healthcare industry 
created by a shift in how Medicare reimbursed hospitals.6 He said the shift had obvious 
implications for the future: the lowest-cost healthcare providers would prevail, and he founded 
HealthSouth to capture the opportunity. Hospitals, therefore, did not necessarily face risk in the 
                                                           
5 Delivered in Stillwater on March 28, 2013.  
6 Before the 1980s, Medicare reimbursed healthcare providers’ costs. Perhaps not surprisingly, under that regime, 
healthcare costs had doubled approximately every five years. To cut costs, Medicare shifted to reimbursing hospitals 
using a capitated system: patients were assigned to federally recognized diagnosis-related groups, and Medicare 
reimbursed a flat rate per patient (Fetter &Freeman, 1986). This incentivized hospitals to cut costs, where the prior 
incentive had been to inflate costs.   
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policy change – as the implications were obvious. Instead, the policy change bore directly on 
hospitals’ ability to produce and capture value.  
 The activities that constitute domain maintenance capabilities are also those that 
constitute risk mitigation capabilities and include wielding influence with lawmakers and filing 
suit against laws that threaten firm activities. The resources brought to bear are also similar to 
resources used in risk mitigation capabilities and are mostly comprised of social capital (Oliver 
& Holzinger, 2008). Nevertheless, it may be worth distinguishing the two sets of capabilities 
because the reasons these capabilities are deployed is different, and capabilities serve as the 
mediator between resources and strategy; therefore, different strategies require different 
capabilities (e.g., Sirmon et al., 2003). 
Manipulation capabilities 
Manipulation capabilities are those capabilities that firms develop to shift institutional 
boundaries in order to 1) expand boundaries to obtain access to new business opportunities, 2) 
retract boundaries to restrict access of currently exploited opportunities from others and 3) create 
boundary ambiguity, which may have a similar effect as boundary retraction and prevent less-
capable firms from exploiting opportunities targeted by other firms. Where politically agnostic 
firms may develop perception and interaction capabilities to enable them to deal with occasional 
institutional threats, firms that develop manipulation capabilities may be more likely to have 
strong and lasting policy preferences, perhaps akin to ideologies (Colomy, 1995; Colomy & 
Rhoades, 1994). Rather than dealing with the occasional institutional threat, firms with 
manipulation capabilities develop policy preferences and seek opportunities to introduce them 
(cf. DiMaggio, 1988). Firms may develop three types of manipulation capabilities: capabilities 
related to expanding institutional boundaries (i.e., proactive manipulation capabilities), 
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capabilities related to retracting institutional boundaries (i.e., defensive manipulation 
capabilities), and capabilities related to smudging or obfuscating institutional boundaries (i.e., 
ambiguity creation capabilities). 
 Proactive manipulation capabilities. Proactive manipulation capabilities push 
institutional boundaries out, making legal that which was previously illegal. These firms believe 
that lucrative business opportunities exist outside the realm of activity proscribed by formal 
institutions, and they bring to bear resources to attain these opportunities. For example, 
Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) study describes how accounting firms, which had begun to 
experience slower growth, decided to branch out and provide consulting services to firms it had 
only previously provided accounting and audit services. Another, more recent example, involves 
the banking industry, where the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 had prohibited commercial banks 
from conducting investing activities. This provision of the act was repealed in 1998, allowing 
commercial banks to acquire investment banks and conduct investing activities, which some 
argue as a triggering event of the banking industry collapse a decade later (e.g., Stiglitz, 2009).  
 The activities that firms use to expand regulatory boundaries primarily include framing 
and social movement organizing (Benford & Snow, 2000; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008; 
Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000). Framing activities help firms develop their policy positions and 
disseminate these positions to other social actors, and social movement activities attract support 
to make the appropriate institutional change. The concept of framing has already been introduced 
in the preceding chapter as the “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and 
legitimate the activities and campaign of a social movement organization” (Benford & Snow, 
2000: 614). Framing consists of three, interrelated activities: diagnostic framing, prognostic 
framing, and motivational framing (Markowitz, 2007; Misangyi et al., 2008). Diagnostic framing 
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is used by the firm to point out how current institutions are failing and must be revised. 
Diagnostic framing may lead to firms using strong, harsh language to motivate social support 
and delegitimate the existing institutional order (Colomy, 1995). For example, Tom Monaghan, 
the founder of Domino’s Pizza, filed a lawsuit to halt the implementation of portions of the 
Affordable Healthcare Act, ostensibly using legal constitutional arguments. He nevertheless has 
called the act “gravely immoral” and refers to it as such in his suit (Associated Press, 2012). 
Firms use prognostic framing to present their solution to the institutional problem as well as to 
justify their role as institutional entrepreneurs, which may give them social approval as change 
agents (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002). Motivational framing stimulates others to action. 
 Framing activities and the social movement organization that it precipitates rely on all 
firm resources, but perhaps most importantly social capital, produced capital, and cultural 
capital. Social capital, which includes relationships with other firms within the industry, may 
help the firm to rapidly accumulate social support for its actions, should firm interest be 
congruent with industry interests. Produced capital provides the infrastructure for quickly 
disseminating the firm’s message, whether that involves deploying PACs and lobbyists to 
contact politicians or for stimulating public awareness and support through issue-oriented 
advertising and grassroots efforts. Cultural capital, especially that generated by the firm’s 
legitimacy among lawmakers and its customers, lends credibility to the firm’s message and may 
make it more likely to be approved and implemented.  
 Defensive manipulation capabilities. This type of institutional capability is similar to 
proactive capabilities, relies on similar activities, and deploys similar resources – but all to a 
different end, making them a unique type of institutional capability. Defensive manipulation 
capabilities enable firms to retract institutional boundaries, which has the effect of protecting 
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opportunities already being exploited by the firm and making them more valuable. Outcomes of 
defensive manipulation capabilities primarily consist of barriers to entry. Firm may solicit 
lawmakers to pass licensure requirements for certain activities. Licensure has the effect of 
rendering some opportunities illegal; for example, though an individual may discover an 
opportunity related to hair design in a small town, they cannot exploit that opportunity without 
first obtaining a license. Firms may also seek policy that excludes outright some forms of 
economic activity; for example, one stipulation of the Affordable Healthcare Act is to prohibit 
physician-owned hospitals built after 2010 from receiving Medicare reimbursements, effectively 
rendering this form of organization ineffective (Scandlen, 2013). The law was supported by 
many in the hospital industry, which perceived physician-owned hospitals as threats (e.g., Lillis, 
2012). And firms may simply seek increased levels of regulation for their industry, which has the 
effect of reducing the number of smaller competitors that do not have adequate resources to 
comply with increasingly onerous regulation (Danzon & Chao, 2000).  
 Ambiguity creation capabilities. The final set of capabilities described in my model are 
those capabilities that create institutional ambiguity where none existed before. Institutional 
ambiguity, as described earlier in this chapter, is frequently the outcome of institutional 
processes: 1) formal institutions are unable to exactly or even adequately capture every possible 
combination of human activity, so they create laws and regulations that require the use of 
discretionary enforcement and 2) the constant churn of formal institutional content, in the form 
of shifting laws, rules, and regulations, that frequently remain unpublished and even unnoted. 
Another source of institutional ambiguity may be brought about by the actions of firms. These 
actions may be intentional or unintentional, but they have the result of obfuscating an 
institutional boundary that had previously been relatively clear.  
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 Institutional boundaries are aggregate compositions of all the formal institutions 
regulating or otherwise influencing a field of activity. Boundaries are clearest when these 
institutions are in alignment and the fuzziest when they are not in alignment. Ambiguity creation 
capabilities, therefore, include those activities that attempt to misalign formal institutions within 
a field. This type of capability is frequently displayed by social movement organizations that will 
often challenge the same laws in different states to create jurisdictional conflict, which congress 
or the Supreme Court resolve (Lindquist & Klein, 2006). The activities that constitute this 
capability are strongly legal in nature and draw on the human capital of the firm, such as that 
held by the firm’s office of legal counsel. The outcome of this capability is a sort of external 
causal ambiguity. Causal ambiguity is a concept within strategic management and is created by 
firms in order to reduce the imitability of its resources (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990). Theoretically, 
firms may also attempt to create causally ambiguous environments, including institutional 
environments, and make it harder for other firms to identify and exploit the same or similar 
opportunities. 
The origins of capabilities, and how capabilities enable value production 
 Firms are embedded in environments rife with uncertainty and in which decision making 
can be laborious and costly. As a consequence, firms will develop decision-making patterns, 
based on past trial-and-error experiences, that facilitate rapid decision making for routine 
activities, which frees the firm to spend more time and resources on more important problems 
(Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958). These established decision-making patterns form 
the foundation of organizational routines, which are activities repeated within a firm to achieve 
certain, basic ends (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Basic firm routines can include a wide range of 
activities, such as how to process billing, how to hire employees, or how to conduct inventories 
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of goods to be sold. These organizational-level routines emerge from the experience of 
individuals within the firm, who, from their own past experience, come to form cognitive 
patterns regarding how they understand and process information and make decisions (Weick, 
1995). Routines, therefore, are frequently influenced by the characteristics of the individuals who 
make up the firm and are born in the interactions among members and leaders of the founding 
team (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). The most basic routines enable firms to conduct day-to-day 
business, or “repetitive patterns of activities” (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 97). Other routines are 
central to how the firm produces value, whether through manufacturing products or delivering 
services to customers (Winter, 2000). These higher-importance routines are used by the firm to 
acquire, bundle, and leverage resources in the production of manufactured goods or the delivery 
of service to customers. Moreover, capabilities serve as the link between the resources a firm has 
at hand and the firm’s ability to pursue a desired strategy: a firm may possess any number of 
valuable resources, but without the ability to deploy these resources in a way that creates value, 
they lie dormant. (Newbert, 2007; Sirmon et al., 2007).  
Capabilities have been linked to improved firm sustainable competitive advantage, or 
performance, in a number of ways. The firm that develops capabilities related to producing 
products and services may find ways of reducing the costs associated with the production process 
(e.g., Brush & Artz, 1999; Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 2011). Firms that become adept at deploying 
capabilities in certain markets may also become better at obtaining feedback from those markets 
and improving their ability to identify and exploit new opportunities (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; 
Sirmon et al., 2007). In sum, capabilities enable firms to produce products and services in new 
and more efficient ways, perceive under-served customer segments and market products and 
services to them, and energize organizational structure, fostering intra-firm communication and 
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producing efficiencies in how the firm administers its activities.   
Capabilities and institutions  
The notion that organizations are invariably and involuntarily subject to institutional 
constraints has largely faded away in favor of a perspective that recognizes that organizations 
have at least some (or a great deal) of discretion over their own actions (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). And as scholars turn away from a perspective that sees the 
restrictions enforced within the organization-institution relationship, another perspective is 
emerging that recognizes that organizations may, indeed, be able to use institutions to advance 
their own interests and exploit opportunities (Bagley, 2008; Crane, 2013).  
Firms have apparently recognized this fact for themselves, especially with regard to 
taking advantage of formal institutions. Today, a growing proportion of firms are hiring lawyers 
as executives (France & Laville, 2004), and organizations have embraced the legal expertise in 
their counsel offices as a critical element of business success (Siedel, 2002). In terms of affecting 
legislative outcomes, scholars have examined the different resources firms acquire or develop for 
themselves, such as hiring lobbyists, opening company offices near political or legislative 
centers, constructing political action committees (i.e., organizations that make political donations 
or conduct policy advocacy under the aegis of a business firm), or obtaining government service 
contracts (Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994; Hart, 2001; Hillman et al., 2004; Schuler, 1996; 
Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002; Shaffer, 1995). These resources buy firms access to the 
political process, and they may even build the close ties necessary for firms to wield influence in 
shaping policy. However, in order for these resources to be effective, they must be acquired, 
bundled, and leveraged with capabilities directed at interacting with the institutional environment 
(Sirmon et al., 2007).
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 The research model presented in Figure 2 demonstrates how firms may use institutional 
capabilities to move regulatory constraints as a means through which to access greater 
entrepreneurial opportunities and increase the value of opportunities they are already exploiting. 
In so doing, these firms are able to use institutional capabilities as a primary means of obtaining 
competitive advantage. Institutional capabilities facilitate constraint expansion and constraint 
retraction. Costs associated with conforming to regulatory constraints is one of several 
moderators of this relationship. When costs are high, firms are more likely to deploy institutional 
capabilities to expand constraints, and when costs are low, firms are more likely to deploy 
institutional capabilities to retract constraints. Regulatory framing, which may be defined as the 
lens through which firms view their regulatory environments, positively moderates the use of 
institutional capabilities to bring about any type of regulatory change. Perceived regulatory 
complexity negatively moderates the use of institutional capabilities and results in a lower 
likelihood that firms will use institutional capabilities to bring about any type of regulatory 
change. Finally, constraint expansion is positively related to greater firm access to opportunities 
while constraint retraction is positively related to greater firm returns on current activities (i.e., 
the opportunities they currently exploit will become more valuable).   
--------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 2 
---------------------------------
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Institutional capabilities to constraint expansion/retraction 
 Attempting to change these constraints can be very costly and entail substantial risks 
(Keim & Baysinger, 1988). Regulatory institutions are frequently the outcomes of political 
processes that involve many actors and that often produce either-or results: either a bill is passed 
or it is not, either a regulation is adopted or not. Even when firms successfully obtain access to 
the process, their ideas are likely to be mixed with those of other political actors, resulting in a 
compromised outcome, which may not always be favorable to the firm. Finally, regulatory 
institutions and formal institutions more broadly may leverage their power to punish firms that 
seek change (e.g., Eilperin, 2013; Kelman, 1980).  
While constraint change may involve the creation of new written regulatory policy or 
new law, this need not always be the case. A critical characteristic of any constraint is its 
enforcement by regulatory agencies (Ostrom, 1986). Therefore, written policy or law that is not 
enforced do not constitute constraints. Moreover, written laws or policies may be regulated 
differently, on a firm-by-firm basis, especially as regulators possess some discretion in how to 
enforce constraints (Endicott, 2001). For example, consider the regulations facing the nuclear 
power industry. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires nuclear power plants to have 
licenses to lawfully operate. However, recently the license at the Indian Point power plant in 
New York expired, and instead of immediately shutting down the plant, regulators have 
permitted the plant to operate, citing extenuating circumstances, such as the complication of the 
licensing procedure and that the plant had applied for license renewal several years before the 
expiration date. The result today is that the Indian Point power plant is the only nuclear plant in 
the United States to operate legally without a license, despite written regulatory policy and 
despite public outcry (Associated Press, 2013). Therefore, when regulatory constraint change is 
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discussed, it is important to consider 1) that though written regulatory policy may be constant 
across all firms, in reality, regulatory discretion in enforcement results in firm-to-firm constraint 
differences and 2) that while regulatory change may involve written changes in law or policy, it 
may also be as simple as a firm seeking for and being granted a temporary exemption from 
enforcement.    
Institutional capabilities facilitate constraint change in a number of ways. Institutional 
capabilities enable firms to perceive their regulatory environments and establish causal 
connections between the costs they bear and particular constraints (e.g., Hinthorne, 1996). They 
may also enable firms to locate and determine what other actors have interests at stake in a 
regulatory constraint (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). And 
institutional capabilities may allow firms to more quickly comprehend complex and ambiguous 
regulatory constraints and the regulatory environment at large, which may enable them to more 
rapidly determine how to effect the changes they seek (e.g., Edelman & Suchman, 1997). 
Not all institutional capabilities are directed at manipulating regulatory constraints 
themselves but are instead directed at the regulatory agencies that propagate constraints, such as 
those described in the preceding chapter as institutional interaction capabilities. These 
capabilities allow firms to obtain a position in the political area, which they may use to voice 
their opinions regarding constraints, offer alternatives, and garner the necessary support inside 
regulatory agencies to push forward a constraint change (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; 
Ferguson & Voth, 2008). Such capabilities may also allow the firm to avoid alienating regulatory 
actors, who may be motivated to tighten constraints on firms that seek constraint change, by 
building long-term relationships within a regulatory agency or by managing to place former 
industry members in places of power within an agency (e.g., Baysinger, 1984; Crane, 2013). 
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Moreover, firms may use these capabilities to wield influence at higher levels of formal 
institutional apparatuses, enabling them to bypass regulatory actors and seek changes through 
using relationships with more important political actors or legislative bodies (e.g., Schuler, 
Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002; Shaffer, 1995). 
Finally, institutional capabilities enable firms to organize support to achieve their desired 
regulatory outcomes by communicating their message effectively to outside actors. Firms may 
become adept at regularly deploying any of the tactics listed in Table 6. In particular, firms may 
attempt to deploy their regulatory framing, which they develop for themselves to understand and 
interpret regulatory environments, outside the firm, either to regulatory agencies, legislative 
bodies, or other stakeholders outside the political process (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000; Rao, 
Morrill, & Zald, 2000). These activities may garner broad-based support for a firm’s desired 
change. Similarly, firms may also use theorization tactics, likely aimed at similar firms facing the 
same constraints: not all firms will have developed institutional capabilities or even be aware that 
the costs they bear are connected to constraints placed by regulations. Theorization would reduce 
such ambiguity for other firms and draw causal connections between constraints and costs 
(Pacheco et al., 2010). This tactic would have the ultimate effect of drawing other firms onto the 
side supporting regulatory change. 
 In sum, firms that possess institutional capabilities will be adept at determining what 
constraints are the most costly and plotting a path for manipulating constraints, once identified. 
Moreover, institutional capabilities enable firms to garner broader support for a proposed 
regulatory change, making it more likely that such a change will take place. Institutional 
capabilities facilitate constraint change, whether in expanding or retracting constraints; thus, we 
would expect:   
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Hypothesis 1a: Firms’ possession of institutional capabilities will be positively related to 
constraint expansion. 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms’ possession of institutional capabilities will be positively related to 
constraint retraction.   
 
Regulatory costs moderate the relationship between institutional capabilities and 
constraint expansion/retraction 
 
 Institutions emerge as actors, in an effort to reduce uncertainty, establish shared 
guidelines for behavior that are relatively stable through time and thus reduce part of the 
variability firms encounter in the environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Firms that behave within the constraints established by regulatory agencies are, therefore, 
able to obtain certain resources that would not otherwise be available to them, such as official 
sanction and legitimacy (Scott & Meyer, 1991; Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
Constraints are durable through time because the benefits they provide to firms tend to outweigh 
the costs of conformity (North, 1990; Oliver, 1992). However, some regulatory constraints may 
levy costs that outweigh the benefits of conformity, and firms may take certain actions to avoid 
or reduce these costs. For example, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of several 
major corporate accounting scandals, requires publically traded firms to follow stringent 
processes regarding the production of financial statements. While many firms comply with the 
act’s requirements, judging that the benefits they receive from the public equity markets 
outweigh the costs of conformity, other firms determined that the costs outweighed these benefits 
and withdrew from public equity markets (Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, & Talley, 2009).  
 When the costs firms bear due to their regulatory constraints becomes burdensome, they 
are more likely to attempt to change these constraints. Seo and Creed (2003) argue that there are 
four specific types of institutional costs borne by firms: 1) the costs of creating conformity 
mechanisms within the firm that are independent from central firm functions (i.e., loose coupling 
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[Meyer & Rowan, 1977]), 2) increased firm stagnation and reduced ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances, 3) conflict with other institutions (e.g., conformity to a particular constraint 
places the firm in conflict with other, contradictory constraints, and 4) reduced ability to pursue 
strategies important to the firm, such as when firm interests and regulatory interests diverge. 
Other possible costs due to regulatory constraints can include financial costs, such as those 
associated with hiring accountants and independent auditors to produce and verify financial 
statements (Engle, Hayes, & Wang, 2007; Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003), or paying licensing fees 
or taxes. Finally, constraints can prevent firms from engaging in certain types of activities, 
though those activities may be important for firms’ survival. For example, the U.S. Department 
of Energy ban on incandescent light bulbs has shut down factories and may threaten firms with 
closure if they cannot compete with off-shore producers of fluorescent light bulbs, which are 
more labor intensive to produce than fluorescents (Whoriskey, 2010).  
 The costs inflicted on firms by regulatory constraints can drive up firms’ intent to change 
the constraints set on their activities. However, given regulatory discretion, not all firms bear 
constraint costs equally, and in some cases, firms may benefit from high regulatory constraints, 
especially when competitor firms are the ones bearing the costs (e.g., Khavul, Chavez, & Bruton, 
2013). Institutional theorists have suggested that institutions perpetuate the unequal distribution 
of resources within society, which tends to benefit some firms at the expense of others (e.g., 
Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). Regulatory constraints may have the same effect. For example, the recent 
imposition of a ban on the production of incandescent light bulbs will be found to be onerous by 
the makers of these bulbs, while the makers of fluorescent light bulbs may benefit from the 
reduced competition. Therefore, firms that possess institutional capabilities but face low 
regulatory costs may be more likely to deploy institutional capabilities to retract constraints and 
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reduce competitive pressures.     
 In summary, the costs associated with regulatory constraints influences firms’ 
deployment of institutional capabilities. Though constraints tend to be durable through time due 
to their ability to reduce uncertainty, constraints may occasionally compel firms to bear costs that 
outweigh the benefits. In these instances, firms are more likely to deploy institutional capabilities 
to expand regulatory constraints. Conversely, firms with institutional capabilities that face low 
costs would be more likely to use their capabilities to retract constraints. 
Hypothesis 2a: Regulatory costs positively moderate the relationship between institutional 
capabilities and constraint expansion such that the higher the costs a firm faces, the stronger the 
relationship between institutional capabilities and constraint expansion. 
Hypothesis 2b: Regulatory costs positively moderate the relationship between institutional 
capabilities and constraint retraction such that the lower the costs a firm faces, the stronger the 
relationship between institutional capabilities and constraint retraction.  
 
Framing moderates the relationship between institutional capabilities and constraint 
expansion/retraction 
 
Firms may develop points of view or preferences for regulatory constraints, independent 
of the costs associated with these constraints. These points of view constitute the framing firms 
use to decipher meaning in and form intentions regarding their regulatory environments. Frames 
enable actors to perceive and evaluate meaning (Goffman, 1974) as well as determine what 
“should be going on” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). Frames work within the firm to disseminate 
meaning across its members, and these collective, firm-level frames are defined as “the action-
oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a 
social movement organization” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). While it would be erroneous to 
suggest that firms have attitudes or opinions, firms are nevertheless characterized by shared 
frames of meaning, and some firms may develop such frames regarding the regulatory 
constraints that affect them (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999). 
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Frames not only guide the firms’ perception and labeling of regulatory constraints as 
“good” or “bad,” through diagnostic framing, they also constitute how firms foresee the future 
regulatory environment, through prognostic and motivational framing (Markowitz, 2007; 
Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008). Firms use diagnostic framing to make explicit the particular 
ways a regulatory constraint is failing or is weak (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). For example, 
Walter Robb, the co-CEO of Whole Foods, recently announced that his company was going to 
begin labeling foods that had been genetically modified, stating “The prevalence of [genetically 
modified foods] in the U.S. paired with nonexistent mandatory labeling makes it very difficult 
for … consumers to choose non-GMO products.” (Hsu, 2013). Robb’s comment, and the 
company’s actions (i.e., supporting legislation that would have required the clear labeling of 
genetically modified foods [Lifsher, 2012]) suggests that Whole Foods has a clearly defined 
diagnostic frame regarding consumer food regulation. Firms’ prognostic framing constitutes their 
solution to the failed institution (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Dejean, Gond, & Leca, 2004; 
Demil & Bensedrine, 2005). It is not enough to disapprove of a regulatory constraint to form 
dissatisfaction or the intent to change the constraint: firms that have a preferred regulatory 
outcome or envision an ideal regulatory environment are more likely to form the intent to affect 
regulatory change.    
Firms’ motivational framing provides reasons to support the new institutional 
arrangement (e.g., Misangyi et al., 2008). Motivational framing includes the language used by 
the firm when communicating its preferred institutional vision to others, whether in 
disseminating its message throughout the firm or spreading it outside the firm to generate 
broader social support (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000). Motivational framing serves to build 
consensus within the firm to take action as well as to attract other social actors to support an 
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effort to bring about regulatory change.  
Firms differ in the frames they develop, and some firms may possess frames regarding 
their regulatory environment while others may not. Firms that possess strong regulatory frames 
are not only more likely to preferences regarding their institutional constraints, but they are also 
more likely, through motivational framing, to form the intent to obtain a particular regulatory 
change (Colomy, 1995; Colomy & Rhoades, 1994). The possession of regulatory frames may 
enhance firms’ perception of the costs they or others bear regarding regulatory constraints, link 
these costs to perceived regulatory inadequacies, and use regulatory change as a means through 
which to obtain competitive advantage. 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms’ possession of regulatory framing will positively moderate the relationship 
between institutional capabilities and constraint expansion. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms’ possession of regulatory framing will positively moderate the relationship 
between institutional capabilities and constraint retraction. 
 
Perceived regulatory complexity moderates the relationship between institutional 
capabilities and constraint expansion/retraction 
 
 Firms’ regulatory environments are frequently complex and are characterized by many, 
overlapping constraints, which may contradict each other (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). 
Scholars have suggested that complex institutional environments create opportunities for 
regulatory change because the contradictions and ambiguity created by conflicting constraints 
enable firms to either pit one institution against another, rapidly garner support from other firms 
facing the same complex environment, or to ignore the constraints altogether (Clemens & Cook, 
1999; Oliver, 1991; Sewell, 1992). While such complexity may create objective opportunities to 
create institutional change (e.g., Seo & Creed, 2002), the effect of perceived regulatory 
complexity may actually have a negative effect on the likelihood that firms will act on their 
55 
 
constraint dissatisfaction or satisfaction.  
 The difference in the expected influence of institutional complexity is a consequence of 
the difference between informal and formal institutions. Firms facing informal institutional 
pressures tend to comply with these pressures due to a desire for social acceptance and 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). While conformity to informal 
constraints may be an important prerequisite for obtaining other valuable resources (e.g., 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), conformity is generally voluntary. The risks of changing informal 
institutions are lower compared to changing formal institutions because informal institutions are 
not enforced through coercion and because firms can frequently rely on alternative sources of 
legitimacy should they opt to reject or alter a particular informal institution, as they are subject to 
multiple informal institutions (Demil & Bensedrine, 2005; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Neustadtl & Clawson, 1988).  
 Conversely, firms are coercively compelled to depend on formal institutions, and 
regulatory institutions in particular, for survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Firms operating 
within regulated industries must conform to regulatory constraints or face closure (e.g., Oliver, 
1991). Firms are also unable to rely on alternative sources of regulatory legitimacy as they would 
informal sources of legitimacy: if a firm is embedded within the constraints of several regulatory 
institutions, they may not merely opt out of one and conform more strongly to the others. The 
existence of multiple regulatory agencies and multiple regulatory constraints amplifies the risk of 
seeking to manipulate constraints. Changing one regulatory constraint may place it in conflict 
with the array of other regulatory constraints (Oliver, 1991), and regulatory agencies may 
therefore seek to reduce firms’ influence in highly complex regulatory environments. In 
response, firms may be compelled to change a wide range of regulatory constraints to facilitate 
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the change they strongly value. In addition to the risks associated with changing complex 
regulatory environments, firms possess limited resources compared to the complete array of 
actors with a stake in regulatory environments. Therefore, firms may be more likely to pursue 
change when they perceive lower regulatory complexity, which means they will confront fewer 
actors with possibly divergent interests. 
Hypothesis 4a: Perceived regulatory complexity negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional capabilities and constraint expansion. 
Hypothesis 4b: Perceived regulatory complexity negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional capabilities and constraint retraction. 
 
Constraint expansion to access to new opportunities 
 The conceptualization of institutional entrepreneurship presented in the preceding chapter 
suggests that formal institutional constraints bisect fields of entrepreneurial opportunities. Within 
a constraint are opportunities that are legal and socially acceptable, and without the constraint are 
opportunities that are social acceptable, albeit illegal (cf. Webb et al., 2009). Constraint 
expansion can be said to occur when constraints are either eliminated or when they permit a 
wider range of behavior. When constraints expand, more legally viable opportunities become 
available for exploitation, and firms initially compelled to manipulate their constraints by high 
regulatory costs (i.e., such as being denied access to a particular customer segment or from 
producing a particular product or service) will be likely to rapidly expand their products and 
services or to deliver existing products or services to new customer markets. 
Hypothesis 5: Constraint expansion will be positively related to the production of new products 
or services or delivering existing products and services to new markets. 
 
Constraint retraction to increased value of current opportunities 
 As described earlier, firms that are satisfied with the regulatory institutions that constrain 
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them are more likely to engage in manipulation efforts that heighten or toughen the constraints. 
For these firms, constraints are a critical element of their competitive advantage seeking 
strategies because it reduces competitive pressures by erecting barriers to entry (Demsetz, 1982). 
When firms push for licensure requirements or for stronger intellectual property protections, they 
are attempting to reduce the number of competitors they will face in the market. In terms of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, such behavior has the effect of making the opportunities they are 
currently exploiting more valuable. As entrepreneurship scholars have noted (e.g., Eckhardt & 
Shane, 2003; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000;  Short et al., 2010), opportunities tend to decrease in 
value as a consequence of exploitation. Therefore, fewer firms exploiting a particular opportunity 
will mean the value of the opportunity will decrease less slowly. Firms that have successfully 
retracted regulatory constraints should expect to see greater levels of performance without 
necessarily introducing new products or services or serving new customer segments.  
Hypothesis 6: Constraint retraction will be positively related to increased opportunity value, 
which would be reflected in greater firm returns on current activities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
  
 This dissertation seeks to establish greater understanding regarding the capabilities firms 
may use to manipulate institutional boundaries in an effort to obtain access to a wider variety of 
entrepreneurial opportunities or increase the value of opportunities they are already exploiting. 
This dissertation proposes that the use of these capabilities may constitute some firms’ means of 
obtaining sustainable competitive advantage. This section describes the method used to address 
the research questions posed in Chapter 1: why do firms opt to manipulate their regulatory 
environments as a competitive strategy, and what role do institutional capabilities play in 
facilitating their pursuit of this strategy? First, I will describe the sample of firms used to obtain 
data. Second, I will describe the qualitative process used to develop the scale used to measure 
institutional capabilities. Third, I will describe the quantitative survey-based process used to 
obtain the data used. Lastly, I will describe the process used to determine the appropriate 
measurement model of institutional capabilities, establish the items used to measure the variables 
in the study, and report reliabilities. 
Sample 
 Firms are more likely to engage in activities directed toward their formal institutional 
environments when they operate in highly regulated industries (e.g., Hart, 2001). There is a wide 
array of highly regulated industries, such as mining and nuclear energy production, healthcare, 
pharmaceuticals, and finance, and firms within these industries may be more likely to possess the 
resources and capabilities described in the preceding chapter. The firms used in this dissertation 
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are commercial banks. There are several different types of banks, including commercial banks, 
savings banks, or savings institutions (Almandoz, 2012), and each type is constrained in the 
range of products and services they offer. Commercial banks are permitted to accept deposits, 
offer business and personal loans (e.g., mortgages or loans that are otherwise backed by assets), 
and offer a range of basic investment tools, such as bonds, certificates of deposit, and insurance.  
Commercial bank activities are highly regulated, from even before startup (e.g., they must 
accumulate enough capitalization before launch to meet state and federal charter requirements) 
and through even failure (e.g., a commercial bank’s failure is controlled by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, which essentially takes over the failed bank and manages the liquidation.) 
Specifically, banks are regulated at two levels: either state or federal. At startup, banks must 
acquire either a state charter from the state bank regulators or a national charter from the U.S. 
Treasury Department (Almandoz, 2012). Throughout their life, banks are regularly inspected and 
controlled by the state or federal agency that chartered them. Banks must also comply with the 
rules and regulations of the FDIC and the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  
 Commercial banks are a highly suitable setting in which to examine the hypotheses 
presented in the preceding chapter for several reasons. First, their operations are not only highly 
regulated, but they are subject to regular inspection and interaction with their regulatory 
agencies, which means they may be more likely to develop routines to facilitate regular 
institutional interaction. Second, their regulatory environment is currently characterized by rapid 
and dramatic flux, the introduction of volumes of new statutory and regulatory law (e.g., the 
Dodd-Frank Bill and the Consumer Protection Agency it created), and increasing discontinuity 
between state and federal regulation, which contributes to regulatory complexity and ambiguity. 
Third, many banks (as opposed to hospitals, drug companies, etc.) are under the control of a 
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founding family or entrepreneur, and many local communities still have locally owned banks. 
Therefore, it may be possible to more readily and effectively conduct qualitative research in this 
setting as compared to dealing with national or even international firms. Fourth, the commercial 
banking industry is regulated by a relatively narrow set of formal institutions – one state-level 
agency, and three federal-level agencies. Compared to other industries, which might be 
constrained by many various formal institutions, the formal institutional environment of 
commercial banks is relatively straightforward. Therefore, bankers may be more aware of the 
capabilities they develop related to managing their institutional environment. 
 As this dissertation employs a mixed methodology, comprised of qualitative interviews 
with a relatively small set of banks, and a two-phase quantitative survey to be sent to a much 
larger sample of banks, it is necessary to describe the samples used in each portion. For the 
qualitative portion, a sample of 15 banks have been selected based on their openness to 
conducting interviews and their availability. In addition to banks, two bank compliance 
consultants, one located in Oklahoma City and one located in Tulsa, were interviewed in order to 
capture an ‘outside perspective.’ All banks selected for the qualitative portion are located in 
Oklahoma. An effort was made to select a variety of banks, based on size, age, whether the bank 
is state- or federally-chartered, and whether the bank is locally or family owned or is part of a 
larger banking organization. Table 7 presents the types of banks that were included in the 
qualitative portion. Selecting banks across these categories will enhance the generalizability of 
the interview findings to the broader banking industry (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010).  
------------------------------- 
Please see Table 7 
------------------------------- 
 
 For the quantitative portion of the dissertation, a much larger sample of commercial 
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banks is required. The FDIC has six regional offices, and governs banks according to location. I 
drew a random sample of 500 banks from each regional office, for a total sample of 3,000 banks.  
Qualitative procedure – building the measurement instrument 
 Understanding many of the concepts and relationships described in the preceding 
chapters requires much richer detail and insight than is provided in existing research, as many of 
the concepts (e.g., institutional capabilities) and relationships (e.g., the relationship between 
constraint change and entrepreneurial opportunities) are currently underdeveloped in the 
literature. Therefore, using qualitative methods, such as interviews, is more appropriate for 
establishing a more thorough understanding of this dissertation’s research questions, especially 
given that understanding “how” firms manipulate regulatory constraints is a principle concern 
herein (Gephart, 2004; Pratt, 2009). Specifically, The purpose of conducting field interviews was 
to validate the institutional capabilities conceptualization presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and 
develop items to measure institutional capabilities (as well as measures for the moderators 
presented in Chapter 3). As no previous study had 1) conceptualized institutional capabilities and 
2) developed measures to assess institutional capabilities, conducting interviews with banks (and 
other knowledgeable industry actors) was necessary to support the theory presented herein and 
was critical to develop survey instruments used later in this study. Scale development follows a 
three-stage process (Hinkin, 1995): 1) item generation, 2) scale development (i.e., building a 
survey with generated items, confirming the structure of the measurements, and assessing the 
reliability of the measurements), and 3) scale evaluation. Stage one of this process was 
accomplished through conducting interviews, described below. Although I entered the field with 
a research model and conceptualized constructs already in place, item generation was inductive 
based on the information gleaned during interviews. Stages two and three are accomplished in 
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the quantitative portion of this study, where I conduct exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses and reliability tests (stage two) and where I test for the invariance of the measurements 
across two samples (stage three).  
   The research model described in the preceding chapter establishes a foundation from 
which semi-structured interview questions may be built (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010). The 
interview script is included in Appendix 1. Interviews were conducted with 15 commercial banks 
and two bank compliance consultants.. In order to locate banks for this portion of the study, in 
June 2013 I contacted the Oklahoma Bankers Association (OBA) and provided them with the 
types of banks that should be interviewed. Oklahoma-based banks are subject to the same 
regulatory agencies and rules as all banks in the United States. State-chartered banks, while 
subject to state banking commission oversight, are also subject to FDIC oversight. Nationally 
chartered banks and Federal-Reserve member banks are not subject to state oversight at all and 
are only regulated by national agencies. Therefore, interviewing banks in Oklahoma provides a 
level of generalizability for all U.S. banks regarding regulatory oversight.  Based on these 
criteria, the OBA provided me with a list of 20 banks to contact. I called each bank, asked to 
speak with their president or chief compliance officer, and made arrangements to conduct in-
person interviews at each bank location. After each interview, I asked if the banker knew any 
other banks that would be willing to be interviewed.  
As the interviews continued through the summer and fall of 2013, I focused on 
conducting interviews with banks based on capturing a wide variance based on the criteria 
described above; in particular, I focused on interviewing more small banks and more nationally 
chartered banks. These banks were not OBA referrals and required cold-calling to secure 
interviews. Table 7 lists the banks interviewed in chronological order and shows how interviews 
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were increasingly conducted with smaller, nationally regulated banks, which were under-
represented in earlier interviews. Such a “snowball” process may bias the information gleaned 
during interviews, and indeed, many of the bankers referred to me by the OBA presented a 
strong interest in discussing regulatory issues from an anti-regulatory viewpoint, but cold-called 
banks exhibited less extreme viewpoints. Finally, I cold-called two banking compliance 
consultants in order to establish a more holistic viewpoint of the compliance process: while 
individual bankers might be able to describe only a narrow range of activities their banks use 
with regard to their regulatory environment, bank compliance consultants work with dozens of 
banks in Oklahoma and across the United States and were useful in helping me understand bank 
practices from a much wider perspective.   In this manner, I was able to find 15 banks and two 
compliance consultants to interview.  
For both the qualitative and quantitative portions of this study, I sought interviews (and 
asked for survey completion) from individuals who were most knowledgeable about banks’ 
activities related to the regulatory environments. Depending on size and available resources, 
banks handle regulatory tasks differently. In small banks, this person was almost exclusively the 
bank president. Small-bank presidents manage the relationships with state and national 
regulators, handle all communication with regulators, and serve as the primary contact during 
bank examinations. As banks increase in size, many of the bank tasks related to the regulatory 
environment are assigned to different individuals: chief operating officers may handle regulatory 
issues related to deposits and other day-to-day transactions while chief loan officers are 
responsible for regulatory issues related to fair housing. In even larger banks, many of these 
duties fall under the oversight of a chief compliance officer. Therefore, I sought interviews with 
individuals in banks who had the most knowledge related to the concepts under examination in 
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this study, and the cover letters that accompanied surveys, as well as the surveys themselves, 
unambiguously stated the purpose of the study.7 In these ways, I attempted to ensure that the 
information obtained from each bank was from the most knowledgeable individual. 
Each interview lasted at least one hour, depending on each banker’s knowledge and 
experience regarding their regulatory environments and their bank’s activities. The semi-
structured interviews followed the script included in Appendix 1. Questions were prepared in 
advance and were written following the research model in Chapter 3. More specifically, 
questions were written regarding each construct in the model, and understanding was sought 
regarding: 1) what are the nature of these constructs within the bank, 2) what activities comprise 
these constructs, and 3) who within the bank performs these activities? During the course of each 
interview, follow-up questions and prompts were used to encourage participants to clarify 
answers (i.e., “such as?” “what do you mean by X?”) or to enhance their description (i.e., “could 
you give me an example of what you just described?” “could you go deeper into that 
subject?”All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcript of all interviews was 170 
pages and 101,035 words. The transcript is included in Appendix 3. To analyze the interviews, I 
inputted them into NVivo and created a set of codes based on the research model presented in 
Chapter 3, with a code for each variable in the model. With the transcript coded, it was possible 
to sort the transcript’s contents by the construct-specific content addressed. For instance, all 
responses related to perception capabilities were portioned off and included into a separate 
document file, all responses related to interaction capabilities were included in a separate file, 
and so on. With responses sorted by construct, the portioned transcript was more easily used to 
                                                           
7 In two instances during the interview portion of this study, it became evident during the course of the interview 
that the person I was talking to was less knowledgeable about regulatory related bank activities than others in the 
bank; in both instances, I politely stopped the interview and asked if it was possible to speak with the more 
knowledgeable individual. Both requests were granted.  
65 
 
generate measurement items. In writing items, I followed recommendations by others to keep 
items short, write items that relate to only one activity, and include reverse-scored items 
(Harrison & McLaughlin, 1993; Hinkin, 1998). Below, I have included examples of how 
subjects’ statements led to the development of items for each independent variable and 
moderator variable: 
Perception capabilities: 
“When you sit down and read a new promulgated rule, part of that volume of paper they 
put out is they give you the complete background as to why this law was ever in effect. 
What the proposal will do. They put it out there for public comment. And this is their 
take on the public comments. Then they finally get to the guts of what the final rule is. So 
try to read through all that? And by the time you get down to the new rules? Well, I’m 
tired. I don’t want to read that. So they put out [a] new section – these are the bullet 
points they are addressing, you need to pay attention; but depending on your banking 
complexity, some of these rules will apply and some you can brush over.” 
 
Sample Item 1: “Understanding the ‘Cliff Notes’ of a regulation is good enough.” (Regulatory 
agencies will regularly highlight key points in new rules; banking associations also email 
summaries of regulation changes to subscribing banks.) 
Sample Item 2: “People in my bank are good at quickly understanding which parts of 
regulation applies to our bank and which don’t.” (Many regulatory rules are product/service 
oriented; therefore, if a bank does not offer home loans, it may not be subject to certain 
regulatory oversight.) 
 
Interaction capabilities: 
 
“I take the philosophy of out of sight, out of mind. I stay quite. I come in, I do my job. I 
figure if they don’t hear from me – you know what I mean?” 
 
“You want to be straight forward and very truthful with them. We just try to treat them 
like anybody else. Like our customers who come in the door.” 
 
“We want them to know our plans, we want them to know where we’re going. We give 
them regular updates on how we’re doing, even though they’re not asking. Because when 
we get around to asking, we want them to know how our thoughts developed and how 
that fits into a logical continuum of what we’re doing.” 
 
Sample Item 1: “Our bank takes an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ approach with regulators.” (A 
reverse-coded item. A bank president indicated that too much interaction with regulators can 
sometimes signal ‘weak management.’)  
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Sample Item 2: “We treat regulators like we would treat our customers.” (The examination 
process is a major point of contact between banks and regulators. These examinations can be 
extremely contentious. When examinations are pleasant and both banker and regulator are 
comfortable with each other, this may facilitate relationship building.) 
Sample Item 3: “People in my bank are proactive and contact regulators before a problem 
arises.” (This item is the opposite of the first sample item. These bankers fear appearing ‘weak’ 
less than they fear poor regulatory or compliance performance.) 
 
Manipulation capabilities: 
 
“CEO actually sits on the ABA government relations board. So he does have more 
insight and more impact sitting on that board as far as the ABA being a lobbyist for bank 
interests. So that’s one way that we do that.”  
 
“There’s always a comment period for the new regulation. We write letters, and we give 
our input. There’s one state that sends more letters than Oklahoma – and look at our 
population in comparison.” 
 
“Believe me, at every chance, I’m in front of congress, I’m in front of our state 
representatives and senators. … I lobby where I can – at the state level, is where I’m most 
effective – at the federal level, I have to rely on the ABA to do that for me.” 
 
Sample Item 1: “People in my bank are involved with the governance committee of a state or 
national banking association.” (Community banks may not be able to lobby federal-level 
regulatory agencies; however, they may participate on the boards of national banking 
associations and influence lobbying in this manner.) 
Sample Item 2: “People in my bank write comment letters on proposed regulation.” (Proposed 
regulations are posted at an agency’s web site for a 6-month period, during which anyone is 
welcome to write critiques. Regulatory agencies may accommodate these critiques in revising 
and finalizing the new rule.) 
Sample Item 3: “People in my bank visit representatives at the state capitol about banking 
issues.” (At the local level, bankers may frequently visit their government representatives. In 
many cases, bankers are leaders in their communities and might have greater influence through 
meeting with a state representative or senator.) 
 
 
Regulatory framing: 
 
“The bank … saw [regulators] as the enemy. I’ve seen places where – I’ve 
probably examined places – where it was clear that the employees had been told to not 
tell the examiners anything. To me, that’s not the way – they’re just people doing their 
job. They are not the ones making the laws and the regulations. They are just doing their 
jobs.” 
 
“I experienced the worst exam in my life because my attitude was “You bastards.” I’ve 
gone through a great change – and in answer to your question, I do believe that they are 
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here to help. They have a job to do. Their bosses are telling you these are rules set down 
through Basel or through congress and we are the police, and just like the main street 
police, they are here to help. They have to uphold the law, but they’re here to help you 
and to guide you through it.” 
 
Sample Item 1: “Regulators are just trying to do their jobs, same as we are.” (A reverse-coded 
item. Many bankers expressed a belief that regulatory agencies are predatory and seek to harm 
banks. Therefore, banks that feel regulators just ‘have a job to do’ may be less likely to possess 
an overall negative attitude toward regulators.) 
Sample Item 2: “I trust examiners to deal fairly with my bank.” (A reverse-coded item. 
Measures the belief that regulators consistently enforce the law.) 
 
Regulatory costs: 
 
“The regulatory environment forced us out of making residential real estate loans – for 
us, we quit offering residential real estate loans primary dwelling in January 2012 
because of the requirement that if you charge X percent, and it’s considered a high-priced 
mortgage, then you have to offer or you have to do escrow – or taxes and insurance. 
Whenever we originate maybe five primary dwelling real estate loans in a year we can’t 
go buy an escrow program to justify the cost. And we were to the point where if we 
needed to price the loans where we needed to price them, we couldn’t lower that rate any 
lower to offset what we were paying – we gotta make money on the loan side so we can 
pay out money on the deposit side. … So we got out of it. Because of the new real estate 
lending new rules and regs that forced us out of that market, which cost us some potential 
income.” 
 
“We choose not to do home equity loans in Texas. The reason we don’t do home equity 
loans in Texas is because of the incredibly difficult compliance with their Texas laws 
related to home equity loans. So instead of learning that and managing that, we’ve chosen 
not to do that, which limits our opportunity and limits our customers’ access.” 
 
Sample Item 1: “Regulation prevents us from offering certain products and services to our 
customers.”  
Sample Item 2: “Regulation prevents us from meeting customer needs.” (These items are very 
similar and assess the degree to which regulation prevents banks from meeting customer needs. 
The first quote addresses the financial risk, and the second quote addresses the opportunity costs 
regulations may create.) 
 
 
Regulatory complexity: 
 
“One reason we left the OCC was … one set of examiners would come in, and we were 
fine. And another would come in, and they would just hammer us on the previous exam. 
It was just really frustrating.” 
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“These rules come down from Congress and they’re implemented all at the same time. So 
you have banks that have to comply with them and regulators who have to enforce them, 
all in the same day. So we’re trying to learn the law and comply with them. They’re 
trying to learn the law so they can enforce them. Just like in the bank business, you’ve 
got these regulators, and they have their own different departments, and they all have 
their different ways of interpretation of the law. So their interpretation of the law could be 
different than the states or than ours.” 
 
Sample Item 1: “Regulators are consistent in their interpretation and application of regulations.” 
Sample Item 2: “There are often differences in how we interpret a regulation and how a 
regulator interprets a regulation.” 
Sample Item 3: “Regulatory enforcement is very subjective.” (These items are also very similar 
and assess the degree of uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity in understanding regulation. The 
first quote addresses the inconsistencies in how enforcing agents understand and apply 
regulation. The second quote discusses the difficulty banks have in interpreting regulation and 
arriving at an interpretation that is congruent with regulatory agents’ interpretation). 
 
 
The complete list of items derived from the interviews is provided in Table 8 and sorts the items 
by code (i.e., by the research model variable they are intended to measure).  
------------------------------ 
Please see Table 8 
------------------------------ 
  
 To ensure the content validity of the items (Hinkin, 1998), I sent the complete list of 
items to eight of the bankers who participated in the initial interviews as well as one professor of 
finance who is familiar with the banking industry and worked as a banking regulator. I asked 
them to assess the items in terms of validity (i.e., are the items applicable to the day-to-day 
activities of bankers, are the items broad enough to capture the potential range of activities and 
phenomena that bankers encounter, and do the items accurately measure the variables in the 
study). I also asked them to assess the length of the item list and recommend items that could be 
dropped, and I asked them to suggest rewording items that may be unclear. Finally, I asked them 
to suggest items that I may have not included. The outcome of this process are the two survey 
instruments used in the study, which are included in Appendix 2. Stages two and three of 
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measurement development require quantitative methods and analyzing data obtained through the 
surveys, which will be described next.  
Quantitative procedure – obtaining survey data 
 The quantitative portion of this study involved a survey-based design to measure the 
variables within the research model. One drawback of the survey methodology is common 
method variance (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). To mitigate the influence of common method 
variance, I used a number of methodological and statistical techniques, and I describe the first of 
these here. One methodological technique involves “temporal separation:” instead of measuring 
all variables of interest in one survey, variable measures are captured by two or more sequential 
surveys (Podsakoff et al., 2003). By requiring the completion of multiple surveys, temporal 
separation may 1) reduce situational effects that might exist while a subject completes the 
survey, 2) reduce the likelihood that previous answers to items may influence how subjects 
answer subsequent items, and 3) reduce the likelihood that certain events or experiences, which 
the survey may prompt in subjects’ memories, would influence their answers to all items in all 
rounds of the surveys. Therefore, I split survey data collection into two phases: the first phase of 
the survey captured all independent variables and moderators in the research model while the 
second phase of the survey captured all mediating variables as well as dependent variables.8 
Approximately one month passed between the receipt of phase 1 surveys and the mailing of 
phase 2 surveys.  
 Phase 1 surveys were sent to 2,915 randomly selected commercial banks included in the 
June 2013 quarterly FDIC reports, which are publically available at the FDIC web site. (An 
                                                           
8 The final dependent variables, “access to new opportunities” and “increased value of current opportunities” were 
also captured using publically available FDIC data and were not included in the surveys. This follows the suggestion 
of scholars (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010; Yin, 1994) to triangulate data and use multiple sources 
for data wherever possible. 
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initial sample of 3,000 were selected, and 85 banks with over $10 billion in assets and more than 
1,000 employees were removed from the sample as these banks operate in a regulatory 
environment unique to smaller banks.) This FDIC database includes information for all 
commercial banks in the United States. Using the Dillman Total Design Method (1978) as a 
guide, I sent surveys, addressed to “Bank President or Chief Compliance Officer,” to all banks 
accompanied by a cover letter and business reply envelope. One week after the surveys were 
mailed, a follow-up post card was sent to all banks encouraging them to complete and return the 
survey. Phase 1 surveys were sent in two waves: 1,500 were mailed in November 2013, and 
1,415 were mailed in January 2014. In sum, 377 phase 1 surveys were returned, with 21 survey 
packets returned due to bad addresses, resulting in a 13 percent response rate. Of these 377 
participants, 216 returned phase 2 surveys, for a 57.3 percent response rate. The overall response 
rate, including both survey phases, was 7.5 percent. The response rate is below the 10 percent 
threshold reported by others surveying organizational executives (e.g., Alexiev, Jansen, Van den 
Bosh, & Volberda, 2010; Boon & Hendriks, 2009; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 
1993), which can threaten the validity of these results. However, one consequence of a two-
phase survey design can include response attrition and is a tradeoff in handling the threat of 
common method variance. I checked for non-response bias between the total sample and phase 1 
respondents and between phase 1 and phase 2 respondents by conducting independent t tests for 
differences in the number of branches, number of employees, and asset size for each bank. 
Between the total sample and phase 1 respondents, there were no significant differences (number 
of branches, p > .10; number of employees, p > .10; assets, p > .10). Between phase 1 and phase 
2 respondents, there were no significant differences across number of branches (p > .10) and 
assets (p > .10); however, phase 1 respondents employed fewer people than phase 2 respondents 
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(p < .10).    
Of the 217 respondents who responded to both survey phases, bankers had about 11.4 
years of experience in the roles they currently occupy (SD = 8.65 years) (e.g., president, 
compliance officer, senior vice president, etc.), with about 28.2 years average industry 
experience (SD = 10.20). About sixty-five percent of respondents listed their role as either 
“president,” “CEO,” or “vice president;” 25 percent listed their role as “compliance officer” or 
“chief compliance officer;” the remaining 10 percent listed various roles, including “chief 
operations officer,” “auditor,” “chief financial officer,” and “chief lending officer.”9  Regarding 
bank characteristics, the average respondent bank had about 5.8 branch offices (SD = 12.744), 
69.13 employees (SD = 129.534), and about $1,112,273 in assets (SD = $9,796,388) (i.e., value 
of depository accounts, loans outstanding, bank investments, etc.). Finally, 41 banks were 
regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 30 by the Federal Reserve, and 146 
by the FDIC. (Several respondents failed to provide complete phase 2 surveys, which affected 
the statistical analyses later in the study. For the constraint expansion model, there were five 
cases with missing data, and for the constraint retraction model, there were 12 cases with missing 
data. These cases were removed using listwise deletion. This difference accounts for 
discrepancies between the information described above and correlation tables presented later.) 
 With the data collected, it was next appropriate to run the first of two post-hoc statistical 
checks for common method variance. The first procedure is the Harmon’s single-factor test, 
                                                           
9  As stated earlier, the variety of roles and regulatory responsibilities may be a reflection of the variance of bank 
resources and size: in small banks, the bank president is often the primary point of contact between the bank and the 
regulatory environment, and in larger banks, regulatory responsibilities may be divided among various individuals 
within the bank or assigned to a compliance officer. The cover letter that accompanied each survey – as well as the 
surveys themselves – were unambiguously concerned with banks’ regulatory activities, and individuals responding 
to the survey would have had to have sufficient knowledge of these activities to answer the items. The generally 
high reliabilities of the survey measures and the invariance of the items across a split sample, both of which will be 
described later in this chapter, provide evidence that there was a consistent awareness and knowledge of regulatory 
activities among respondents. 
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which determines if most of the variance measured by the survey items can be accounted for 
with one factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003). To conduct this test, I entered all the items of the survey 
that measured latent constructs (i.e., perception, interaction, and manipulation capabilities; 
institutional framing, costs, and complexity) into the factor analysis function in SPSS. I forced 
SPSS to extract a single, un-rotated factor. The factor accounted for 15.13 percent of variance, 
which is well below the 50 percent threshold recommended by scholars (e.g., Podsakoff et al., 
2003). 
  Next, I conducted both an exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to determine the 
factor structure of the overall measurement model (all independent and moderator variables), 
including examining whether the institutional capabilities described in the theory section 
constitute a single construct (i.e., institutional capabilities) or is better measured as three separate 
constructs (i.e., perception, interaction, and manipulation capabilities). I entered all items 
measuring the independent and moderator variables into the principle components analysis 
function of SPSS, using all 380 returned phase 1 surveys. The first step of exploratory factor 
analysis is to determine how many components – or linear combinations of survey items – 
should be used to capture the greatest amount of variance. Stevens (2009) describes two often-
used techniques: retaining components that have eigenvalues greater than 1 and using a scree-
test, or a graphical picture of each component’s eigenvalue, to find the point at which each 
subsequent component stops accounting for significant additional variance. The results of this 
initial factor analysis are presented in Table 9 and Figure 3.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Please see Table 9 and Figure 3  
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 As shown in Table 9, 15 components have eigenvalues greater than 1 and would be 
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retained under the first rule described in Stevens (2009). However, examination of the scree-plot 
in Figure 3 clearly shows a drop-off in accounted-for variance between components 6 and 7; 
therefore, due to the scree-test and theoretical considerations, a six-factor measurement model – 
consisting of perception, interaction, and manipulation capabilities, and measures for regulatory 
framing, costs, and complexity – may be most appropriate. The next step is to determine how 
each item correlates, or “loads,” onto the six components. To assess item loadings and improve 
the interpretability of the components, I split the rotated factor analysis of the independent 
variables from the analysis for the moderator variables. The reason for doing this is that it may 
be reasonable to expect the three institutional capabilities to be correlated with each other, while 
the moderator variables are less likely to be related to each other (e.g., a bank may face a 
complex regulatory environment without experiencing costs related to that environment). For the 
independent variable analysis, I used oblique factor rotation (i.e., direct oblimin) in SPSS, which 
allows the three components to correlate with each other (Stevens, 2009; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 
1991), and for the moderator variable analysis, I used Varimax rotation, which generates three 
orthogonal factors from the items. For both analyses, to determine which items may be retained, 
an item must have at least a .40 loading on its primary factor with no cross-loadings greater than 
.20 (Stevens, 2009). I suppressed all loadings below .20 to ease interpretability. Items were 
removed singly or in pairs, and the factor analysis was rerun, and this process was completed 
until the remaining items loaded according to the criteria described above. The initial, un-filtered 
factor analysis results for the independent variables are presented in Table 10b. Table 10a 
includes each item code along with its text to facilitate interpretation. I arrived at the final factor 
solution through the following steps: 
1) I removed items labeled ICInter1 and ICInter4 as these are interaction capabilities items 
and were mis-loading on factor 1 with other manipulation capability items. ICInter1 (“I 
74 
 
or others in my bank have a close relationship with the state banking commissioner”) and 
ICInter4 (“I or others in my bank participate on the advisory boards of regulatory 
agencies”) stand out from the other interaction items because they describe bankers’ 
current relationship with regulators whereas the other interaction items tend to describe 
activities bankers may use related to contacting regulators.  Removing first ICInter1 and 
then ICInter4, I reran the factor analysis. These results are presented in Table 10c.  
 
2) I removed ICPercep5, which mis-loaded on the manipulation capabilities factor. 
ICPercep5 (“My bank regularly sends managers and employees to compliance workshops 
hosted by trade associations or regulatory agencies”) differs from other perception 
capabilities items as it describes attending an event whereas the other perception items 
tend to describe how well bankers come to understand the written content of regulations. 
Removing ICPercep 5, I reran the factor analysis. These results are presented in Table 
10d. 
 
3) I removed ICManip5 and ICManip6, as both items had strong cross loadings on two 
factors. ICManip 5 (“It is possible to negotiate with examiners on compliance issues”) 
does not necessarily involve regulatory change, and ICManip 6 (“We have found that 
regulatory boundaries are flexible”) do not necessarily describe a firm capability as much 
as it does the condition of the regulatory environment. ICManip5 and ICManip6 were 
removed, and I reran the factor analysis. These results are presented in Table 10e. 
 
4) I removed ICManip7 and ICManip8 due to mis-loading on factor 4 in Table 10e. 
ICManip7 (“On occasion, it is better to act first and seek regulatory approval later”) and 
ICManip8 (“We don’t always seek regulatory approval before making business 
decisions”) describe bank activities related to avoiding or shirking regulatory 
requirements rather than describing regular activities banks may use to change regulatory 
constraints. ICManip7 and ICManip8 were removed, and I reran the factor analysis. 
These results are presented in Table 10f.  
 
5) I removed ICPercep6 due to a cross-loading on a second factor above the .20 threshold. 
In Table 10f, ICPercep6 (“People in my bank are good at quickly understanding the 
intent of new regulations”) cross-loads onto the interaction capability factor. This could 
be because the item would require bank employees to know regulators well enough to 
understand the intent of a new regulation. ICPercep6 was removed, and I reran the factor 
analysis. These results are presented in Table 10g.  
 
6) I removed ICPercep9 for loading too low onto factor 3 (below .40) and ICPercep10 for 
mis-loading on factor 1 in Table 10g. ICPercep9 (“Understanding the ‘Cliff Notes’ (e.g., 
summaries prepared by trade associations) of a regulation are good enough) and 
ICPercep10 (“People in my bank are good at quickly understanding which parts of a new 
regulation apply to our bank and which parts do not”) may differ from the other 
remaining items that measure perception capabilities because they go beyond the issue of 
detecting the appearance of new regulations and focus on the content of regulations. 
ICPercep9 and ICPercep10 were removed, and I reran the factor analysis. These results 
are presented in Table 10h. 
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7) Lastly, ICInter3 was removed for cross-loading on factor 2 above the .20 threshold, as 
shown in Table 10h. ICInter3 (“People in our bank are proactive and contact regulators 
before a problem arises”) may concern an activity that is not related to building 
relationships with regulators but rather with complying with existing regulation. ICInter3 
was removed, and I reran the factor analysis. The final results are presented in Table 10i. 
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 10j.  
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 10a through 10j  
------------------------------------------------- 
 I next conducted an orthogonal factor analysis of the moderator variables, and the initial 
rotated results are presented in Table 10k. I arrived at a final factor solution through the 
following steps: 
1) I removed InstFrame3 as it cross-loaded on two factors above the .20 threshold, nor did it 
load on a single factor above the .40 threshold. InstFrame3 (“Banks are overregulated”) 
differs from the other five regulatory framing items as it is describes bankers’ belief 
about banks and the other items describe bankers’ beliefs about the regulatory 
environment. InstFrame3 was removed, and I reran the factor analysis. The results are 
presented in Table 10l.  
 
2) I removed InstFrame1 and InstFrame2 because it cross-loads on three factors above the 
.20 threshold. InstFrame1 (“Regulation ensures that every bank plays by the same rules”) 
and InstFrame2 (“Regulation is good for the banking industry”) may cross-load because 
their wording is too broad, compared to other framing items. InstFrame1 and InstFrame2 
was removed, and I reran the factor analysis. The results are presented in Table 10m.  
 
3) I removed InstComplex14 because it did not load on any factor above the .40 threshold. 
InstComplex14 (“It is pointless to try to read a regulation – the clarification from our 
trade associations and other groups tell me what a regulation really means”) may not have 
loaded because it does not necessarily measure regulatory complexity. Rather, it 
measures the effectiveness of other banking groups in deciphering regulation. 
InstComplex14 was removed, and I reran the factor analysis. The results are presented in 
Table 10n. 
 
4) As shown in Table 10n, all items load on their appropriate factors at a level above the .40 
threshold. However, several items cross-load on factors above the .20 threshold. I 
removed each cross-loaded item, starting with the largest cross-loaded item, reran the 
analysis, and removed the next largest cross-loaded item. Between each step, I assessed 
whether the factor structure changed significantly (i.e., items that once loaded on one 
factor now loaded on another factor). No such changes occurred. The final results are 
presented in Table 10o. Please note that two framing items – InstFrame6 and InstFrame4r 
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were left in the analysis in order to have enough items to measure regulatory framing. 
Their loadings were sufficiently high (> .70) and their cross-loadings were significantly 
low (< .30) that I determined this solution to be adequate. 
 
------------------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 10k through 10o  
------------------------------------------------- 
 
The next step is to conduct confirmatory factor analysis to address two questions: 1) do 
these three-factor measurement models fit the data better than 1-factor measurement models? and 
2) are the three-factor measurement models invariant across samples? To address both questions, 
I relied on structural equation modeling in AMOS 20, and I again test the independent variable 
measurement model separately from the moderator measurement model. For the independent 
variable measurement model, using the items retained during exploratory factor analysis, which 
are listed in Table 10j, I specified a 3-factor measurement model in AMOS, with six ‘perception’ 
items loading onto a latent ‘perception capability’ variable, six ‘interaction’ items loading onto a 
latent ‘interaction capability’ variable, and four ‘manipulation’ items loading onto a latent 
‘manipulation capability’ variable. This model is shown in Figure 4a. The fit for this model was 
acceptable (χ2  = 261.687, df = 101, p ≤ .001; CMIN/df = 2.591; RMSEA = .065; CFI = .845; 
SRMR = .0584). A single factor measurement model is presented in Figure 5a, with all items 
loading onto a single latent variable.  
------------------------------------------ 
Please see Figures 4a and 5a  
------------------------------------------ 
 
The fit for this model is inadequate (χ2  = 632.418, df = 104, p ≤ .001; CMIN/df = 6.081; RMSEA 
= .116; CFI = .491; SRMR = .1069), and it provides significantly worse fit than the three-factor 
measurement model (∆χ2  = 370.731, ∆df = 3, p ≤ .001). Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis 
supports the three-factor measurement model for institutional capabilities found during 
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exploratory factor analysis.  
For the moderator variable measurement model, using the items retained during 
exploratory factor analysis, which are listed in Table 10o, I specified a 3-factor measurement 
model in AMOS, with three ‘framing’ items loading on a latent ‘regulatory framing’ variable, six 
‘cost’ items loading onto a latent ‘regulatory cost’ variable, and six ‘complexity’ items loading 
onto a latent ‘regulatory complexity’ variable. This model is shown in Figure 4b. The fit for this 
model was low (χ2  = 266.016, df = 87, p ≤ .001; CMIN/df = 3.058; RMSEA = .074; CFI = .886; 
SRMR = .0723). A single factor measurement model is presented in Figure 5b, with all items 
loading onto a single latent variable.  
------------------------------------------ 
Please see Figures 4b and 5b  
------------------------------------------ 
 
The fit for this model was worse (χ2  = 671.404, df = 90, p ≤ .001; CMIN/df = 7.460; RMSEA = 
.131; CFI = .630; SRMR = .1029), and it provides significantly worse fit than the three-factor 
measurement model (∆χ2  = 405.388, ∆df = 3, p ≤ .001). Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis 
supports the three-factor measurement model for the moderator measurement model found 
during exploratory factor analysis.  
 As a final step to evaluate the robustness of both three-factor measurement models, I 
conducted a test of invariance, which seeks to determine the usefulness of the measurement 
model across different samples. I created two samples by splitting my dataset into two roughly 
equal halves. Group 1 consisted of all returned phase 1 surveys sent in November 2013 (N = 
204). Group 2 consisted of all returned phase 1 surveys sent in January 2014 (N = 176). Using a 
macro developed by James Gaskin (Gaskin, 2012) which compares the path estimates between 
items and latent variables across two groups, I determined which item loadings were 
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significantly different across Group 1 and Group 2. The results for both models are presented in 
Table 11 and Table 12. For the independent variable measurement model, shown in Table 11, no 
items loaded differently across groups, which satisfies the threshold of at least one item for each 
factor that is not significantly different (Gaskin, 2012). For the moderator variable measurement 
model, two items, InstFrame5 and InstCost7, loaded significantly different across groups, which 
also satisfied the threshold.    
----------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 11 and 12  
----------------------------------------- 
  
With three-factor measurement models established for the independent variables and 
moderator variables, I next conducted the final check for common method variance, which 
involves using a common latent factor in structural equation modeling and is used to assess how 
much common method variance exists in the data. The technique involves creating a single latent 
variable alongside the total measurement model including all the items and latent variables in the 
study. Paths are specified between items and the latent variables they measure, and paths are also 
specified between all items and the common latent factor. The model is run, holding the path 
coefficients constant, and the resulting coefficient of the paths and all items (which will all be the 
same as they were held constant) is squared to obtain the percent variance attributable to using a 
common method (Gaskin, 2012). I included both measurement models in this analysis, which is 
presented in Figure 6, and the variance in the measurement model due to common method is 2.79 
percent.  
----------------------------- 
Please see Figure 6  
----------------------------- 
Measures 
 Institutional capabilities. Institutional capabilities were measured using a 13-item scale 
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that measures three factors. The items included were those retained during exploratory factor 
analysis (unless otherwise noted). All items were measured using a 5-point scale that ranged 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The five items used to measure perception 
capabilities included “People in my bank subscribe to and read trade association email alerts 
about new regulations,” “In my bank, only one person is responsible for being aware of new 
regulations,” and “My bank regularly sends managers and employees to compliance workshops 
hosted by trade associations or regulatory agencies.” Interaction capabilities were measured by 
four items, including “People in my bank feel comfortable calling state or federal regulators to 
ask questions about compliance,” “People in our bank are proactive and contact regulators before 
a problem arises,” and “We are familiar with the agents who examine us.” Manipulation 
capabilities were measured by four items, including “People in my bank visit representatives at 
the state capitol about banking issues,” “People in my bank write comment letters on proposed 
regulation,” and “People in my bank speak with regulators about relaxing enforcement of a 
regulation.” The Cronbach’s alphas were .597 for perception capabilities, .734 for interaction 
capabilities, and .780 for manipulation capabilities.10 Individual item scores were summed to 
create overall scores for each capability type. 
 Regulatory costs. Regulatory costs were measured using six items developed during the 
qualitative portion of this study and retained in exploratory factor analysis. All items were 
measured using a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Example items include “Regulation prevents us from offering certain products and services to 
                                                           
10 Scale reliability considerations also played a role in selecting items to include for each measure. For the 
perception capabilities measure, ICpercep4 and ICpercep8r were dropped, which brought the reliability for this 
measure up to .597 from .382. For the capabilities measure, ICinter6r, ICinter7r, and ICinter8 were dropped. 
ICinter3, which had been removed during exploratory factor analysis was added to the scale. The addition of this 
item brought the measure reliability to .734 from .624. I determined that the added reliability to which this item 
contributed justified including it in the measure.  
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our customers,” “Our costs due to regulation are a serious threat to our performance,” and “My 
bank has discontinued products and services due to regulation.” The Cronbach’s alpha for 
regulatory costs was .829. Item scores were summed to create an overall regulatory cost score. 
 Regulatory framing. Regulatory framing was measured using three items developed 
during the qualitative portion of this study and retained during exploratory factor analysis. All 
items were measured using a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). Example items include “Regulators don’t trust bankers,” “Regulators are receptive to 
bankers’ concerns,” and “Regulators are just trying to do their jobs, same as we are.” The 
Cronbach’s alpha for regulatory framing was .717. Individual item scores were summed to create 
an overall framing score. 
 Regulatory complexity. Regulatory complexity was measured by 9 items developed 
during the qualitative portion of this study. All items were measured using a 5-point scale that 
ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Example items include “Banking 
regulation is easy to understand,” “The various banking regulations do not contradict each 
other,” and “The pace at which new regulation is being proposed is increasing.” The Cronbach’s 
alpha for regulatory complexity was .817.11 Individual item scores were summed to create an 
overall complexity score.  
 Constraint expansion and constraint retraction. Constraint expansion and constraint 
retraction were measured with seven items and six items respectively, which asked respondents 
to indicate the number of times they successfully moved regulatory boundaries over the past five 
years. Constraint expansion was measured with seven items, including “How many times have 
                                                           
11 To enhance scale reliability, three items (InstComplex7r, InstComplex9r, and InstComplex11r) were added and 
one item (InstComplex13) was dropped from the scale. The inclusion and exclusion of these items, respectively, 
increased scale reliability from .666 to .817. The items added in this measure were initially dropped due to excessive 
cross-loadings (see Table 10n). I determined the added measure reliability justified including these items. 
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you been able to negotiate with examiners to improve a loan rating, “How many times have you 
been able to contribute to legislative efforts to loosen legal constraints, such as in working with a 
state or federal legislator,” and “How many times have you been able to obtain regulatory 
approval to open a new branch or banking location.” Constraint retraction was measured with six 
items, including “How many times have you been able to attract regulatory attention to the non-
compliant activities of your competitors,” “How many times have you been able to halt the 
implementation of a new law that would have unduly favored your competitors,” and “How 
many times have you been able to influence regulation, such as through writing comment letters, 
discussing issues with regulators/lawmakers, or any other approach, so that your competitors’ 
costs increased.” The Cronbach’s alphas were .710 for constraint expansion and .809 for 
constraint retraction. The item scores for these measures were summed together to create overall 
constraint expansion and constraint retraction scores. 
 New opportunities. Banks’ access to new opportunities was measured by the sum of two 
items: “How many new products or services have you introduced in the past five years,” and 
“How many new branches/banking locations have you opened in the past five years.” As 
opportunities are defined as situations in which new products and services may be introduced to 
create value (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), this measure serves as a proxy for banks’ discovery 
of such situations.  
 Opportunity value. The dependent variable related to constraint retraction is opportunity 
value. This study measures opportunity value as the growth rate of the ratio of sales to existing 
firm activities. Specifically, opportunity value is measured by the five-year growth rate of each 
firm’s total sales divided by the number of its employees, reported between 2009 and 2013. 
Similar “sales-per-employee” or “net-income-per-emploee” measures have been used in prior 
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studies examining workforce productivity (e.g., Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005; Huselid, 
Jackson, & Schuler, 1997). A productivity measure may also be an appropriate measure of 
opportunity value; measured this way (and in conjunction with controls for firm size and number 
of new opportunities), increases in productivity occur either when employees’ performance 
improves or when firms are able to derive more sales from existing customer bases (i.e., 
increased opportunity value).  Moreover, using “sales-per-employee” rather than “net-income-
per-employee” is more suitable for this study because opportunity value likely does not influence 
internal firm processes and cost structures.  
 Both “access to new opportunities” and “opportunity value” are lagged five years, while 
institutional capabilities and the moderator variables measures were not lagged. While this may 
hamper the ability to draw inferences of causality from the results, theory suggests that 
organizational capabilities are developed over the long-term and are stable through time (Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). Therefore, measuring a firm’s capabilities in the present time may also reflect the 
firm’s possession of these capabilities over longer periods of time. In addition, while some of the 
regulatory constraint changes measured in this study may occur over extended periods of time 
(e.g., writing a comment letter to adapt a proposed rule could take months or years), other 
changes may take place more quickly (e.g., negotiating with an examiner for an improved loan 
rating may take effect at the end of a single discussion or examination period, which may last 
several days or weeks).    
 Controls. I controlled for a number of individual and firm level variables that could 
influence the research model. At the individual level, I controlled for respondents’ years of 
experience in the role they play in the bank. Bank presidents and compliance officers may, 
throughout their careers, have acquired practices, experience, and cognitive abilities at other 
83 
 
banks or in other roles that they transfer to their new roles, which can influence the degree to 
which banks exhibit institutional capabilities (e.g., Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Gavetti, 2005). At 
the firm level, I controlled for bank age (i.e., number of years since the bank was founded), the 
number of lobbyists a bank employs, and bank size (i.e., the log of the number of branches each 
bank operates). Age may influence banks’ ability to manage their regulatory environment 
because long-established banks may possess greater legitimacy than newer banks (e.g., 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). These banks may have developed long-standing relationships with 
regulatory agencies and agents, and these relationships may influence how regulatory agencies 
apply rules, examine bank processes, and receive feedback from banks. As a consequence, these 
banks may not need to develop capabilities related to actively fostering and managing 
relationships with regulatory agencies as these relationships might be inherited as a legacy from 
preceding generations of bank and regulatory decision makers (e.g., Steier, 2001). This study 
controls for the number of lobbyists and bank size as research suggests these variables may 
influence firms’ ability to achieve regulatory or other political outcomes (e.g., Schuler et al., 
2002). Finally, in the constraint retraction models, I control for new opportunities, as described 
above. This study suggests that banks that successfully retract regulatory constraints may expect 
to benefit from more valuable opportunities, all else being equal. Therefore, I include this 
variable to hold the effect of new opportunities constant in analyzing the outcomes of constraint 
retraction. 
 Correlation tables, with descriptive statistics and reliabilities, are presented in Tables 13 
and 14. The data in Table 13 pertains to all variables included in the expansion model, and the 
data in Table 14 pertains to all variables included in the retraction model, as these models will be 
tested separately. 
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Please see Tables 13 and 14  
------------------------------------------ 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
 I used hierarchical regression in SPSS to test all hypotheses. Regression techniques may 
be more suitable for this study than other techniques, such as structural equation modeling 
(SEM), for several reasons. First, recent statistical developments in testing mediation and 
moderated mediation models rely on programs designed and built for regression software. The 
use of these new statistical approaches is more robust (i.e., lower Type 1 error rates) than earlier 
techniques developed using regression (i.e., Baron & Kenny, 1986) and replicated in SEM. 
Second, moderation in SEM is more difficult to conduct than in regression analyses and may be 
less effective. Specifically, moderation would require splitting the sample in half and testing high 
and low levels of each moderator separately. SEM is extremely sensitive to sample size, and 
splitting the sample size of this study in half may render inaccurate results. In all analyses, I 
included role experience, bank age, number of lobbyists, and bank size as control variables. In 
analyses related to constraint retraction, I also controlled for new opportunities. In addition, I 
centered all independent and mediator variables to avoid multicollinearity issues while 
multiplying variables to test moderation effects (Aiken & West, 1991).  
Mediation  
Hypotheses 1a and 1b proposed that institutional capabilities would be positively related 
to constraint expansion and constraint retraction, respectively. Following the factor analyses, I 
tested the relationship between each type of institutional capability (i.e., perception capabilities, 
interaction capabilities, and manipulation capabilities) on constraint expansion and constraint 
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retraction separately. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 15 and Table 16.  
------------------------------------------ 
Please see Tables 15 and 16  
------------------------------------------ 
 
In the constraint expansion model, perception capabilities (β = .156, p < .05) and manipulation 
capabilities (β = .266, p < .001) were positively related to constraint expansion while interaction 
capabilities were negatively related to constraint expansion (β = -.148, p < .05), providing mixed 
support for Hypothesis 1a. In the constraint retraction model, perception capabilities (β = .120, p 
< .10) and manipulation capabilities (β = .204, p < .05) were positively related to constraint 
retraction while interaction capabilities were not related to constraint retraction, providing mixed 
support for Hypothesis 1b. Hypothesis 5 proposed that constraint expansion would be positively 
related to firms’ access of new opportunities. This hypothesis is supported (β = .209, p < .001). 
Hypothesis 6 proposed that constraint retraction would be positively related to increased value of 
firms’ existing opportunities. This hypothesis is also supported (β = .187, p < .05).  
 To test the indirect effects of institutional capabilities on new opportunities and 
opportunity value through constraint expansion and retraction, I followed the Baron and Kenny 
(1986) method for testing mediation. This method suggests mediation exists when 1) the 
independent and mediator variables are significantly related, 2) the independent and dependent 
variables are significantly related, 3) the mediator and dependent variables are significantly 
related, and 4) the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable is weakened by 
including the mediator variable. Table 15 presents these steps for the constraint expansion model 
and Table 16 presents these steps for the constraint retraction model.  
For the constraint expansion model, Step 1 is satisfied in the results for Hypothesis 1a: 
the independent variables were significantly related to constraint expansion. Step 2 is satisfied in 
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the results for Hypothesis 5: constraint expansion was significantly related to new opportunities. 
Step 3 is satisfied, as shown in the column labeled Step 3 in Table 15: perception capabilities (β 
= .141, p < .05), interaction capabilities (β = -.151, p < .05), and manipulation capabilities (β = 
.111, p <.10) were significantly related to new opportunities. Step 4 is satisfied, as shown in the 
column labeled Step 4 in Table 15: the effects of the independent variables were weaker when 
the mediator variable, constraint expansion, was included in the model. The effects of perception 
and interaction capabilities on new opportunities remain significant, suggesting partial 
mediation, and the effect of manipulation capabilities on new opportunities is not significant, 
suggesting that the effect of manipulation capabilities is fully mediated by constraint expansion.  
 To check the significance of the indirect effects of perception, interaction, and 
manipulation capabilities on new opportunities, I used a bootstrapping approach recommended 
by Preacher and Hayes (2008). This bootstrapping approach in mediation analyses has been 
found to have lower Type 1 error rates than either using Sobel tests or the Baron and Kenny 
method (1986) and is, therefore, a more robust test.  Results show that the indirect effects of 
perception capabilities (.047, p < .05), interaction capabilities (-.043, p < .10), and manipulation 
capabilities (.053, p < .01), on new opportunities were significant.  
For the constraint retraction model, Step 1 is satisfied in the results for Hypothesis 1b: 
perception and manipulation capabilities were significantly related to constraint retraction, 
though interaction capabilities was not and was not included in further analysis. Step 2 is 
satisfied in the results for Hypothesis 6: constraint retraction is significantly related to 
opportunity value. Step 3 is satisfied, as shown in the column labeled Step 3 in Table 16: 
perception capabilities (β = .154, p < .05) and manipulation capabilities (β = .163, p <.05) were 
significantly related to opportunity value. Step 4 is satisfied, as shown in the column labeled Step 
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4 in Table 15: the effects of perception and manipulation capabilities were weaker when the 
mediator variable, constraint retraction, was included in the model. The effects of perception and 
manipulation capabilities on opportunity value remained significant, suggesting partial 
mediation.  
 To check the significance of the indirect effects of perception and manipulation 
capabilities on opportunity value, I again used the Preacher and Hayes (2008) method described 
above. Results show that the indirect effect of interaction capabilities on opportunity value is not 
significant, but the indirect effects of perception capabilities (.0003, p < .10) and manipulation 
capabilities on opportunity value are significant (.0004, p < .05).  
Moderation  
Hypotheses 2a through 4b propose moderation of the effects of institutional capabilities 
on constraint expansion and constraint retraction. The results of these analyses are presented in 
Table 17 (constraint expansion model) and Table 18 (constraint retraction model). Hypothesis 2a  
----------------------------------------- 
Please see Tables 17 and 18  
----------------------------------------- 
proposed that high regulatory costs would positively moderate the relationship between 
institutional capabilities and constraint expansion. The results do not support this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2b proposed that low regulatory costs would positively moderate the relationship 
between institutional capabilities and constraint retraction. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. Hypotheses 3a and 3b proposed that regulatory framing would positively moderate 
the effect of institutional capabilities on constraint expansion and constraint retraction. The 
results largely do not support these hypotheses. However, as shown in Table 17, manipulation 
capabilities positively interact with regulatory framing (β = .286, p < .001). Figure 7 presents the 
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plot of the interaction between manipulation capabilities and regulatory framing. The figure  
------------------------------- 
Please see Figure 7  
------------------------------- 
shows that when regulatory framing is high, the positive relationship between manipulation 
capabilities and constraint expansion is stronger than when regulatory framing is low. This result 
lends partial support to hypothesis 3a. Hypotheses 4a and 4b proposed that regulatory complexity 
would negatively moderate the relationship between institutional capabilities and constraint 
expansion and constraint retraction. The results do not support these hypotheses. 
 Though not hypothesized, I conducted a final analysis to determine whether the indirect 
effect of manipulation capabilities through constraint expansion on new opportunities was 
moderated by regulatory framing. This was the only moderated mediation effect tested given it is 
the only effect that satisfies the conditions necessary to establish moderated mediation. Such 
moderated mediation effects are examined by determining 1) if the relationship between 
manipulation capabilities and new opportunities is significant, 2) if the interaction between 
manipulation capabilities and framing is significantly related to constraint expansion and if the 
interaction between constraint expansion and framing is significantly related to new 
opportunities, 3) if constraint expansion is significantly related to new opportunities, and 4) if 
different indirect effects of manipulation capabilities on new opportunities through boundary 
expansion existed as a consequence of low or high regulatory framing (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 
2005; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).  
 Step 1 is satisfied in the analyses presented in Table 15, which shows that manipulation 
capabilities were significantly related to new opportunities. Step 2 is satisfied in the analyses 
presented in Table 17. The interaction term of manipulation capabilities and regulatory framing 
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is significantly related to constraint expansion (β = .286, p < .001), and the interaction term of 
boundary expansion and regulatory framing is significantly related to new opportunities (β = -
.222, p < .05). Step 3 is also satisfied in the analyses presented in Table 17. Constraint expansion 
is significantly related to new opportunities (β = .180, p < .05). With the first three steps of the 
moderated mediation satisfied, the final step examines whether the effects of manipulation 
capabilities on new opportunities through boundary expansion is different across low and high 
levels of regulatory framing. To satisfy this step, I employed a statistical significance test 
developed by Preacher et al. (2007). The test assesses the significance for moderated indirect 
effects on a dependent variable through a mediator. This test recommends measuring an indirect 
effect’s significance at plus one and minus one standard deviation of the moderator variable. 
Table 19 presents the results of this test, including effect sizes, standard errors, confidence  
 
 
------------------------------- 
Please see Table 19  
------------------------------- 
 
intervals, and significance levels, and it suggests that the effect of manipulation capabilities on 
new opportunities was stronger and significant (manipulation capabilities = .115, p < .001) at 
higher levels of regulatory framing and insignificant at low levels of regulatory framing.  In sum, 
the moderation hypotheses were not supported, with the exception of the significant moderation 
of regulatory framing on manipulation capabilities in the constraint retraction model.  
Post-hoc analyses 
 Given that 1) theory suggests interaction capabilities may be an important means through 
which firms obtain access to the regulatory process and influence constraint change, and 2) the 
results above suggest interaction capabilities either have no direct effect or a negative direct 
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effect on constraint change, a post-hoc analysis was conducted in which a moderation effect of 
interaction capabilities on the use of manipulation capabilities was tested. Theory would suggest 
that manipulation capabilities might be more effective for firms that are able to rely on close 
relationships with regulatory actors through deploying interaction capabilities. The model tested 
is presented in Figure 8 and the results are presented in Tables 20a (i.e., constraint expansion 
model) and 20b (i.e., constraint retraction model).  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Please see Figure 8 and Tables 20a and 20b  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
The moderation effect of interaction capabilities on manipulation capabilities is positive in the 
constraint retraction model (β = .186, p < .05), which provides evidence that interaction 
capabilities may enhance firms’ use of manipulation capabilities. Figure 9 presents this 
interaction in graphical form. The interaction effect is insignificant in the constraint retraction 
model, which may suggest, as I describe more thoroughly in Chapter 6, that interaction 
capabilities may be used as a defensive mechanism against changing industry and market 
conditions.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Institutional entrepreneurship research, to which this study seeks to contribute, has 
largely neglected DiMaggio’s suggestion (1988) that institutional entrepreneurs seek to 
intentionally change social constraints to obtain favorable outcomes and has instead examined 
the interactive social processes through which new institutions arise. This study tightly focuses 
on the relationship between constraint change and “favorable outcomes” (i.e., entrepreneurial 
opportunities), which may set the stage for future scholars to incorporate more insights from core 
entrepreneurship theory to help us understand institutional entrepreneurship. In addition, this 
study developed a capabilities-based explanation for successful institutional change, which may 
enhance scholarly understanding of the types of work involved in institutional entrepreneurship 
(e.g., Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
  The empirical results support the notion that entrepreneurs and firms that develop 
institutional capabilities, which are defined earlier as routines that are used to perceive, interact 
with, and manipulate an institutional environment to obtain competitive advantage, are better 
able to change institutional constraints. The results also support the notion that constraint 
expansion enables entrepreneurs and firms to capture a greater number of opportunities, while 
constraint retraction increases the value of opportunities already being exploited. Moreover, 
through deductive theorization, conducting field interviews and statistical analyses, I 
demonstrated that at least three types of institutional capabilities exist – perception capabilities, 
interaction capabilities, and manipulation capabilities – and that these capabilities each have 
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different effects on institutional constraints and opportunity quantity and value.  
 Looking more closely at each type of institutional capability, the results showed that 
perception capabilities had a strong positive direct effect on new opportunities beyond their 
influence on constraint change. This finding is congruent with entrepreneurship research, which 
suggests that individuals and firms attune to their external environments may be more likely to 
discover opportunities (Barringer & Bluedorn, 1999; Tang, Kacmar, & Busenitz, 2012; Valliere, 
2013). Entrepreneurs and firms that deploy perception capabilities may be more likely to detect 
other types of market information, other than just information on the institutional environment, 
and this additional information may form the basis for opportunity beliefs. The effects of 
manipulation capabilities on new opportunities, perhaps unsurprisingly, was fully mediated by 
constraint expansion, as discrete institutional change is the primary objective of deploying 
manipulation capabilities.  
 Interestingly, interaction capabilities, while insignificant in the constraint retraction 
model, were negatively related to constraint expansion and to new opportunities. This negative 
effect may due to several factors. First, as described earlier in this dissertation, interaction 
capabilities are used to obtain access to regulatory agencies and acquire legitimacy with 
institutional actors (Hillman et al., 1999, 2009). While interaction capabilities may enable firms 
to acquire access and legitimacy with institutional actors, firms that have acquired this access 
and legitimacy may maintain their status by continuing to conform to institutional expectations. 
In this position, firms may be less likely to deploy institutional change tactics, which could risk 
their position with institutional actors. Second, firms that interact with institutional actors may be 
motivated, in part, by a desire to reduce risk related to institutional change. Institutions are 
effective at constraining behavior insofar as they remain constant (North, 1990), and institutional 
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change can lead to increased costs for actors that are required to conform to these constraints. 
Therefore, firms that deploy interaction capabilities may be seeking to reduce institutional 
change (e.g., Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), which would explain the negative relationship this 
study found between interaction capabilities and constraint expansion.  
Third, in addition to using interaction capabilities to protect the institutional status quo, 
firms may deploy these capabilities to maintain an industry or market status quo (e.g., Crane, 
2013; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). Launching new products and services or opening new 
locations to serve customers are risky activities, and some firms (e.g., especially traditionally 
conservative firms, such as banks) may prefer to continue to offer the same products and services 
rather than risk launching new products and services to react to changing institutional conditions. 
In addition, for these firms, regulatory institutions serve as a protection against competitors, and 
they may perceive any expansion of regulatory constraints as potentially leading to increased 
competition. Following these reasons, firms that face declining performance may be more likely 
than other firms to use interaction capabilities to protect the institutional and industry status quo, 
and this might explain the negative relationship found between interaction capabilities and new 
opportunities.   
The study also found that regulatory framing, which is defined as a firm’s sets of beliefs 
regarding institutions, strengthens the relationship between manipulation capabilities and 
constraint expansion. Firms that perceive regulations and regulatory agencies to be obstructive 
and detrimental to performance were more likely to make efforts to reduce regulation through 
constraint expansion. The finding in this study that regulatory framing moderates manipulation 
capabilities, rather than perception or interaction capabilities, is congruent with existing theory 
that suggests framing is “action-oriented,” which may mean regulatory framing leads to discrete 
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behaviors to change the regulatory environment (i.e., manipulation capabilities), rather than 
perceive it or interact with regulatory actors (Benford & Snow, 2000; Misangyi et al., 2008).    
Implications 
 This research presents a number of implications for theory and for practitioners. First, 
this study is the first to link deliberate institutional change to entrepreneurial outcomes, namely 
the capture of new opportunities and more valuable opportunities. In so doing, it establishes a 
foundation from which agency may be reintroduced to the institutional entrepreneurship 
discussion. Scholars in this area have long been concerned with the paradox of embedded 
agency: how do actors, who are constrained by institutions, simultaneously influence the 
institutions that constrain them (e.g., Battilana et al., 2009)? This study examines the why of 
institutional entrepreneurship (i.e., the pursuit of opportunity), which may inform the paradox 
issue. If entrepreneurs are motivated strongly enough by the prospect of financial gain, they may 
assume the risks inherent in any institutional change project. Second, by placing the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunity as the objective of institutional entrepreneurship, this study is among 
the first to integrate concepts and relationships established within entrepreneurship theory (i.e., 
opportunity and innovation) (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Short et 
al., 2010) into institutional entrepreneurship. Third, this study contributes to the growing stream 
of capabilities research examining the different types of capabilities that might exist. This 
dissertation builds on the foundation established by others (e.g., Bagley, 2008; Oliver & 
Holzinger, 2008; Crane, 2013) and more thoroughly conceptualizes institutional capabilities, 
their constituent activities, and empirically measures the effects of these capabilities.  
 This study suggests that firms pursue regulatory change in order to pursue more 
opportunities or more valuable opportunities and this pursuit may be a distinguishing 
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characteristic of institutional entrepreneurs. In other words, institutional entrepreneurs are not 
motivated to change institutional constraints as the primary objective: in this study, constraint 
change is linked to another motivation, opportunity. This is congruent with the “motivated 
propensity” exhibited by entrepreneurs to depict images of the future (Kirzner, 1985), which is 
the notion that entrepreneurs are able to perceive present inefficient or undervalued uses of 
resources and determine more valuable applications of these resources in the future. This 
entrepreneurial motivation is an important, though tacit, component of the research model 
presented in this paper. It may be possible that a firm could possess the ability to change 
regulatory constraints without putting this ability to use, as a firm may either not perceive the 
existence of entrepreneurial opportunities outside a regulatory constraint or a firm may be 
satisfied with the value it is already extracting from existing opportunities and opt not to bear the 
additional costs of engaging in potentially costly efforts to change constraints.  
 Firms may also choose not to deploy institutional capabilities when they are embedded in 
extremely strong and coercive regulatory environments. Holcomb (2003) suggests that the 
discovery of opportunities may be shaped by the institutional environment and that some 
institutions may be so strong and so well-accepted by members of a society that the perception of 
new and innovative uses of resources may be impossible. In addition to this influence of strong 
institutional environments on the perception of opportunities, institutional environments may be 
so strong or so coercive that they discourage attempts at constraint change. This results of this 
study were found using a sample of firms in the United States; however, the findings may be 
different if sought in other institutional environments, such as China or other authoritarian 
regimes, where political activity may be punished by jail time or even stricter sanctions. In these 
sorts of institutional environments, firms may develop strong capabilities related to perceiving 
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and interacting with the regulatory environment, while manipulation capabilities remain 
underdeveloped or even avoided do to the potential of severe legal sanction. 
 In addition to formal institutional pressures that could prevent the development or use of 
institutional capabilities, there may be a number of informal institutional pressures involved. As 
portrayed in Figure 1, opportunities exist on both sides of a regulatory constraint, and 
opportunities that are outside a regulatory constraint are still embedded within informal 
institutional constraints. Loosening a regulatory constraint a short distance to capture an 
opportunity that may have a great deal of social acceptance may be much easier than loosening a 
constraint far enough to capture an opportunity that has much less social acceptance. For 
instance, changing a state law that would permit individuals to sell caskets without an 
undertaker’s license may be much easier than seeking a law change that would permit the sale of 
narcotics. Firms that pursue the latter type of change may encounter both formal and informal 
institutional pushback, making the change effort much more difficult. Scholars have examined 
the role of institutional distance, or the difference between one country’s set of institutions and 
another country’s set of institutions, and this research may also inform the examination of the 
differences between formal and informal institutions and the difficulties this may create for firms 
pursuing regulatory change (cf. Gaur & Lu, 2007; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). The location of 
opportunities relative to a regulatory constraint depends on their level of broad social acceptance, 
and future research might examine what opportunity characteristics may influence opportunities’ 
placement relative to formal constraints.  Firms that pursue the former type of change may only 
encounter formal institutional pressures or pressures from competing industries (e.g., undertakers 
who may have lobbied for licensure requirements to increase barriers to entry), while drawing on 
broader social approval for the change project (Greenwood et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 
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2006; Misangyi et al., 2008). 
 This last issue suggests that a broader “zone of legitimacy” may exist in addition to the 
location of an institutional constraint, which could influence the degree to which firms are able to 
change institutional constraints. A zone of legitimacy could include all opportunities within a 
formal institutional constraint as well as a number of opportunities that lie a limited distance 
outside these constraints. Constraint change within such a zone of legitimacy may be possible, 
and change efforts outside this zone would be more difficult if not impossible. In addition, future 
scholars might examine the extent to which firms possess institutional capabilities and how these 
capabilities influence firms’ ability to effect constraint change, both within and without the zone 
of legitimacy. The size of the zone of legitimacy may be dependent upon the degree to which a 
formal institutional constraint is understood or accepted by other formal or informal institutional 
actors. More specifically, constraints that are poorly understood (such as newly created 
constraints or very ambiguous constraints) or seen by informal institutional actors as less 
legitimate may have more potential for change than constraints that are clearly understood and 
well accepted. The extent to which firms are aware off and consider “zones of legitimacy” before 
launching any constraint change effort may be a fruitful path for future research.  
For practitioners, the results strongly suggest that regulatory constraint manipulation is 
one path toward better performance. However, these activities, which may be labeled by some as 
“crony capitalism,” are not positively viewed in the classroom or in the field.12 The debate about 
whether regulatory manipulation is inimical to society is one worth having, but the results of this 
study do support the efficacy of manipulation, if not the social validity. At the very least, this 
                                                           
12 In several second-phase surveys, which asked bankers to count specific instances in which they moved regulatory 
constraints, several bankers abstained from answering and instead wrote in the margins that that they believed these 
activities to be unethical. 
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study suggests that fostering an awareness within the firm of the importance of regulation and of 
perceiving regulatory change can contribute to performance. In the management and 
entrepreneurship classroom, little time is spent on discussing the importance of the formal 
institutional environment to firm performance and less time is spent on discussing strategies to 
manage this environment. The results of this study suggest that teaching and discussing this topic 
may have value for future entrepreneurs and firm leaders. 
Future directions 
 Since Oliver (1991) proposed that firms may take a number of strategic postures related 
to the institutions that constrain them, scholars have focused on explaining the conditions that 
enable firms to manipulate, avoid, defy, and compromise these constraints. This study, which 
links constraint change to entrepreneurial opportunity, falls within this stream of research, and it 
helps establish a foundation on which future research may further explore the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and institutional change. This study also contributes to this literature 
by examining the role of institutional capabilities and firms’ strategy, and it raises a number of 
issues that could prove fruitful for further examination. For instance, greater understanding could 
be sought regarding the origins of institutional capabilities, such as why firms develop these 
capabilities, and why certain capabilities (e.g., interaction capabilities) may be developed more 
strongly by one firm but other capabilities (e.g., manipulation capabilities) may be developed 
more strongly by another firm.  
 With regard to Oliver’s (1991) work, an institutional capabilities perspective may 
enhance our understanding of when, how, and why firms adopt certain strategic postures related 
to institutions. According to Oliver, firms may acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy, or 
manipulate institutions. Oliver (1991) also outlined the institutional environmental conditions 
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that may influence firm responses, such as whether there are many conflicting institutional 
demands on the firm, whether institutional expectations are congruent with firms’ goals (cf. Seo 
& Creed, 2002), and the extent to which institutional pressures are coercive. The institutional 
capabilities perspective may build on this work and explain why firms may take strategic 
postures contrary to those suggested by Oliver. For instance, a firm with strong manipulation 
capabilities may be more willing to assume a manipulation or compromising posture, all else 
being equal, because they are adept at changing institutional constraints.  
 Regarding institutional entrepreneurship as described in Chapter 2 of this study, the 
theory and results presented herein help explain 1) how firms may act as institutional 
entrepreneurs in formal environments and 2) what discrete activities these entrepreneurs may 
undertake to influence their institutional environments. As described earlier, and as shown in 
Table 5, scholars have closely examined the role of institutional entrepreneurs in informal 
environments and how entrepreneurs create new organizational forms and cultural norms. While 
this research contributed to the development of the theory in this study, we nevertheless have 
much less insight regarding how entrepreneurs change formal institutional constraints. 
Examining how institutional entrepreneurs operate in formal institutional environments, where 
constraints are more explicit and coercive than in informal institutional environments, may help 
build a foundation from which scholars can develop a more generalized theory of institutional 
entrepreneurship.  
Capabilities have been defined as high level routines that are central to helping firms 
acquire competitive advantage (Winter, 2003), and capabilities have often been conceptualized 
by scholars as routines directly related to firms’ production of products and services, such as 
contracting capabilities (Mayer & Salomon, 2006) or strategic alliance capabilities (e.g., Schilke, 
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2014). However, the notion of institutional capabilities suggests that one of firms’ central 
concerns may be managing their institutional environments. In understanding how such 
capabilities develop, scholars may pay particular attention to the conditions in which firms might 
develop capabilities that are seemingly tangential to their core production of products and 
services. 
 Constraint expansion and constraint retraction are presented in this study as mirror 
activities, in that they may be caused by the same types of activities and that the same 
capabilities may lead equally to expansion or contraction. However, a firm may not be as 
ambivalent regarding the decision to pursue constraint expansion versus constraint retraction. 
Future research could more closely examine how decision makers in firms choose to target 
constraints for change, how they determine the most appropriate direction for change, and under 
what conditions do firms decide to pursue either greater number of opportunities or increase the 
value of opportunities already being exploited. 
 Capabilities help firms cope with environmental dynamism, which may be defined as the 
rapidity and unpredictability of market and industry change (Miller & Friesen, 1983). In dynamic 
environments, products and services are frequently outmoded by competitors’ innovation and the 
development of new technologies (Peteraf, Stefano, & Verona, 2013; Teece et al., 1997). 
Therefore, firms that are rapidly able to detect and react to these changing conditions, enabled by 
capabilities, may be more likely to obtain competitive advantage (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2014; 
Schilke, 2014). However, environmental dynamism has been frequently conceptualized as the 
extent of changing market conditions and competitor actions rather than changing regulatory 
environments. In highly regulated industries, such as that examined in this study, products and 
services may be more homogenous across firms and few innovations are taking place; however, 
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due to institutional dynamism, these firms may nevertheless benefit from developing capabilities 
not associated at all with the creation and delivery of products and services but rather to protect 
existing operations and modes of value creation. Though consensus has formed around the 
notion that dynamism may be related to firms’ development of capabilities (e.g., Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Peteraf et al., 2013), future scholars may examine how different types of 
dynamism may influence the development of different types of capabilities.  
 Nevertheless, this study’s findings are congruent with research that suggests capabilities 
enable firms to cope with rapid and uncertain environmental change. In this study, firms are 
subject to a multi-layered regulatory environment, in which different regulatory agencies set 
different, sometimes conflicting, constraints. Moreover, the rapid regulatory change has created 
extreme uncertainty. While congress passes a law to regulate banks, this law must then be 
translated into rules, which are instantly and simultaneously promulgated to both regulatory 
agencies for enforcement and to firms for compliance. The consequence of this process is that 
regulatory agencies are determining the best means for defining and enforcing the rules while 
firms are determining the best means for defining and complying with the rules. The outcome is 
a negotiated regulatory environment, albeit rife with uncertainty, conflicting definitions, 
conflicting enforcement standards, and conflicting approaches to compliance. In an institutional 
environment this complex, the pursuit of competitive advantage may be best achieved by firms 
that are able to control this negotiated process, such as through using institutional capabilities. 
Other research has found that institutional complexity slows the rate at which firms comply with 
a new rule (e.g., Raaijmakers, Vermeulen, Meeus, & Zietsma, in press). Therefore, the firm that 
possesses institutional capabilities may be able to comply more rapidly, which may also 
contribute to their ability to control the process through which regulation is negotiated and 
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ultimately enforced. 
 Lastly, the capabilities perspective has been used to inform transaction cost economics by 
explaining which transactions firms may internalize (i.e., those for which they possess 
capabilities) and those which they may leave outside the boundaries of the firm (i.e., those for 
which they do not possess capabilities) (Argyres, Felin, Foss, & Zenger, 2012; Brahm & 
Tarziajan, 2014). One might expect that a bank, restaurant, or drilling company would focus on 
developing capabilities related to the production of customer value, such as the development of 
products and services, process innovations, and new technologies related to more effectively and 
more efficiently creating market value. However, an interesting theme arose in the interviews I 
conducted with bankers, which challenges this expectation. The bankers I interviewed almost 
unanimously agreed that they spend more time dealing with regulatory issues than with strategic 
issues. To the extent that they do develop new products and services, these products and services 
are developed by investment firms outside the bank, vetted by regulatory actors, and ultimately 
purchased by the bank.13 And in the larger banks I visited, the largest departments were the 
compliance departments, and even functions outside compliance (e.g., tellers, loan officers) were 
constantly informed by a compliance priority. The question here would be: at what point does a 
bank cease to be a bank and instead become a compliance mechanism? The notion of 
institutional capabilities assumes that firms are achieving competitive advantage by managing 
the regulatory environment, not by creating innovative new products and services and not by 
delivering these products and services to customers more efficiently and effectively. Instead, in 
                                                           
13 For instance, many small community banks do not have resources sufficient to offer certain products (e.g., home 
loans, certificates of deposit, money market accounts, etc.). Therefore, they may enter into agreements with 
mortgage companies or investment firms to offer these products through the local bank. These products are paired 
with a compliance package (e.g., a regularly updated computer program that local banks use to facilitate the 
transaction of these products), which is maintained by the outside company. 
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some industries, competitive advantage may actually be determined by the ability with which 
firms are able to obtain regulatory access and manipulate regulatory boundaries.  
Limitations 
 This study has a number of limitations. One limitation is the study’s empirical focus on 
the banking industry, which may reduce the generalizability of its findings. The banking industry 
is highly regulated, and the regulation the industry faces is currently highly dynamic. Though 
some industries may share the same level of regulation as the banking industry (e.g., health care, 
nuclear energy, etc.), few, if any, industries are subject to regulatory institutions that are as 
rapidly changing and expanding as those facing the banking industry. Therefore, we may expect 
that banks have more fully developed capabilities related to managing their regulatory 
environment, especially capabilities related to keeping up with rapid and accelerating regulatory 
change. However, the theory developed in the preceding chapters may nevertheless be applicable 
to other firms that face regulatory constraints of any degree. Moreover, this study makes no 
claims to address informal institutions, and whether institutional capabilities, as conceptualized 
in this dissertation, exist in an informal institutional context is left for future researchers to 
examine.  
 The narrow industry focus also has methodological implications, which may also reduce 
the generalizability of this study. The institutional capability measurement model was developed 
through interviewing and surveying individuals within the banking industry. Therefore, the items 
in the survey are tailored to address activities and outcomes specific to the banking industry. 
Subsequent research, when applying the institutional capabilities scale developed in this 
dissertation as well as using the constraint change measures, would likely have to adapt many of 
the items to address new industry contexts.  
105 
 
 A second limitation concerns the low sample size, which reduces the statistical power of 
the study and which can increase the likelihood of Type II error (i.e., the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false). For instance, some moderation effects may be 
relatively small, and these effects could be found to be non-significant in a small sample size 
study. To mitigate this limitation, I am currently contacting subjects who responded to the first 
survey but not to the second survey to acquire their response to the second survey, which will 
increase the sample size available for this study. The final limitation also concerns the empirical 
portion of this study. The survey I developed was based on deductive theorization and field 
interviews. While several of the measures produced through this process were very reliable, at 
least two were not. Perception capabilities and regulatory framing both had Cronbach alphas 
below the .70 threshold (Kline, 1999). Low reliability of these measures primarily indicates a 
problem with the survey instrument, which would need to be corrected if ever reused. Low 
reliability also calls into question the results found through statistical analysis, especially given 
that perception capabilities and regulatory framing were involved in several supported 
hypotheses. 
 Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the model presented in this study may be more 
broadly applicable to firms facing a wide variety of regulatory challenges. The 2010 passage of 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides a recent example of how heavily regulated industries 
may use capabilities to influence and comply with the law. The hospital industry, including 
national trade associations, supported many of the provisions of the law as it was being debated 
among lawmakers (medicarenewgroup.com, 2014). For hospitals, the law constituted constraint 
retraction in that it limited the number of competitors from other industries (i.e., physician-
owned clinics and hospitals) that were permitted to exploit the same opportunity: by preventing 
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the establishment of new physician-owned clinics and hospitals, the ACA served to increase the 
value of opportunities being exploited by primary-care hospitals. In terms of the capability model 
presented in this study, perception capabilities likely played a role in how hospitals established 
causality between the costs they were bearing and the establishment of physician-owned 
hospitals. Interaction capabilities enabled the hospital industry to create relationships within the 
lawmaking entities from which they could advocate for constraint change. Manipulation 
capabilities enabled the industry to propose and pursue the implementation of new law. 
However, as the theory presented in chapters 2 and 3 suggests, many different actors may 
have an interest in formal institutional changes, and as the ACA took shape, other industries, 
such as the health insurance industry, became involved in the process. The ACA eventually took 
on many different dimensions that affect many different industries, not all of which are perceived 
as favorable to the hospital industry. This divergent process is congruent with some institutional 
entrepreneurship research that suggests any change effort may be diverted as other actors 
become involved and pursue their own interests. Since its passage, the ACA has been subject to 
repeal efforts and other modification efforts (i.e., constraint expansion efforts), some of which 
have been led by industry players.  However, as the law has been gradually enforced (i.e., many 
of its provisions have been phased-in over a period of several years) and much of its enforcement 
remains ambiguous, these subsequent change efforts have not been effective. The research model 
in this study would suggest that since the ACA, as a regulatory constraint, is vague, its costs on 
performance are unclear, and is highly complex, that firms may be hesitant to launch or support 
new change efforts. 
The model may also inform formal institutional changes even in industries that contend 
with relatively low levels of regulation. As described above, firms that operate in stable 
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regulatory environments may be less likely to develop capabilities related to changing their 
regulatory environments (e.g., Peteraf et al., 2013). Moreover, firms that do not have significant 
interaction with the regulatory environment may be less likely to bear costs related to the 
environment or develop strong regulatory frames. Therefore, these firms may exhibit less 
regulatory change behavior because the antecedent conditions, as described in the research 
model, do not exist to the extent they do in highly regulated industries. Nevertheless, these firms 
may be motivated to change regulatory constraints in the face of increased competition or when 
they have identified new opportunities to exploit that lie beyond a particular constraint. Firms in 
service industries, such as restaurants, hotels, bars, hairdressers, and taxi-cab drivers, are 
frequently required to meet minimum regulatory requirements, such as the purchase of vendors’ 
licenses, or be open to periodic inspection, such as inspections of kitchen sanitary conditions. As 
new competitors arise, these firms may attempt to tighten even these minimum constraints. For 
instance, taxi-cab and limousine drivers, who are required to purchase chauffers’ licenses in 
Oklahoma, have attempted to retract regulatory constraints in order to prevent the entry of un-
licensed competitors, such as Uber (i.e, a smartphone app-based taxi service that links consumers 
with independent drivers).     
Conclusion 
 This dissertation had two objectives: 1) understand why firms pursue regulatory change, 
and 2) understand why some firms are better at achieving this change than others. To address the 
first objective, I integrated concepts central to entrepreneurship theory into the institutional 
entrepreneurship perspective by suggesting that entrepreneurs and firms are motivated to change 
regulatory constraints while in pursuit of business opportunities. To address the second objective, 
I drew on the capabilities perspective to conduct a series of field interviews as well as develop 
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and test a measurement model of institutional capabilities. While I hope that this measurement 
model may serve as a launching point for future scholars to examine the role of institutional 
capabilities, the foundation that this dissertation has laid for the examination of institutional 
entrepreneurship as a phenomenon informed by entrepreneurship theory is very promising. 
Heretofore, institutional entrepreneurship scholars have largely neglected the insights developed 
within entrepreneurship theory, but I hope that the potential implications and insights of 
integrating the two streams of research are clearer as a consequence of this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adler, P.S., & Borys, B. 1996. Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 41: 61-89. 
 
Adler, P.S., & Kwon, S.W. 2002. Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy of 
Management Review, 27: 17-40.  
 
Aiken, L.S., & West, S.G. 1991. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Aldrich, H.E. 2012. The emergence of entrepreneurship as an academic field: A personal essay 
on institutional entrepreneurship. Research Policy, 41: 1240-1248. 
 
Aldrich, H.E., & Fiol, C.M. 1994. Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation. 
Academy of Management Review, 19: 645-670.  
 
Alexiev, A.S., Jansen, J.J., Van den Bosch, F.A., & Volberda, H.W. 2010. Top management 
team advice seeking and exploratory innovation: The moderating role of TMT 
heterogeneity. Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1343-1364. 
 
Alm, J., Jackson, B., & McKee, M. 1992. Institutional uncertainty and taxpayer compliance. 
American Economic Review, 82: 1018-1026.  
 
Anderson, B.S., Covin, J.G., & Slevin, D.P. 2009. Understanding the relationship between 
entrepreneurial orientation and strategic learning capability: An empirical investigation. 
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 3: 218-240.  
 
Argyres, N., Felin, T., Foss, N., & Zenger, T. 2012. The organizational economics of 
organizational capability and heterogeneity: A research agenda. Organization Science, 
23: 1212-1226. 
 
Argyres, N., & Mayer, K. 2007. Contract design as a firm capability: An integration of learning 
and transaction cost perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 32: 1060-1077. 
 
Autio, E., George, G., & Alexy, O. 2011. International entrepreneurship and capability 
development – Qualitative evidence and future research directions. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 35: 11-37. 
 
Bagley, C.E. 2008. Winning legally: The value of legal astuteness. Academy of Management 
Review, 33: 378-390.
 
110 
 
Bailey, B. 2013. Federal appeals court grants Hobby Lobby’s request to speed court case. The 
Daily Oklahoman, accessed on March 31, 2013 at http://newsok.com/federal-appeals-
court-grants-hobby-lobbys-request-to-speed-court-case/article/3775608. 
 
Bales, K., & Soodalter, R. 2009. The slave next door: Human trafficking and slavery in 
America today. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Bargeron, L.L., Lehn, K.M., & Zutter, C.J. Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 49: 34-52. 
 
Barley, S.R., & Tolbert, P.S. 1997. Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the links 
between action and institution. Organization Studies, 18: 93-117. 
 
Barney, J.B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17: 99-120. 
 
Barney, J.B., & Arikan, A.M. 2001. The resource-based view: Origins and implications. In M. 
Hitt, R. Freeman, & J. Harrison (Eds.), The Blackwell handbook of strategic 
management (pp. 124-188). 
 
Barney, J.B., Wright, M., & Ketchen, D.J. 2001. The resource-based view of the firm: Ten years 
after 1991. Journal of Management, 27: 625-641. 
 
Baron, D.P. 1995. Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components. California 
Management Review, 37: 47-65.  
 
Barringer, B.R., & Bluedorn, A.C. 1999. The relationship between corporate entrepreneurship 
and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 421-444. 
 
Battilana, J. 2006. Agency and institutions: The enabling role of individuals’ social position. 
Organization, 13: 653-676. 
 
Battilana, J., & D’Aunno, T. 2009. Institutional work and the paradox of embedded agency. In T. 
Lawrence, R. Suddaby, & B. Leca (Eds.), Institutional work: Actors and agency in 
institutional studies of organization: 31-58. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxembaum, E. 2009. How actors change institutions: Towards a 
theory of institutional entrepreneurship. In J. P. Walsh & A. P. Brief (Eds.), Academy of 
Management Annals, vol. 3: 65-107. Essex, U.K.: Routledge. 
 
Baum, F., & Tarzijan, J. 2014. Transactional hazards, institutional change, and capabilities: 
Integrating the theories of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 35: 224-245. 
 
Baum, J.R., & Bird, B.J. 2010. The successful intelligence of high-growth entrepreneurs: Links 
to new venture growth. Organization Science, 21: 397-412. 
 
111 
 
Baumol, W. 1990. Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive. Journal of 
Political Economy, 98: 893-921.  
 
Baysinger, B.D. 1984. Domain maintenance as an objective of business political activity: An 
expanded typology. Academy of Management Review, 9: 248-258. 
 
Bebbington, A. 1999. Capitals and capabilities: A framework for analyzing peasant viability, 
rural livelihoods and poverty. World Development, 27: 2021-2044. 
 
Becker, H.S. 1963. Outsiders. New York: Free Press. 
 
Becker, H.S. 1984. Moral entrepreneurs: The creation and enforcement of deviant categories. In 
Delos Kelly (ed.), Deviant behavior: A text-reader in the sociology of deviance (pp. 21-
28). New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Benford, R.D., & Snow, D.A. 2000. Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26: 585-609.  
 
Bingham, C.B., Eisenhardt, K.M., & Furr, N.R. 2007. What makes a process a capability? 
Heuristics, strategy, and effective capture of opportunities. Strategic Entrepreneurship 
Journal, 1: 27-47.  
 
Bo, E.D. 2006. Regulatory capture: A review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22: 203-225. 
 
Boettke, P.J., Coyne, C.J., & Leeson, P.T. 2008. Institutional stickiness and the new 
development economics. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67: 331-358. 
 
Bonardi, J.P., & Keim, G.D. 2005. Corporate political strategies for widely salient issues. 
Academy of Management Review, 30: 555-576. 
 
Boone, C., & Hendriks, W. 2009. Top management team diversity and firm performance: 
Moderators of functional-background and locus-of-control diversity. Management 
Science, 55: 165-180. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1986. The forms of capital. In J.G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory and 
research for the sociology of education (pp. 241-258). New York: Greenwood.  
 
Bourdieu, P. 1990. The logic of practice. Cambridge, UK: Polity.  
 
Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L.J.D. 1992. An invitation to reflexive sociology. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
Brint, S., & Karabel, J. 1991. Institutional origins and transformation: The case of American 
Community Colleges. In W.W. Powell & P.J. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new 
112 
 
institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 337-360). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Brush, T.H., & Artz, K.W. 1999. Toward a contingent resource-based theory: The impact of 
information asymmetry on the value of capabilities in veterinary medicine. Strategic 
Management Journal, 20: 223-250. 
 
Caldeira, G.A. 1987. Public opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR’s court-packing plan. 
American Political Science Review, 81: 1139-1153. 
 
Calfee, J.E., & Craswell, R. 1984. Some effects of uncertainty on compliance with legal 
standards. Virginia law review, 70: 965-1003.  
 
Center for Responsive Politics. 2013. Top PACs. Accessed on March 24, 2013 at 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/toppacs.php.  
 
Chew, M.K., & Laubichler, M.D. 2003. Natural enemies – Metaphor or misconception? Science, 
301: 52-53. 
 
Chiasson, M., & Saunders, C. 2005. Reconciling diverse approaches to opportunity research 
using the structuration theory. Journal of Business Venturing, 20: 747-767.  
 
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. 2008. Political connections and preferential access to 
finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88: 554-
580. 
 
Clawson, D., Newstadtl, A., & Bearden, J. 1986. The logic of business unity: Corporate 
contributions to the 1980 congressional elections. American Sociological Review, 51: 
797-811. 
 
Coff, R., & Kryscynski, D. 2011. Invited editorial: Drilling for micro-foundations of human 
capital-based competitive advantages. Journal of Management, 37: 1429-1443. 
 
Colomy, P. 1995. Uneven structural differentiation: Toward a comparative approach. In J. 
Alexander (Ed.), Neofunctionalism (pp. 131-156). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Colomy, P. & Rhoades, G. 1994. Toward a micro corrective of structural differentiation theory. 
Sociological Perspectives, 37: 547-583.  
 
Combs, J.G., Michael, S.C., & Castrogiovanni, G.J. 2009. Institutional influences on the choice 
of organizational form: The case of franchising. Journal of Management, 35: 1268-
1290. 
 
Corbett, L. M., & Campbell-Hunt, C. 2002. Grappling with a gusher! Manufacturing’s response 
to business success in small and medium enterprises. Journal of Operations 
Management, 20: 495-517.  
113 
 
 
Cornelissen, J.P., Clarke, J.S. 2010. Imagining and rationalizing opportunities: Inductive 
reasoning and the creation and justification of new ventures. Academy of Management 
Review, 35: 539-557. 
 
Covin, J.G., & Miles, M.P. 1999. Corporate entrepreneurship and the pursuit of competitive 
advantage. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23: 47-64.  
 
Crane, A. 2013. Modern slavery as a management practice: Exploring the conditions and 
capabilities for human exploitation. Academy of Management Review, 38: 49-69. 
 
Creed, W.E.D., Scully, M.A., & Austin, J.R. 2002. Clothes make the person? The tailoring of 
legitimating accounts and the social construction of identity. Organization Science, 13: 
475-496. 
 
Cyert, R.M., & March, J.G. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Danzon, P.M., & Chao, L.-W. 2000. Does regulation drive out competition in pharmaceutical 
markets? Journal of Law and Economics, 43: 311-358. 
 
Datta, D.K., Guthrie, J.P., & Wright, P.M. 2005. Human resource management and labor 
productivity: Does industry matter? Academy of Management Journal, 48: 135-145. 
 
Davis, G.F., Diekmann, K.A., & Tinsley, C.H. 1994. The decline and fall of the conglomerate 
firm in the 1980s: The deinstitutionalization of an organizational form. American 
Sociological Review, 59: 547-570. 
 
Day, G. S. 1994. The capabilities of market driven firms. Journal of Marketing, 58(4): 37-52. 
 
Delmar, F., & Shane, S. 2004. Legitimating first: Organizing activities and the survival of new 
ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 19: 385-410.  
 
Delmestri, G. 2006. Streams of inconsistent institutional influences: Middle managers as carriers 
of multiple identities. Human Relations, 59: 1515-1541.  
 
Demil, B., & Bensedrine, J. 2005. Processes of legitimation and pressure toward regulation: 
Corporate conformity and strategic behavior. International Studies of Management and 
Organization, 35: 56-77. 
 
Demsetz, H. 1982. Barriers to entry. American Economic Review, 72: 47-57. 
 
Denrell, J., Fang, C., & Winter, S.G. 2003. The economics of strategic opportunity. Strategic 
Management Journal, 24: 977-990. 
 
DiMaggio, P.J. 1988. Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. Zucker (Ed.), Institutional 
114 
 
patterns and organizations: 3-22. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.  
 
DiMaggio, P.J., & Powell, W.W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48: 147-
160. 
 
Drnevich, P.L., & Kriauciunas, A.P. 2011. Clarifying the conditions and limits of the 
contributions of ordinary and dynamic capabilities relative to firm performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 32: 254-279. 
 
Dyer, J.H., & Singh, H. 1998. The relational view: Cooperative strategy and interorganizational 
competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 660-679. 
 
Edelman, L.B. 1992. Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational mediation of civil 
rights law. American Journal of Sociology, 97: 1531-1576.  
 
Edelman, L.B., Petterson, S., Chambliss, E., & Erlanger, H.S. 1991. Legal ambiguity and the 
politics of compliance. Law and policy, 13: 73-97. 
 
Edelman, L.B., & Suchman, M.C. 1997. The legal environments of organizations. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 23: 479-515.  
 
Eisenhardt, K.M., & Martin, J.A. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic 
Management Journal, 21: 1105-1121. 
 
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1995. Charisma and institution building: Max Weber and modern sociology. In 
S. Eisenstadt (Ed.), Power, trust, and meaning (pp. 167-210). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Elenkov, D.S. Strategic uncertainty and environmental scanning: The case for institutional 
influences on scanning behavior. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 287-302. 
 
Endicott, T. 2001. Law is necessarily vague. Legal theory, 7: 379-385. 
 
Estrin, S., Korosteleva, J., & Mickiewicz, T. In press. Which institutions encourage 
entrepreneurial growth aspirations? Journal of Business Venturing.  
 
Ferguson, T., & Voth, H.-J. 2008. Betting on Hitler – The value of political connections in Nazi 
Germany. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123: 101-137. 
 
Fetter, R.B., & Freeman, J.L. 1986. Diagnosis related groups: Product line management within 
hospitals. Academy of Management Review, 11: 41-54. 
 
Fisman, R. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 91: 
1095-1102. 
 
115 
 
Fligstein, N. 1997. Social skills and institutional theory. American Behavioral Scientist, 40: 
397-405.  
 
Fligstein, N. 2001. The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of twenty-first century 
capitalist societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
France, M., & Laville, L. 2004. A compelling case for lawyer CEO’s. BusinessWeek, December 
13: 88. 
 
Friedland, R., & Alford, R.A. 1991. Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and 
institutional contradictions. In W. Powell & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new 
institutionalism in organizational analysis (pp. 232-263). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Fukuyama, F. 2011. The origins of political order: From prehuman times to the French 
Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.  
 
Garud, R., Jain, S., & Kumaraswamy, A. 2002. Institutional entrepreneurship in the sponsorship 
of common technological standards: The case of Sun Microsystems and Java. Academy 
of Management Journal, 45: 196-214. 
 
Gaskin, J. 2012. “CFA: Invariance.” Gaskination's StatWiki. http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com. 
 
Gaur, A.S., & Lu, J.W. 2007. Ownership strategies and survival of foreign subsidiaries: Impacts 
of institutional distance and experience. Journal of Management, 33: 84-110. 
 
Gavetti, G. 2005. Cognition and hierarchy: Rethinking the microfoundations of capabilities’ 
development. Organization Science, 16: 599-617. 
 
Giddens, A. The constitution of society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
 
Gioia, D.A., & Poole, P.P. 1984. Scripts in organizational behavior. Academy of Management 
Review, 9: 449-459.  
 
Goffman, E. 1963. Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Englewood Cliffs, 
NY: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. 2009. Do politically connected boards affect firm value? 
Review of Financial Studies, 22: 2331-2360.  
 
Grant, J.K. 2010. What can we learn from the 2010 BP oil spill: Five important corporate law 
and life lessons. McGeorge Law Review, 42: 809-824. 
 
Grant, R.M. 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 17: 109-122. 
 
116 
 
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C.R. 1988. Organizational design types, tracks and the dynamics of 
strategic change. Organization Studies, 9: 293-316.  
 
Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K., & Suddaby, R. 2008. Introduction. In R. Greenwood, C. 
Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organizational 
institutionalism: 1-46. Los Angeles: Sage.  
 
Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. 2006. Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: The big 
five accounting firms. Academy of Management Journal, 49: 27-48. 
 
Grief, A. 1994. Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical 
reflection on collectivist and individualist societies. Journal of Political Economy, 102: 
912-950.  
 
Grier, K.B., Munger, M.C., & Roberts, B.E. 1994. The determinants of industry political activity, 
1978-1986. American Political Science Review, 88: 911-926. 
 
Gulati, R., & Gargiulo, M. 1999. Where to interorganizational networks come from? American 
Journal of Sociology, 104: 1439-1493. 
 
Hadfield, G.K. 1994. Weighing the value of vagueness: An economic perspective on precision in 
the law. California law review, 82: 541-554. 
 
Haeussler, C., Patzelt, H., & Zahra, S.A. 2012. Strategic alliances and product development in 
high technology new firms: The moderating effect of technological capabilities. Journal 
of Business Venturing, 27: 217-233.  
 
Hambrick, D.C. 1982. Environmental scanning and organizational strategy. Strategic 
Management Journal, 3: 159-174. 
 
Hambrick, D.C., Geletkanycz, M.A., & Fredrickson, J.W. 1993. Top executive commitment to 
the status quo: Some tests of its determinants. Strategic Management Journal, 14: 401-
418. 
 
Hannan, M.T., & Freeman, J. 1984. Structural inertia and organizational change. American 
Sociological Review, 49: 149-164. 
 
Hannan, M.T., & Freeman, J. 1989. Organizational ecology. Boston: Harvard University Press.  
 
Hansen, W., & Mitchell, N. 2000. Disaggregating and explaining corporate political activity: 
Domestic and foreign corporations in national politics. American Political Science 
Review, 94: 891-903.  
 
Hargrave, T.J., & Van de Ven, A.H. 2006. A collective action model of institutional innovation. 
Academy of Management Review, 31: 864-888.  
 
117 
 
Hart, D. 2001. Why do some firms give? Why do some firms give a lot? High-tech PACs, 1977-
1996. Journal of Politics, 63: 1230-1249.  
 
Hayek, F. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35: 519-530.  
 
Helfat, C.E., & Peteraf, M.A. 2003. The dynamic resource-based view: Capabilities life cycles. 
Strategic Management Journal, 24: 997-1010. 
 
Helfat, C.E., & Peteraf, M.A. 2014. Managerial cognitive capabilities and the microfoundations 
of dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, in press. 
 
Hiatt, S.R., Sine, W.D., & Tolbert, P.S. 2009. From Pabst to Pepsi: The deinstitutionalization of 
social practices and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 54: 635-667.  
 
Hill, F., & Gaddy, C. 2012. Vladimir Putin’s risky ploy to manufacture history. The Atlantic, 
retrieved online March 1, 2013 from 
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/vladimir-putins-risky-ploy-to-
manufacture-history/251269. 
 
Hillman, A.J., & Hitt, M.A. 1999. Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, 
participation, and strategy decisions. Academy of Management Review, 24: 825-842. 
 
Hillman, A.J., Keim, G.D., Schuler, D. 2004. Corporate political activity: A review and research 
agenda. Journal of Management, 30: 837-857. 
 
Hillman, A.J., Withers, M.C., & Collins, B.J. 2009. Resource dependence theory: A review. 
Journal of Management, 35: 1404-1427. 
 
Hillman, A.J., Zardkoohi, A., & Bierman, L. 1999. Corporate political strategies and firm 
performance: Indications of firm-specific benefits from. Strategic Management Journal, 
20: 67-81 
 
Hinkin, T.R. 1998. A brief tutorial on the development of measures for use in survey 
questionnaires. Organizational Research Methods, 1: 104-121. 
 
Hinthorne, T. 1996. Predatory capitalism, pragmatism, and legal positivism in the airlines 
industry. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 251-270. 
 
Hitt, M.A., Ireland, R.D., Camp, M., & Sexton, D.L. 2001. Strategic entrepreneurship: 
Entrepreneurial strategies for wealth creation. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 479-
491. 
 
Ho, P. 2001. Who owns China’s land? Property rights and deliberate institutional ambiguity. The 
China quarterly, 166: 394-421. 
 
118 
 
Holburn, G.L.F., & Vanden Bergh, R.G. 2004. Influencing agencies through pivotal political 
institutions. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20: 458-483. 
 
Holburn, G.L.F., & Vanden Bergh, R.G. 2008. Making friends in hostile environments: Political 
strategy in regulated industries. Academy of Management Review, 33: 521-540. 
 
Holcombe, R.G. 2000. Entrepreneurship and economic growth. The quarterly journal of 
Austrian economics, 1: 45-62.  
 
Holcombe, R.G. 2003. The origins of entrepreneurial opportunities. Review of Austrian 
Economics, 16: 25-43. 
 
Holmes, R.M., Miller, T., Hitt, M.A., & Salmador, M.P. In press. The interrelationships among 
informal institutions, formal institutions, and inward foreign direct investment. Journal 
of Management.  
 
Huntington, S.P. 1996. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: 
Simon & Schuster.  
 
Huselid, M.A., Jackson, S.E., & Schuler, R.S. 1997. Technical and strategic human resources 
management effectiveness as determinants of firm performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40: 171-188. 
 
Jepperson, R.L. 1991. Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. The new 
institutionalism in organizational analysis, 6: 143-163. 
 
Jennings, P.D., Greenwood, R., Lounsbury, M.D., & Suddaby, R. 2013. Institutions, 
entrepreneurs, and communities: A special issue on entrepreneurship. Research Policy, 
28: 1-9.  
 
Kalberg, S. 1980. Max Weber’s types of rationality: Cornerstones for the analysis of 
rationalization processes in history. American Journal of Sociology, 85: 1145-1179. 
 
Kelly, D., & Amburgey, T.L. 1991. Organizational inertia and momentum: A dynamic model of 
strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 591-612. 
 
Kelman, S. 1980. Occupational safety and health administration. In J. Wilson (Ed.), The politics 
of regulation (pp. 236-266). New York: Basic Book Publishers. 
 
Kilmer, B., & Pacula, R.L. 2009. Estimating the size of the global drug market: A demand-size 
approach. RAND Corporation. Accessed on March 5, 2013 at 
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR711.pdf 
 
King, A.W., & Zeithaml, C.P. 2000. Competencies and firm performance: Examining the causal 
ambiguity paradox. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 75-99 
 
Kirzner, I. 1973. Competition and entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
119 
 
 
Kirzner, I. 1985. Discovery and the capitalist process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Kline, P. 1999. The handbook of psychological testing. London: Routledge. 
 
Klein, P.G., Mahoney, J.T., McGahan, A.M., & Pitelis, C.N. 2013. Capabilities and strategic 
entrepreneurship in public organizations. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journals, 7: 70-91. 
 
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. 2009. Bank governance, regulation, and risk taking. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 93: 259-275. 
 
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. 1991. The politics of government decision-making: A theory of 
regulatory capture. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 1089-1127. 
 
Langbein, L.I. 1986. Money and access: Some empirical evidence. Journal of Politics, 48: 1052-
1062. 
 
Lavie, D. 2006. Capability reconfiguration: An analysis of incumbent responses to technological 
change. Academy of Management Review, 31: 153-174. 
 
Lawrence, T.B. 1999. Institutional strategy. Journal of Management, 25: 161-188. 
 
Leiblein, M.J. 2011. What do resource- and capability-based theories propose? Journal of 
Management, 37: 909-932. 
 
Leiblein, M.J., & Reuer, J.J. 2004. Building a foreign sales base: The roles of capabilities and 
alliances for entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 19: 285-307.  
 
Lichenthaler, U., & Muethel, M. 2012. The impact of family involvement on dynamic innovation 
capabilities: Evidence from German manufacturing firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 36: 1235-1253.  
 
Lindquist, S.A., & Klein, D.E. 2006. The influence of jurisprudential considerations on Supreme 
court decisionmaking: A study of conflict cases. Law & Society Review, 40: 135-162. 
 
Lillis, M. 2012. Former GOP Sen. Frist urges party to back key measure in Obama health law. 
The Hill, accessed on April 1, 2013 at http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-
reform-implementation/238771-former-gop-senator-urges-party-to-back-key-measure-in-
health-law. 
 
Lincoln, J.R. 1995. Book review – Walter W. Powell & Paul DiMaggio (Eds.): The new 
institutionalism in organizational research. Social Forces, 73: 1147-1148. 
 
Lounsbury, M., & Glynn, M.A. 2001. Cultural entrepreneurship: Stories, legitimacy, and the 
acquisition of resources. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 545-564. 
 
Lumpkin, G.T., & Dess, G.G. 1996. Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and 
120 
 
linking it to performance. Academy of Management Review, 21: 135-172.   
 
Lyon, F. 2000. Trust, networks and norms: The creation of social capital in agricultural 
economies in Ghana. World Development, 28: 663-681. 
 
Lux, S., Crook, T.R., & Woehr, D.J. 2011. Mixing business with politics: A meta-analysis of the 
antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity. Journal of Management, 37: 
223-247. 
 
Mair, J., & Marti, I. 2009. Entrepreneurship in and around institutional voids: A case study from 
Bangladesh. Journal of Business Venturing, 24: 419-435.  
 
Maguire, S., Hardy, C., Lawrence, T.B. 2004. Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields: 
HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 657-
679.  
 
March, J.G., & Simon, H.A. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley.  
 
Markowitz, L. 2007. Structural innovators and core-framing tasks: How socially responsible 
mutual fund companies build identity among investors. Sociological Perspectives, 50: 
131-153.  
 
Martens, M.L., Jennings, J.E., & Jennings, P.D. 2007. Do the stories they tell get them the 
money they need? The role of entrepreneurial narratives in resource acquisition. 
Academy of Management Journal, 50: 1107-1132.  
 
Mayer, K.J., & Salomon, R.M. 2006. Capabilities, contractual hazards, and governance: 
Integrating resource-based and transaction cost perspectives. Academy of Management 
Journal, 49: 942-959. 
 
McMullen, J.S., Bagby, D.R., & Palich, L.E. 2008. Economic freedom and the motivation to 
engage in entrepreneurial action. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32: 875-895.  
 
Meek, W.R., Pacheco, D.F., & York, J.G. 2010. The impact of social norms on entrepreneurial 
action: Evidence from the environmental entrepreneurship context. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 25: 493-509.  
 
Meyer, A. 1982. Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27: 515-
537.   
 
Meyer, J.W. 2006. Visiting relatives: Current developments in the new sociology of knowledge. 
Organization, 13: 725-738. 
 
Meyer, J.W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutional organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-363.  
 
Miller, T.C. 2007. Private contractors outnumber U.S. troops in Iraq. The Los Angeles Times, 
121 
 
accessed on March 31 at http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/07/04/2284. 
 
Miller, D., & Friesen, P.H. 1982. Innovation in conservative and entrepreneurial firms: Tow 
models of strategic momentum. Strategic Management Journal, 3: 1-25. 
 
Misangyi, V.F., Weaver, G.R., & Elms, H. 2008. Ending corruption: The interplay among 
institutional logics, resources, and institutional entrepreneurs. Academy of Management 
Review, 33: 750-770.  
 
Mitnick, B.M. 1981. The strategic uses of regulation – and deregulation. Business Horizons, 24: 
71-83.  
 
Muller, D., Judd, C.M., Yzerbyt, V.Y. 2005. When moderation is mediated and mediation is 
moderated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89: 852-863. 
 
Mullins, B., & Zimmerman, A. 2010. Target discovers downside to political contributions. The 
Wall Street Journal, accessed on March 31, 2013 at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696.html 
 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational 
advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23: 242-266. 
 
Nasra, R., & Dacin, M.T. 2010. Institutional arrangements and international entrepreneurship: 
The state as institutional entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34: 583-
609.  
 
Nelson, R.L., & Nielson, L.B. 2000. Cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs: Constructing the role of 
inside counsel in large corporations. Law and Society Review, 34: 457-494. 
 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. 1982. An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge, 
UK: Belknap Press / Harvard University Press.  
 
Neustadtl, A. & Clawson, D. 1988. Corporate political groupings: Does ideology unify business 
political behavior? American Sociological Review, 53: 172-190. 
 
North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
North, D.C., & Weingast, B.R. 1989. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of 
institutional governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. Journal of 
Economic History, 49: 803-832. 
 
Oakes, L.S., Townley, B., & Cooper, D.J. 1998. Business planning as pedagogy: Language and 
control in a changing institutional field. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 257-292.  
 
Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional pressures. Academy of Management Review, 
16: 145-179. 
122 
 
 
Oliver, C. 1992. The antecedents of deinstitutionalization. Organization Science, 13: 563-588. 
 
Oliver, C., & Holzinger, I. 2008. The effectiveness of strategic political management: A dynamic 
capabilities framework. Academy of Management Review, 33: 496-520. 
 
OpenSecrets.org. 2013. Political action committees. Accessed on March 31, 2013 at 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs. 
 
Orr, A. 2009. Too complex to regulate? Published by the Economic Policy Institute, accessed on 
March 24, 2013 at http://www.epi.org/publication/too_complex_to_regulate/ 
 
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Pacheco, D.F., York, J.G., Dean, T.J., & Sarasvathy, S.D. 2010. The coevolution of institutional 
entrepreneurship: A tale of two theories. Journal of Management, 36: 974-1010. 
 
Palmer, J. 2012. ABLE commission corks mall holiday wine sales in Oklahoma. The Daily 
Oklahoman, accessed on March 25, 2013 at http://newsok.com/able-commission-corks-
mall-holiday-wine-sales-in-oklahoma/article/3739626. 
 
Pedhazur, E., & Schmelkin, L. 1991. Measurement, design, and analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Peteraf, M., Stevano, G., & Vernoa, G. 2013. The elephant in the room of dynamic capabilities: 
Bringing two diverging conversations together. Strategic Management Journal, 34: 
1389-1410. 
 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G.R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.  
 
Phillips, N., Lawrence, T.B., & Hardy, C. 2004. Discourse and institutions. Academy of 
Management Review, 29: 635-652. 
 
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee, J.Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. 2003. Common method biases 
in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 88: 879-903. 
 
Podsakoff, P.M., & Organ, D.W. 1986. Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and 
prospects. Journal of Management, 12: 531-544. 
 
Preacher, K.J., Rucker, D.D., & Hayes, A.F. 2007. Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: 
Theory, method, and prescriptions. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 42: 185-227. 
 
Puffer, S.M., McCarthy, D.J., & Boisot, M. 2009. Entrepreneurship in Russia and China: The 
123 
 
impact of formal institutional voids. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34: 441-
467.  
 
Raaijmakers, A.G.M., Vermeulen, P.A.M., Meeus, M.T.H., & Zietsma, C. In press. I need time! 
Exploring pathways to compliance under institutional complexity. Academy of 
Management Journal, in press. 
 
Rao, H. 1998. Caveat emptor: The construction of nonprofit consumer watchdog organizations. 
American Journal of Sociology, 103: 912-961.  
 
Rao, H., Morrill, C., & Zald, M.N. 2000. Power plays: How social movements and collective 
action create new organizational forms. In B. Staw & R. Sutton (Eds.), Research in 
organizational behavior (vol. 22, pp. 239-282). New York: JAI Press.  
 
Reed, R., & DeFillippi, R.J. Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and sustainable competitive 
advantage. Academy of Management Review, 15: 88-102.   
 
Ritzer, G. 2008. Sociological theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Salvato, C. 2009. Capabilities unveiled: The role of ordinary activities in the evolution of 
product development processes. Organization Science, 20: 384-409.  
 
Salvato, C., & Rerup, C. 2011. Beyond collective entities: Multilevel research on organizational 
routines and capabilities. Journal of Management, 37: 468-490. 
 
Santos, F.M., & Eisenhardt, K.M. 2009. Constructing markets and shaping boundaries. Academy 
of Management Journal, 52: 643-671.  
 
Sapienza, P. 2003. The effects of government ownership on bank lending. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 72: 357-384.  
 
Scandlen, G. 2013. Physician-owned hospitals rated high but are doomed. National Center for 
Policy Analysis, accessed on April 1, 2013 at http://healthblog.ncpa.org/physician-
owned-hospitals-rated-high-but-are-doomed/ 
 
Schilke, O. 2014. On the contingent value of dynamic capabilities for competitive advantage: 
The nonlinear moderating effect of environmental dynamism. Strategic Management 
Journal, 35: 179-203. 
 
Schuler, D.A. 1996. Corporate political strategy and foreign competition: The case of the steel 
industry. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 720-737. 
 
Schuler, D.A., Rehbein, K., & Cramer, R.D. 2002. Pursuing strategic advantage through political 
means: A multivariate approach. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 659-672. 
 
Schumpeter, J. 1934. The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
124 
 
 
Scott, R.W. 1987. The adolescence of institutional theory. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 
493-511. 
 
Scott, R.W. 2001. Institutions and organizations. (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Scott, R.W., & Meyer, J.W. 1991. The organization of societal sectors: Propositions and early 
evidence. In W. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis: 108-140. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Siedel, G.J. 2002. Using the law for competitive advantage. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
 
Selznick, P. 1948. Foundations of the theory of organization. American Sociological Review, 13: 
25-35.  
 
Selznick, P. 1957. Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. Evanston, Ill.: 
Row, Peterson.  
 
Seo, M., & Creed, W. 2002. Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: A 
dialectical perspective. Academy of Management Review, 27: 222-247.  
 
Shaffer, B. 1995. Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and research 
approaches. Journal of Management, 21: 495-514. 
 
Shane, S. 1993. Cultural influences on national rates of innovation. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 8: 59-73.  
 
Shane, S. 2003. A general theory of entrepreneurship: The individual-opportunity nexus. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  
 
Shane, S. 2012. Reflections on the 2010 AMR decade award: Delivering on the promise of 
entrepreneurship as a field of research. Academy of Management Review, 37: 10-20. 
 
Shane, S., & Venkataraman, S. 2000. The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research. 
Academy of Management Review, 25: 217-226. 
 
Shapiro, S.P. 2005. Agency theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 31: 263-284. 
 
Shils, E. 1975. Center and periphery: Essays in macro sociology. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Short, J.C., Ketchen, D.J., Shook, C.L., & Ireland, R.D. 2010. The concept of “opportunity” in 
entrepreneurship research: Past accomplishments and future challenges. Journal of 
Management, 36: 40-65.  
 
Sine, W.D., & David, R.J. Environmental jolts, institutional change, and the creation of 
125 
 
entrepreneurial opportunity in the US electric power industry. Research Policy, 32: 185-
207.  
 
Sirmon, D.G., & Hitt, M.A. 2003. Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management 
and wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27: 339-
358. 
 
Sirmon, D.G., Hitt, M.A., Arregle, J.-L., & Campbell, J.T. 2010. The dynamic interplay of 
capability strengths and weaknesses: Investigating the bases of temporary competitive 
advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 1386-1409. 
 
Sirmon, D.G., Hitt, M.A., & Ireland, R.D. 2007. Managing firm resources in dynamic 
environments to create value: Looking inside the black box. Academy of Management 
Review, 32: 273-292. 
 
Sleptsov, A., & Anand, J. 2008. Exercising entrepreneurial opportunities: The role of 
information-gathering and information-processing capabilities of the firm. Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal, 2: 357-372. 
 
Smallwood, J.M. 1979. An Oklahoma adventure of banks and bankers. Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
 
Smith, A. 1955. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica.   
 
Sobel, M.E. 1982. Asymptotic intervals for indirect effects in structural equations models. In S. 
Leinhard (Ed.), Sociological methodology (pp. 290-312). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Sorensen, R. 2001. Vagueness has no function in law. Legal theory, 7: 387-417. 
 
Spiller, J. 1990. Politicians, interest groups, and regulators: A multiple-principles agency theory 
of regulation, or ‘Let Them Be Bribed.’ Journal of Law and Economics, 33: 65-101. 
 
Steier, L. 2001. Next-generation entrepreneurs and succession: An exploratory study of modes 
and means of managing social capital. Family Business Review, 14: 259-276. 
 
Stenholm, P., Acs, Z.J., & Wuebker, R. 2013. Exploring country-level institutional arrangements 
on the rate and type of entrepreneurial activity. Journal of Business Venturing, 28: 176-
193.  
 
Stevens, J.P. 2009. Applied Multivariate Statistics for the Social Sciences. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Stigler, G.J. 1971. The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2: 3-21.  
 
126 
 
Stiglitz, J. 2009. Capitalist fools. Vanity Fair, accessed on April 1, 2013 at 
http://media.yoism.org/CapitalistFools-Stiglitz.pdf. 
 
Strang, D., & Sine, W.D. 2002. Inter-organizational institutions. In J. Baum (Ed.), Companion to 
organizations: 497-519. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
 
Suchman, M.C. 1995. Managing legitimacy – strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of 
Management Review, 20: 571-610.  
 
Suddaby, R. 2010. Challenges for institutional theory. Journal of Management Inquiry, 19: 14-
20.  
 
Sweet, A.S., Sandholtz, W., & Fligstein, N. 2001. The institutionalization of Europe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Tang, J., Kacmar, K.M., & Busenitz, L. 2012. Entrepreneurial alertness in the pursuit of new 
opportunities. Journal of Business Venturing, 27: 77-94. 
 
Tarm, M. 2013. Former DEA heads: Nullify Colorado, Washington marijuana laws. The 
Huffington Post, accessed on March 25, 2013 at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/05/dea-marijuana_n_2810347.html. 
 
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509-533. 
 
Tolbert, P.S. 1988. Institutional sources of organizational culture in major law firms. In L.G. 
Zucker (Ed.), Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment (pp. 
101-113). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.    
 
Tonoyan, V., Strohmeyer, R., Habib, M., & Perlitz, M. 2010. Corruption and entrepreneurship: 
How formal and informal institutions shape small firm behavior in transition and mature 
market economies. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34: 803-831.  
 
Townsend, D.M., & Hart, T.A. 2008. Perceived institutional ambiguity and the choice of 
organizational form in social entrepreneurial ventures. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 32: 685-700. 
 
Tucker, R. 2001. P&G struggles to regain Crest’s toothpaste lead. The Cincinnati Enquirer. 
Accessed on March 5, 2013 at 
enquirer.com/editions/2001/04/07/fin_p_g_struggles_to.html. 
 
Turner, R., & Colomy, P. 1988. Role differentiation: Orientating principles. Advances in Group 
Processes, 5: 1-27. 
 
Turner, R., & Killian, L. Collective behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.   
 
127 
 
Valliere, D. 2013. Towards a schematic theory of entrepreneurial alertness. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 28: 430-442. 
 
Van Der Sluis, J., Van Pragg, M., & Vijverberg, W. 2008. Education and entrepreneurship 
selection and performance: A review of the empirical literature. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 22: 795-841. 
 
Walters, P. 1986. The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet state. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 483: 135-145. 
 
Weber, M. 1989. Some consequences of bureaucratization. In L. Coser & B. Rosenberg (Eds.), 
Sociological theory: A book of readings: 334-335. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland 
Press.  
 
Weber, M. 1994. Charismatic authority. In W. Hydebrand (Ed.), Max Weber: Sociological 
Writings: 32-37. New York : Continuum. 
 
Weber, M. 2004. Formal and substantive rationalization: Theocratic and secular law. In S. 
Whimster (Ed.), The essential Weber: 809-815. London: Routledge.  
 
Webb, J.W., Kistruck, G.M., Ireland, R.D., & Ketchen, D.J. 2010. The entrepreneurship process 
in base of the pyramid markets: The case of multinational enterprise/nongovernment 
organization alliances. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34: 555-581. 
 
Webb, J.W., Tihanyi, L., Ireland, R.D., & Sirmon, D.G. 2009. You say illegal, I say legitimate: 
Entrepreneurship in the informal economy. Academy of Management Review, 34: 492-
510. 
 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5: 171-
180. 
 
Westphal, J.D., Gulati, R., & Shortell, S. 1997. Customization or conformity? An institutional 
and network perspective on the content and consequences of TQM adoption. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 366-394.  
 
Wicklund, J., Baker, T., & Shepherd, D. 2010. The age-effect of financial indicators as buffers 
against the liability of newness. Journal of Business Venturing, 25: 423-437. 
 
Wilson, J.Q. 1980. The politics of regulation. New York: Basic Book Publishers. 
 
Winter, S. G. 2003. Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 
991-995.  
 
Xu, D. & Shenkar, O. 2002. Note: Institutional distance and the multinational enterprise. 
Academy of Management Review, 27: 608-618. 
  
128 
 
Zahra, S.A., Sapienza, H.J., & Davidsson, P. 2006. Entrepreneurship and dynamic capabilities: A 
review, model and research agenda. Journal of Management Studies, 43: 917-955. 
 
Zimmerman, M.A., & Zeitz, G.J. 2002. Beyond survival: Achieving new venture growth by 
building legitimacy. Academy of Management Review, 27: 414-431.  
 
Zollo, M., & Winter, S.G. 2002. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic capabilities. 
Organization Science, 13: 339-351. 
 
Zott, C., & Amit, R. 2008. The fit between product market strategy and business model: 
Implications for firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 29: 1-26. 
 
Zott, C., & Huy, Q.N. 2007. How entrepreneurs use symbolic management to acquire resources. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 52: 70-105.  
 
Zucker, L.G. 1987. Institutional theory of organizations. Annual Review of Sociology, 13: 443-
464.  
 
Zucker, L.G. 1988. Where to institutional patterns come from? Organizations as actors in social 
systems. In L.G. Zucker (Ed.), Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and 
environment (pp. 23-49). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.  
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1: Examples of regulated industries and organizations and the agencies that regulate them 
      
Many industries and organizations are regulated by one or more government agencies, whether at the 
local, state or federal level. As Scott notes (1983: 105), the result is that organizations deal with a 
"jungle of conflicting requirements at the local level." The Center for Small Government reports that 
there are at 465 government agencies, many of which supervise many sub-agencies.  
      
      
Industry Agencies         
Intra-industry regulatory agencies Social Security Administration   
 Internal Revenue Service   
 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration 
 Office of Equal Employment Opportunity 
      
Banking & Finance Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
  Treasury Department     
  
Federal Depository Insurance 
Corporation 
  Consumer Protection Agency     
  
State-specific banking regulation 
agencies 
      
Restaurants State-specific departments of health  
      
Real-estate Local zoning laws       
      
Healthcare Department of Health   
 Healthcare accreditation agencies  
 State-specific agencies   
      
Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese Canon law       
      
University of Nebraska athletic department NCAA rules and regulations   
 Big 10 Athletic Conference    
      
130 
 
Nuclear energy production 
International Atomic Energy 
Administration 
  Department of the Interior     
  Department of Defense     
      
Agriculture Department of Agriculture   
 Food and Drug Administration   
 Environmental Protection Agency  
      
University biotechnology research programs National Institutes for Health     
      
Oil and gas  Bureau of Land Management   
 Environmental Protection Agency  
 Bureau of Ocean Energy Development  
      
Airlines Federal Aviation Administration   
      
Gun manufacturers 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives 
      
Oklahoma public schools State Department of Education   
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Table 2: Continuum of Informal to Formal Institutions     
        
  Informal <--------------------------------------------> Formal 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
 Unwritten         Written 
 Tacit         Explicit 
  Non-coercive         Coercive 
  Longer duration         Shorter duration 
              
Examples of institutions             
Unwritten contracts         x   
Constitutional amendment           x 
Family institutions x           
Religious traditions x           
Canon law         x     
Regulatory rule            x 
Judicial law           x   
Tribal honor codes   x         
Marriage contracts     x       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Table 3: Types of Institutional Enforcement   
      
 
Normative 
isomorphism   
Mimetic 
isomorphism   
Coercive 
isomorphism 
         
Example 
Institutions 
- Union-backed 
workplace safety 
standards 
  - Industry 
trend toward 
franchising 
  - Regulation 
limiting 
hours 
children may 
work 
- Nursing 
association 
recommendation 
adoption 
 - Common 
adoption of 
production 
standards 
(e.g., TQM, 
ISO 9000, 
etc.) 
 - Laws 
prohibiting 
false 
advertising 
 
- Use of 
common, 
profession-
related 
terminology 
across 
organizations 
(e.g., "assistant," 
"associate," and 
"full" professor 
tend to refer to 
the same thing 
across 
universities 
  - Copying 
competitor 
strategies 
  - Interstate 
speed limits 
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Table 4: Differentiating between organizations, institutions, and means of institutional 
transmission 
      
Organizations   Institutions   Means  
Accounting firm   Relationships 
between junior and 
senior firm 
members 
  Organizational 
flow chart 
 
         
Oklahoma Department of 
Health 
 Food quality 
standards 
 Regular 
inspections 
 
         
Family   Spousal roles   Popular media  
         
Department of Public 
Safety 
 Driving laws  Stripes on the 
road 
 
         
Newspaper   Standards for 
grammar, usage, 
punctuation, etc. 
  Style guide  
         
Catholic Church  Regard for 
priesthood 
 Clerical garb  
         
Military   Chain of command   Uniform insignia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ŀ
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Table 5: Journal-published research conducted on institutional entrepreneurship since 2000  
      
This table lists articles published in the past 13 years that either included institutional 
entrepreneurship in the title or abstract.  
      
Author(s) Journal Year Title 
Institutional issues 
considered Contribution 
Pacheco, D.F., 
York, J.G., 
Dean, T.J., & 
Sarasvathy, 
S.D. 
Journal of 
Management 
2010 The coevolution 
of institutional 
entrepreneurship: 
A tale of two 
theories 
Compared 
institutional theories 
based in economics 
and sociology 
In examining the components and focuses of the 
two theoretical foundations, make suggestions 
regarding integration of the two, such as in 
incorporating a greater understanding of 
property rights into the sociological tradition, in 
determining under which conditions 
entrepreneurs may prefer to enhance formal or 
informal institutions, and establishing a greater 
understanding regarding the influence that 
institutional change may play in entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Levy, D., & 
Scully, M.  
Organization 
Studies 
2007 The institutional 
entrepreneur as 
modern prince: 
The strategic face 
of power in 
contested fields 
Organizational fields 
and power 
Conceptualizes the role of institutional 
entrepreneur as a powerful actor who is able to 
understand the interests at stake in an 
organizational field and to manipulate those 
interests to obtain change. 
135 
 
Khan, F.R., 
Munir, K.A., & 
Willmott, H.  
Organization 
Studies 
2007 A dark side of 
institutional 
entrepreneurship: 
Soccer balls, child 
labour and 
postcolonial 
impoverishment 
Child labor as a social 
practice 
Describes the role that power and framing had 
in successfully reducing child labor use in soccer 
ball production, but emphasized that wages 
decreased and overall family life worsened after 
the institutional entrepreneurship project. 
Lawrence, T.B., 
& Phillips, N. 
Organization 2004 From Moby Dick 
to Free Willy: 
Macro-cultural 
discourse and 
institutional 
entrepreneurship 
in emerging fields 
Organizational 
practices 
Describes the various types of discourse used to 
legitimate the whale-watching industry and the 
role that institutional entrepreneurs played in 
facilitating the development of the emergent 
industry. 
Leca, B., & 
Naccache, P. 
Organization 2006 A critical realist 
approach to 
institutional 
entrepreneurship 
Embedded agency In defining institutions as "self-reproducing 
recurrent patterns of behavior," they attempt to 
describe the various levels at which interested 
actors can affect institutional change despite 
constraints. They argue that action occurs at 
three levels, and agents play a critical role at the 
lowest level, whose practices may become 
adopted at higher levels. 
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Perkmann, M., 
& Spicer, A.  
Organization 
Studies 
2007 Healing the scars 
of history': 
Projects, skills 
and field 
strategies in 
institutional 
entrepreneurship 
Individual change 
projects; skills 
required for project 
success 
Institutional entrepreneurship is the production 
of new organizational forms. Institutional 
entrepreneurs rely on political, theorization, and 
framing skills to facilitate the adoption of their 
new organizational forms.  
Tracey, P., 
Phillips, N., & 
Jarvis, O. 
Organization 
Science 
2011 Bridging 
institutional 
entrepreneurship 
and the creation 
of new 
organizational 
forms: A 
multilevel model 
New organizational 
forms 
Authors argue that institutional entrepreneurs 
who are adept at bridging institutional forms -- 
that is, combining the logics of multiple 
institutional fields -- may facilitate their success. 
Zilber, T.B. Organization 
Studies 
2007 Stories and the 
discursive 
dynamics of 
institutional 
entrepreneurship: 
The case of Israeli 
high-tech after 
the bubble 
Stories and discourse Institutional entrepreneurs who use stories to 
link past events to current outcomes, cast actors 
in various roles, and assign blame, are better 
able to generate widespread support for their 
vision of a future institutional arrangement. 
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Wijen, F., & 
Ansari, S. 
Organization 
Studies 
2006 Overcoming 
inaction through 
collective 
institutional 
entrepreneurship: 
Insights from 
regime theory 
Embedded agency Employs regime theory to explain how multiple, 
international actors -- rather than a sole actor -- 
may overcome institutional constraints and 
affect change. Tactics used include organizing 
bandwagons, creating implementation 
mechanisms, finding common ground, and 
developing incentive structures.  
Munir, K.A., & 
Phillips, N. 
Organization 
Studies 
2005 The birth of the 
'Kodak Moment': 
Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
and the adoption 
of new 
technologies 
Technology adoption Deploying a particular institutional definition -- 
the "historical accretations of past practices and 
understandings that set conditions on action" -- 
these authors describe how Kodak was able to 
have its camera technology adopted as the 
standard through discursive tactics, such as 
through linking the technology to past practices, 
and creating new roles (i.e., the Kodak Girl). 
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Child, J., Lu, Y., 
& Tsai, T. 
Organization 
Studies 
2007 Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
in building an 
environmental 
protection system 
for the People's 
Republic of China 
Organizational fields Filling the gap of understanding institutional 
entrepreneurship in transitioning economies, 
the authors describe how actors were able to 
create an agency within China. Specifically, 
institutional entrepreneurs would capitalize on 
critical events (e.g., disasters, pollution 
accidents, trials, and other important 
milestones). 
Dorado, S. Organization 
Studies 
2005 Institutional 
entrepreneurship, 
partaking, and 
convening 
Organizational fields Describes the various agency orientations (i.e., 
toward the past, present, or future), and the 
implications of these orientations on 
institutional outcomes. 
Greenwood, 
R., & Suddaby, 
R.  
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2006 Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
in mature fields: 
The big five 
accounting firms 
New organizational 
forms 
Addresses the conditions under which highly 
embedded firms may bring about institutional 
change, such as when organizations bridge 
multiple fields, are misaligned with institutional 
pressures, or are centrally located within fields 
and are thus aware of alternative institutional 
arrangements. 
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Santos, F., & 
Eisenhardt, K. 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2009 Constructing 
markets and 
shaping 
boundaries: 
Entrepreneurial 
power in nascent 
fields 
New organizational 
forms 
Describes the power tactics (i.e., hard and soft) 
that new firms may use in establishing the 
boundaries of their firm activities and protect 
these boundaries from other organizations. 
Maguire, S., 
Hardy, C., & 
Lawrence, T. 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2004 Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
in Emerging 
fields: HIV/AIDS 
treatment 
advocacy in 
Canada 
New social practices Authors sought to extend knowledge regarding 
how marginalized actors in emergent fields 
might bring about institutional change. 
Specifically, they argued that institutional 
entrepreneurs who were domain experts, are 
able to use a variety of tactics to align the 
interests of a diverse group of actors, and to link 
new practices to existing practices, will be more 
likely to find success in their efforts. 
Garud, R., Jain, 
S., & 
Kumaraswamy, 
A. 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
2002 Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
in the 
sponsorship of 
common 
technological 
standards: The 
case of Sun 
Microsystems and 
Java 
Technology adoption Describes the challenges that Sun Microsystems 
faced in proposing Java as a technological 
standard, including the interests of other actors, 
which are sometimes divergent and 
opportunistic. 
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Garud, R., 
Hardy, C., & 
Maguire, S. 
Organization 
Studies 
2007 Institutional 
entrepreneurship 
as embedded 
agency: An 
introduction to 
the special issue 
Embedded agency In their special issue introduction, the authors 
describe the challenges of institutional 
entrepreneurship research, such as overcoming 
the paradox of embedded agency. 
Khavul, S., 
Chavez, H., & 
Bruton, G. 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
2013 When 
institutional 
change outruns 
the change agent: 
The contested 
terrain of 
entrepreneurial 
microfinance for 
those in poverty 
New organizational 
forms 
Institutional entrepreneurship is a process that 
occurs over time and is influenced by ebbs and 
flows, as different actors challenge the 
boundaries of the new organizational form.  
Wright, A., & 
Zammuto, R. 
Journal of 
Business 
Venturing 
2013 Creating 
opportunities for 
institutional 
entrepreneurship: 
The Colonel and 
the Cup in English 
County Cricket 
New organizational 
forms 
Describes how an institutional entrepreneur was 
able to use his field position to create 
opportunities for institutional change. In this 
instance, repeated failure taught the 
entrepreneur how to better acquire and deploy 
resources to affect the change he desired. 
141 
 
Nasra, R., & 
Dacin, M. 
Entrepreneur
ship Theory 
and Practice 
2009 Institutional 
arrangements 
and international 
entrepreneurship: 
The state as 
institutional 
entrepreneur 
New social practices Describes how Dubai was able to create an 
economic zone free from the informal 
institutions of Arab society in order to attract 
Western businesses. Such decoupling of native 
and foreign institutions proved effective at 
stimulating economic growth. 
Misangyi, V., 
Weaver, G., & 
Elms, H. 
Academy of 
Management 
Review 
2008 Ending 
corruption: The 
interplay among 
institutional 
logics, resources, 
and institutional 
entrepreneurs 
New social practices Describes how institutional entrepreneurs are 
able to draw upon existing resources and 
institutional logics to nevertheless affect social 
change and reduce corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ŀ
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Table 6: Types of activities used in institutional entrepreneurship  
     
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) describe the various activities used by institutional entrepreneurs in creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions. The information in this table is derived from their work. 
     
     
Type of activity   Activity   Definition 
        
Creating institutions  Advocacy   The mobilization of political and 
regulatory support through direct and 
deliberate techniques of social suasion, 
with the purpose of redefining the 
allocation of material resources or social 
and political capital needed to create 
new institutional structures and 
practices. 
   Defining  The construction of rule systems that 
confer status or identity, define 
boundaries of membership, or create 
status hierarchies within a field. 
   Vesting   The creation of rule structures that 
confer property rights, and is deployed 
through the use of government 
authority. 
   Constructing 
identities 
 Establishing new relationships between 
actors and the fields in which the actor 
operates, such as the creation of 
professions. 
   Changing normative 
assumptions 
  Re-making the connections between 
sets of practices and the moral and 
cultural foundations for those practices.  
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   Constructing 
normative networks 
 Building interorganizational connections 
through which practices become 
normatively sanctioned and which form 
the relevant peer group with respect to 
normative compliance, monitoring, and 
evaluation. 
   Mimicry   Leveraging existing sets of taken-for-
granted practices, technologies, and 
rules, and associating them with the 
new in a way that eases adoption. 
   Theorizing  The development and specification of 
abstract categories and the elaboration 
of chains of cause and effect, which 
includes the naming of new concepts 
and practices so that they might 
become part of the cognitive map of the 
field. 
   Educating   Equipping actors with the skills and 
knowledge necessary to support the 
new institution, such as the 
institutionalization of Edison's light bulb, 
which required that workers be trained 
how to install and operate electronic 
infrastructure. 
        
Maintaining 
institutions 
  Enabling work   The creation of rules that facilitate, 
supplement and support institutions, 
such as creating authorizing agents or 
new roles needed to carry on 
institutional routines or acquiring 
resources that ensured institutional 
survival. 
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   Policing  Ensuring compliance through 
enforcement, auditing, and monitoring.  
   Deterrence   Creating the threat of coercion to 
inculcate the conscious obedience of 
institutional actors. 
   Valorizing and 
demonizing 
 The provision for public consumption of 
especially positive and especially 
negative examples that illustrate the 
normative foundations of an institution. 
   Mythologizing   Emphasizing positive or negative 
examples from the past to establish the 
normative foundations of an institution, 
such as through glorifying an 
organization's history. 
   Embedding and 
routinizing 
 Maintaining and reproducing 
institutions through the stabilizing 
influence of embedded routines and 
repetitive practices such as training, 
education, hiring and certification 
routines and ceremonies of celebration. 
        
Disrupting institutions   Disconnecting 
sanctions/rewards 
  Removing the incentives for engaging in 
established practices 
   Disassociating moral 
foundations 
 Typically exhibited by the gradual 
undermining of the normative 
foundation of institutions. For example, 
the practice of permanent employment 
in Japan was overturned through 
indirect means, such as hiring freezes.  
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   Undermining 
assumptions and 
beliefs 
  Removing the costs of moving away 
from taken-for-granted patterns of 
practice, technologies or rules, such as 
through facilitating new ways of acting 
that replace existing templates or 
decreasing the perceived risks of 
innovation and differentiation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Characteristics of banks interviewed   
            
Bank Charter Charter date Family owned? Reg. Agency 
No. 
Employees 
No. 1 State 1923* Yes FDIC 75 
No. 2 State 2007 No FDIC 66 
No. 3 State 1922 Yes FDIC 15 
No. 4 State 1896 Yes Federal Reserve 54 
No. 5 National 1894 No OCC 351 
No. 6 State 1923 No Federal Reserve 37 
No. 7 State 1931 No FDIC 128 
No. 8 State 2007 No FDIC 46 
No. 9 State 1988 No FDIC 130 
No. 10 State 2005 Yes FDIC 24 
No. 11 National 1984 No OCC 66 
No. 12 State 1902 Yes FDIC 6 
No. 13 National 1919 Yes OCC 4 
No. 14 National 1901 No OCC 8 
No. 15 State 1918 Yes Federal Reserve 7 
      
* Bank No. 1, which is a startup bank, purchased an existing bank charter in 2009 rather 
than pursue a new charter. 
Note. OCC stands for the "Office of the Comptroller of the Currency," which is a national 
bank regulator. 
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Table 8: Survey items derived from interviews 
  
An asterisk denotes a reverse-coded item. 
Items retained for the final survey are marked in bold. 
  
Perception capabilities 
Strongly disagree to strongly agree 
1) People in my bank regularly subscribe to and read trade association email alerts about 
new regulations. 
2) *In my bank, only one person is responsible for being aware of new regulations. 
3) In my bank, each manager is responsible for being aware of regulatory changes that 
pertain to their department. 
4) The people in my bank discuss regulatory changes with each other as soon as they are 
announced. 
5) People in my bank regularly read the text of new banking laws and regulations. 
6) My bank regularly sends managers and employees to compliance workshops hosted by 
trade associations. 
7) My bank regularly sends managers and employees to conferences hosted by regulatory 
agencies. 
8) My bank subscribes to and reads email alerts or other notifications from compliance 
consultants. 
9) People in my bank are good at quickly understanding the intent of a new regulation. 
10) People in my bank are good at quickly understanding which parts of regulation applies 
to our bank and which don’t. 
11) Upper management in my bank is aware of and takes interest in regulatory changes. 
12) *To operate effectively, people in my bank need to have detailed understanding of 
every regulation. 
13) Understanding the “Cliff Notes” of a regulation is good enough. 
  
Interaction capabilities 
Strongly disagree to strongly agree 
1) The chief compliance officer in my bank has a close relationship with the state banking 
commissioner. 
2) The chief compliance officer in my bank has a close relationship with federal banking 
regulators. 
3) People in my bank feel comfortable calling the state and federal regulators to ask 
questions about compliance. 
4) People in our bank are proactive and contact regulators before a problem arises. 
5) I or others in our bank participate on the advisory boards of regulatory agencies. 
6) I or others in our bank regularly attend conferences hosted by regulatory agencies. 
7) Contacting regulators is a good way to clarify an ambiguous regulation. 
8) We are familiar with the regulatory agents who examine us. 
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9) There is not likely to be a familiar face on the next exam team.* 
10) People in our bank try to foster personal relationships with regulators. 
11) Our bank takes an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ approach with regulators.* 
12) People in our bank try to minimize contact with regulators.* 
13) If the regulator knows you, they are more likely to cut you slack in an examination. 
14) We treat regulators like we would treat our customers. 
15) It is OK to email a regulator about a problem the bank encounters. 
16) It is OK to call a regulator about a problem the bank encounters. 
  
Manipulation capabilities 
Strongly disagree to strongly agree 
1) People in my bank work with our state trade association to kill bad legislation. 
2) People in my bank visit representatives at the state capital about banking issues. 
3) People in my bank travel to Washington to lobby congressmen about banking issues. 
4) People in my bank write comment letters on proposed regulations. 
5) People in my bank are involved with the governance committee of a state banking 
association. 
6) People in my bank are involved with the governance committee of a national banking 
association. 
7) People in my bank speak with regulators about changing regulations. 
8) People in my bank speak with regulators about relaxing the enforcement of a regulation. 
  
Regulatory Complexity 
Strongly disagree to strongly agree 
1) Banking regulation is easy to understand.* 
2) The various banking regulations do not contradict each other.* 
3) Banking regulation was written by people familiar with how banking works.* 
4) Regulators are consistent in their interpretation of regulations.* 
5) Regulators are consistent in their application of regulations.* 
6) Regulators at the state and federal agencies are on the same page.* 
7) New regulations are very frequently proposed. 
8) Every bank plays by the same rules.* 
9) People in my bank are very familiar with regulatory requirements.* 
10) The pace at which new regulation is being proposed is accelerating. 
11) Regulation takes into account the real world.* 
12) There are often differences in how we interpret a regulation and how a regulator 
interprets the regulation. 
13) Regulators do a good job keeping up with regulatory changes.* 
14) Compliance examiners tell me one thing and safety and soundness examiners tell me 
another.* 
15) The language in which regulations are written is easy to understand.* 
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16) The guidance provided by regulatory agencies is always useful.* 
17) Regulatory enforcement is very subjective. 
18) It is easy to know how to conform to a regulation.* 
19) Regulatory language is dense and unreadable. 
20) Two people can read the same regulation and arrive at different conclusions. 
21) It’s impossible to read every regulation that is adopted. 
22) Regulations do not address every possible scenario encountered in a bank. 
23) We rely on third parties (e.g., compliance consultants, attorneys) to tell us what a 
regulation means. 
24) It is pointless to try to sit down and read a regulation – the clarification from our trade 
associations and other groups tell me what a regulation really means. 
  
Regulatory Costs 
Strongly disagree to strongly agree 
1) Regulation prevents us from offering certain products and services to our customers. 
2) Our customers demand products and services that we cannot offer them due to 
regulation. 
3) Highly regulated products and services create more value for customers than less-
regulated products and services.* 
4) Regulation has increased our costs. 
5) The costs created by regulation are a serious threat to our performance. 
6) Regulatory requirements make us a better bank.* 
7) Our training costs due to regulation have increased dramatically in the past ten years. 
8) Our compliance costs due to regulation have increased dramatically in the past ten 
years. 
9) We have discontinued certain products and services because we couldn’t keep up with 
the regulatory requirements. 
10) Regulatory costs comprise a small portion of our overall expense.* 
11) The time I and others spend on regulation takes away from our ability to increase bank 
revenue. 
12) Our bank’s growth is limited mostly by the regulatory environment. 
13) The changing regulatory environment plays a major role in influencing our strategic 
decision making. 
14) Regulation prevents us from meeting customer needs. 
15) Consumers are hurt by regulatory requirements (e.g., the restriction of overdraft 
protection fees). 
  
Boundary expansion 
How many times, in the past year (five years), have you been able (failed) to: 
1) Negotiate with examiners to improve a loan rating? 
2) Halt the implementation of legislation harmful to your industry through lobbying 
efforts? 
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3) Influence proposed regulation by writing comment letters? 
4) Contribute to legislative efforts to loosen legal constraints, such as in working with a 
state or federal legislator? 
5) Contribute to the efforts of a state or national trade association to defeat bad 
legislation? 
6) Obtain regulatory approval to open a new branch or banking location? 
7) Obtain regulatory approval to market a new product or service to customers? 
8) Discuss issues with a state or federal regulatory official, which caused him or her to 
change their attitude toward your bank? 
  
Boundary retraction 
How many times, in the past year (five years), have you been able (failed) to: 
1) Attract regulatory attention to the non-compliant activities of your competitors? 
2) Work with state or federal legislators to write law restricting the activities of credit 
unions or farm bureaus? 
3) Halt the implementation of a new law that would have unduly favored competitors? 
4) Discuss with regulators your concerns regarding "shadow banking," which caused them 
to change their attitude toward that industry? 
5) Discuss with regulators your concerns regarding credit unions/farm bureaus, which 
caused them to change their attitude toward that industry? 
6) Influence regulation, whether through writing comment letters or discussing issues with 
regulators, that increased the costs of your competitors? 
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Table 9: Extracted components with eigenvalues 
greater than 1 
    
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
 
1 
 
8.322 
 
15.130 
 
15.130 
2 4.617 8.394 23.524 
3 2.729 4.961 28.485 
4 2.400 4.363 32.848 
5 2.138 3.887 36.735 
6 1.869 3.398 40.134 
7 1.591 2.893 43.026 
8 1.570 2.855 45.882 
9 1.518 2.761 48.642 
10 1.430 2.600 51.243 
11 1.277 2.322 53.565 
12 1.235 2.246 55.810 
13 1.214 2.207 58.017 
14 1.079 1.962 59.979 
15 1.021 1.857 61.836 
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Table 10a: Item key 
To facilitate the interpretation of the following tables, I have included this chart, which matches each item's 
code with the text of that item. 
    
Item code Item text 
ICpercep1 People in my bank subscribe to and read trade association email alerts about new 
regulations. 
ICpercep2r In my bank, only one person is responsible for being aware of new regulations. 
ICpercep3 In my bank, each manager is responsible for being aware of regulatory changes that 
pertain to their department. 
ICpercep4 People in my bank regularly read the text of new banking laws and regulations. 
ICpercep5 My bank regularly sends managers and employees to compliance workshops hosted by 
trade associations or regulatory agencies. 
ICpercep6 People in my bank are good at quickly understanding the intent of new regulations. 
ICpercep7 Upper management in my bank is aware of and takes interest in regulatory changes. 
ICpercep8r To operate effectively, people in my bank need to have detailed understanding of every 
regulation. 
ICpercep9 Understanding the "Cliff Notes" (e.g., summaries prepared by trade associations) of a 
regulation is good enough. 
ICpercep10 People in my bank are good at quickly understanding which parts of a regulation apply to 
our bank and which parts do not. 
ICinter1 I or others in my bank have a close relationship with the state banking commissioner. 
ICinter2 People in my bank feel comfortable calling state or federal regulators to ask questions 
about compliance. 
ICinter3 People in my bank are proactive and contact regulators before a problem arises. 
ICinter4 I or others in my bank participate on the advisory boards of regulatory agencies. 
ICinter5 We are familiar with the agents who examine us. 
ICinter6r There is not likely to be a familiar face on the next exam team. 
ICinter7r Our bank takes an 'out of sight, out of mind' approach with regulators. 
ICinter8 We treat regulators like we would treat our customers. 
ICinter9 It is OK to call or email a regulator about a problem the bank encounters. 
ICmanip1 People in my bank visit representatives at the state capitol about banking issues. 
ICmanip2 People in my bank write comment letters on proposed regulation. 
ICmanip3 People in my bank are involved with the governance committee of a state or national 
banking association. 
ICmanip4 People in my bank speak with regulators about relaxing enforcement of regulation. 
ICmanip5 It is possible to negotiate with examiners on compliance issues. 
ICmanip6 We have fond that regulatory boundaries are flexible. 
ICmanip7 On occasion, it is better to act first and seek regulatory approval later. 
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ICmanip8 We don't always seek regulatory approval before making business-related decisions. 
InstFrame1r Regulation ensures that every bank plays by the same rules. 
InstFrame2r Regulation is good for the banking industry. 
InstFrame3 Banks are overregulated. 
InstFrame4r Regulators are receptive to bankers' concerns. 
InstFrame5r Regulators are just trying to do their jobs, same as we are. 
InstFrame6 Regulators don't trust bankers. 
InstCost1 Regulation prevents us from offering certain products and services to our customers. 
InstCost2 Our costs due to regulation are a serious threat to our performance. 
InstCost3 Our training and compliance costs due to regulation have increased dramatically in the 
past ten years. 
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Table 10b: Rotated IV loadings, initial 
results 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICmanip3 .825     
ICmanip1 .814     
ICmanip2 .744     
ICmanip4 .633     
ICinter4 .482     
ICinter1 .438   .223 
ICmanip7   .572   
ICpercep7   -.525   
ICpercep2r   -.474   
ICpercep3   -.472   
ICpercep4   -.412   
ICpercep5 .306 -.409   
ICpercep1   -.363   
ICmanip8   .345   
ICpercep9   .336   
ICpercep8r   .214   
ICmanip5   .484 .629 
ICmanip6   .511 .605 
ICinter5     .605 
ICinter2   -.234 .564 
ICpercep10     .523 
ICpercep6     .484 
ICinter9   -.302 .477 
ICinter3 .245 -.348 .453 
ICinter8     .429 
ICinter6r     .348 
ICinter7r   -.232 .261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
Table 10c: Rotated IV loadings, step 1 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICinter5 .621     
ICmanip5 .612 .547   
ICinter2 .597     
ICmanip6 .592 .577   
ICpercep10 .533     
ICinter9 .510 -.245   
ICpercep6 .503     
ICinter3 .500 -.308 .208 
ICinter8 .447     
ICinter6r .340     
ICinter7r .283 -.213   
ICmanip7   .601   
ICpercep7   -.476 .224 
ICpercep2r   -.425   
ICpercep3   -.424   
ICpercep4 .216 -.385   
ICmanip8   .379   
ICpercep9   .347   
ICpercep1   -.312   
ICpercep8r       
ICmanip3     .823 
ICmanip1     .787 
ICmanip2     .755 
ICmanip4     .680 
ICpercep5   -.357 .368 
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Table 10d: Rotated IV loadings, step 2 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICmanip5 .636 .559   
ICmanip6 .616 .585   
ICinter5 .600     
ICinter2 .571 -.220   
ICpercep10 .546     
ICpercep6 .519     
ICinter9 .489 -.266   
ICinter3 .469 -.343 -.237 
ICinter8 .436     
ICinter6r .325     
ICinter7r .270 -.222   
ICmanip7   .624   
ICpercep7   -.457 -.208 
ICpercep2r   -.411   
ICpercep3   -.404   
ICmanip8   .397   
ICpercep4 .216 -.380   
ICpercep9   .343   
ICpercep1   -.305   
ICpercep8r       
ICmanip3     -.822 
ICmanip1     -.808 
ICmanip2     -.766 
ICmanip4     -.697 
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Table 10e: Rotated IV loadings, step 3 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICinter2 .726     
ICinter5 .692     
ICinter3 .636 .211   
ICinter9 .612     
ICinter8 .503     
ICinter6r .446   .217 
ICpercep10 .402     
ICinter7r .398     
ICpercep6 .321   -.220 
ICmanip3   .805   
ICmanip1   .795   
ICmanip2   .737   
ICmanip4   .681   
ICpercep7     -.583 
ICpercep3     -.561 
ICpercep2r     -.540 
ICpercep4     -.513 
ICpercep8r     .480 
ICpercep1     -.460 
ICpercep9     .359 
ICmanip7   .212 .328 
ICmanip8     .311 
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Table 10f: Rotated IV loadings, step 4 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICinter2 .728     
ICinter5 .669     
ICinter3 .638 .242   
ICinter9 .621     
ICinter8 .527     
ICinter6r .415     
ICinter7r .401     
ICpercep10 .353   -.243 
ICmanip3   .824   
ICmanip1   .814   
ICmanip2   .757   
ICmanip4   .666   
ICpercep3     -.618 
ICpercep7     -.596 
ICpercep2r     -.580 
ICpercep4     -.563 
ICpercep1     -.489 
ICpercep8r     .479 
ICpercep6 .286   -.335 
ICpercep9     .320 
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Table 10g: Rotated IV loadings, step 5 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICinter2 .740     
ICinter5 .670     
ICinter3 .647 .241   
ICinter9 .632     
ICinter8 .528     
ICinter6r .413     
ICinter7r .409     
ICpercep10 .334     
ICmanip3   .827   
ICmanip1   .815   
ICmanip2   .753   
ICmanip4   .662   
ICpercep3     -.636 
ICpercep2r     -.620 
ICpercep7     -.591 
ICpercep4     -.546 
ICpercep1     -.528 
ICpercep8r     .452 
ICpercep9     .311 
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Table 10h: Rotated IV loadings, step 6 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICinter2 .743     
ICinter5 .667     
ICinter3 .645 -.231   
ICinter9 .637     
ICinter8 .527     
ICinter7r .427     
ICinter6r .407     
ICmanip3   -.833   
ICmanip1   -.826   
ICmanip2   -.743   
ICmanip4   -.655   
ICpercep3     -.690 
ICpercep2r     -.657 
ICpercep7     -.582 
ICpercep1     -.582 
ICpercep4     -.514 
ICpercep8r     .405 
 
 
 
Table 10i: Rotated IV loadings, step 7 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
ICinter5 .713     
ICinter2 .685     
ICinter9 .619     
ICinter8 .521     
ICinter6r .500     
ICinter7r .442     
ICmanip3   -.836   
ICmanip1   -.830   
ICmanip2   -.750   
ICmanip4   -.657   
ICpercep3     -.685 
ICpercep2r     -.656 
ICpercep7     -.581 
ICpercep1     -.566 
ICpercep4     -.530 
ICpercep8r     .415 
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Table 10j: Factor correlation matrix 
    
Factor 1 2 3 
Interaction capabilities 1.000 -.133 -.176 
Manipulation capabilities -.133 1.000 .201 
Perception capabilities -.176 .201 1.000 
Table 10k: Rotated moderator loadings, initial 
results 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
InstCost4 .771 .216   
InstCost6 .764 .209   
InstCost2 .762     
InstCost5 .692     
InstCost1 .653     
InstCost7 .615   .218 
InstCost3 .509 .255   
InstCost8 .502   .315 
InstFrame3 .354 .307   
InstFrame2r .320 .292 .280 
InstComplex1r   .659   
InstComplex3r   .636   
InstComplex9r .219 .626 .202 
InstComplex12   .599   
InstComplex6 .222 .550   
InstComplex7r .352 .550 .256 
InstComplex11r   .541 .408 
InstComplex2r   .532 .223 
InstComplex4r   .505 .500 
InstComplex5 .272 .488   
InstComplex13   .487   
InstComplex8   .461 .402 
InstComplex14   .264   
InstFrame6 .227   .729 
InstFrame5r     .681 
InstFrame4r .245   .668 
InstComplex10   .308 .476 
InstFrame1r .334 .273 .335 
161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10l: Rotated moderator loadings, step 2 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
InstComplex1r .673     
InstComplex9r .645 .226   
InstComplex3r .634     
InstComplex12 .624     
InstComplex11r .582 .202 .335 
InstComplex7r .565 .351 .231 
InstComplex2r .558     
InstComplex4r .551   .423 
InstComplex6 .528 .224   
InstComplex8 .499   .311 
InstComplex13 .489     
InstComplex5 .474 .272   
InstComplex14 .255     
InstCost6 .224 .771   
InstCost2   .769   
InstCost4   .766   
InstCost5   .699   
InstCost1   .668   
InstCost7   .630   
InstCost8   .521 .267 
InstCost3 .242 .510   
InstFrame1r .299 .332 .330 
InstFrame2r .310 .318 .275 
InstFrame6   .220 .748 
InstFrame5r     .715 
InstFrame4r .224 .228 .702 
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Table 10m: Rotated moderator loadings, step 3 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
InstComplex1r .675     
InstComplex9r .648 .226   
InstComplex3r .637     
InstComplex12 .625     
InstComplex11r .585 .201 .325 
InstComplex7r .570 .349   
InstComplex2r .562     
InstComplex4r .559   .424 
InstComplex6 .533 .222   
InstComplex8 .501   .336 
InstComplex13 .487     
InstComplex5 .478 .269   
InstComplex14 .249     
InstCost2   .771   
InstCost6 .229 .771   
InstCost4 .201 .765   
InstCost5   .706   
InstCost1   .672   
InstCost7   .633   
InstCost8   .522 .256 
InstCost3 .251 .514   
InstFrame6   .235 .760 
InstFrame5r     .724 
InstFrame4r .233 .235 .681 
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Table 10n: Rotated moderator loadings, step 4 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
InstComplex1r .677     
InstComplex9r .653 .231   
InstComplex3r .642     
InstComplex12 .614     
InstComplex11r .590 .205 .315 
InstComplex7r .583 .360   
InstComplex2r .576     
InstComplex4r .570   .405 
InstComplex6 .537 .229   
InstComplex8 .489   .365 
InstComplex5 .481 .275   
InstComplex13 .468     
InstCost2   .771   
InstCost6 .223 .769   
InstCost4   .765   
InstCost5   .703   
InstCost1   .673   
InstCost7   .631   
InstCost3 .264 .525   
InstCost8   .523 .255 
InstFrame6   .235 .763 
InstFrame5r     .724 
InstFrame4r .249 .242 .663 
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Table 10o: Rotated moderator loadings, step 5 
 
  
Factor 
1 2 3 
InstCost6 .808     
InstCost1 .766     
InstCost2 .754     
InstCost5 .697     
InstCost7 .649     
InstCost8 .610     
InstComplex6   .736   
InstComplex5   .693   
InstComplex3r   .617   
InstComplex12   .586   
InstComplex2r   .533   
InstComplex13   .467   
InstFrame6 .231   .792 
InstFrame5r     .786 
InstFrame4r .211 .247 .731 
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Table 11: Factor structure invariance across two groups: IV measurement model 
                
      Group number 1  Group number 2   
Item   Factor Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
ICpercep4 <--- Percep -2.122 0.020 -1.933 0.011 0.158 
ICpercep1 <--- Percep -1.447 0.017 -0.962 0.011 0.681 
ICpercep7 <--- Percep -1.528 0.016 -1.190 0.009 0.432 
ICpercep2r <--- Percep -2.576 0.016 -1.466 0.013 0.911 
ICpercep3 <--- Percep -1.823 0.021 -2.054 0.008 -0.208 
ICinter6r <--- Interact 0.698 0.127 0.902 0.000 0.389 
ICinter8 <--- Interact 1.813 0.008 0.843 0.000 -1.332 
ICinter9 <--- Interact 1.945 0.005 1.186 0.000 -1.030 
ICinter2 <--- Interact 3.855 0.003 2.009 0.000 -1.345 
ICinter5 <--- Interact 2.585 0.004 1.096 0.000 -1.612 
ICmanip3 <--- Manip 1.415 0.000 2.066 0.000 1.415 
ICmanip2 <--- Manip 1.083 0.000 1.601 0.000 1.399 
ICmanip1 <--- Manip 1.361 0.000 2.021 0.000 1.468 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
 
Please note for Table 11 and Table 12, in AMOS, one item path estimate for each factor is 
constrained to 1. Therefore, no differences would exist for these item path estimates across 
groups, and they are not included in the model. 
 
 
Table 12: Factor structure invariance across two groups, moderator measurement model 
                
      Group number 1  Group number 2   
Item   Factor Estimate P Estimate P z-score 
InstCost7 <--- Cost 1.270 0.000 0.837 0.000 -1.724* 
InstCost5 <--- Cost 1.466 0.000 1.017 0.000 -1.605 
InstCost2 <--- Cost 1.250 0.000 1.231 0.000 -0.071 
InstCost1 <--- Cost 1.313 0.000 1.006 0.000 -1.234 
InstCost6 <--- Cost 1.706 0.000 1.375 0.000 -1.091 
InstComplex2r <--- Complex 1.144 0.030 0.715 0.019 -0.706 
InstComplex12 <--- Complex 1.205 0.014 0.616 0.017 -1.064 
InstComplex3r <--- Complex 1.919 0.010 0.813 0.009 -1.369 
InstComplex5 <--- Complex 3.647 0.005 1.626 0.000 -1.478 
InstComplex6 <--- Complex 3.264 0.005 1.541 0.000 -1.399 
InstFrame5r <--- Frame 0.843 0.000 0.510 0.000 -2.098** 
InstFrame6 <--- Frame 1.106 0.000 0.848 0.000 -1.225 
Notes: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.10   
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Table 13, continued 
       
              
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
       
       
       
       
       
0.734       
.216** 0.780      
0.033 .257** 0.829     
-.209** 0.078 .322** 0.717    
0.030 0.105 .465** .318** 0.817   
0.004 .283** 0.114 .228** 0.122 --  
-0.091 0.068 -0.103 0.113 0.072 .162* -- 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Correlation table, means, standard deviations, and reliabilities for constraint expansion 
model 
                
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Role experience 11.254 8.642 --     
2. Bank age 87.116 41.967 -.212** --    
3. No. lobbyists 0.005 0.068 -0.033 0.019 --   
4. Bank size 5.722 12.701 -0.120 -0.057 -0.033 --  
5. Perception cap. 20.963 2.674 -0.017 -0.019 0.052 0.101 0.597 
6. Interaction cap. 15.127 2.588 0.047 0.070 0.023 0.020 .205** 
7. Manipulation cap. 11.671 3.624 0.043 -0.004 0.044 0.042 .206** 
8. Inst. Cost 30.938 5.154 .185** -0.005 -0.112 -.195
** .173* 
9. Inst. Framing 15.377 3.217 0.070 0.093 0.068 -0.059 -0.027 
10. Inst complexity 50.498 5.108 0.116 0.047 -0.046 -0.070 0.086 
11. Constraint expansion 13.125 14.642 0.024 0.078 0.008 0.070 .174** 
12. New opportunities 5.178 4.556 -0.071 0.071 -0.005 .456** .154* 
* p < .05. ** p < .01        
Note. Numbers along diagonal are Cronbach's alphas.     
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Table 14: Correlation table, means, standard deviations, and reliabilities for constraint retraction 
model 
                
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Role experience 11.220 8.743 --     
2. Bank age 86.930 42.378 -.212** --    
3. No. lobbyists 0.005 0.069 -0.033 0.019 --   
4. Bank size 5.904 12.972 -0.120 -0.057 -0.033 --  
5. New opportunities 5.289 4.656 -0.071 0.071 -0.005 .456** -- 
6. Perception cap. 20.971 2.655 -0.017 -0.019 0.052 0.101 .154* 
7. Interaction cap. 15.064 2.530 0.047 0.070 0.023 0.020 -0.091 
8. Manipulation cap. 11.559 3.611 0.043 -0.004 0.044 0.042 0.068 
9. Inst. Cost 30.754 5.120 .185** -0.005 -0.112 -.195** -0.103 
10. Inst. Framing 15.289 3.231 0.070 0.093 0.068 -0.059 0.113 
11. Inst. Complexity 50.443 5.128 0.116 0.047 -0.046 -0.070 0.072 
12. Boundary contraction 3.766 6.579 0.083 0.044 0.113 -0.077 -0.017 
13. Opportunity value -0.038 0.044 .041 .045 -.079 .035 .078 
* p < .05. ** p < .01        
Note. Numbers along diagonal are Cronbach's alphas.      
 
Table 14, continued 
                
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
        
        
        
        
        
0.597        
.205** 0.734       
.206** .216** 0.780      
.173* 0.033 .257** 0.829     
-0.027 -.209** 0.078 .322** 0.717    
0.086 0.030 0.105 .465** .318** 0.817   
0.071 .140* .252** .156* 0.077 0.084 --  
.150* .038 .120 .059 -.074 .034 .070 -- 
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Table 15: Regression results for testing mediation, constraint expansion model 
     
   Mediation 
   New Opportunities 
Factor and statistic 
Constraint 
expansion 
New 
opportunities Step 3 Step 4 
Role experience 0.028 0 0.007 0.006 
Bank age 0.035 0.053 0.058 0.066 
No. of lobbyists -.002 0.009 0.012 0.003 
Bank size 0.032 .473*** .485*** .463*** 
     
Capabilities     
Perception .156**  .141** .116* 
Interaction -.148**  -.151** -.127** 
Manipulation .266***  .111* 0.067 
     
Constraint expansion  .209***  .164** 
     
F 3.646** 16.127*** 11.464*** 11.208*** 
R squared 0.109 0.277 0.278 0.302 
Adjusted R squared 0.079 0.26 0.254 0.275 
     
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .001    
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Table 16: Regression results for testing mediation, constraint 
retraction model  
     
   Mediation 
   Opportunity value 
Factor and statistic 
Constraint 
retraction 
Opportunity 
value Step 3 Step 4 
Role experience 0.147 0.025 0.054 0.034 
Bank age 0.02 0.035 0.048 0.045 
No. of lobbyists 0.176 -0.119* -.097 -.122* 
Bank size -.109 -0.016 -.04 -.025 
New opportunities 0.051 0.116 0.087 0.08 
     
Capabilities     
Perception .120*  .154** .137* 
Interaction 0.064  -.084 -.093 
Manipulation .204**  .163** .135* 
     
Constraint retraction  .187**  .140* 
     
F 4.345*** 2.026* 2.138** 2.334** 
R squared 0.148 0.057 0.079 0.095 
Adjusted R squared 0.114 0.029 0.042 0.055 
     
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .001    
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Table 17: Regression results for testing moderation for constraint expansion and new 
opportunities 
With interaction     
 Constraint expansion  
Factor and statistic Perception Interaction Manipulation 
New 
opportunities 
Role experience 0.015 0.016 -0.001 0.006 
Bank age 0.019 0.000 -.016 0.043 
No. of lobbyists -0.015 -.013 -.033 -.012 
Bank size 0.038 0.050 0.046 .457*** 
Perception 0.153** 0.142** 0.131* .124** 
Interaction -0.110 -0.106 -.097 -.099** 
Manipulation 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.098 
Inst. Costs -0.013 0.005 -0.003 -.090** 
Inst. Frame 0.151** 0.148** 0.143** 0.123* 
Inst. Complexity -0.006 0.001 -0.013 0.087 
     
     
Interactions     
Perception X Costs -0.021    
Perception X Frame -0.010    
Perception X Complex 0.015    
Interaction X Costs  -.078   
Interaction X Frame  -.030   
Interaction X Complex  -.073   
Manipulation X Costs   -.061  
Manipulation X Frame   .286***  
Manipulation X Complex   -.089  
Expansion    .180** 
Expansion X Costs    0.086 
Expansion X Frame    -.222** 
Expansion X Complex    0.064 
     
F 2.308** 2.712** 3.614*** 7.521*** 
R squared 0.129 0.149 0.189 0.344 
Adjusted R squared 0.073 0.094 0.136 0.298 
     
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .001    
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Table 18: Regression results for testing moderation for constraint retraction and 
opportunity value 
With interaction     
 Constraint retraction  
Factor and statistic Perception Interaction Manipulation 
Opportunity 
value 
Role experience 0.145** 0.144** 0.149** 0.026 
Bank age 0.023 0.029 0.033 0.037 
No. of lobbyists 0.192** 0.187** 0.192** -0.200** 
Bank size -0.090 -0.118 -0.104 -0.028 
New opportunities 0.059 0.068 0.061 0.083 
Perception 0.099 0.114 0.118 0.142* 
Interaction 0.063 0.070 0.062 -0.099 
Manipulation 0.207** 0.193** 0.199** 0.127* 
Inst. Costs 0.032 0.042 -0.023 -0.029 
Inst. Frame -0.005 -0.025 -0.018 -0.041 
Inst. Complexity -0.010 -.013 -0.018 -0.020 
     
Interactions     
Perception X Costs 0.010    
Perception X Frame -0.094    
Perception X Complex 0.102    
Interaction X Costs  0.039   
Interaction X Frame  -0.054   
Interaction X Complex  0.074   
Manipulation X Costs   0.047  
Manipulation X Frame   -0.090  
Manipulation X Complex   -0.004  
Retraction    0.208** 
Retraction X Costs    -0.111 
Retraction X Frame    0.064 
Retraction X Complex    -0.129 
     
F 2.694** 2.608** 2.578** 1.915** 
R squared 0.163 0.158 0.157 0.130 
Adjusted R squared 0.102 0.098 0.096 0.062 
     
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .001    
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Table 20a: Post-hoc analysis, constraint expansion model  
    
Factor and statistic Constraint expansion    
Role experience 0.047    
Bank age 0.1    
No. of lobbyists -0.001    
Bank size 0.071    
     
Capabilities     
Manipulation .292***    
Interaction -0.066    
     
Manip X Inter 0.031    
     
     
F 2.854**    
R squared 0.097    
Adjusted R squared 0.063    
     
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .001    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: Moderated mediated results for manipulation capability on new 
opportunities across levels of regulatory framing 
              
Moderator Level 
Conditional 
indirect effect SE 
Lower 
CI 
Upper 
CI p 
Framing Low (-SD) 0.0060 0.0295 -0.0824 0.085 > .10 
  High (+SD) 0.1148 0.0475 0.0475 0.2918 < 0.001 
       
173 
 
 
Table 20b: Post-hoc analysis, constraint retraction model  
    
Factor and statistic Constraint retraction    
Role experience 0.058    
Bank age 0.07    
No. of lobbyists 0.1    
Bank size -0.071    
     
Capabilities     
Manipulation 0.219***    
Interaction 0.100    
     
Manip X Inter .186**    
     
     
F 3.988***    
R squared 0.131    
Adjusted R squared 0.098    
     
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .001    
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Figure 1: Opportunities and formal institutional constraints 
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Figure 2: Relationship between institutional capabilities and regulatory change  
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Figure 3: Scree-plot of initial component eigenvalues
ŀ
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Figure 4a: Three-factor institutional capabilities measurement model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5a: One-factor institutional capabilities measurement model 
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Figure 4b: Three-factor moderator variables measurement model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5b: One-factor moderator variables measurement model
ŀ
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Figure 6: Common latent factor model to test for common method variance
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Figure 7: Interaction effect, manipulation capabilities by framing on boundary expansion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Post-hoc analysis: moderating effect of interaction capabilities 
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Figure 9: Interaction effect, manipulation capabilities by interaction capabilities                                              
on constraint retraction 
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APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
General questions 
1. How long have you personally been in the banking industry? How long have you led your current 
bank? What types of products and services do you offer? How has the bank changed under your 
leadership?  
2. When was your bank founded? How many employees does your bank have? What sort of 
growth has you bank encountered in the past five years? What about going forward – where do 
you see your bank five years from now? How about the banking industry in general? 
Basic regulatory questions 
3. Does your bank have a state or national charter? What influenced your decision in pursuing this 
charter? What are the implications for your bank in either having a state or national charter? 
4. What regulatory agencies oversee your bank’s operations? How much interaction do they have 
with you and your bank? Are some agencies more interactive than others? Why do you think so? 
5. Do you personally interact with the regulatory agencies or are there others in the bank who 
manage these relationships?  Regarding the agencies themselves – do your interactions tend to 
be with specific people, who you have come to know, or are they more generalized across many 
people from the agencies? 
6. How would you characterize your relationship with the various regulatory agencies? How do the 
agencies help your bank? In what ways do they hinder your bank? 
7. What role do you think these regulatory agencies play in shaping the banking industry 
performance in general? What about your bank specifically? Is a significant portion of bank 
industry performance, and your bank specifically, shaped by the actions of regulatory agencies? 
If so (or if not), how? 
Drilling down on regulatory agencies 
8. If regulatory agencies write the ‘rule book,’ which your bank has to follow, how do you know 
what’s in the rule book? Is it a matter of reading the existing rules and statutes? Do you do this 
yourself, or do you rely on others’ expertise? If so, who do you rely on (others in your firm? 
others outside your firm, such as attorneys? others in the regulatory agencies?)  
9. Is it easy to understand what the expectations of regulatory agencies are? Is it easy to 
understand the written rules that govern your operations? If so, why is it easy? If not, how do 
you clarify the meaning of written rules or comprehend regulatory expectations? Are there 
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10. differences between the written content of a rule and the expectation of an agency or how an 
agency enforces a rule? If so, how do you resolve these differences? 
11. Have you been able to improve your ability to understand and “stay on top” of the regulatory 
environment? How? 
12. Would you characterize any of the regulations you face as vague or unclear? Have you ever 
exploited a vaguely written rule to pursue the bank’s interests? Describe a situation.  
13. In your day-to-day operations, when you have to make decisions, how relevant is existing 
regulation to how you make these decisions? How frequently are your decision options limited 
by regulation? How impactful are these limits on your bank’s operations? 
14. How do you know when regulatory changes occur? Do they occur frequently? Are you aware of 
when regulatory change is about to occur? Does the potential for changing regulation influence 
how you make decisions related to your bank’s operations?  
15. Are rules enforced differently, either by different agencies or by different individuals within an 
agency? Are rules enforced differently across banks? Are you subject to more strict enforcement 
than other banks? Looser enforcement? In what areas of your operations? Why? 
16. Other banks likely have interest in the content of regulatory rules and how they are enforced. 
Are you aware of what other banks’ interests are? How? Can they be different from your 
interests? How does this awareness influence how you interact with regulatory agencies? How 
does this awareness influence your decision making regarding your own bank’s operations? 
17. How often do you interact with regulatory agencies in a given month? Year? What types of 
interactions do you have? Regular inspections? Phone calls or emails? Industry-related events? 
Social gatherings? Are these interactions two-way streets – how interested are agencies in your 
interests or do they merely enforce their own interests?  
18. Are some types of interactions more “interactive” than others – that is, are there situations in 
which they are strictly interested in enforcing their expectations and situations in which you 
may have greater input? Are different agencies (or individuals within these agencies) more 
receptive in your interests than others? Describe a situation in which they were receptive to 
your interests. Describe on in which they weren’t. Are there situations in which you were able to 
get a regulatory agency to become more receptive to your interests?  
19. Have you built relationships with certain agencies or people within these agencies? How have 
these relationships been productive? Do agencies tend to be open to building close 
relationships?   
20. Have you been able to improve your ability to foster relationships with agencies or individuals 
within these agencies? How? 
21. Do agencies seek your input in creating new rules or enforcing existing rules? Are you proactive 
in proposing new rules, eliminating existing rules, or recommending tightening or relaxing 
enforcement? Do agencies tend to be open to your suggestions?  
22. Have you ever been successful in encouraging agencies to eliminate restrictive rules or to loosen 
enforcement? How? Describe a situation in which you were successful. How significant was this 
change for your business? Describe a situation in which you were not successful.  
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23. In what situations do you seek these types of changes? Are you reacting to a specific customer 
request? Do you seek these types of changes as part of a broader effort to attract more 
customers or to provide new products and services?   
24. Do these changes tend to be momentary – such as asking for an exemption to meet a specific 
customer’s needs? Have any of the changes you sought resulted in a rule change or a 
permanent, lasting change in how an agency enforces its rules? Have there been situations in 
which the regulatory change you sought was adopted by an agency and applied across the 
industry?  
25. In seeking these types of changes – either rule changes or relaxing enforcement – what role do 
other banks play? Are other banks generally open to your efforts, or even support them? Have 
there been situations in which they resisted these efforts? What risks or threats do you face in 
seeking these types of changes? From other banks? From industry associations? From the 
regulatory agencies? How do you handle or reduce these risks? 
26. Have you ever sought to actually toughen regulatory rules or enforcement? How? Why? In what 
situations? Describe a situation in which you were successful. How significant was this change 
for your business? Describe a situation in which you were not successful. Have other banks 
sought tougher regulation or enforcement in a way that impacted your business, either 
incidentally or deliberately? Describe a situation like this and how you reacted. 
27. Have you been able to improve your ability to affect the regulatory environment – either in 
changing written rules or influencing enforcement? How? 
28. How important is the regulatory environment in your strategic decision-making? Does 
regulatory change – either seeking to relax or toughen the regulatory environment – play a 
significant role in your strategy? Do you tend to see the regulatory environment as highly 
relevant to your activities? Do you view the regulatory environment as generally positive or 
negative? Is the regulatory environment often discussed among you and others in your bank?  
29. Do you often think about ways in which regulatory changes can benefit your bank? Do you see 
deliberate regulatory change as a tool to widen your products and services and improve 
growth? Do you see deliberate regulatory change as a tool with which to reduce competitive 
pressures? 
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APPENDIX 2 
SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
 
 
Interview No. 1 
 
Does your bank have a national or state charter? 
State charter. This is my 40th year in banking. The first 20 were with a national charter bank. 
Stillwater National Bank. During that time, one year, I was a special assistant to the comptroller 
of the currency, the principle regulator of national banks. When we started our last bank, 
Oklahoma National Bank, I was very focused on a national charter. And in course of managing 
Oklahoma National Bank, I had a long term positive relationship with the state banking 
commissioner, Mick Thompson, and so I would talk with our regulators with the SEC about 
issues and I would talk to Mick about issues, just as a friend, and he seemed more flexible with 
letting us do what we wanted to do. In our case, the principle issue was our rate of growth. And 
so from Mick’s point of view, as long as it was quality growth, he was OK with that.  We 
changed our charter at Oklahoma National Bank to a state bank, called ONB Bank, which we 
had been saying in our advertising anyways, so the public didn’t care. In my research of that, I 
realized that there has been a dramatic shift in the last two decades of charters from national 
banks to state banks across the country. I’m not sure what everybody elses’ reasons are, but I 
think it has to do with what business opportunities are you trying to pursue and who’s going to 
be more flexible and who’s going to be less flexible. All of them are going to make you comply 
with regulations and so forth, but there’s a lot of subjective regulatory oversight. It comes down 
to, Mick Thompson’s a guy I can contact, and he’ll pick up my call, and I’ve got an issue, we can 
talk it through. He’s not going to let me do anything I shouldn’t do, but he listens. He responds. 
The FDIC is our national regulatory, an in our case, we have a bank holding company, so we 
also have the Federal Reserve as a regulator, which we would have as a state or national charter.  
 
I have done both, as a new charter, and it has seemed to me that relationally, while I think they 
were both good, I think working with Mick has been better. And the FDIC has been cooperative, 
down in Dallas, with what we’re trying to do.  I think relationships really matter, and I have 
always had a good relationship with the comptroller of the currency, especially as I was in 
Washington as one of their senior officers. But I think because Mick Thompson is in Oklahoma 
and he understands what we’re talking about – such as growth – Jenks is only across the river – 
it’s not really a different market. It’s good to have a regulator who knows exactly what you’re 
talking about and can respond to you.  
 
Paint a picture of your overall regulatory environment. Who do you have to answer to?  
 
Everyone. Because we have a state charter, we have a primary federal regulator and the state 
banking commission – so the FDIC and the state banking department are both primary regulators 
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for us. If we were, as a bank, a member of the Federal Reserve, it would be the state banking 
commissioner and the Federal Reserve, rather than the FDIC. We did think about that because 
we do have a holding company, and so we also have to respond to the Federal Reserve.  
 
How much interaction do you have? Agency by agency … what’s the interaction like with 
each one of those? 
 
As a startup bank, it’s different than as a mature, ongoing bank. As a startup bank, you agree to 
not only the standard conditions banking operation, but typically they have special conditions 
that until you reach a certain level of maturity, you have more dialogue. You have to get more 
permission to do stuff. So it depends on how new you are and how active you are. For example, 
in our case, when we got a charter approved, they agreed to let us build an office at 41st and 
Rockford, which is off 41st and Peoria, that we were going to move into and see how it went. 
Subsequently, we decided this was a nice building and nice people, but we couldn’t have a drive-
thru, we couldn’t have signage. Parking, as you’ve experienced, is not perfect. And so, we 
wanted to build a headquarters at another location, but we had to get their permission to do that. 
If we were a mature bank, we would have to have their permission to move headquarters, but the 
cost wouldn’t be a big deal. But since we’re a new bank, it is a big deal. When we first talked 
about it, at that point, we still weren’t making any money, and they told us to wait until we were 
making money. So there was an ongoing dialogue about our desire to do that. The amount of 
communication for a newer bank is greater than for a mature bank, and the amount for a bank 
that wants to do stuff and for a bank that wants to stay where they are is more. One who wants to 
do new stuff – like build a headquarters – anytime you want to do something different, you’ve 
got to get approval. Because of that, we have more regular communication than we might 
otherwise, because we don’t want to surprise them. We want them to know our plans, we want 
them to know where we’re going. We give them regular updates on how we’re doing, even 
though they’re not asking. Because when we get around to asking, we want them to know how 
our thoughts developed and how that fits into a logical continuum of what we’re doing. We send 
in quarterly reports just like everybody else does, and then we probably talk to them quarterly – 
we don’t have to – but from a relational point of view, we let them know where our plans are 
going. And certainly, when we want to do something new, we’ll tell them what we’re wanting to 
do, get their advice, and then make a proposal.  
 
Is this for the three different agencies? Or are you talking mostly about the state? 
 
The state and the FDIC. We have to get permission as a bank. The Federal Reserve really relies 
on the state and FDIC to oversee the bank. But we do have to get their permission if we want to 
borrow money as a startup bank, and if we want to do anything as a holding company to effect 
the bank, we have to talk to the Federal Reserve, so we send them a copy of our annual plan and 
our long term plan just so they’ll know what we’re doing. Probably, in that case, we meet with 
them once a year.  
 
Are some agencies more interactive with you than others?  
 
They are active in a lot of different ways. One, for example, the FDIC has an initiative under the 
Community Reinvestment Act, what they’re calling economic inclusion, which has just started in 
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Tulsa. They came to visit us about our possible involvement, and so we started it. It’s something 
we’d like to do anyway, they’re sponsoring it, so it’s a real plus from our point of view. I’m on 
their advisory board, and I talk to them once a month about promoting economic inclusion. Then, 
if we have a question that comes up that we haven’t faced before or it’s out of the norm for us, 
we’ll touch base with either our examiner or somebody. Each of them have an examiner in 
charge, who we communicate with, and in my case, I communicate more with Commissioner 
Thompson, just because we’re old friends.  
 
Are you the one personally interacting with the agencies, or are there others …  
 
I’m the chairman and co-CEO, and my son Tom is president. We both interact with all three of 
the agencies. In our division of duties, its more my responsibility to interact with the senior 
people at the agencies, and then, others who work at the bank – in their area of responsibility – 
compliance, interact with compliance officers interact with compliance officers at the FDIC and 
state. They examine our compliance, our CRA, IT, as well as the normal CAMELs ratings issues. 
Our chief credit officer is a former national bank examiner himself and has had relationships 
with regulators – may call into question, “Here’s what we’re doing on appraisals, what are 
insights that you can help us with?” Sometimes, its technical issues, and sometimes its broader 
issues.  
 
It’s very relational.  
 
You don’t see – there’s not a state banking commission. It’s the people within it. It’s not a 
faceless bureaucracy. Is that true across the agencies, or is it more true with the state 
because you know the commissioner? 
 
I would say – that’s a really good question – as comparing the state banking department with the 
comptroller of the currency, it’s much more relational because the comptroller’s in Washington, 
and when I lived in Washington, he left shortly after I left, so I didn’t have a relationship there I 
had before. I think non-major banking companies, you aren’t likely to have a personal 
relationship with the comptroller of the currency, and you’re not likely to have a personal 
relationship with the chairman of the FDIC. But you are likely to have a relationship with – all 
banks in each region have a person in the regional office that is their principle contact – and we 
have a relationship with that person. And also, to the extent that we are doing anything – we 
went through the approval process to have a charter and so we established a dialogue with some 
people in the Dallas office that we continue to contact. And then you have an ongoing 
relationship with your examiners that hopefully, for all banks, is very positive.  
 
At the other banks you’ve been … is it the same way as it is here, where you’re the one 
person who’s interacting? At a place like Stillwater National Bank, is Rex Horning doing 
all the interacting with the commissioner, or those larger banks – do they have 
departments?  
 
It probably depends on the bank. At the very largest bank – CitiBank, JPMorgan – their primary 
regulator has an office at their office. So they’re there 12 months out of the year – they’re there 
all the time. So that’s really different. Those are mega institutions, and it’s a constant oversight – 
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and they probably do have a relationship with the comptroller or the chairman of the FDIC or the 
chairman of the Fed because it’s a big deal.  
 
There are a lot of things that go on in Washington that don’t have a lot to do with community 
banks but do have a lot to do with the banking system, that I got to learn when I was there, and 
it’s very interesting, but it’s not our problem. It really depends on the personality of the bank. 
When I was with Stillwater National Bank, the CEO was Bob McCormick. Bob was the 
principle person interacting with the regulators, and that was the OCC. However, during bank 
exams, I was in charge of lending, so I would be responsible for interacting with the examiner in 
charge on our loans. McCormick also sat in on that, but we would talk through all the loans and 
the quality and so forth. It probably depends on the bank. In our bank, there are probably more 
people who have contact with the regulators, which we think is a positive thing. Tom and I are 
probably the ones who coordinate that flow of information – we don’t want them to be surprised, 
but we don’t want to be surprised either.  
 
What’s the posture of the agencies you deal with toward your business? Do they facilitate? 
Do they goal keep? Hamper? How would you characterize their mission and orientation 
toward what you’re trying to do? 
 
It depends. It depends on what they’re looking at and what their concerns are. I found them all to 
be generally cooperative. I believe their mood has changed from time to time as the economy has 
changed and as their issues have changed. I think the current environment has much more 
emphasis on compliance than it did before because it’s the environment we’re in. I think this 
environment – this economic environment – has been more concerned about rates of growth and 
things they perceived have caused failures at other banks. Now, there’s a lot more research that 
has been done in the past twenty years on the causes of bank failures, anything that looks like 
that, you raise a red flag. I would say I have found them very cooperative when we’re talking 
about a new idea – something we want to do in the future. And helping us think about how that 
fits within what works for them. I think they’re also very clear if they have a concern about what 
you’re thinking, and most of the time that has caused us to back up and go OK, is there another 
way of thinking about this. We want to grow. Ours is a rapid growth model. And we know that’s 
out of the norm. This time, for example, we have raised more equity capital – substantially more 
equity capital – than we did ten years ago. Ten years ago, we were able to use more debt in the 
holding company, and this time they preferred that we raised equity capital, and so we did. 
 
Were you proactive in that? Did you anticipate that? 
 
I wasn’t. I understood that the whole international regulatory environment is focused on more 
capital in the banking system – Basel III and so forth. The whole environment has been, they’d 
rather you have equity capital rather than debt. I listened to that and set that in the context of the 
discussions we’ve been having, and I went to our stockholders and went, “Look, they’re going to 
make the whole banking system have more capital.” Forty percent of banks never raise 
additional equity capital after they start. Forty two percent only raise additional equity capital 
once after they start. So only 18 percent are actively raising capital. That means there are going 
to be a lot of banks that either don’t grow or they shrink to fit their current capital level, so I 
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think that’s an opportunity for banks to go out and aggressively raise capital. So our stockholders 
went, “Yeah, I think you’re right, and so let’s put up more capital.” 
 
They didn’t say, you have to go out and raise more capital. You know, X million more dollars in 
capital. But they said, we’re concerned about these capital ratios as you grow. In ONB, the way 
we solved that problem is we went out and borrowed money in the holding company and put that 
in the bank as capital. And we listened to them, and they said that’s not what we want banks to 
do right now. So we went, OK, as long as everybody is playing by the same rules, good.  
 
What role do you think regulatory agencies play in shaping industry performance, in 
general? 
 
Very significant. And more significant in economically difficult times than in happy times. They 
have less concerns in happy times, and they have great concerns in difficult times. For example, 
in our last bank we were a very active lender of development and construction lending because 
the economy was working and the pro formas were working, and so we were very active in that. 
We don’t have development loans in this bank because that’s an area where a number of banks 
got in trouble with those kinds of loans. That’s an area of regulatory concern, and we don’t want 
to hit that hot button. We’re focused on things of less concern. So they can very much shape 
what somebody does by what they’re concerned about and what they’re less concerned about. 
We were less focused in the beginning on profitability and more focused on getting to scale. 
They were really focused on getting profitable more quickly, so that changed our focus. We 
slowed down our growth to get profitable sooner, so that impacted us. By and large, I would say 
their impact has been positive, they give good advice, and they have tried to keep all banks 
within parameters that would keep them from getting into trouble. And to the extent that there’s 
a more entrepreneurial bank trying to do something outside the norm, that’s going to be hard to 
do, so you know you’re going to face a lot more scrutiny doing that. People think more 
deliberately about their plans if they know they’re going to have to answer for them.  
 
The agencies write the rule book. How do you know what’s in the rule book?  
 
Our chief credit officer is a former bank examiner and has a great deal of knowledge. Our chief 
financial officer stays up with all the financial rules. Our chief operations officer stays up with 
all the compliance rules. It’s a shared task, and we talk about it all the time. It’s constantly on the 
horizon.  
 
How do you do it? It’s 8,000 pages of Bible-thin paper and little bitty type. It’s so 
overwhelming, it seems. Do you set aside time each day to read …  
 
Yes. You read. You go to conferences. You attend seminars. And you hire consultants. We, 
particularly in compliance and IT, we have had external audits by people who are experts in 
those areas to make sure we are compliant. If there’s something we missed in our reading. We 
attend seminars to listen to what are the hot issues of the day in exams. Banks don’t share much 
information about … banks are not good cooperating on credit. But they are good at cooperating 
on how we work with our regulators. This is what’s going on in the exams we’re experience, so 
how do we all listen to what they’re trying to say and apply that to what we do?  
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We spend enormously more time thinking about regulations today than we did a decade ago. 
And enormously more than we did twenty or thirty years go.  
 
When I was in Mr. Gilbert’s office, he showed me two books. One was the book of every 
rule that had been written between 1970 to 1990. And then he showed me the binder – one 
of five – which is a fraction … most of the rules haven’t been written yet.  
 
Is it easy to understand what the words mean?  
 
Most of the time. We have a general counsel who we use, whose clients are primarily banks. We 
have a specialist in regulatory issues who is an attorney in Oklahoma City. If you have a question 
of a technical nature. We use consultants and attorneys to help us make sure we understand what 
those are about.  
 
Is there a difference between the written rule and how it’s enforced? 
 
I don’t think they mean to, but because they are human beings, different examiners may see it 
differently. And different examiners in the field may see it differently than their headquarters. 
The truth is, there may be functional differences because banks do it differently. We are not a 
heavy consumer lending bank, so what we may be doing as compared to a bank that is 
principally consumer lending, would be very different. We’re probably easier to examine than 
someone where that’s their primary business. We own a mortgage company as part of our bank, 
and so we know there’s a whole new set of rules in the mortgage industry, and some banks don’t 
make mortgage loans. Ours would be more complicated than other people. 
 
Whenever you encounter ambiguity – maybe the last time you encountered ambiguity – or 
uncertainty regarding what a rule was … is that a phone call to the attorney? To the 
commissioner?  
 
Well, it’s probably first a phone call to the attorney or a consultant on that topic. To say, hey, we 
were thinking about this, what have you heard? And then we formulate something and if we 
think that’s right, we go forward, and if we aren’t sure, we’ll probably call our examiner in 
charge first and say, what do you think? If they’re not sure, then we go up the organization. For 
most banks, your principle relationship is going to be with the examiner in charge.  
 
Let’s say you had at Time 1, X, an ability to understand new regulations and now you’re at 
T = 3, how has your X improved? How have you improved your ability to understand the 
regulatory environment? 
 
I think understanding the context is important. How things evolved. What are they trying to 
achieve? What’s the point? Usually there’s a logic and there’s a fairness in the discussion, 
particularly if there’s a misunderstanding about something. What’s material, and what isn’t 
material. I would say our industry right this minute, in the last three years, three years ago, you 
would have said there was a lot of confusion about what the rules were. Less confusion two years 
ago. A little less a year ago. It’s clearer now, because we’re coming out of the fog of the 
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recession. When chaos appears in the economy, there’s just a lot of confusion. They aren’t sure 
what to do. A lot of banks chose to shrink. They chose to turn inward and focus on problems that 
needed to be fixed, which created enormous opportunity for us because they were focused on 
themselves and we were focused on customers. We see them coming back in the game now. 
They’ve got their problems solved or manageable, and we see them coming back. 
 
There’s been a lot of consolidation too. I can’t imagine how hard it would be to be sitting in 
Locust Grove and deal with this issue.  
 
I don’t know how small banks do it. We have a number of people focused on compliance issues. 
I can’t imagine how a bank with only 20 people can do that. The consolidation is not simply 
driven by increased regulation, but increased regulation has contributed to consolidation. There 
are 57 percent fewer banks today than 25 years ago, and its getting less. Which, from a banker’s 
point of view, that’s a good thing. From the economy point of view, I think it’s not a good thing.  
 
But you’re one of the only startups … how many years do you have to go back? 
 
Technically they’re treating us as a charter. We bought a charter of a bank in Glenco. If you 
drive from Stillwater to Tulsa and back, you touch Glenco twice. In 1999, we applied and 
received a charter for a national bank, Oklahoma National Bank. We talked to them when we 
were going to start this bank, and they said, yeah, sure that’s fine. And as the discussion went 
along, they said we’d rather you buy a bank. I think in 2009, I think they approved five charters, 
and they were all working on it in 2008, and I think they just quit approving them. I think in 
2010, they didn’t approve any charters. They don’t approve charters during a recession. It tends 
to ebb and flow with the economy.  
 
When you’re doing your day-to-day operations, how often do you run up against a 
regulatory boundary? Is that relevant to your decision making? 
 
There’s regulatory consideration in almost everything we do.  
 
Are there examples you can give? Maybe how it’s limited the options you have? Or the 
effectiveness of what you’ve decided?  
 
Every time you do something or create a new product, you go, well, how do we make sure that’s 
compliant, we want to make sure we’re staying within the regulations. So you just have to say, 
we’ll do it right. We’re updating our Web site, as a current project, and so the first issue is, well, 
is there anything involved in that that we have to improve the compliance? And then, as we think 
of these 10 more things we want to add, what issues does that raise? So we need to be sure that 
we’re compliant. If I think back on my 40 years, in the first place, we didn’t have Web sites. And 
in the second place, there weren’t regulations we have to worry about. That’s pretty different. 
When you think about – we are presently thinking about going to Oklahoma City. Well, we 
know we have to get permission to do that. Now, we’ve been laid out in our strategic plan, that 
that was our long term plan to go to Oklahoma City, well now we have to develop a proforma of 
how that’s going to work. How is that going to affect our growth? Our profitability? Do we have 
enough capital to do that? That’s both a technical issue and a strategic issue; when you’re doing 
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those things, you have to think about how that will fit into the regulatory environment at this 
time?  
 
Think about the type of loans you make – it’s going to be a while before any new development 
loans are approved in the country. Nobody’s getting any loans. That’s really different. Now, as 
there’s a shortage of lots, they’re going to be some activity, but they’re not going to be as easy as 
they were five years ago when everything was booming. Spec construction loans have been more 
difficult to get because that’s a bucket you know – those things, when they do a bank exam, you 
know that’s going to be the first thing they look at, you’re going to be cautious about filling that 
bucket.  
 
How much imput is there, when, with the agencies you deal with, they propose a new rule 
or new enforcement standards. How much say do you have in the outcome? 
 
In things like capital regulations and Basel III, they have hearings and they have public comment 
periods. In that particular instance, my son Tom’s on the board of the Oklahoma Banker’s 
Association, we wrote our opinion to both the OBA and to the regulatory agencies. We thought 
that was overkill for community banks. There’s a lot of opportunity for input on major changes. 
Some of the things are more technical in nature, and it’s more of a dialogue or an interpretation.  
 
Are there written rules for everything, and then there’s enforcement on top of that, that’s 
malleable? 
 
There are more and more written rules for more and more things. In the past, when I was doing 
exams in the late 70s and 80s, you’d have a discussion about something, they’d take your word 
for it and then you’d come back to examine it to see if it worked out like you said. Bank credit 
files, particularly community bank files, didn’t exist till the 70s. They evolved through the 80s. 
Bank lending policies didn’t exist until the 70s and they evolved in the 80s. It’s gotten to the 
point now, if it’s not in writing, it didn’t happen. Everything’s in writing. Every policy is in 
writing, and every policy is going to be reviewed by examiners.  
 
Do you try to have a say in the process? How do you try to get involved in it? 
 
Through our trade associations primarily. The OBA, the independent banker’s association. You 
know, they have full time people studying these issues. They ask for input. They’re a good voice 
for us. Where any of us as individuals – we’re trying to run a bank, and we don’t have time to 
run up to Washington and chat.  
 
But at the state level? You also rely on associations? 
 
The OBA is a very effective voice for the banking community in Oklahoma. But we also value 
our relationships. I really believe that the people at both the FDIC in Dallas and in Oklahoma and 
the people at the state banking office want to do what’s fair. Want to do what’s reasonable. They 
understand that if they just pass something, that’s what it says and it’s going to take us a while to 
figure out what it’s going to mean and how you apply that. And we’re going to discover what 
were the unintended consequences of that. Again, it’s more relational than you might imagine.  
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A rule that’s not enforced isn’t a rule …  
 
The problem is is that there are so many rules. Determining which apply to your circumstance, 
and what does that mean with your lens and with your circumstance, can be variable. There are 
specific exclusions for smaller banks related to bigger banks. Part of that, I think, is based on not 
everything is understood in writing, a lot of things are understood in relationship. By analogy: if 
I am lending money to you, and I’ve just met you, I’m probably going to be more concerned … 
 
If I’ve been lending money to you for a decade, and I understand your business plan and how it’s 
working, and we’ve had discussions for a decade about your management team and your 
philosophy, and I see how it’s working, I’m going to have less concerns than if you’re a brand 
new customer and I’m trying to learn your business and figure out how it works. And I think 
that’s true with regulators and banks. That an advantage over my son Tom is that I’ve been 
around for 40 years, and they’ve seen what I’ve done, and I’ve been a survivor in different 
economies and have had successful banking operations. The flip of that is that I’ve never seen 
anybody in the banking business with Penn Square Bank on their resume. So if you’re associated 
with a bank that goes down, that’s not good.  
 
Is the relational such an important component that it’d be hard for somebody who didn’t 
have any background at all? There’s nobody going to be writing a business plan for our 
business plan competition who’s going to be starting a bank – or will be successful – unless 
they’ve got family history or someone involved that’s related to a bank. 
 
They would have to have knowledge of how does it work. I mean, they could write a business 
plan, but they’re not going to have credibility with regulators that they know how to do it, if they 
haven’t done it. If they can’t see a track record. For example, in our circumstance, we have our 
chief credit officer – a former regulator, a former consultant to banks on how to work with 
regulators, and was with us at our last bank as our chief credit officer. And our chief lending 
officer has been with me since 1980 in Stillwater and at ONB. So there’s a continuum of 
knowledge. And the younger folks, Tom and his generation, are establishing those relationships, 
and as we retire, they will have been working at it for 20 years and have relationships with 
people. When I tell you I’m going to do this, we’ve had this discussion 10 times before, and you 
know I did it.  
 
I wonder why if that’s why banks, as opposed to other businesses, tend to be family 
businesses.  
 
Community banks, it’s very common. Ours is adnormal. The normality is that we have a number 
of family members working together. The adnormal part is that we have 211 others. Most 
community banks are run by relatively small numbers of people, and they tend to be family 
members or golfing buddies. Part of my research is looking at – the why – you can look at the 
number of employees over time, the number of senior managers over time, the number of 
investors over time, and say that there is a covariance with the growth of the organization and the 
number of people involved, which I’m describing as human and social capital. Banks that don’t 
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have as many investors, employees, don’t grow. There’s a lot of reasons for that, but it’s their 
business model, I think. 
 
Most small businesses – community banks are really small businesses – most small businesses 
stay small and never intended to get big. We started off as the third smallest bank in Oklahoma 
when we bought Glenco. At Oklahoma National, we started off as the smallest bank the day we 
opened. Oklahoma National is one of the top twenty banks in the state. We’re now 69th largest in 
Oklahoma with First Oklahoma. That’s my intent. Most banks kind of hit their groove.  
 
They’re not trying to do what we’re doing. And I would say, most banks, are easy for the 
regulators to regulate because it’s pretty much the same thing year after year after year. Ours is 
different, we know it’s different. 
 
When was the last time you were able to move the boundary in pursuit of an opportunity? 
 
By concrete example, there’s always a boundary on where you operate – where you do business. 
We had to get permission to build a new building, and it was a dialogue of why did that make 
business sense, how did that investment relate to the amount of capital we had in the bank, and 
how did that relate to the profitability of the bank? In first having a dialogue, saying, here’s what 
we want to do, and the regulators saying, here are the issues you have to address, and then we 
came back and addressed those issues, and then we got approval to do that. To get into a new 
line of business – or a new market – well, that’s a boundary, so to do that, we have to explain 
why it makes sense, how it affects our profitability, and do we have the capital to do that? 
 
But there’s no rule change, no enforcement change taking place. Are there changes that 
take place that are industry wide? Say, you pursue an action that results in a policy change 
that influences all the other banks.  
 
Well the biggest change I’ve seen in that regard, in my career, there used to be in the state of 
Oklahoma, each bank could only have one branch. It had to be within 1,000 feet of your 
headquarters. In the economic crisis of the 80s, the economy collapsed, there was a need to 
consolidate to keep banks open. Because of the problem banks, there was a need to change the 
law to allow strong banks buy weak banks and have multiple branches. That was a way in which 
things changed dramatically, and the number of banks in Oklahoma declined by 57 percent as the 
bigger banks bought the smaller banks, or as the smaller banks combined with stronger smaller 
banks. Philosphically, I think the idea of limited branching was winning until the economy 
collapsed, and then it went away. I was on that side, and we lost.  
 
How did that rule change take place? Where did it start? 
 
There were multiple sides. On one side, there were those who wanted to acquire more branches 
and limit competition under the theory that more banks provide broader services that a few, 
smaller banks. From a regulatory point of view, I think the state banking commissioner tended to 
be favorable to the community bankers concerns, the comptroller of the currency was very much 
for nationwide branching. So there was differences in opinion among the regulatory community. 
One of the things I learned when I worked at the comptroller of the currency, back in 85 and 86, 
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there is no monolith in regulation. Now, there is a singular voice that comes out of the agency, 
but there’s a lot of different opinions within the agencies of “what are the right regulations, and 
what do those mean?” You don’t know it on the outside because they’re going to talk to you with 
one voice, but you’re going to have people sympathetic to your cause on the inside who go, 
“Actually, you’re right.” 
 
Is it possible to know … you’ve got so many players, so many different interests in what the 
boundary is, different banks, different regulators, different voices … how good are you at 
knowing what those different players are? 
 
It’s hard to know. Part of how you know that is from people who have been in the agency and 
left and become consultants on the outside. They know who’s on which side of the debate inside 
the agency. And you can know that the agencies are debating between themselves because 
they’re public about it. They clearly disagree on some things, and you naturally tend to gravitate 
toward those who you agree with.  
 
Do you see those conflicts … do you try to take advantage of them in certain ways?  
 
I would say I avoid conflict with my regulators as much as possible. There’s enough conflict in 
life, and I don’t want any conflict there. We’re going to be compliant. We want to understand the 
rules and abide by the rules. We will tell them if we disagree but we’ll do what they say.  
 
You will find that (conflict) among regulatory agencies. We know when they sometimes disagree 
with each other on what we’re doing and what did that mean.  
 
Do banks rat on each other? 
 
I don’t think they do it like that, but I think where it happens, during a bank exam, I mean you 
live with regulators for two or three weeks, and they’re talking to you about what’s going on in 
your bank and they’re talking to you about your competitors and what’s happening. So they’re 
offering opinions, you know, “Those guys are crazy.” I know we’re an anomaly, and you look at 
our growth compared to the others and you go, “Oh, that’s different.” I know we have our critics, 
and that’s just life. If you’re doing something different in life, you will have critics.  
 
The pushback you face from regulators … do you get the impression that stems from other 
bankers’ concerns or from other regulators’ concerns? 
 
I don’t know, but I suspect it’s some of both. We know we pay the top CD rates in town, so it’d 
be easy for somebody else to go, “See, they’re just paying the top CD rates in town to grow fast,” 
and we’re going, “Yeah, that’s true. And that’s bad because why?” We explain our business 
strategy, and does that result in us having a more narrow interest margin? Yes it does. It’s no 
hugely more narrow, but we think in the long run, because we’ll have a greater pool of assets, 
we’ll make more money. We’re more focused on longterm shareholder value than this year’s 
shareholder value. And that’s our model, and other banks are focused on this year’s earnings, and 
I understand that.  
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How has your underlying ability to create relationships changed? How have you gotten 
better at it?  
 
I’ve learned not to surprise them with anything, and I’ve learned way in advance to say, “This is 
what I’m thinking about.” I’ve learned to listen more than tell; to ask questions more than make 
assertions. And to say, this is what we see. How do you see it? Help us understand if that’s 
bothersome to you, and how would that be different? I think that over the years, I’ve learned to 
stay in touch more often. Are you married? Well, one of the things you’ll learn about marriage is 
communication is like oxygen: the less communication you have, the less oxygen you have to 
breathe, and you need oxygen to live. If communication goes away, you will die. The marriage 
will end. Similarly, in a relationship with a regulator, communication is really important, 
particularly if it’s abnormal. I don’t want them to find a problem. If I have a problem, I should 
know it, and I should call them and say, “I’ve got a problem.” Something came up and I want 
you to know about it. Do you have any advice for me? That’s a lot better than them showing up 
in a bank exam and them going, wait a minute, you’ve got a problem.  
 
Before you knew these lessons, how did it hurt what you were trying to do as a banker? Do 
you have examples?  
 
In my younger years as a banker, bank exams then were unannounced. They would just show up 
on a Monday morning, and the first thing they would do count all the cash. (They quit doing that 
because there’s not enough cash to make a difference.) Everything was supposed to be a surprise, 
and they were a surprise audit. When I was at the comptroller of the currency’s office when that 
changed nationwide; now, they tell us when we’re going to have an exam 90 days in advance. 
They ask for a lot of outside information they can analyze in advance. When they show up, the 
go, here are the 10 issues we want to work on and here’s what else we want to know. Knowing 
that, that those rules changed – that that part of the relationship changed – as long as they’re 
going to have all this stuff off site anyway, you might as well provide them with anything else 
they didn’t ask for that they’re going to find when they get here.  
 
It’s become less police oriented and more like a team. 
 
The chief national bank examiner – I wish he hadn’t retired the same time I did because that 
would have been a great ongoing relationship – he saw the job of the examiner as more of a 
consultant than as a policeman. Now, there certainly was a time to be a policeman, when they’re 
doing something improper. But for the most part, helping them understand the rules and helping 
them get compliant, rather than I’m here to beat you up. 
 
Do you see these people outside the banking context? 
 
Not really. At least it hasn’t been for me. The commissioner and I have known each other since I 
was a state senator. We knew each other in a different way, and he was a banker, so he was on 
our side. I think, particularly, with the changes in the rules on … in the old days, you could take 
a regulator to lunch. You can’t do that any more. You can’t do anything that could appear 
improper, so that’s put a real damper on knowing them on a personal level. And that’s regretful. 
The other thing is, we’re not in Oklahoma City, so we wouldn’t see people in Tulsa if they’re in 
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Oklahoma City. And we’re not in Dallas. When I was in Washington, I saw everybody all the 
time, so that was different.  
 
How often are you inspected? 
 
Now, you send in a quarterly call report. Quantitative, unbelievable data available. So there’s 
that. There’s a bank exam, usually at least annual. During economic times, it depends on what 
the quality of your bank was. Usually, it’s annually, that they’re here for two or three weeks 
going through everything. And then there’s special exams for things like compliance, IT, and the 
community reinvestment act, which are different from the annual exams, and those are every two 
or three years.  
 
Is that all at the state level, or do you have different folks coming in here?  
 
When we have an exam, because we have the state and the FDIC, every other time, the other 
agency is in charge of it. There is an examiner in charge for us at the FDIC and at the state, and 
last time, the FDIC was in charge of the exam, next time the state will be in charge of the exam. 
The Federal Reserve reads those exams and examines us off site.  
 
What are the other points of contact are you have with your regulators? 
 
Conferences. You’ll see them at the state banker’s association. They hold their own conferences, 
where they’ll talk about capital or whatever, and we always go. I will at least annually, try to 
make an appointment and go down and visit. We’re updating our strategic plan and I’ll go down 
and say, well, here’s how it’s gone, and here’s what we’re thinking about. I don’t want to 
surprise them with anything. Either our plans haven’t changed, or they have changed, because of 
this, so here’s what we’re doing.  
 
The banks that don’t do that. What are the differences? 
 
It depends on if what they’re doing is the same thing year after year after year. It probably 
doesn’t matter. If they’re trying to do something different, then it matters. I’m guessing that 
those banks that know they’re trying to be different communicate more often. And some banks 
that were the same size they were ten years ago – they’re not kicking up any dust or making any 
issues – then it depends on how relational are the managers of that bank. Do they care about 
having a relationship? If they’re highly capitalized, profitable, and not causing any trouble …  
 
Do you seek out the relationships you have now as a tool to use later? Or do you do it 
because you’re a relational guy? 
 
I think both are true. I think it has to do with the personality of the people in charge, and it has to 
do with what you’re trying to achieve and how important is that to what you’re trying to achieve.  
 
Will the association or someone in the industry – try to place people from the banks inside 
the regulators? 
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Not really. I was an anomaly inside the comptrollers office – because I had been a banker and 
because I was going back. That’s unusual. There are a lot of former regulators working as 
bankers or as consultants to banks, but it doesn’t go the other way very much. I say that, and Mr. 
Thompson’s a former banker.  
 
How significant is it the other way around – I have to talk to 15-20 bankers – how many of 
those should I expect to be former regulators? 
 
If you talk to the CEOs, a number of them will have been regulators because that’s a great 
training ground for young bankers or people who aspire to be bankers. My bet is that at the 
bigger banks, most of them will have someone who was a former regulator. Perhaps their credit 
officer.  
 
There’s this issue called framing – how do you think about issues – by analogy … what’s 
your bank’s frame? 
 
There are some bankers who think of bankers as a pain in the neck. I think – we have a public 
charter that we – our banking system is unique in the world. There is no banking system – and 
never has been a banking system – like the United States banking system. And I think a part of 
that has been the relationship with the regulators. I think it’s good to have competition between 
our regulators. We can be a state charter or a national charter. As a state charter, you can have 
the Fed or the FDIC. I think those are positive from the banker’s point of view. From a public 
policy point of view, I think it is a very positive thing to have oversight of banks, who might be 
misbehaving, on the negative side. But on the positive side, to encourage them in positive, 
affirming ways. My frame is that the regulatory environment is a good thing.  
 
The community reinvestment act would be a good example of that. I think banks should be 
required to reinvest deposits taken from the local community back into that local community. I 
think that’s good public policy. I know most of my colleagues do not – they think it’s a pain in 
the neck. I think banks should be required to make loans to low to moderate income families and 
businesses because I don’t think they would, independently, choose to do that. We do because I 
think it’s the right thing to do. When I was a White House fellow, one of my key takeaways from 
that was – I was there under Ronald Reagan – and I was one of 14. Five of us were Democrats, 
two were independents, and seven were Republicans. We debated everything in the world for a 
year together as we travelled the country and the world. One of my takeaways were that the 
Republicans – their frame – is that the government is the problem. The Democrats consistently 
said, no, the government is part of the solution to that problem. Now, they can also be part of the 
problem, but it is really part of the solution because in a democracy, ‘We the people’ are the 
government and we’re acting on our behalf. So I’m a Democrat, and I believe Obamacare is a 
good thing. I see the largest number of bankruptcies in the country come from healthcare. I think 
it’s horrible that 30 percent of people in Oklahoma are uninsured. Yes it cause an adjustment to 
the system, and it will take a decade to work it all out, but we needed to move in that direction. I 
think Social Security is a good thing, Medicare is a good thing, because we all are either old or 
we have parents who are old, and we need to be concerned about people who are old and 
disabled. So it’s the frame I have.  
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Is that frame shared throughout the bank? 
 
There’s a lot of difference of opinions. And when you have 211 owners, you have 422 opinions. 
I would say our group has a more positive frame for regulation even though we probably are 
engaged more with them than most banks because of what we’re trying to do. I realize as a 
democrat and a banker and a southern Baptist, that I’m in a minority group that is small in this 
country and small in this state. I would say that people who fight with the regulators don’t tend 
to say around this business a long time. They will win. The regulators will win. They are 
permanent, and they get to decide. I think that there are a lot of really frustrated bankers about 
that, and I would confess that there are times when I’m frustrated as well. But when I drop back 
and go, well, they’re fairly applying these rules to everybody else and that’s just the way it is, I’ll 
go along with this. I think it’s important to know in life what you can change and what you can’t 
change – what hill you want to die on. I’m not going to fight all those battles because it’s not 
meaningful to me.  
 
 
Interview No. 2 
 
I will tell you – and this is great timing on your part – because there was a ton of regulatory – 
there’s been a lot of new regulations come out in the last three or four years. The absolute worst 
being called Dodd-Frank. That is a killer for our industry. 
 
What caused – and this is my personal opinion – in 2008, when the recession hit all the big banks 
– and if you notice, we got painted by a broad brush – Lehman Brothers was a bank. Well, 
they’re no more a bank than you are. They’re an investment house. And then you have the big 
banks – Bank of America, Chase, CitiBank – that are huge. But they painted community banks 
with the same brush, which is what we are. Which is what most banks are. You got ten of your 
top big banks that are huge, and the other 7,000 odd whatever are community banks taking care 
of people where we live. We take care of them there. We know our customers. But we’re the 
same regulatory requirements because of them needing TARP money and they needed to be 
bailed out because they didn’t have enough capital – what it boiled down to – they had funny 
capital. They’d show capital on their books of 12 percent, but when you took all the fluff out, 
they were between 2 and 3 percent. Now, we’ve been sitting at – Tier 1 capital, which is true 
cash, the real stuff – is at 8 percent. And most of us hover above 8 percent in the 8 to 10 percent 
range. Some of them are 20 percent, which is crazy because your return on equity is killed. But 
family owned banks don’t care about the return on equity because they don’t have investors.  
 
So we’ve had Dodd-Frank come out, which it was about a 3,000 page bill. But honestly, nobody 
ever read it. By Nancy Pelosi’s own admission, you have to enact it to find out what’s in it, 
which is maybe the dumbest thing I’ve ever heard in my life. Be you Republican or Democrat – I 
don’t care – but when the leader of the party says we have to enact it to find out what’s in there – 
they don’t even take the time to read the stupid thing – makes no sense. And that only set up the 
rules – there’s today over 10,000 pages. So in essence, if it stays true to form, we’re going to 
have over 30,000 pages of regulation requirements from one bill, which is absolutely asinine. 
How can a community bank keep up with that kind of oversight? And that’s just the one thing. 
That’s just the big one. There’s tons of others that have been enacted – they’ve got a whole new 
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agency – the Consumer Protection Agency – we didn’t have enough agencies? We’ve got the 
OCC – the comptroller of the currency – the FDIC – the Federal Reserve Bank – the state bank 
examiners – bank commissioners. We had plenty of regulators. Now, this one happens to be one 
that isn’t subject to appropriations, which is absolutely unconstitutional, in my opinion, and in 
attorneys’ opinions. They don’t have to get approval from the House – well, we haven’t had a 
budget from the House in so many years anyway, which is also unconstitutional – Obama’s had 
one budget under his administration, which is unconstitutional. The constitution calls for one 
every year.  
 
So this was formed – in my opinion – unconstitutionally. It is not subject to appropriations, so 
it’s just at the will of the secretary of the treasury to fund whatever he or she wants however 
much he or she wants, which, again, is unconstitutional. They are running havoc – kind of 
picking and choosing how they want to attack people. They are a rogue regulator with unlimited 
power. They can make up the rules as they go. So far, fortunately, for us, community banks, 
they’ve really aimed at the bigger banks. Dodd Frank was aimed at the bigger banks, what 
everybody thought, but it’s been dwindled down to – you know how it rolls down hill? – well 
we’re all subject to it. That wasn’t the intent.  
 
Right now, the big one out is called Basel III. As of just yesterday, they didn’t exempt 
community banks from it, but they softened community banks from a portion of it. We as 
community bankers believe we should be exempted from it, and Basel III – the whole purpose of 
Basel III was started by the international banking community. Europe – all the countries are 
participating – so that they would have capital requirements to do international business. I’ve 
never done a piece of international business in my life. Nor have any of my friends and 
associates in this state or in any other state. But now, they have brushed us with Basel III – well, 
it is absolutely crazy. We proved by the best test – the recession – that our capital requirements 
were fine. Community banks did fine. The earnings dropped, but we didn’t close up and go 
away. The big banks were the ones that went under – that had to be pumped up because they 
didn’t have any capital. Community banks are fine under capital.  
 
I’m just giving you the tip of the iceberg in terms of regulation.  
 
Here’s the big issue that honestly we are advocating for and are concerned about at the same 
time. We think there ought to be a bifurcated system within banking. Have one set of rules for 
these 2 trillion dollar banks – these international banks – and then have another set for 
community banks. We don’t look anywhere the same. We’re nothing to the same kind of 
business. Maybe consumers – all in all, our balance sheets don’t look anything at all alike. So 
why would you have a one-size-fits-all rule? Now, that’s not been very popular, I can tell you, in 
Washington – or with the ABA. I’ll tell you why. The ABA gets the biggest amount of their fees 
from the big banks because they pay by what your size is. So they’re fees, next to mine, mine are 
nothing. So they’re in favor of whatever the big banks are in favor of. Now, don’t get me wrong 
– the ABA does a lot of great things. But they would be opposed to that bifurcated system 
separate set of rules because the big banks wouldn’t like that. You hear a lot about too big to fail 
– and the flipside of that is, ‘are you too small to succeed’? To stay alive, actually. We’ve 
already had real cases here in Oklahoma where they’ve sold out – they’re so small that the owner 
said we don’t think we can keep up with the regulatory issue so before they fail us because we 
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haven’t been keeping up – or go to jail – not because they don’t want to but because they 
physical cannot – so screw it, I’ll sell. These banks are the lifeblood of their communities. I will 
give you an example: David Cook – he is the epitome of the community bank – rural community 
bank. Dave Cook’s a very humble guy. If something happened to David Cook and his bank, that 
town would go away. Because he provides – when the bands need uniforms, he provides it. He 
serves on the fire department. He’s a medic on their ambulance service. He referees their high 
school football and basketball games. I mean, this guy – let me tell you what – if you take that 
bank away from that community, you think Bank of America’s going to have to move into 
Laverne, Oklahoma? No. They’ll have no banking services. You talk to him, when you’re up 
there, about what he’s done in residential lending. He’s gotten out of it. He and so many other 
bankers in Oklahoma – they can’t keep up with the regulatory requirements. They don’t have the 
staff or the resources. Now that’s taking a guy out of the market for people who are buying 50 to 
60 thousand dollar houses and giving them no avenues. So the people who they’re trying to 
protect – the consumer – the unintended consequence is that they’re killing the consumer in the 
process. Because they’re taking guys like David Cook out of the business or that line of business.  
 
How do you handle the regulation. If there’s a rulebook, how do you know what’s in the 
rules? 
 
I will tell you – I read – I can’t tell you how much I read on regulatory. Between David Cook and 
myself – he’s chairman and I’m vice chairman. Paul Cornell is first vice chair and he will follow 
me as chairman. Our past chairman is Brad Swicky. Our president and CEO of the OBA is Roger 
Beverage and I would say between the five of us – and we are emailing each other all the time as 
a group. “I saw this work.” I get everything from Capital Hill – and so do they – it’s called The 
Hill; Politico; The American Bankers – we just get flooded. Every day, I bet I get fifty emails 
and I peruse them to see what regulation’s being put in place. We’ve got kind of a two-pronged 
approach: 1) an approach to deal with what’s already in place and how to get it whittled down 
away from community banks or more of a realistic version of it and 2) try to stop those things 
that are going to absolutely cripple us that they’re talking about bringing on. 
 
I will tell you, here again, I will tell you – this is another personal opinion – but I’m not sure if its 
an unintended consequence or an intended consequence from the regulatory bodies: it’s a lot 
easier to regulate 10 or 15 or 20 banks than it is 70 some hundred. It sure has every indication of 
that (consolidation), from this administration. The regulatory agencies kind of flow as the 
administrations do. They’re not going to do out in left field out against the administration. So my 
point being is: is this an unintended consequence or are the kind of OK if we end up with 10 
banks at some point. You look at other countries – we’ve got a lot more banks than anybody else. 
You know where the largest bank in the world is? Taipei. We’re not number one in the world – 
we used to be. We’ve got number two and three. China’s right up in there. But, you know, 
Brown Vitter is another one that’s trying to break the big banks up. Actually, most of us – now, 
the industry is split on Brown Vitter – Brown Vitter wants to increase capital requirements on the 
biggest banks; by the sounds of it, most of us wouldn’t be against that. But the problem is, when 
you look on into that, this legislation, is that it will require, in essence, to survive, the big banks 
will have to split up, kind of like the Baby Bells did. To make them a bunch of smaller banks. 
We don’t want to lose our status as an international industry and banking industry. None of us 
want that for the big banks. There again, two sets of rules. It makes sense. Let them play in the 
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international world and be a power in the international world. We don’t want that to go away 
from the United States. To make us subject to what they have to comply with is absolutely 
asinine on a rational basis in any way you look at it. I will tell you, our legislators absolutely 
agree with that – from Oklahoma. We have great representation. The problem is, they are only so 
many. I will tell you, there are fine community bankers that agree with it (Brown Vitter), too. 
And the reason is they’re focused on is because they think it will get them out of Basel III and 
some of that stuff. That’s more important to them; hell, they don’t care what happens to a big 
bank. From a more global perspective, I think a lot of us are looking at it – the OBA, we’ve 
made no comment. We’ve not taken sides on it. On Brown Vitter. We’ve held back. Because 
some of our membership is saying ‘screw them, let them bust out.’ Don’t know that that is the 
smartest thing. You know, for the country. But that’s a real good debatable issue, and there’s 
merit to both sides of that.  
 
How do you – when you sit down and read this stuff – how do you understand …  
 
There’s rules and then there’s interpretations of the rules. So you try to find out the 
interpretations from the regulators, which is not … it sounds easier than it is.  
 
Well, how do you do that? 
 
Well, it’s a difficult task. Your examiners at the time will have one interpretation and you find 
out in the examination what their interpretation is. Now, depends on if you’re a national bank, 
the OCC’s coming in. I tell you, I come from an OCC background – they view these regulations 
totally different from the FDIC and the state banking commission. If you’ve read some, you see 
its not just clear cut. I’ll tell you an example. In the bank I ran before; they came out with their 
new appraisal guides of what were called ‘valid appraisal questionaires’ – VAQs is what the 
regulation called it – and it had to meet these certain requirements. Well, this particular 
regulation was very clear – very unusual, but it was very clear – it was great. We all understood 
it. We had examiners come into the bank, and say that our VAQs didn’t meet the requirements. 
And we said, we beg to differ. We have followed the regulations step by step and the lead 
examiner said, “That was not in our PowerPoint presentation.” That’s what he told us. You 
know, we said, we’re going by the regulation, we haven’t seen your PowerPoint presentation. 
And he said, well, as of now, you’re in violation, but I’ll check with our regional office. They 
never came back and said they were wrong – but they came back and said – we provided them 
copies of the regulation before they left – these are the actual regulation that we’re giving you. 
Tell us which item we are not compliant with because we believe we are. With every step of the 
way. Well, that’s not the presentation they got in their PowerPoint presentation, whoever did 
that. They differed. I said, well, we’re trying to comply with the actual reg, we have no idea 
what’s in the PowerPoint presentation. He came back and said: “the way you’re doing it is 
acceptable.” They couldn’t say we were wrong – our PowerPoint presentation was terrible. 
They’re never wrong. They’ll accept our VAQs as we were doing them. The way we were doing 
it was acceptable.  
 
The point is: it’s very frustrating to see the reg and then determine how its going to be – and 
second guess regulators and see how they’re going to interpret it. One thing we do is we go to 
Washington DC quite often. We sit down with the regulator. And we discuss these items. How 
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are you looking at this? How are you going to interpret this new reg? How are you going to 
apply it to our banks? We’ll go and sit down – for example, our next one’s in September – we’ll 
sit down with the FDIC, the OCC, the Federal Reserve maybe – the FDIC for sure – those three 
are absolutely guaranteed who we’ll sit down with and say, OK, how are you seeing these regs? 
But you know, they’re so voluminous – you can’t cover them all in an hour meeting or an hour 
and a half get together. So we pick out the major and we try to get the best interpretation and we 
try to share that with all our member banks.  
 
When you come across a regulation that’s unclear – what do you do?  
 
I write legislators, I write regulators. Pick up the phone and call – say, how are you interpreting 
this thing – they hate that – and one of the other things we’re pushing for is, for a lack of a better 
term, is an appeals process on the exam. Right now, you appeal to your regulator. Well, how’s 
that going to go for you. Hey, I’d like to tell you you did a crappy job, and I’d like another look 
at this … so nobody says anything. I could give you an example, where we had a signed contract 
with the FDIC – our bank, we were buying a bank – they came to us with (the contract), they 
changed their mind and then went and closed the bank and went and took bids on it. After we 
had a signed agreement, they came to us and said, “Would you mind – at this price. We’ll set off 
the bad assets. We’ll take care of the whole thing.” We spent, I will tell you, a couple hundred 
thousand dollars in our due diligence. We had an agreement, all parties signed it. A week before 
closing – we had already told employees, their employees, everything, what was going on – a 
week before they called and said we’re going to see how we come out on the bid process. And I 
go, “wait a minute,” we’re set to close in a week – we spent a lot. They did it. We were one of 
the bids, there were two of them, one of the other banks got the bid. But what are we going to 
do? Sue the FDIC? That’s the kiss of death. Next thing you know, our FDIC coverage is gone 
because we failed. 
 
What’s your interaction like with your regulators? 
 
Our state regulators are terrific. If you’ve got a question, you can call Gilbert, you can call Mick 
Thompson. These people are there to help you. They’re the only regulator I’ve ever seen – 
they’re there to help you work through the regulation, understand it and comply with it. They’re 
on your side. And that’s the way regulators ought to be – to help you be better at what you ought 
to do. I would say the state is the only one we get that from. 
 
What about the FDIC? 
 
It’s good. I mean, we’ve had good exams. But we don’t have the trust in the federal regulators 
the way we do the state. We know the state – they’re people who are right here. They’re us. 
They’re Oklahomans. They understand, and they understand us. They understand our market 
better than any federal regulator can. We have absolutely zero issues with our state banking 
regulators – they’re great. In my opinion, they’re awesome.  
 
What do you think the difference is – in terms of performance – between being regulated 
by the state or national agencies? 
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Its easier to operate as a state bank as opposed to a national bank. Number 1, the costs are 
cheaper. We pay fees – we’re a self-contained – your tax dollars aren’t going to FDIC coverage. 
We support our own, and you’ve never paid a tax dollar toward your FDIC insurance coverage. 
So we pay fees, whether we’re a member of the FDIC – everybody pays FDIC premiums for the 
insurance coverage – but state association dues, OCC, you have assessments. Your state 
association fees are so much cheaper to be a state bank than they are to be a national bank. 
Substantially different. Based on your size, it depends on how different, but it’s hundreds of 
thousands of dollars cheaper.  
 
I wonder if regulations are enforced differently for different banks …  
 
There’s no question they’re enforced differently. Depending on who the regulatory examining 
team is. They’re not all on the same page. I’ll give you another example. At a former employer, 
they disagreed with our allowance for loan loss. They accused us basically of tax evasion. Said 
they’re keeping too much in reserve. This is prior to 2008. In fact, it was 2007. They said – 
because we were not taking it all to the bottom line, and according to tax law, we should have 
been. And our question was, ‘When did you become the IRS? We thought you were safety and 
soundness.’ And safety and soundness would like that our reserves are at a higher than-you-think 
level needs to be because we did because of the way we did them, there’s a calculation they had, 
but our calculation showed that it needed to be hire. Because we would do loan-by-loan what the 
exposure was. So we thought it was the most realistic view. Well, it came out by their equation 
as a whole total package that we were over reserving. So we were told not to reserve for the next 
year. Well, our earnings went through the roof. And then, the recession hit. During that time, I 
was on one of our visits to Washington – I talked to the assistant deputy of the OCC and told 
them – and he was in charge of all examiners – and I told him what we were told. And if you 
could have seen the look on his face: ‘Now wait a minute, you weren’t underreserved?’ He 
thought I was complaining about being underreserved, and I said, ‘No sir, you misunderstand 
me. We were overreserved. We have not been – under direction of your examiners – we have not 
been taking any more to reserve. We have taken zero this year.’ He looked at me and goes, 
‘That’s insane.’ This is the guy over all of them! Well, he reported to the comptroller. He’s 
number two. And I said, ‘I agree with you, but that doesn’t change the way we live. Now, I 
would like professionally for you not to call your regional manager in charge of your region 
because I imagine they will show up Monday morning for another exam.’ If you know what I 
mean. He said, ‘I absolutely do.’ He told me, ‘I can assure you – we are not the IRS – we are 
never – we are safety and soundness.’ And I said, ‘That was my thought, too.’ He agreed with us. 
However, they’ve got people in the field doing their own deal. We take no reserves. Well, 2008 
hits, we take loan losses. Well, we’re underreserved now, in our opinion. So we have to now, go 
back up and overreserve to make up for what we hadn’t been reserving. They did say – well, on 
the next exam, they said, ‘We’ll never ask you to take less reserve than you think, as long as it 
meets our requirement.’  
 
But we had to go through two years of hell. The income statement’s going bingity bangity boom 
– not to mention what it did to our shareholders: hey, that’s going to be the new norm. We made 
X amount of dollars. That’s the best year in the history of our bank.  Folks, that’s an anomaly, 
that’s not going to happen next year. Try to tell shareholders that – that that’s a one-year goof. 
No, they get used to it real quick and expect more.  
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How aware are you of what other banks’ interests are?  
 
Very much so because of my affiliation with the Oklahoma Banker’s Association. We just did a 
survey – we asked all our member banks to tell us – because I wear two hats. Ones is as 
president of my bank then I wear another hat that is what’s best for Oklahoma banks by the 
majority. So I’ll give you an example. I serve on the government relations committee of the 
ABA, and they’ve asked us – there’s one representative from each state – and I’m for Oklahoma. 
We are setting priorities for 2014 of regulatory issues to address. I’ve certainly got the five that 
would be on my number one hit list for this bank,  but that’s not what I’m going to send them. 
What I’m going to send them is the top five for Oklahoma banks. I feel compelled and passionate 
to do that. I’m asked to represent them, and that’s what I’m going to do. Now, I’ll tell you, it will 
go hand in hand – maybe in a different order – of what mine would be. Example: the federal 
credit union – credit unions, it’s absolutely ridiculous that they’re tax free. They’re taxed – we’re 
basically subsidizing credit unions – they’re never paying taxes. Now, the ones that have stayed 
with their main mission – I’ve got no problem with. But Tinker Federal Credit Union: they’re no 
more a credit union – if you can breathe, you’re a member. And you don’t have to breathe real 
well to be a member. I’d like to see them turn somebody down for membership. They never 
have. They’re building branches everywhere, they’re doing commercial lending, they want their 
cap raised on how much commercial lending they do. And I use them as an example because 
they’re the biggest in the metro. But there’s huge credit unions all over the country.  
 
That’s an uneven playing field. They’re competing for the same customers on the commercial 
side of the bank, and have long lost what their original mission was, which was for military 
people from Tinker Air Force Base. They’re nowhere near that anymore. So what we’re saying is 
take these credit unions that play in that realm, convert them to thrifts, and make them taxable. 
The rural area banks don’t deal with the credit unions – they’re not out there, they’re in the metro 
areas. But what they have out there is farm credit bureau, which is their credit union. Farm credit 
bureau is tax-free, and they’re competing with the same business. So what I’d be advocating 
against the credit unions being increased their lending limits – their commercial lending limits – 
they’ve done an end around and they always get their way. They’ve got a lot of support in 
Washington. The rural bank would think, they don’t care about the credit unions. But they do 
care about the farm credit bureau. Because farm credit to them is what credit unions are for us in 
the metro, so I lump them together. We need to do something about credit unions and farm credit 
bureau. Because I can tell you David doesn’t – I would be shocked if he told you he has to 
compete with credit unions – but he deals with the farm credit bureau all the time. They’re in the 
same game. 
 
Do agencies seek their input on new rules? 
 
There’s always a comment period for the new regulation. We write letters, and we give our 
input. There’s one state that sends more letters than Oklahoma – and look at our population in 
comparison. There’s only one (I think it was Ohio). Everytime, we are – and the regulators tell us 
they hear more from us than they do from anybody. We’ve got some apathy in other states. Why, 
I have no idea. It makes no sense. We believe in Oklahoma that we’re fighting for survival. It’s a 
war to survive. We have the right to survive as a community bank. To take us away would be 
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detrimental to our communities, we believe. And other bankers at conferences I go to will agree 
with that, but they’re not doing anything about it.  
 
We want to work with them (regulators). We’d love nothing better than to sit down and say, 
here’s what we face. Here’s our issues. You tell us what your issues are, where’s the common 
ground here? We can find solutions. But you can’t just paint us with a brush and say, by God, 
that’s the way it is. That’s exactly what happens – I watched the number two guy from the 
consumer financial protection bureau do a presentation at the last conference I was at. If I 
wouldn’t have gotten arrested, I’d have gone up there and hit him in the mouth. Because he was 
so arrogant in his presentation – he was, its not any two way – this is how it will be. Now, we 
don’t want to hurt anybody in the process, but if we do, that’s just part of it because we’re out to 
protect the consumer. When actually, they’re a bunch of consumer advocate groups that got 
together, and it’s not just about the consumer, like they’re trying to make it out.  
 
Sheila Bear, when she was the head of the FDIC, which she is no longer the head of, thank God, 
that she told Oklahoma, as an example that our community banks were more predatory than 
payday lenders. Can you imagine that? Can you imagine how that riled us up? They don’t have 
the courtesy to work with us, and she says something like that? Oh my God. We were coming 
out of our chairs. Really? We’re more predatory than payday lenders? 
 
Question about frame. 
 
I’ll give you a good example. People in other industries – in fact, we had a discussion not too 
long ago, there were some attorneys sitting around, business owners – we kind of reflected back 
and said, ‘Remember when we were kids, that you looked up to the Honorable So and So who 
was a senator or congressman to – we were just in awe of the government. They were our 
government. We were proud of our government. We’d go to war for our government. Now, it’s 
just wrought with criminals. With everybody’s that got their hand out. I don’t know where that 
change happened, or if it did, and maybe if we just became aware of it, but somewhere along the 
way … well, congress has been rated lower than it ever has been in history for quite a while now. 
There’s no trust in them. They don’t know how to be good with the money they’re given. They 
spend – just like crazy spending – on unbelievably silly stuff. Now, that’s probably happened for 
a long time, but it’s gotten bigger and bigger and bigger, and people are tired of it. And people 
are finally saying enough’s enough. And people are finally getting to where they don’t trust the 
government. When every day you see on the news that they’re spying on us all, the NSA is doing 
this. How are you going to trust that?  
 
Do you think this affects how you think about groups like the FDIC? 
 
There’s no doubt.  
 
The state agency seems to get a pass.  
 
But the difference is, they’ll talk to us. They’ll deal with us. If we have a problem, they’ll help us 
with a solution. We know – and this was not built over night – but over years, and Mick 
Thompson, who’s been the commissioner for so long, that’s his approach: how do we deal with 
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this. Not how do you. We. How do we deal with this? How can we help, and here’s what we can 
do. We come together, and we work on it. If a bank gets into trouble, he doesn’t just go out there 
and threaten them and start slapping stuff on them. He says, OK, guys, lets sit down and work 
through this thing. Sometimes its successful and sometimes its not but he tries. So his whole 
office takes this approach.  
 
Do you see faces or faceless entities? 
 
You do, but it’s not as personal. You don’t sit down and have a beer with one of them. You don’t 
let your hair down and say, here’s what we’re really fighting. Number one, I would never say 
that because you’d be scared about the retribution. It’s always in a very formal setting. It’s 
always a limited amount of time – that they set, in their terms – and they put on their little dog 
and pony show for us. We get to ask a few questions, and then our time runs out. I get it – 
they’ve got fifty states coming at them, and I get that, but I don’t know if they really care about 
their reputation or how we view them because they’re God almighty. That mentality has to 
change. They need to be part of the solution and not just the acknowledger of the problems. And 
oh, here you go, here’s some more new regulations. Good luck to you. We’ll be checking next 
time we’re in.   
 
Interview 3 
 
How long have you been involved in banking? 
 
I came out of college in 78, so I’ve been here since 1978. Do the math, I haven’t. 30 some years. 
Started out in the operations side and moved over in the management side in 1983. 
 
Family business? 
 
Yes. My granddad bought it in the mid 40s. My dad worked here until he passed. I worked here 
until college and came back.  
 
Always been a state charter? 
 
No. We converted to a state charter in the mid 90s. We were a national bank in the 40s, when my 
granddad bought it. The biggest reason we changed is because of the regulatory environment. In 
the 80s and 90s, national banks were examined by the comptrollers office – the office of the 
comptroller of the currency – and we just got the feeling that comptroller really didn’t care about 
small rural community banks. That wasn’t their forte, and they would almost have a hostile 
feeling whenever they would come out and examine us. They didn’t really understand what 
community banking was and we made the election to change to a state charter.  
 
Had you always felt that way about the comptroller? 
 
No – there was a change there in the 80s and 90s that we felt like they just ripped us. For years, 
this bank was a model bank, and the OCC would bring trainees and show them what a good bank 
looked like and bring them up to speed, and I bet you we had four different training groups 
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through here when they did an examination the years prior. But like I said, something changed in 
the 80s – late 80s, early 90s – there was a shift, whether it was out of the field office in 
Oklahoma City or higher up. They just was not a good fit, and we got tired of banging our heads 
against the wall trying to deal with their whims and wishes.  
 
More and more banks are switching over to state charters.  
 
Probably a two-fold reason. One is the regulatory emphasis. Two is a cost saving factor. It is 
much cheaper to be a state bank and be assessed examination fees based on a state charter rather 
than a national charter.  
 
How does the fee structure work? 
 
I really don’t know. I just know that it saved us thousands on thousands of dollars to change. But 
from a cost saving factor but also feeling like you’ve got a regulatory body that understands and 
comes in as a tool to help rather than a tool to detract and destroy, and that’s the feeling we had 
with them. Now, we get examined, we’re not a federal – so we’re what they call a non-member. 
We have dual examination – we still have federal oversight from the FDIC – but what we’ve 
experienced when the FDIC comes in and examines, they’re much more like our state banking 
commission examination, and they’re here as a resource/tool to help. Now, the FDIC will tell 
you in very forthright, helpful hint, this will be done before we come back next time. As long as 
you comply, then they see you’re making steps to improve/comply, management’s up to speed, 
and they don’t seem to have any heartache over that.  
 
As a state bank, you’ve got the state commission, the FDIC. How would you characterize 
your regulatory environment? 
 
Other than just not knowing what new rules or regs are coming down because of the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank, which should have never been passed in my opinion, a knee-jerk 
reaction by policy makers to something that shoulda shaken out and would have taken care of 
itself through the regulatory environment we already had. But they had to show they were doing 
something to fix the problem, and all they did was create a monster. So, from the regulatory 
environment standpoint, it’s very confusing and makes us very apprehensive about what’s 
coming out. From an examination process, what we have seen from FDIC especially, is they’re 
giving some leeway and time to come up to speed to the new rules and regs. And they are 
encouraging us to call the field office and visit with somebody with expertise in that area for 
guidance so that when they come out, they’ve already crossed the problem. I don’t know that 
OCC – maybe I’m just being sour grapes on OCC, but visiting with other bankers in the 
association at different meetings – I don’t get that feeling from them that OCC is helpful in that 
regard.  
 
They’d almost rather let you break a rule so they could come back and get you. 
 
It’s almost like a gotcha. What I’ve experienced. 
 
With your interactions – do you personally handle the intractions? 
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We run this bank on a management team. We have seven board members and five of the board 
members are officers in the bank. Probably my CFO, my vice president, the cashier and myself 
probably have most of the interaction with the regulatory environment.  
 
On the regulatory side, are there individual who you know on a name-to-name basis?  
 
Yeah. And it’s just – the chief counsel for the state banking commission – we could pick a phone 
up and call him and bounce an idea off him. Dudley Gilbert. We call him quite a bit. Even in the 
FDIC, Don Fitzwater, anyway, there’s two or three guys in the FDIC. 
 
So it’s not like the IRS: you get a letter in the mail.  You see individuals? 
 
Yeah. 
 
What role do these agencies play in industry performance? 
 
With the promulgation with some of the rules that they’ve handed down the last few years – 
especially with overdraft protection and overdraft programs – banks generate a lot of income 
based on fees. One area that is very fee driven is overdraft protection and NSF plans. They have 
reigned back in some of that ability to collect fee income through some new rules and regs that 
they have passed down. Other than that – they have basically, the regulatory environment, forced 
us out of making residential real estate loans – for us, we quit offering residential real estate 
loans primary dwelling in Januar 2012 because of the requirement that if you charge X percent, 
and it’s considered a high-priced mortgage, then you have to offer or you have to do escrow – or 
taxes and insurance. Whenever we originate maybe five primary dwelling real estate loans in a 
year we can’t go buy an escrow program to justify the cost. And we were to the point where if 
we needed to price the loans where we needed to price them, we couldn’t lower that rate any 
lower to offset what we were paying – we gotta make money on the loan side so we can pay out 
money on the deposit side. We try to keep our interest rates up that we’re paying to depositors to 
a certain level, so we’re not squeezing their potential income. Anyway, those never did balance, 
and we either had to make the determination to do escrow or originate five loans a year and sell 
them to the secondary market. And nobody’s going to want to come out here and buy a 
residential loan at $35,000 – and a lot of the houses out here, that’s what the average price is on 
what we were doing. So we got out of it. Because of the new real estate lending new rules and 
regs that forced us out of that market, which cost us some potential income. It wasn’t a big 
balance sheet item, but it was something we did make some money off of.  
 
Other than that, on the other side, the time and money and effort spent of trying to stay up to 
speed with all the new compliance rules and regs as result of Dodd-Frank. I mean, basically, my 
brother Todd, our cashier, serves as our compliance officer, and for the last year, that’s about all 
he’s done. He’s not generating loans, he’s just trying to keep up with the new compliance 
burdens of Dodd-Frank, making sure policy and procedure is in place because of that.  
 
And I’m sure we’re not any different from any other bank in the state, other than we have limited 
resources and people, and we can’t afford to hire full time compliance, so we try to do it in 
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house. The regulatory environment has forced us to – at the suggestion of FDIC – of hiring an 
outside compliance auditor. We have a lady who comes in and reviews our compliance efforts 
three times a year, does training, does an exit meeting, because we can’t devote the time to do 
that part of it.  
 
The rule book? How do you know what’s in it? 
 
We rely on the OBA, the ABA, to give quick bullet points. Their staff goes through the – Mary 
Beth Guard at the OBA – is our legal counsel and compliance expert. Bankers Online, which 
Mary Beth started, now going through the new rules and regs, and make quick bullet points of 
things you need to address, seminars. We rely on our outside compliance officer to stay up. She 
tell us the things to do to stay in compliance with this. So it’s a combination of Tom sitting there 
at the computer reading the new rule and reading the comments from OBA, ABA, BOL …  
 
Are bullet points sufficient? Seems like it might not be. 
 
When you sit down and read a new promulgated rule, part of that volume of paper they put out is 
they give you the complete background as to why this law was ever in effect. What the proposal 
will do. They put it out there for public comment. And this is their take on the public comments. 
Then they finally get to the guts of what the final rule is. So try to read through all that? And by 
the time you get down to the new rules? Well, I’m tired. I don’t want to read that. So they put – 
out of the new section – these are the bullet points they are addressing, you need to pay attention; 
but depending on your banking complexity, some of these rules will apply and some you can 
brush over. And it’s up to us to determine what we need to change to stay in compliance for our 
bank. Because they’ll issue new rules and regs and they’ll say this applies to banks a billion 
dollars or more, or this applies to all banks under a billion dollars. On that stuff that says a billion 
or more, we don’t pay attention to. Other than to know it’s out there, and if the beast is out there, 
it can always penetrate down.  
 
Is it easy to understand a written rule? 
 
For the most part. Some of it’s – some of it is confusing.  
 
If there’s any ambiguity, is it in the written rule? Or is it in the enforcement of the rule? 
 
Usually in the enforcement. What we have seen – or what we saw early on – is that here’s a rule 
black and white, and now the examiners read it and they’ve got to be able to apply a grey area. 
Some examiners don’t have much grey area thinking and unless it fits here, you’re not 
compliant. And that’s what I refer to – on something that is maybe a little ambiguous – not quite 
clear – I have found, especially from state, or the FDIC, that they give a little leeway. You may 
have tried, but you missed the mark. Go back and tweak this, send us what you did or how you 
addressed it. 
 
Are you proactive – will you reach out in advance … 
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Yeah, Todd does a pretty good job of that. If he just can’t grasp what they’re saying, he’s making 
a phone call either directly to FDIC, state, or to Mary Beth at the OBA on what her take is, what 
she thinks the intent is. The guys from Oklahoma City in the FDIC office – they ship them to DC 
from time to time and give them training – but they’re not any different from us. It’s just that 
they’ve been an examining force for a while and they kind of have an idea. Sometimes they miss 
it. And then the FDIC will come back out – the head office will come back out – and give 
guidance to the examining force: This is what we intended. What we’re hearing is that you’re 
enforcing it too far this way, and this is what we intended. Here’s guidelines for your 
examination process, and we do pay attention to that.  
 
How relevant are regs in the day-to-day? 
 
Well, you gotta know what the regs are fairly well to know if what you’re getting ready to offer 
is going to be allowed. What area does it fall? I’ll be honest, in our bank, we’re not looking for 
new products. We’re a pretty plain Jane, vanilla organization – we don’t assume much risk, and 
we don’t take much risk. And that has been the mainstay since the 40s when my granddad 
bought this. I mean, we’ll meet the credit needs of the community, but if its too risky, on the loan 
side, or if it looks like a risky investment, we’ll stay away from it. So new products – other than 
something that’s been tried and tested out there – we don’t bring in. 
 
Do you feel like your range of options are limited by regs? 
 
Nah. I don’t know if they’re trying to pass rules and regs to limit business opportunities. I think 
they’re trying to pass rules and regs to appease the consumer advocate groups not to screw the 
consumer. But. The consumer advocate groups don’t represent all consumers: they represent a 
vocal minority group. The old proverb: the squeaky wheel gets the grease, you know? You take 
the overdraft protection plan – you go out and ask consumers: would you rather your bank pay a 
checking overdraft and charge you a fee or bounce your check? That’s the two options you have. 
And they’re going to say we want our bank to cover our check – we’ll pay whatever fee we have 
to pay. But the consumer groups are saying, no, you’re double charging them. But there’s a cost 
to pay it and assume a risk of not collecting that overdraft as opposed to turning back. They get 
to deal with the DA – the charges, a bogus check charge – and you think the bank’s charges are 
exorbitant, try facing what the DA imposes in terms of fines and penalties for a bogus check. 
 
How do you know when regulatory change occurs? 
 
Those agencies will send out advance notice. 
 
Do you participate in the comment period? 
 
Sometimes. If its something that directly effects us, and we have an opinion, we’ll post a 
comment. 
 
Example? 
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It’d probably be in the real estate lending process, when they were proposing going to a high 
priced mortgage and enforcing escrow. That was probably back on the heels of the financial 
crisis – 08. In 09, they’d start coming up with these rules. Our comment was: you do this, and 
you’re going to drive small, rural community banks out of the real estate lending function. And 
now, they’re starting to see what happened, so they’re going back and making exceptions to 
those because they have recognized that there are hundreds – approaching perhaps a thousand – 
of banks that have quit making real estate loans in small, rural communities. And the real estate 
market is being driven upstream to the bigger banks that don’t want to come into the heart of 
America and make a $50,000 home loan. Your BofAs, your Wells, your JP Morgan, they’re 
wanting $100 thousand and above real estate loans. So they’re starting to relax some of that. 
That’s just once instance, we wrote a comment stating that we thought it would be detrimental to 
rural communities.  
 
Do you think rules are enforced differently by different agencies? 
 
What I have experienced lately, no. Very seldom do we have the same examiners back again. We 
just got done with a compliance exam. One of the examiners had been here prior, but not the last 
time.  The way they went through it, the outcomes, their decision–making process had been 
pretty uniform. One reason we left the OCC was that never happened. One set of examiners 
would come in, and we were fine. And another would come in, and they would just hammer us 
on the previous exam. It was just really frustrating. But so far, in this new regulatory 
environment, have not seen that. 
 
Are sometimes of your interactions more interactive than others? Are regulators always 
strictly interested in enforcing regs? 
 
As far as complying with the strict letter of the law, there is no give and take with compliance on 
a law. If you violate a law, they will cite you. Now, there’s give and take on following policies 
and procedures. When they come in for an exam there’s one component of the examination, the 
CAMEL rating, on management. And they will – CAMEL’s capital, asset, management, 
liquidity, I forgot what the e is – one of the components of the CAMEL is management. And 
they will rate management as to their overall ability to take care of capital, asset, risk, interest 
rate risk, liquidity, needs, and part of that is policies and procedures. They expect you to have all 
these policies, but if management has decided that that policy is not needed in this bank, it’s not 
a violation of the law, but it could downgrade your management rating from a one to a two. But 
there’s a give and take there. Sometimes they’ll come in and see, you know, really for your 
complexity and size, maybe this policy isn’t really needed. As long as you know what should be 
addressed, if you haven’t reduced it to formal policy, then they may give you a little pass there. 
As far as the letter of the law, if it’s a law, you have to comply with it. If there’s a deficiency 
there, they’ll say in the exit meeting, we noticed this deficiency, it’s a technical violation, we 
need a management response about what you’re going to do to rectify it. And then the next time 
they come in, you had better had it taken care of.  
 
How often do you interact with the regulatory players? 
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Bankers go to the OBA functions, bankers night out, some seminars, the convention – Mick does 
a pretty good job about coming out. Dudley, who was there this past spring. You have some 
social interaction with them in that regard. Now, have I ever just, on my way to the city, just 
stopped in and said hi guys? Well no.  
 
Do you buy the value of the relationship? 
 
Yeah. In some respects, early on, with OCC, I felt like we had that. They brought those trainees 
out here to show them how a good bank should be run. Because they’d been in bank that were 
not so good and every now and again, they’d bring trainees out here. There may be two seasoned 
examiners sitting back there and four or five trainees. And so that relationship was built there, 
they knew this was a good bank, they would use that. I’ve made recommendations to other banks 
in this area that were considering changing national charters – Texhoma, out there in the 
panhandle, was a national bank longer than we were – Paul Freeman called me one day and said, 
do you think we need to make a change? I told him I don’t think he’d live to regret it. Well, next 
time Mick saw me, he says thank you. Your comments helped. You know, the state banking 
commissioner wants every bank in the state to be a state bank. It’s the state banking commission 
isn’t a state legislated item – they’re self-funded. And they’ve actually been able to reduce our 
assessment because the number of banks coming in has increased. 
 
Do you feel like you’ve gotten better at doing the relationships?  
 
I think we’ve got to maintain some sort of personal relationship. Being able to pick up the phone 
and call Dudley. We used to call them all the time. Got to have a contact where you can bounce 
something off them. We’re thinking about doing this, are we out of line? 
 
Have you been successful at changing a rule/policy/enforcement? 
 
Probably not me directly, personally. But through the lobbying efforts of the OBA, ABA. I 
mean, if I call the director of the FDIC, and say, man, you missed the mark, he’s not going to 
listen to me. It’s going to take some type of lobbyist association representing thousands of banks. 
I mean, I can write a comment and they’ll read it. And they’ll segregate it – these are comments 
in this line – and they do listen to comments. Probably they look at comments more from the big 
players more than they do some $65 million bank out in the middle of nowhere.  
 
Can you think of an example – the OBA – regulation loosening? 
 
No because what OBA tries to do during the bill markup period, when bills are introduced on the 
floor of the house or senate, our staff puts together a tracking – a quick synopsis of what the bill 
intends to do, and then our government relations council sits down and reads through that. And if 
any of those proposed new rules are germaine to the banking industry – if we think it’s going to 
be detrimental or squeezed to hard – we’re going to kill the bill before it’s introduced. And 
we’ve been very successful over the last two or three years of working with the author to change 
the language to where it’s not detrimental. Or to convince the author, I know you need to 
introduce a bill, but this is stupid. You don’t need to do it. And that kind of works hand-in-hand 
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with Mick in the state banking commission – whatever the legislature passes, Mick has to 
enforce.  
 
The state agency is your shield against the Feds. Does Mick speak up for you guys – in 
dealing with legislators?  
 
I think him and Roger and Adrian talk back and forth. The commissioner puts forth his own bill 
every year. Things he wants changed or things he wants to change. And asks for the OBA 
support in passing that. At the same time, he’s gone through it with Roger and Adrian and the 
staff. But you know, there are some things that happen at the Federal level that he has to address 
at the state level to where he can keep his enforcement in front of Federal. That’s where he 
introduces the commissioner’s bill. From time to time, a representative or senator, at the request 
of a constituent puts forth a bill on something the constituent felt he was getting screwed, and the 
OBA says that’s just a stupid idea and kills it.  
 
How worried are you about blowback? 
 
I’ve heard others say it. I haven’t gone out there and filled out an examination survey. You get 
done with a compliance exam, and you can go out there and give your feedback on compliance. 
Oh, it was terrible. It was good. They really hammered us in this area and were concerned in this 
area. It allows the state association to get a feel for how the different regions are enforcing the 
rules and regs. And as long as they can assure us that its completely anonymous – that there’s no 
way – if one of the questions in there wants me to specify my asset size, I usually, respectfully, 
decline. Because I don’t want a chance that the FDIC will get ahold of that information and they 
can figure out what asset size was recently examined, and they could, if it was a harsh, negative 
feedback. Now, FDIC when they send their report out on the compliance exam, they have a 
survey in there where we’re supposed to critique them as to how the exam process went. If we’ve 
got any bitches or complaints, we can respond directly to them and say you missed the mark 
here, you were overly harsh in this area, or this was a good exam. They want that feedback 
directly to them, and it does go through the field office, the regional office, right up to DC.  
 
Have you ever tightened? 
 
In some areas, the farm credit system is a very strong competitor. For the last ten years, I have 
lost maybe two customers to farm credit, where I feel like they went out and cherry picked a 
good customer and offered them a better interest rate than I could offer. But what I have found 
with our Woodward office – the federal land bank – we’ve kind of worked hand-in-hand. I really 
don’t feel like the guys out of the land bank – I know they’re actively pursuing – but if we do a 
good enough job meeting our customers’ needs and don’t gouge them on interest rates, they’re 
pretty loyal. Now, I’ve worked with them. I’ve had customers come in and buy a big tract of 
land. We’re really not set up to offer a 30 year purchase on a big tract of ag land. That’s what 
land banks do. I’ll send them over there. What I don’t want them doing is going over there and 
getting their operating line. I can take care of their operating line here, if they’ll finance their 
land over there, that leaves them room to fiannce their operations here. As far as tightening rules 
and regs, the only tightening I would want to see is kicking the credit unions out of the no 
taxation. If they’re a small credit union serving Oklahoma educators, and you had to be a 
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teacher, or be employed by the school district or university to be a member, that’s fine. But it’s 
the credit unions that say, if you’re living and breathing and you know somebody that’s in the 
military, then you can be a member and now they’ve gotten bigger than any bank. They’re 
getting a federal subsidy in the form of no taxes. That’s got to be changed.  
 
There’s other banks in other areas of the state, those [farm credit] SOBs are cherry picking me.  
 
Framing? 
 
The banking industry has always been an industry where there had to be rules and regs. And it 
probably started from the 30s depression, was when a lot of these rules and regs came forth. I 
don’t have a problem with rules and regs. It makes all the banks compete at the same level. But 
some of the stuff that they’re promulgating today is overkill. We’ve fought tooth and toenail, 
OBA did, when they first rolled out the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a brand new 
agency spun out of thin air – and there wasn’t any need because all the rules and regs were 
already in place through the Fed, FDIC, and OCC. You already had every bank in the nation 
regulated. Why do you need another agency promulgating rules, which is exactly what happened 
under Dodd-Frank. CFPB writes new rules and regs and pushes them out to the OCC, FDIC, and 
Fed, saying this is the rules and you’ve got to examine your banks by them. 10 billion dollars and 
above is all they go in and actually examine, and yet they’re writing all the rules and regs for 
banks under 10 billion.  
 
The CFPB is more compliance – safety and soundness – from what I’ve seen, I can’t think of 
anything they’ve promulgated that’s safety and soundness issue, other than trying to rein in some 
of this exotic mortgages.  
 
I think [this frame] is throughout the industry. By nature, there’s very few bankers who try to 
figure out a way not to comply. I think most bankers have in mind that we need to comply with 
the rules and regs that are out there. We did not screw the customers. We can’t harm them. And 
that’s what the rules and regs are for. This onslaught is just overkill and should never have been 
spun up.  
 
Brad Swicky’s theory that we need to have a bifurcated regulatory system. Your big six players 
and banks at 250 billion and above – whatever that magic number is – need to be under OCC. 
That’s OCC’s expertise is those big banks. Any bank under that ought to be a state chartered 
bank with Federal oversight, either with the Fed or FDIC.  
 
Interview 4 
 
How long have you been involved with the bank? 
 
I’ve been here since 1991, so 22 years. 
 
Family? 
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I’m a third generation community banker. My grandfather didn’t start the bank. This bank was 
established back in 1896, we’re about 115 years old. My grandfather purchased controlling 
interest in the bank in the early 20s, and worked for the bank for 50 years. My father worked for 
the bank for 50 years. I’m in year 22, and my brother works with me now, and he’s in year 12. 
So it’s a pure family operation. 
 
State charter? 
 
We’ve always been a state chartered bank. Of course, we were established in 1896, so we were 
here before statehood. There were no charters back then, but we got our state charter in 1907, I 
guess, when we become a state. And we were rechartered after the moratorium in 33. We were 
the only bank in Noble county that was allowed to reopen without recapitalization after the 
moratorium. So we can advertise and market that we have been in business since 1896. Whereas, 
my competitor was – not a bad thing, there’s two strong banks in this community – but they were 
not allowed to reopen. They had to recapitalize and recharter. So their charter says they were 
established for 1933 although they’d been around longer. 
 
What do you think the implications are of a state charter? 
 
First of all, I’m a big fan of the dual banking system. What we find is being a state – what makes 
it great for us to be a state charter is, number one, a certain degree of pride associated with being 
part of the state of Oklahoma and being regulated in part – our primary regulator being the state 
of Oklahoma. Secondly, it’s the relationship building – it’s a whole heckuva lot easier for me to 
go down and get to know a bunch of Oklahomans and the state bank commissioner than it is for 
me to get to know Ben Bernanke. You know what I’m saying? I can’t fly up to Washington and 
make a spur of the moment appointment with Ben and talk to him about my problems on Main 
Street. I can do that with a telephone call, a text message, or a trip to Oklahoma City to see our 
commissioner Mick Thompson. There is an enormous amount of value with that. Mick 
Thompson, our bank commissioner grew up in a small town in Poteau, Oklahoma. He has a 
street named after him. He was a community banker. He understands community banking. He 
understands what makes us successful and what doesn’t. He speaks our language. No disrespect 
to Washington or Bernanke or anybody else. But, you know, they get Potomac Fever when they 
get up to Washington, and in my opinion, they lose sight or lose track of what drives community 
banking. State bank charters that fall under the regulatory burden of the state banking department 
– they get it. There’s a great deal of value there. Additionally, and I might have said this, but 
there’s not enough I can say about the relationships. I’m on a first name basis with our bank 
commissioner. I’ve got a placque on our wall that last year, we were named by the American 
Bank Association a top 100 performing banks in the United States of America. I get a personal 
handwritten note from my bank commissioner. Do I get anything from the Feds? Nothing. That’s 
just an example of somebody who’s in tune and knows what’s going on. 
 
We’re not regulated by the OCC at all – thank goodness. That’s about all I’m ready to go on the 
record with.  
 
Regulatory environment? Fed member? 
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All banks are, of course, going to be insured by the FDIC. We pay a premium and, in the current 
environment, the FDIC found themselves under insured and we had a special assessment that we 
had to pay. So we’re all insured by the FDIC, but I’m not regulated by the FDIC because I joined 
the Federal Reserve system, and you do that by the purchase of stock. We bought stock in the 
Federal Reserve. Each Fed member is a stock holder in the Federal Reserve. We get a dividend 
from our purchase of the stock – it’s a statutory dividend, so it’s not driven by the market or by 
book value or EPS. But once you join the Fed system, then you become regulated by the Fed, 
and the FDIC is not your primary regulator on the national level.  
 
The Fed does safety and soundness as well. 
 
Who’s doing the interacting? 
 
Great question. No. It used to be, even when I started, I can talk to you like an old timer because 
I’ve been here for two decades now, but it used to be in the old days that you could be a jack of 
all trades in the bank. The president and CEO really had his hand on everything and was the 
primary point of contact for the regulator. Banking today has become very very specialized. 
There is no way that I have the time or ability to become specialized in all the areas I would need 
to be to be in compliance with the regulatory burdens that we’re up against on a daily basis. So in 
answering your question, I would be considered as the primary contact. All Federal Reserve 
information comes to me directly. All state banking notifications come to me directly and then I 
disseminate those among my staff. But particularly, the state, because they know us and 
understand us, they know if it deals with asset liability management, I’ve given that 
responsibility over to my brother. My brother manages an $80 million investment portfolio. He’s 
responsible for the day to day interaction with asset liability management. So if they’re calling 
with regards to risk weighted assets, investments, how we’re managing through a yield curve that 
may be steepening, they know that I’ve divested myself of that and they’ll call him directly. 
Ultimately, I’m going to be responsible for it, but they’re going to call him directly because I just 
can’t stay on top of it. Additionally, if there’s changes in mortgage laws and mortgage 
regulations, they know I have two mortgage departments – one in Stillwater and one here in 
Perry – and they have those names and those contacts and they’ll call them directly. If something 
comes up, if we’re in violation, if we’re doing something they would like to see changed, then 
they’ll report that to me. But they understand that I can’t be a specialist any more in the bank.  
 
Regulations – operations match? Is that unique to your bank? 
 
I doubt it. I doubt it’s a unique model in today’s environment. Now, we’re a $240 million bank. I 
think you need to judge this by the size of bank. If you’re out at Laverne, and you’re at a $35 
million bank – look, I’m running on 60 employees – they probably have five. That guy can still 
manage and keep its pulse – and probably would want to – he’s probably in charge of the 
investment portfolio, the loan portfolio. He may have a compliance officer but I bet he’s meeting 
with him or her on a regular basis. But the larger you get, the more you’ll see these 
responsibilities spread amongst the staff.  
 
Consultants? 
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We rely on them like crazy. And that’s only really started in the past 10 or 12 years, when there’s 
been a real crisis on compliance related issues, and us not being able to stay up on this. We bring 
in loan specialists, we bring in compliance specialists, we bring in investment strategists, and 
then we have an internal auditor, an external auditor, and then we do an annual board audit. So 
we have specialists that come in outside of the bank regularly. We have to – we just can’t stay up 
on it. 
 
Characterize your relationships with regulatory agencies? 
 
It’s interesting. We actually – we’ve gone through an interesting cycle – I’ve been CEO and 
chairman of the board during our worst examination in this bank’s history. And I’ve been CEO 
and chairman of the board during our best exam in this bank’s history. Worst exam came about 
15 years ago. Best exam came this year. I think that there is one thing that has fundamentally 
changed – when my grandfather and father were here, they looked at the examiners as a pain in 
the ass. These guys come in, they start snooping around, they try to run your business. There’s 
no way that they know – these are hot shot little kids coming out of college. They’ve never been 
in a bank before. They’re black and white. They’re reading a book. They don’t know what it 
takes to run a bank. When I took over – that’s the philosophy I lived with because that’s the 
philosophy I grew up with. And guess what? I experienced the worst exam in my life because my 
attitude was “You bastards.” I’ve gone through a great change – and in answer to your question, 
I do believe that they are here to help. They have a job to do. Their bosses are telling you these 
are rules set down through Basel or through congress and we are the police, and just like the 
main street police, they are here to help. They have to uphold the law, but they’re here to help 
you and to guide you through it. For years, look, they get gold stars if they find some things 
going wrong. That’s how you get promoted in the organization. I don’t think that’s the case any 
more. I don’t believe that. I think they have a job to do. I think they value and look upon a good, 
well operated bank through rose colored glasses. And when they do that, you build a relationship 
with them. What I’ve seen now, since now we’ve had one of our best regulatory years, in the 
history of this bank, I’ve seen now almost a switch where now, instead of them coming in and 
their saying, here’s what you’re doing wrong, they want to know how you’re doing it. Because I 
think they use that information and pass it along to their banks that aren’t doing quite as well 
from a regulatory stand point. I think they say, look, we have other banks that are doing  X, Y 
and Z and they’re telling their other banks that aren’t rated quite as well, here are peer examples, 
and they use us as those examples. And so, when you get on that level with them, a couple of 
things happen. One, you develop a good relationship. Two, they don’t look at you quite as hard 
because they begin to get confidence in the management of the bank and they have other places 
they need to be where they have less confidence in bank management. And so, we’ve seen our 
exams not get easier so much, but they’re quicker and rely more on our strategic thinking as 
opposed to the black and white of the law itself. 
 
To bring it full circle, I think our relationship is better than ever, and I look at them more as 
friend than I do foe. And because of that, I think you’ve seen our examinations go a lot better 
because I see them more as a help than a hindrance.  
 
State commission’s role as a shield? 
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I think that has changed. It depends on the leadership in the state banking department. Mick 
Thompson will go down in history as the best bank commissioner that we’ve ever had in the 
history of the state of Oklahoma. And the reason that he is that way is because he was a banker 
first. We’ve never had a bank commissioner who was a banker. We’ve always had someone who 
was either a regulator or a politician. He was a banker first, and so he gets it. We’re on rotating 
cycles on Fed exams and state exams. Every 18 months we have an exam. It will either be the 
state or be Fed on the off cycle, so we only see the Fed every three years. Because the Federal 
Reserve accepts state bank examinations. I can see why Dudly would see himself as a buffer 
because – there’s been many cases in which the state has fought for me. We get a Fed report in 
that I didn’t necessarily agree with, and I would call Mick, and say, “Here’s what they’re 
saying,” and you’ve got a well-respected state banking commissioner that’s contacting the 
Federal Reserve on my behalf and walking through this and talking through it and it has paid 
dividends. It really has. 
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
Basel III just came down last week – 973 pages. It’s crazy. We talk about this with the regulators 
a lot. What we ask for more than anything out of them is regulatory guidance. If they have a 
downfall at the Fed level, it’s with the regulatory guidance. These rules come down from 
Congress and they’re implemented all at the same time. So you have banks that have to comply 
with them and regulators who have to enforce them, all in the same day. So we’re trying to learn 
the law and comply with them. They’re trying to learn the law so they can enforce them. Just like 
in the bank business, you’ve got these regulators, and they have their own different departments, 
and they all have their different ways of interpretation of the law. So their interpretation of the 
law could be different than the states or than ours. All I ask for – I’ll comply with any law they 
send down. I’ll comply with it. Just give me the guidance on it. Tell me what it is you want me to 
do. 
 
For example, we knew that we were going to have increased capital requirements through Basel. 
We knew we were going to have that. And during this last exam, they would come in and the 
increase capital requirement is now six percent, for leveraged tier 1 capital. And we go, no it 
isn’t , Basel hasn’t been passed yet. And they go, well, you need to be in compliance with Basel. 
But I said, it hasn’t passed yet. So I said, how can you expect me to be in compliance with 
something … and they say, we know between now and the next examination it’s going to 
happen. And you just throw up your hands. I want to follow the law. The laws on the books. But 
you can’t make me comply with something that’s not even on the books. And by the way, Mr. 
Young Examiner, why don’t you explain to me the capital requirements. How are they 
calculated. Well, they don’t know. You know why? They haven’t seen the law yet. It gets kind of 
frustrating. 
 
So what I ask for – and the Fed was just in after their last examination, wanted to talk to us about 
how’s it going, and said you’re doing great – I just want guidance. When you come out with a 
new interpretation of a law, you send it down in the form of written guidance, we’ll evaluate it. 
We’ll follow it. I’ll follow the law – I have no problem with that. But I can’t have an arbitrary 
examiner coming in here with his own interpretation of a law that hasn’t been written yet. It’s 
frustrating.  
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How do you understand the law?  
 
There’s certain basic standards. There’s an enormous expense with compliance. Generally, 
there’s compliance programs that come out once a law has been standardized, and the 
compliance programs are built into our computer systems so that flags and notices will come up 
as we enter data and inputing information that keys us to make sure we’re in compliance with the 
law. Additionally, as you already alluded to, we have outsourced compliance audits where 
they’re regularly coming in and we do regular training on that. This is pretty close to true: We 
have so many regs now that they run A through Z, and they’re beginning to renumber the regs, 
so you have reg AA, reb BB, reg CC, so they’re starting all over again in the alphabet. So they 
are difficult to stay up with, but, again, we have these systems in place that red flag us. 
 
Do you spend much personal time reading law? 
 
I read them when they come out. Not word for word. Most of us, at this level, we get the Cliff 
notes. I don’t have time to – I tell my people ‘Tell me what I need to know. Give me the 
synopsis. What does this boil down to?’ So I get that, and we bring in training to specialize and 
make sure we’re at full compliance. Additionally, all executives attend regular Federal Reserve 
updates, state banking updates, and we utilize our state organizations and our national 
organizations – the ABA, and the OBA—we depend on them for training and to tell us what we 
need to know. They’ll send out notices – again, we get publications – this is a weekly publication 
I get called the bank advisor. And this one particularly is on safety and soundness. So weekly, 
I’m reading the concerns that the regulators are having and the problems that banks are having in 
dealing with bank regulation. 
 
Are the rules clear? 
 
There’s a lot of ambiguity – particularly out of the Fed. They’re not clear at all. Again, that’s 
what creates a lot of this expense. Because we have to have people who come in here who 
specialize in this to train us on what it’s saying. And so, no, it’s not clear. And you really don’t 
even know from a compliance standpoint of what the Feds are going to key in on exactly. We 
could have new laws and regs come down that they’re not even going to look at for six years 
because they’re not going to interpret it. It takes them a while to interpret the law. It takes us a 
while to interpret the law. Both sides get that. And it starts to clear up over time, but in the initial 
stages, it’s pretty bogged down.  
 
How do you work through it? 
 
We generally try to get consensus through the specialists that come in and help us and try to nail 
it down pretty close to what we think the interpretation is going to be. And then, if we come in 
and for whatever reason we’ve misinterpreted, we have a paper trail of our best practices, our 
best efforts of our trying to comply. I’m not going to tell you that that always meets the mustard. 
But 99 percent of the time, the regulators will go, you all have made a real effort to try to be 
incompliance with this. Now, while they might make a special mention that you were out of 
compliance in a particular area, they may hold off on making it a violation of law because you’ve 
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tried so hard to do it. Where you really get yourself in trouble is where you thumb your nose at it 
and say I know what it says, but I don’t care. I’m going to do it this way. That’s where you really 
get in trouble, and that’s where we got in trouble on our worst examination we’ve ever had. 
Because we would have a law come down, and I would go: it’s stupid. It’s bad for our 
customers. It’s bad for our shareholders. I’m not going to do it. And they – don’t appreciate that 
at all.  
 
The risks aren’t so high – there is some give and take. But look, there are some still bad civil and 
monetary penalties for blatant errors and misrepresentations. We haven’t talked about 
misrepresentations, which is more along the lines of Sarbanes Oxley than regulatory compliance. 
I’m not misrepresenting my financial condition for any amount of money. We cover that through 
directors audits, internal audits, outside audits and through the posting publically of our 
statements, and that’s more along the lines of Sarbanes Oxley, that’s misrepresenting your 
financial condition. We don’t do that. That’s where – there’s zero tolerance for that on both sides 
of the equation. I’m talking about regulatory compliance – what this barrage of regulatory issues. 
They recognize that there are so many things, we’re going to miss one. Even on my best 
examination that I ever had, which I just had three months ago, I still had violations. It’s just 
going to happen. You can’t help but not have some. But they see the best practices and the 
efforts and management’s commitment to following through on compliance.  
 
How have you improved your ability to stay on top of the law? 
 
At the time of our worst examination – and even a few years after that – we did not take 
advantage of the consultants that were in the market. To me, it was an additional expense, I felt 
like we could manage it ourselves. And I came to a point and realized that we can’t manage 
through by ourselves. We took in loan consultants and compliance consultants, where we could 
spend the time with them and they could spend the time with us to get control of it – and make 
sure our systems were in place to be compliant. That’s truly what changed is me taking 
advantage of the professionals out there in particular areas.  
 
In your day-to-day, how relevant are regulations? 
 
That’s a trick question. I assume that we are in, by and large, complete compliance in everything 
we do. The decisions that I make generally speaking from having to be tuned in on what the laws 
are related to investment strategies, and particularly capital levels and liquidity – liquidity 
management and capital management, that sort of thing – that has a direct impact on what I do 
daily as it relates to the law. The other things, as it relates to the consumer stand point – I make 
an assumption that we are compliant, and that’s not going to change, unless our exams start 
looking different. That we’re operating under the law and under the regulations, so I don’t really 
take those into consideration so much as I do the investment strategies and capital, liquidity type 
issues.  
 
What about new products and services? 
 
Look, no bank is creating anything new. We all – I don’t care who you talk to – you can talk to 
the biggest bank in Oklahoma, you can talk to the smallest bank in Oklahoma. We have the same 
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products. They may have a different name on them. They may be packaged a little different. But 
all in all, they’re the same products, and guess what – sometimes we buy a product from a 
vendor. They’re all going to be shrouded in a compliance package, so when you buy that you 
know that the compliance package is in place. It’s generally been researched and studied, and the 
vendor, whoever is selling that, is in full compliance with the law. And generally, they will 
disclose that when you sign on.  
 
Do regulators treat all banks equally? 
 
Well, yes and no. And I think it’s the nature of the beast. We talked about it a little bit. I think we 
are not allowed to talk about our CAMEL ratings – as you’re probably aware – so let’s just do a 
hypothetical. If you take a bank that’s a CAMEL rated one bank and has been for three or four 
examination cycles, and you take a bank that’s a CAMEL rated three for the past – they’re 
marginal operations – acceptable but marginal – for the past two or three examination cycles, 
what you have is the trainees and the young guys who are just starting in the business – they will 
send them to, guess where? The number 1 rated, so they could see how a good, well operated 
bank runs. They’ll learn from that banker and they’ll see what it takes, and what good numbers 
look like. The seasoned ones will go to the troubled banks. That creates an inequity, just by 
design. All the ones that are smart and know what the hell they’re doing – I never get to see 
them.  
 
You get the dumb kids. 
 
Well, I get the newbies. They’re generally bright and intelligent – I get the newbies. And I 
almost find myself having to train them. What they do – they’ll come in, and they’ll go, ‘I was 
reading in your board minutes that you did this or that, and I don’t really get it,’ and I’ll go, 
‘Well, I wouldn’t expect you to because this is your first day on the job.’ And you talk through it 
and you can see the light come on. And so when they go to the Number 3, and they either don’t 
see that particular notation in the minutes or they don’t see that particular notation in the 
minutes, they tie it back to previous meetings. Then you get these hot shots that are trying to 
make themselves a name, and they can be very very difficult. And I have to sit there and take it. 
In the early days, I’d go, ‘You snot nosed little brat,’ now I go ‘yes sir, no sir,’ to a 20 year old 
because they’re my regulator. I don’t think that there’ s purposeful inequity. I think it’s the 
nature of the beast. They’ve got to train their people just like I’ve got to train my people. I 
remember when I came on – when I started on the job – he put me, my first job was loan 
collections. I went out and I was responsible for taking the worst loans in the bank and collecting 
on them. The reason he wanted me to do that was because he said, if you can learn what a bad 
loan looks like, then you’ll make good loans from this point forward. Conversely, the Federal 
Reserve, when they’re training their young people and constantly training them – you constantly 
train them because they make great bankers – so you train them up in the regulatory environment 
and guess what, they can become compliance in a bank because they learned from the best. So 
you take your newbies and put them with a new banker – and you learn what it takes to run a 
good bank, and you can identify what the problems are in a non-so-well-run bank. I think it’s by 
design – I don’t think they come in with a chip on their shoulder. I used to think that – I’ve come 
full circle – I don’t believe that any more. I think they’re here to help you. They have a job to do. 
We have a job to do. We’ve got to work together.  
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Relationships – what are your points of contact? 
 
You’ve got the regulator over here, and the interaction flowing toward us. And you’ve got the 
interaction of us flowing towards the regulator, and they look different. Regulators are first of all, 
they’re sending down laws and compliance strategies and guidance. That’s generally not verbal – 
that’s written communication that they send to us. And then we have to interpret that and that 
sort of thing. Quarterly, I will get a regulator on sight, unrelated to an examination, where they’re 
just trying to get a feel for the economics of the community and the state and the region. Give 
them a feel for what’s going on from an economic standpoint. So that’s generally the extend of 
the communication from them flowing down to us. From us flowing up to them: I take the 
philosophy of out of sight, out of mind. I stay quite. I come in, I do my job. I figure if they don’t 
hear from me – you know what I mean? Now, there are times when I wanted to do things – for 
example, I did a denovo branch in Stillwater, so I had to seek approval for that. So I’ll write them 
and tell them of my intent to seek a denovo branch application, and we work through the denovo 
laws and application process, so I’m working with them through that process. So I do speak with 
them from that standpoint. Sometimes, I will seek interpretations of the law. Sometimes, I will 
say, you know, I’m getting mixed signals here. My consultants are telling me one thing, but from 
my years of experience, I’ll interpret it a different way. So I’ll make a call and I’ll say, what is 
the official interpretation from either the state or the Feds on this particular situation. And I do 
that from time to time. And I’ll log that call. I’ll make a note, time of day, I talked to this person. 
Because if that person comes in for an examination, they’re going to stay consistent with that. If 
somebody else comes in and they interpret it different, they’re going to go nope, you did it 
wrong, and now we’ll write you up. And now we have this dynamic of, I called Bob on this day 
and this was his interpretation, now you on this day are giving me this interpretation. And I was 
operating under what Bob told me and we have to work through that.  Many many times they 
will say it makes no difference what Bob said, it only matters what we say today, here, on sight.  
 
But the due diligence – best practices …  
 
Best practices makes all the difference in the world. We have got to be able to show that we are 
100 percent on board with trying to comply with the law, that we are not thumbing our nose at 
anything, and that generally goes a long, long way.  
 
How do you square, out of sight out of mind, with “relationships are valuable” ? 
 
The out of sight, out of mind that I’m talking about is really from a compliance – from a 
pestering kind of deal. You can see how I could come to work every day and say, I am scared to 
death to make a move. So let me call the Federal Reserve and say, look, can I take a coffee 
break? You just pester, and pester, and pester, and – I can see them running around the office, 
saying, that Exchange Bank in Perry, they’re driving me crazy. They won’t even do anything 
without calling me first. From a relationship standpoint, Bob Tolner is the head of the Federal 
Reserve, Oklahoma City Branch. When I see him at an OSU football game, we sit together, we 
eat hot dogs together, we drink a beer together, I know how many kids he has. He knows how 
many kids I have. We’re developing a personal relationship. Same with the state banking 
department. They need to see us as people, as individuals, and not just as a bank number, 
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registration number on a sheet of paper. I found that to be most beneficial to me, when 
something comes up – the state commissioner, Mick Thompson – I have a good personal 
relationship with, I can hear him, and I’ve witnessed him say, Look, take Exchange Bank Perry, 
for example, that Chuck Hall has been there for 22 years, third-generation banker, that guy 
knows what’s going on. Wow. That’s what you want – your bank commissioner saying. As 
opposed to, ‘There’s some banker in Dibble or wherever, and I don’t really remember who that 
is. Guys, go down there, check the place out. Tell me how it’s going.’ He knows me. He knows 
that if he has some sort of problem, he can pick up the phone and call. 
 
Has that changed from 15 years ago to now? 
 
Dramatically, because my attitude has changed. I don’t hate them. I don’t see them as a burden. 
Actually – and the way I got over it, I’m highly competitive, and most bankers are. Look, we are 
inundated with peer information. What I do mostly in this office is peer comparison. I have a 
peer group that I have picked out that are tied to generally my same size, my same size 
stockholders, my same kind of operations. And I want to be the best damn bank in that peer 
group. I want to be. I’m highly competitive. So when we have examinations – I want to be the 
best performing bank in the State of Oklahoma. And I’m going to use every source, every 
possible way that I can do that. Look, if I play in a football game, the worst thing I want to do is 
piss off the referees. Don’t I want to be their friend? That’s a great analogy – I don’t want to piss 
off the referees. Federal Reserve? State banking department? Referees.  
 
It’s an advantage. I’m looking for every advantage I can get. Look man, if you’re mom’s favorite 
kid, you’re less likely to get scolded. If I can be Mick’s favorite kid, it makes it a little tougher – 
if, when he would normally write me down for a violation, they’re going to come in and go, man, 
hold out your hand, don’t do that anymore. Yes sir, I got it. As opposed to writing you down and 
slashing your regulatory rating. I don’t know if it makes a different. But it can’t hurt.  
 
Manipulation? Did you ever want to do anything that made you want to change 
regulation? 
 
Sure. I mean, sure. I mean, sure. Absolutely. I mean, look. I would never dare try to change 
something was enforced, and again, we go back to the law is the law, is the law, is the law. But 
what I would do – I would lobby our concerns of the community bank. Look, lets look at this 
from the 30,000 foot level – and you’re going to hear this from every community bank you talk 
to in the State of Oklahoma – we did not cause the financial collapse. We didn’t cause it. We are 
not the cause of it. New York, big city, East Coast, West Coast. They’re the cause of it. They’re 
the derivatives buyers. They’re the volatile mortgage holders, the discounted stuff. They did that. 
So guess what happens – let’s create laws that make sure that will never happen again, and we all 
have to comply with it. Big, small, whatever. We all have to comply with it. So, believe me, at 
every chance, I’m in front of congress, I’m in front of our state representatives and senators. And 
I’m going, people, what you read in the Washington Post is going to be different from what you 
read in the Daily Oklahoman. Completely different. And you all have to understand that 
community banking is different than the corporate banking stuff in the big cities, and you’ve got 
to protect that. You have to protect that.  
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Let’s get more specific – just for you. The Know Your Customer Act. I’m in a town of 5,000 
people. I’m the mayor of Perry. I was born and raised here. My family’s been here since before 
statehood. I know every customer that walks into this bank. I know them intimately. I know their 
kids. Where they graduated from. I know where they live. I know where they go to church. I 
know everything about them. So when somebody comes in and opens a new account, it’s very 
easy, I know them, or I don’t know them. If I don’t know them, I get three forms of 
identification, the name of their first born. Where they graduated college. We’ve been doing this 
for decades. But guess what? The Know Your Customer Act now requires that I’ve got to hire a 
new compliance person – or buy a new piece of software – that I can prove that I’m running 
through the Ofax system, that they don’t have any outstanding warrants or that they’re not 
funding the Al-Quaida, when I know that Uncle Bob is not funding the Al-Quaida. They don’t 
get it, because you can’t make laws that say – but now, they’re doing a little bit better. They are 
starting to break it up by the size of banks. If you’re a billion or over, you have this compliance 
status, if you’re under 100 million, you have this compliance … they’re doing a little bit better, 
but the laws, we have to comply with.  
 
So, in answer to your question, I lobby where I can – at the state level, is where I’m most 
effective – at the federal level, I have to rely on the ABA to do that for me. Fortunately, Frank 
Keating is running the American Banker’s Association,  he’s a good Oklahoman. So, we have – 
he cares a little more about Oklahoma because he used to be a governor here. So I depend on him 
and his staff to do it at the national level. At the state level – now, here’s a little bit of 
background you didn’t ask for: I used to work for the Oklahoma Banker’s Association. I was 
their director of government relations, so I was their head lobbyists. I passed the interstate bank 
branching act for the state of Oklahoma, and I passed the denovo bank branching act for the state 
of Oklahoma – the two largest law changes in banking. From that, Mick Thompson, he has to 
periodically change the state banking code, and he will call on me. And he will say, a, what do 
you think about this, where’s the devils behind the trees, where am I hurting community banks, 
where am I helping community banks before I run this up there. We talk through it, make sure 
nobody’s getting hurt, it accomplishes what he wants, doesn’t hurt community banks, and then 
he says, will you help me with it. Sure – because he knows I know how to lobby, I’ll run it up to 
the state capital, it’s the commissioner’s bill, your people back home won’t be mad at you, vote 
yes. 
 
Constraining boundaries – you guys telling on each other?  
 
I can’t watch him from a compliance standpoint. I can’t watch him from a regulatory compliance 
stand point directly, because I don’t see his examinations. He doesn’t see mine. I will see 
something go on up there – I will hear that this customer go this loan at this rate, and I will go, 
now, how can they do that? But I stay out of it. We don’t stand each other from a compliance 
standpoint. When we look at our peers, it’s 100 percent performance based. You’re trying to beat 
them from performance – and overall return on equity, an overall return on assets, deposit 
growth, loan growth, etc. If I see an enormous amount of loan growth up there, I don’t think – 
they can’t do that unless they’re breaking the law. I don’t think that.  
 
What I look at is, how did they get that? Is it in their marketing? Is it in their people? Have they 
done something different? What’s their pricing structure? Because I can see all that – that peer 
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information is public. They’ve figured something out, and I’m a winner, so I’ve got to figure out 
a defense to the pass play, or whatever it is. We don’t – even my competitor, who’s a block 
away, versus one of my peers who may be in southeastern Oklahoma – we aren’t looking and 
saying, you can’t do that without breaking the law. That’s just not something we do. This is a big 
fraternity. At the end of the day, we’re all part of the same team. We’re not whistle blowers. It 
just doesn’t happen. Particularly community banking. Maybe BOK or Bank First can be 
considered a big bank, but even Bank First is the largest state chartered bank in the State of 
Oklahoma. And they started with one bank in Shawnee. I mean, they get it.  
 
So maybe not amongst yourselves – but what about outsiders? 
 
I think you’ve got a misinterpretation – look, other bankers may look at it a little different – it’s 
not so much the encroachment that bothers me. It’s now they’ve expanded the congressional 
intent of what a credit union’s supposed to be. First of all, credit unions pay no federal or state 
income tax. It’s a competitive advantage that I don’t have – I’ve got to pay taxes. I have to retain 
capital and pay taxes all at the same time. I’m the largest shareholder in this bank – but in the sub 
S, I’ve got to pay taxes on my retained earnings. So lets say, hypothetically, that my earnings this 
year is 10 million, I pay out 40 percent in dividends just to cover my 40 percent of the tax I pay 
to the federal government. 60 percent remains in capital because I have to have capital to grow, 
so now, I’m paying the government -- $400,000 in a year – I didn’t get the benefit of it. So yes, 
they have a competitive advantage. It’s not so much the encroachment as it is the – when 
congress, when they set up the credit union system – it made sense to me, we’re all about it – 
small mom and pop farmers pulling their money together so they can all buy a tractor that they 
can share. I’m all about that. I’m all for it. And what congress said was, that as long as you all 
have like interests – in this particular case, it was farming – you can pool your money together, 
and we wouldn’t tax you on the income you made on using that tractor. So as the years and years 
go by – now its farmer John, and his family, can be members of the credit union. Now it’s farmer 
John, his family, and his aunts and uncles. Now farmer John, and his family, and his aunts, 
uncles, cousins, etc. Now, you look at Tinker Federal Credit Union, what advertisement do they 
put nationally on the … anybody can be a member of the credit union. That’s not fair. So it’s not 
the encroachment, it’s the competitive advantage they have. When you don’t have to pay taxes, 
you can pay more on your CDs and you can get less on your loan rates. That’s a competitive 
advantage that bankers are pissed off about. When it was small mom and pop deals – when it 
was $5 million in total assets – that’s one thing. But when you get up to $500 billion in assets, 
it’s a different deal. So it’s not that encroachment is the problem – it’s the competitive advantage 
that credit unions have that really, really cut us to the quick.  
 
Any efforts to fight this? 
 
Constantly. Constantly. Here’s the problem. The problem is – I bet they don’t teach this in 
college – the problem is that Congress’ paychecks are deposited in the Congressional credit 
union. Federal judges are deposited in the federal judges’ credit union. The own state banking 
department’s paychecks go through the state of Oklahoma credit union. Even Mick Thompson’s 
paycheck – goes right in the state credit union. Now if the Federal Reserves paychecks – and 
their examiners – are being deposited into the credit union, where they’re getting high interest 
rates on CDs, low interest rates on their home loans and car loans, why in the world would they 
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lobby to change it? You see what I’m saying. We go to the president of the United States himself 
and say, they have a competitive advantage over us, and he says, you’re right, they do, somebody 
should do something about that, I’d like to write a check for the effort, and he writes it on the 
congressional credit union checkbook.  
 
Now there may be some types of changes – a collapse in the credit union industry from an 
operations standpoint, a safety and soundness standpoint – then you might see some pile on, and 
this tax stuff might change. Another place where this might change would be from the deficit – 
look, I’d be speculating on the numbers – but I’m telling you, it’d billions of dollars of missed 
tax collections by the federal government giving these credit unions a free pass. So if we need to 
help the deficit, that’s a way to fend off tax increases – just by taxing those people that aren’t 
being taxed now. That are providing – Oooh, I’m going to sound like a whiny banker – but credit 
unions do the exact same services that I do. They’re no different. I pay taxes. They don’t. Why 
shouldn’t they? Somebody should be saying: we’ve got all this deficit, and the only way we’re 
going to get out of it is to increase taxes or decrease spending, well, why don’t we start looking 
at credit unions, which are doing the same things banks are doing and start taxing them as one 
aide to help with the deficit.  
 
Interview No. 5 
 
Background? 
 
I came here, actually, in the role of compliance officer, so I was primarily working with 
consumer regulations when I first came here. That was why I was first hired. But I’ve been in 
banking 30 years maybe. I started as a banker. I worked at several – family owned banks – that 
was interesting. Then, I had an opportunity to go work for the Federal Reserve as a safety and 
soundness examiner. For the Kansas City Fed, but out of the Oklahoma City office, and did that 
for about five and a half years. I had some expertise in the risk management function, so I try to 
keep my hand in it by doing some compliance exams at least once a year. So I did keep up with 
regulations and where they were going. Then I had this opportunity. Wanted to get off the road, 
so I came here.  
 
Your role here? 
 
I’m the chief operating officer. In the last few years, I had the opportunity to step up. I was the 
chief credit officer during difficult times, to help kind of bring us out of that. I was a credit 
expert with the Fed. So used that expertise, and hired someone in, and took over when we had a 
lame duck CEO, last year, and served as chief operating officer during that time. And now we 
have a new CEO, and I’m very happy. 
 
Nationally chartered bank. Switching over?  
 
I’d be interested to know what other people’s arguments are. To me, if you do business – I’m 
speaking for myself now, not for the bank – but if you do your job right and run a good bank, it’s 
immaterial who the regulator is. Different regulators have different points of emphasis, but all of 
my years of experience on both sides of the desk – but it’s clearly dictated by Washington. It’s 
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very political in nature, at least what the points of emphasis are. Your underlying premis should 
be protecting the assets of the depositors. It’s very interesting to me – the whole concept that the 
public has – the whole perception that the public has is very interesting – because they view 
banks as a public utility, when in fact, they are owned by people who deserve to earn a return on 
their investment, whether its public or closely held. So because of all of that, and I think people 
sometimes – to me, I think it’s very clear. You’re regulated because we hold insurance. We hold 
insurance by the FDIC – and I also have another, I guess, belief – that most of the regulations we 
have today are because somebody, somewhere did something wrong. And the government, in the 
way that it sometimes does, overreacts, and we paint everybody with the same brush so 
everybody gets to abide by the same rules. Except for credit unions. They don’t have to pay 
taxes, they don’t have to follow community reinvestment act. There are so many things that 
make it very very interesting, especially as they demand more abilities that make them look more 
and more like a commercial bank. To me, it’s very interesting.  
 
As an examiner, you’ve got to maintain that objectivity. And I know when I was an examiner, I 
did not bank at a bank, because you don’t want to have to ever be in a position where you’re 
examining a bank where you’re a customer. So you have to be careful about that. As far as – it is 
probably cheaper to be a state charter bank – so that is one aspect. However, it’s not so much a 
factor today, but it has been a compelling reason in the past, if you’re going to be in more than 
one state, you had some federal exemption – you could just follow the Federal laws, you didn’t 
have to follow each separate state. So if you were a multi-state bank, it was important to me, 
anyway, that you a Federally chartered bank.  
 
And that’s the other thing to me – now you would find varying beliefs, even within our own 
management team – but my personal opinion is – the Federal Reserve regulates the holding 
company and the OCC is our primary federal regulator for the bank. To me, that’s very simple 
and it’s clean cut. I get the same thing everytime. Every exam is the same. However, if you’re a 
state charter, depending on the size of your bank, you either have a joint exam with the state 
banking commission and either the FDIC or the Fed, depending on if you’re a Fed member or 
not. The way I had seen it as a banker on that side – as a state supervised bank – there was a 
discrepancy from one year to the next, one exam to the next, depending on who was leading it. 
There’s a difference in the quality of the supervision at various agencies. The Fed takes great 
pride – I don’t think you can get a job there unless you had a 3.75. So it’s – they take great pride 
in that – I’ve seen, however, when you come to the state banking departments – and this is just a 
general statement across the board – certainly not about Oklahoma – as a general rule, they don’t 
pay as well, so you did not get the highest level. 
 
Mick Thompson, yea or nay?  
 
I think part of that’s different people’s personalities and perspectives. I don’t like to have to rely 
on politics. I’d rather do a good job. I don’t want to have to rely on politics to get what I need. 
And I don’t like to play politics, and people who kind of get off on that like that environment. I 
would prefer not to have that environment. I just want to do things right.  
 
What is your regulatory supervision? 
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The Federal Reserve is the umbrella regulator for all holding companies. Any bank that has a 
holding company is also regulated by the Federal Reserve. The FDIC would come only if you’re 
a state chartered bank who does not have Fed membership. So all state chartered banks can be 
regulated by either the Fed or the FDIC, and it depends on whether you hold Federal Reserve 
stock. And again, that gets political – so you get upset at how the Fed regulates you so you 
change to the FDIC. And I know that – there were some laws passed where you couldn’t change 
regulator when you were in a certain position, so it tried to keep banks that were in a poor 
position from changing and blaming it on the regulation. Don’t blame it on the regulators.  
 
Characterize the relationships across agencies? 
 
My perception is that any regulator is willing to work with the bank. I think part of it is how the 
bank responds to regulation. I have worked places where it was very adversarial with the 
regulators. The bank did not want – they saw them as the enemy. I’ve seen places where – I’ve 
probably examined places – where it was clear that the employees had been told to not tell the 
examiners anything. To me, that’s not the way – they’re just people doing their job. They are not 
the ones making the laws and the regulations. They are just doing their jobs. So I think it depends 
on how you interact. I have, for example, I am the primary regulatory contact for our institutions, 
and I make sure that if something is happening, especially since we’re public, I don’t want our 
regulators to read it first in a press release or a news release. I want to reach out to them. And 
likewise, when they see something coming down the pike, they call me and say, hey, just a heads 
up. I think it’s nurturing a relationship, so it’s not one sided. It shouldn’t be one sided. 
 
We are regulated from the OKC field office, so we have one person who is over us, and we have 
an examiner who is assigned to us and only oversees us, and it’s usually for a cycle, three to four 
years, whatever is determined internally. So you do get some continuity that way. And I’m sure 
they have rules on how long they can be so they don’t get too familiar and compromise their 
objectivity.  
 
Who interacts? How does the interaction work?  
 
The OCC, for our size, they do a quarterly review – only on sight once, maybe twice a year. 
They do a review of our call report data, anything we submit. They will sometimes do 
questionnaires. They do come in about six months after our examination to follow up on any 
issues there may have been, to see how we’re doing. And they are in here because of the size of 
our institution. They’re in here once a year, and are here for about four weeks. They send us a 
letter requesting the information they want to review, sometime before the exam, we’ll have it 
prepared for them. They will review the information, they’ll interact with – if its reviewing loans, 
they’ll talk to the credit people, if it’s capital lending, they’ll talk to the treasurer and his 
department. And the way the OCC currently does it – we’re not big enough to have continual 
supervision, where you have someone here all the time – but they do monitor our staff through 
our reports. If they saw something that raised a red flag, they would probably call. But I try to 
make them never have to call. I try to give them a heads up if something is anomalous. What’s 
going on over there? Of course, like any regulated institution, we get ratings, based on the 
CAMELs rating, for our basic rating structure – capital asset quality, management, earnings, 
liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. An then a composite rating. They also rate our IT, 
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because that’s a very large risk area. And they, if you have a trust department, they’ll rate your 
trust. They’ll rate your compliance. And then, not every year, but whatever the time frame is, 
they’ll rate your CRA, and that’s your only rating that’s public. Community reinvestment act. 
That’s the only rating that’s public.  
 
Proactive? How do you maintain relationships on your side? 
 
I have the ability, I email them. I pick up the phone and call them. We have a new EIC, examiner 
in charge right now, so just building that relationship, this will be the first exam he does for us 
this year. But to me, if you treat people with respect just like they’re a guest in their home. 
They’re just here doing their job. I’ve never had issues with anybody. Even the bank has certain 
challenges. To me, it’s all about attitude.  
 
You get what you give? 
 
Right. 
 
Do you see faces, or do you see faceless agencies? 
 
Absolutely. Of course, I have a little bit different perspective because I’ve worked with the 
people at the Fed. I actually know all of them personally, they were my colleagues, or my boss, 
as the case may be. And I will say this – I don’t want to get ahead of what you want to know – 
the OCC, one of the things I appreciate about their supervision is that they’re very systems 
oriented. They look at what your structure is, what are your systems, what are your controls. 
Rather than nit picky details. The FDIC, who currently regulates our sister bank in Kansas, is 
very transaction and very detailed oriented and very much no sense of materiality whatsoever. 
The same emphasis is put on something that is an absolute non event as is what is a huge issue. 
So to me, that negates the effectiveness of supervision when they throw out this huge plate of 
issues, and some of them are just like, ‘Really?’ It just is – I don’t appreciate that kind of 
supervision. To me that’s not helpful. I’d rather somebody say, hey, we see holes in your 
structure.  
 
Do the agencies help or are they an obstacle? 
 
If your bank – if a bank – is in sound financial condition and they have confidence in the 
management, then there’s not a hindrance. Now, the agencies themselves, that would be the 
answer. Regulations, laws, they can be a hindrance. There are many banks – let me give you an 
example – we choose not to do home equity loans in Texas. The reason we don’t to home equity 
loans in Texas is because of the incredibly difficult compliance with their Texas laws related to 
home equity loans. So instead of learning that and managing that, we’ve chosen not to do that, 
which limits our opportunity and limits our customers’ access. So, to me – but that’s not the 
regulators – all the agencies are doing is enforcing the laws or ensuring the banks are operating 
in a safe or sound manager.  
 
Your services/products are constrained … 
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By the regulations themselves. Absolutely. Another example would be the higher price mortgage 
loans, where you can’t have more than a certain spread. It actually impacts our profitably, so we 
don’t fall into that category where we have to do all these disclosures, we just squeeze our 
margin down so that it doesn’t fall in there. I mean, that’s ridiculous, when you think about it.  
 
What percent of performance is influenced by the regulatory environment? 
 
I can’t quote you any numbers or percentages because I actually haven’t done that study, but that 
would be a really interesting study to do and we probably should do it. I have a very good 
compliance department. Because of the people that I have, I probably have, I don’t have to have 
as many people as other organizations of the same size. But it’s significant. The amount of 
dollars we expend on training, education, the staff themselves, and now, with Dodd-Frank, it’s 
just exploding, and you know, when I start budgeting for next year, I’m going to have to think 
about that. 
 
What about opportunity cost? 
 
At some point, we’ll probably address that. Quite frankly, that’s part of the nature of what we’re 
done there. Except in Stillwater, we’re not really a retail bank. So that’s not been a huge issue for 
us, but we have a new CEO, who’s probably going to want to expand in some of these markets, 
so we’re probably going to have to start looking at that. But no, that’s very astute – we really 
haven’t put pen to paper. We’re cognizant that there’s a lost opportunity cost. 
 
The rule book. How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
My compliance – the person who manages my compliance department is responsible for 
monitoring new laws and regulations. How we internally manage those is different depending on 
the impact of that law or regulation. If it’s a high risk, it’s going to be treated differently. If it 
affects more than one department, it’s going to be treated differently. So we may convene a task 
force if it’s going to be something that impacts various, across departmental lines. If it’s 
something that is just one department is going to have to deal with, then we might handle that 
differently, then we might provide some guidance for that department manager. Help them – give 
them – feedback, when they develop procedures to handle it. And I have, since I’ve been either 
the compliance officer or at least the compliance department reports to me – so over it in some 
sort of manner – I think my philosophy does permeate a little bit – and I do not believe in 
compliance as an add on. To me, that’s impossible to ask your front line lender to understand 
everything. Now, there are some certain aspects – they need to know fair lending, they need to be 
sure they aren’t discriminating – they need to know certain parameters. But to know all this stuff, 
they can’t possibly do it. So my philosophy is you design procedures and policies and parameters 
and processes that, if followed, ensure compliance. Because that’s the only way. Everybody 
can’t be an expert. So my compliance department is the expert.  
 
How would you create a procedure or process based on a new rule? 
 
The FACT Act, when it came out. The identity theft rules – that impacted so many of the 
departments in this organization, from the credit area to the mortgage people to operations, I 
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mean, to IT, that we convened a task force in that case. Somebody representing every one of the 
areas that was going to be impacted – I bet we started anywhere from six months to a year before 
the implementation – and tried to review all the ramifications, see, you know, figure out how 
we’re going to do this and develop some type of software to be able – to allow you to do that, 
which we did in this case. Almost every new regulation that comes down nowadays includes a 
risk assessment … 
 
What’s a risk assessment? 
 
They require you, as part of it, to do a risk assessment. So, for us, that’s much bigger than the 
bank at Laverne, or some of the smaller banks I’ve worked in. Because you really have to think 
through all the ramifications of all the things that you do. If you’re really going to do a true risk 
assessment. So it’s not just – so you’ve got to figure out what’s impacted, then you’ve got to 
figure out how you’re going to deal with it, then you’ve got to write your procedures. Then 
almost always, you have to figure out reporting mechanisms and control mechanisms on the back 
end. It’s always complicated. One we’re going through right now is the mortgage rules. The 
changes in the mortgages rules – that doesn’t just impact our mortgages department, but we do 
mortgages in house as well, so it impacts our other lenders and our credit department as well.  
 
Are the rules easy to understand? How much uncertainty is there with a new rule? 
 
There can be. I think probably, having worked in smaller banks, in my life, too, they – again, I 
hate to throw out generalities, but I think this is probably generally true – in small banks, they 
usually do not have the expertise or the sophistication to handle that. And they’re heavily reliant 
on outside assistance. The OBA does a superb job of providing support for those kinds of 
institutions. There are vendors – BKD, the accounting firm – has a compliance practice, which I 
actually worked for for a while. They actually provide this service for smaller banks. And I 
always saw that as a niche that somebody could – I want to say exploit, but that has such a 
negative connotation –  
 
We’re not Marxists here …  
 
To me, that was always something, because how could somebody afford me on their staff at a 
Laverne? And I had a lot of that size of banks who were my clients, when I worked for BKD, 
because I could do for them what they could not do. I could review the regs, I could say, let’s 
look at your processes, whether this is going to impact you. It wasn’t nearly as complicated or 
complex as it is at an organization this size. Here, there is still ambiguity. One of the things that 
we do that a smaller bank can’t do is try to look at the proposed regulations and comment. So, 
that does give banks the opportunity to say, OK, this is really unclear so what standard are we 
going to be held to? What are you going to be looking for? And sometimes they will clarify that, 
and sometimes they don’t. But at least you can try to provide some feedback on what is 
workable, what isn’t, what is unclear, what isn’t. There is always, even if it’s clear, in the world 
of regulation, you are still subject to individuals who are doing the job. So is there a difference 
between the people who examine you? Absolutely? My job, my philosophy, has always been, is 
that my job is to know more than the regulator, and that has served me well. If we know it better 
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than they do, they’re just like, every other company now – they’re stretched and their resources 
are thin – and I will just tell you, just an ancillary statement – I detest getting green examiners.  
 
We’ve had our problems. It’s public – we were in a formal agreement for credit issues, I think 
2011 – so we’ve had our problems.  
 
The hot shot kids go to the exemplar banks …  
 
Now, we have had after last year, after we cleaned up and did a $350 million bulk sale and took a 
$100 million loss, which thankfully, we had the capital to do, we did have them come in and 
bring a training crew in. Now, that doesn’t bother me, if they just come in and want to use our 
files for training. But it’s just like hiring an auditing firm, you’re getting their June hires in to do 
an audit. They have not benchmarks, no sense of materiality, no experience to fall back on. And 
to me, the lack of – I mean, I just used to, when I was a senior examiner, I had younger 
examiners who worked under me – they would go off on this tangent, that at the end of the day, 
didn’t really matter. And I felt it was my job to kind of pull us back to – OK, lets step back and 
go across the road and take a look at this from the longer view. Does this really matter? The 
other thing you get from green examiners is because they don’t – they have that lack of 
experience and because they’re always incented to want to shine – you know, they’re wanting to 
find something or whatever the issue is. I always used to think that if they didn’t do their job if 
they didn’t find something. So I don’t know that – it probably did used to be that way, and I 
think with the fluctuations with the economy, I think that some of those things have happened, 
where all they see are bad things they have to get jaded and cynical. I think that’s probably true. 
But we also used to have a saying when I was on the examiners side, that a good economy hid 
bad bankers. It really is true. It’s a balance. It’s a balance.  
 
How have you gotten better at knowing what the rules are? 
 
There was a time, many, many years ago when this bank probably had the attitude of – there was 
a time, at least I’ve been told, this would have been way before me – that this bank did have the 
attitude that regulators are our enemy. Let’s hide everything. Let’s not tell them everything. I 
think this bank probably did have some compliance challenges from time to time, and I know the 
guy who hired me to come in here. He was a lawyer. He was the first compliance officer ever 
hired here, so I think it was probably one of those things that was parceled out. And of course, 
this bank grew very quickly, and sometimes infrastructure struggles to keep up when you grow 
that quickly. But I think we have an exemplary compliance department today and I think it’s 
because we hired the right people. I hire experienced people and then we’ve supplemented that 
with bringing in people and training them. 
 
Do you hire former regulators? 
 
I’m the only former regulator we’ve ever hired. That is something we would certainly look at. I 
have hired former regulators in other areas of the bank. 
 
Although, I will say, it’s just like anything, you have to find that balance of academic viewpoint 
and a practical viewpoint. And I think that’s been an advantage for because I’ve seen both sides, 
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as a banker, and then as a regulator, and then as a banker. I think it made me a better regulator, 
and now, having been a regulator, makes me an even better banker.  
 
Day-to-day – how relevant is regulation? Especially related to new products / services, 
growth, etc. 
 
Compliance is an integral part of everything we do, and I don’t know if that’s because it’s our 
culture now. I imagine we’re a little bit different from some other banks. Our compliance officer 
sits on our risk management committee. Our compliance officer, the manager of our compliance 
department, sits in on any new product development. She has to be involved, and she sits on our 
data processing committee, so she hears any new innovations because anything you do, it’s nice 
to have somebody who has that hat on who can say, OK, all you innovators and marketing types, 
OK, that’s all well and good, but what are you going to do about this law? So we try to bring that 
balance. Any change or change control process, she’s one of the components of that.  
 
Do you ever feel like your decision options are constrained? 
 
I think that’s probably empirically correct. Although, I will tell you that since I am not a creative 
person, I’m probably not the right person to ask that because I see everything through my eyes of 
this is what a bank is, this is what a bank can do. So, just to be fair … I’m saying, if its my 
decision, I’m probably going to always default to, is that something we can do? Whereas, 
somebody who’s much more creative is probably going to try to push the boundaries and then 
my job is not to say ‘No,’ – this is also Priscilla’s philosophy that I’ve tried to incorporate here – 
my job is not to say ‘No,’ my job is to say, ‘How can we do this within the parameters?’ So 
that’s our philosophy here; doesn’t always mean we can do it, but that’s our first go to. No is not 
allowed to be our first go-to.  
 
Has ‘no’ been … ? 
 
I think there are banks where their compliance officers are definitely, ‘No, no we’re not going to 
do that.’ But my philosophy and what we’ve implemented with our department is, that’s not 
allowed. Now, it might have to end up being the answer, but I would rather say, well, we can’t 
do that but we could do it this way.  
 
What’s the difference between the compliance officer where ‘no’ is the first option versus 
the one who looks for solutions? 
 
As far as their perception, the bank is huge. The person who says No is not a partner in the 
organization, they’re viewed as an adversary, they’re viewed as somebody nobody wants to talk 
to. Kind of – literally, in the basement with the auditors – which is actually where our 
compliance and audit department are. We do live off electric light – sometimes air conditioning.  
 
What about personal characteristics? Like experience? 
 
I think that’s absolutely fair. I think your more experienced people have that more depth of 
knowledge that they can think around the implications and ramifications. I know of one 
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organization here in the state that’s actually a very large organization that one of the people in 
their compliance department – he is very much a ‘No’ kind of person – and I know some of the 
lenders and they hate him. I mean, so to me, that’s not – I would rather them be able to pick up 
the phone to my compliance officer and say, help me figure out how to do this. 
 
You probably have some idea of what a regulatory environment should be. How aware are 
you of other banks’ interests? 
 
I know of banks that my perception is that they could care less what the regulation say – you can 
see it in their advertising: they don’t follow the rules in their advertising. You can see – 
customers will always tell you that some other bank will do it when you won’t – so whether 
that’s true or not, who knows. But yeah, you do have a perception of those that are lax.  
 
I think that the strategic plan of the bank – their ultimate goals – their philosophy – will greatly 
impact how they feel about regulation. I want to make sure that whatever our strategic plan is, 
whether its to grow, to expand, to acquire – you know, if you are not in good standing on certain 
aspects, for example, community reinvestment act, there’s a chance you will not get approved for 
some of those activities. So its, to me, managing regulation, managing compliance with 
regulation, is a balance act – you cannot, in my opinion, Priscilla speaking not for the bank – 
afford to try to get a 1 rating on compliance. I don’t think you can possibly throw enough 
resources at it to get a 1 rating. A small bank can do it much easier than a bank this size. But if I 
were to spend the money it would take to be a 1, it would be astronomical. It would really be 
astronomical. The expense would be astronomical. So, do we ever want to break a law or not 
follow regulation? Absolutely not. But to ensure that that doesn’t ever happen is cost prohibitive, 
it’s just not possible.  
 
How do you pick and choose? It’s materiality isn’t it? 
 
It is material. We’re not going to do anything – if it’s illegal, we won’t do it. That’s not the point. 
And I’m not speaking necessarily to – do we make decisions to skirt this law? No, we don’t do 
that. But I’m talking about the systems we would have to put in place to ensure compliance. We 
have a good control system – that’s not what I’m saying at all – but for however many locations 
we have in three states, because we manage compliance for our sister bank as well, it would just 
be impossible.  
 
Now, do I want to be known as a good compliance shop? Absolutely.  
 
That’s the positive feedback you get with the regulators? If you’re a tinfoil hat person …   
Anyway, what about the personal relationship? Is that of huge value to you? 
 
It’s certainly not a social relationship. It is a more professional relationship. Do I have the ability 
to call them and visit with them and go to their offices when I want to talk to them? Yes, I can do 
all that. But am I going to call and say, let’s go meet at the bar? No. The OCC in particular is 
much more careful about any apparent conflict of interest. I know it used to be – years ago, 
probably in the 80s, early 90s when things were still recovering from the 80s, I used to take the 
examiners to lunch at the country club just because I knew they couldn’t pay. And it would drive 
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them bananas. And it did. And so they would try to guess what the meal cost, and hand me cash 
for their meal because they have so much more strict parameters as far as conflict of interest 
issues.  
 
The Fed is pretty – I think all the Federal regulators, the FDIC, the Fed, and the OCC are very 
careful about ethics, conflicts of interests. The state agencies are much less careful.  
 
They emphasize the relationship – the personal relationship – you can have the hot dog 
with the Federal Reserve guy at an OSU football game. The relationship seems critical – 
you want to have a bond with these people – but I wonder: would you say, that it’s the 
relationship with these people that’s most critical? 
 
I want them to respect me and respect my bank. I don’t need to be their best friend. I want them 
to know that I’m a good banker. That I run a good shop. That I do things right. That’s my goal. I 
want them to know that I’m in it to  maximize my return to my shareholders and do things in a 
safe and sound manner. I don’t care about going out with them. Now, have I gone and had a 
drink with a regulator? I have.  
 
Quantify the interactions. 
 
Its different for different aspects. If you’re talking about compliance with regulations piece, then 
its … we get a question, you know – it’s never easy, it’s never black and white, there’s always 
some nuance to a question that some case that a lender has and can I do X,Y,Z, and you’re 
thinking, wow, I don’t know. And we will try to find the answer first, because we don’t like to 
ask question we don’t think we know the answers to. But then, if its something we think may bite 
us if we don’t follow through, then we’ll always call and say, hey, can you help us. We have that 
kind of relationship we can do that and I don’t feel like they’re going to hold it against us and 
come in and look for that to be wrong the next time, so I don’t have an issue with that. Now, if 
it’s on the safety and soundness side – last year, we paid off our TARP, and I made sure that 
everything that I did with the regulators – that we were going to do – that they were informed. 
That they – I always want them to at least think they have the ability to opine. Its because I want 
to say – OK, what I’m saying to them in better words is: this is your chance to tell me if you’ve 
got an issue with this because here’s the direction I’m going, and I have it in a much more 
congenial, give-and-take kind of manner, and I know where I’m going and I want them to know 
it and give them a chance to provide me some feedback. 
 
Do you keep records of these contacts? 
 
I have in the past, but I don’t know. There have been times in my past when, especially when it 
came to compliance issues, you did write down examiner John Doe told me on such a such a date 
X,Y,Z, and part of that was this discrepancy between examiners. There is that sometimes. But I 
think that I’m looking at it from a little bit different perspective. I’m older. I’ve been in banking 
in Oklahoma for a lot of years, and I think my number 1 criteria for my departments is to have 
credibility. And I want them to know when I tell them something that it is the truth. You know, if 
you establish this kind of relationship, you don’t have to worry about all this other stuff.  
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Move the boundary? Do you ever encounter a regulation that is a hindrance and you’ll try, 
in some way, to change it? 
 
The comment period is one way we try to do that.  But are we as proactive as I would like to be?  
No.  
 
Do you want to be proactive? 
 
Yes. I think as we mature as an organization, as we get past some of the problems we’ve had 
over the past few years, as we continue to refine our infrastructure, I think those are some things 
we probably need to be a little more proactive. Now, I will say that our CEO actually sits on the 
ABA government relations board. So he does have more insight and more impact sitting on that 
board as far as the ABA being a lobbyist for bank interests. So that’s one way that we do that. I 
think that in the past, I have probably have been involved at the state level with the OBA in 
certain things. ABA has a fairly sophisticated comment system for grassroots efforts, and if you 
sign up, you try to get ahold of your bankers to do that and things like that. The bank industry, in 
my opinion, as a whole, does a poor job at lobbying. I think we’re probably better than we used 
to be, and I think actually Frank Keating at the help of the ABA – I think he’s doing a great job. 
But I think that’s something that, as a whole industry, we need to improve on. We just get so 
busy doing our jobs.  
 
Any example?  
 
No. Not the OBA on behalf of our bank. We’ve probably participated in larger efforts that the 
entire banking community has been involved in. Anything that impacts us directly, no. Not to my 
knowledge. I think that’s an interesting concept – and it really would be interesting to see how 
far you could go with it – but part of the problem with it being so politically motivated. For 
example, the consumer financial protection agency or bureau or whatever its called – I mean, it’s 
going to be a pain in every banker’s neck. And it’s not because bankers don’t want to treat 
consumers properly. It’s that some people didn’t get treated properly, and everybody’s guilty. Or 
the mortgage brokers in the latest go around didn’t treat people properly. So the bankers on Main 
Street who didn’t treat people that way still get to comply with the same laws. It will be 
expensive. One of the things that have gone away as part of the Durbin Interchange Fees bill, for 
example, many banks have gone away from free checking accounts because they made their 
money on interchange fees on their ATM transactions and debit card transactions, and with those 
capped, now, and I think Congress does a very poor job about thinking about the dominoes 
following. I think they do not look at the consequences of some of the things they do, and if the 
bankers could do a better job because it’s all, to me, at least in the recent past, grandstanding 
about, well, I’ve got to get elected so I’m going to tell these people who bought a home they 
couldn’t afford, somebody apparently coerced them to do that, and now, somebody’s going to 
come and take care of them.  
 
In the last few years, anyway, the popularity of banks has been down there with … 
 
Are you ever worried about – regulatory blowback?  
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Yeah, I’m actually not worried about that. We fill out an evaluation after every exam, and I don’t 
mind telling them what I think. Now, I think you have to be careful. Again, a generality: I think a 
lot of times, the bankers who are the most vocal about – they had a bad examination, it’s because 
they’re not doing it very well. I think – I’m not saying we’re perfect, we’re not, we’re people. 
We make mistakes. But I think if you’re trying to run a good shop, I think – I’m not afraid to tell 
people, you know, you have a loan review examiner who is missing the mark and beating our 
people up. I don’t mind saying that, and I try to do it in a professional manner, and so – it 
changes because I’m angry about the outcome of what they found; I try to keep it factual. I think 
a lot of times – I read a statistic recently that I still find – I have a hard time getting my mind 
around it – that women make decisions faster than men on emotion, which I would never have 
believed, and I don’t know about the validity of the study I read. But I thought, I don’t know if 
that’s so wrong, because a lot of the bankers I have run against – banking is a male dominated 
industry – they’re very emotional. It’s very personal to them. Whereas, to me, this is facts. We’re 
doing our job. We want to serve our customers. We want a healthy return to our shareholders, 
and that’s my job, and these people are doing their job.  
 
Frame?  
 
We have a culture where the – I don’t know if its been that way always – but it certainly is now, 
but the regulators are doing their job. And we encourage people to answer questions honestly. 
We try to make sure that people who don’t know the whole story don’t answer the questions 
because they can skew the regulator’s perception. I will say this: for a lot of regulators, if they 
start going down – and not so much the OCC, but the FDIC is particularly bad about this – if 
they start going down the wrong path, it’s very hard to drag them back and say, wait a minute, 
wait a minute, you’ve got the wrong perception. Because of that, I do try to control the flow of 
information through people who actually know what they’re talking about. But they have access 
to anybody if they need it. I also try to encourage them – for the same reason – not to hide 
anything. But I do try to encourage them to try to say, if they’re asked the time, to tell them the 
time, and don’t tell them how the clock is made. I think sometimes people can get overzealous in 
wanting to be helpful and cooperative, and they say things where they don’t have the whole 
picture. Then, all of the sudden, you’ve got an examiner sitting in your office saying, “What the 
heck is going on.” And then you to go back to square one and explain it.  
 
What are the differences between a bank where it is antagonistic and one that’s not? 
 
I think – I’m speaking from my former regulator years – I can remember when you walked into a 
bank – we had a bank one time, it was pouring with rain on the Monday morning when we got 
there. It was going to be a big exam. We had probably 15 examiners – maybe not quite that many 
– they made us stand in the rain, even though they knew us, they made us stand in the rain to 
check our IDs before they would let us in the door. OK, that does not start a relationship off that 
well. There was one lady who, in that same exam, she told us a lot of interesting things, then all 
of the sudden, she was on vacation after that. And does that – so all that does, for an examiner, is 
raise their antennae with, ‘What’s going on that we haven’t found yet?’ It makes them dig 
deeper, it makes them be cynical. It makes them question everything. I would rather us – to me, 
the main difference – if you come from a position of credibility and you know what you’re doing 
and you’re honest about your faults – I mean, I want to know, if we’ve got a problem, I want to 
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have found it before the regulators come, and if we haven’t fixed it, I want to have a plan. So, to 
me, it’s all about – I think you make your life just so much more difficult if you have an 
antagonistic – and you make the regulators view you differently.  
 
Where do you think that comes from?  
 
It’s an ego thing, on some people’s part. Different answers for different people. I’m sure. A lot of 
it is this – I’ve actually said this to an examiner, to a young examiner – he was in haranguing the 
president of the bank about some thing – and I pulled him out and said, ‘He’s been banking 
longer than you’ve been alive. Even if you’re right, you address him with respect.’ And I think 
that’s part of it: sometimes personality types – you get egos on both sides. And instead of let’s 
have a congenial conversation, let’s talk about the facts without getting emotion involved. But 
you do have these guys – this is their family’s bank; this is what they’ve done all their life. And 
I’ve worked for these banks – they’re not in it for the return. They’re not in it for the return, 
they’re not in it for a financial gain. It’s a warm and fuzzy that they get. They like to be the guy 
in the community, you know, going down to the local diner and everybody knows you. So I think 
all of those kinds of things factor into it. But to me, if you have an adversarial relationship, it just 
makes your life so much more difficult.    
 
Boundary contraction? 
 
I think it does happen occasionally, but I don’t think it – the guy who used to work here, the guy 
who worked here was a lawyer – one of the banks here in the state was giving away a free car for 
something – I can’t remember how it went – but it was a lottery, which is against Oklahoma law, 
and it violated some other advertising laws and things like that. He actually did write a letter to 
the state attorney general. And he said, in the interests in competitive pressures, my 
understanding of the law is ‘this’ – now, he’s a lawyer – so if I’m misinterpreting this, I want my 
bank to do the same thing. He wasn’t saying – it was interesting how he did it – he wasn’t 
tattling on this guy – he was saying, were at a competitive disadvantage if we aren’t allowed to 
do this, so tell me if I’m missing something. And before long, all of the sudden, those ads were 
dropped.  
 
Credit unions …  
 
I think bankers – I don’t know why we’re bad at this. I know the ABA will come out every once 
in a while – or the OBA – and everybody will get all excited about it. And all of the bank 
presidents from Oklahoma will go to Washington. But as far as a concerted in-the-front-of-the-
mind regulation – I think everybody in the bank is so focused on serving customers and making 
sales, doing deals, that that’s what’s in the forefront of bankers’ minds instead of ‘If we don’t 
wake up we’re going to turn around and credit unions are going to have exactly the same 
opportunities, exactly the same benefits, except they don’t have to pay taxes and they don’t have 
to comply with the community reinvestment act. I think it’s all very interesting, and then what 
will happen. Because what will happen – because they don’t know how to do these commercial 
loans – there’s going to be a catastrophe, some sort of economic melt down, just like in the 80s 
with the thrifts. The thrifts, what they were doing, they were making these very low interest rate 
mortgages on very long terms, they had huge interest rate risk, and it bit them. They didn’t know 
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how to manage that. And nobody even knew how to regulate it – I mean, the regulators are 
learning, too. But I think you’re going to see the same kind of catastrophe – it’s just like a bank 
growing too fast without infrastructure. If you don’t put infrastructure in place, and if that 
happens, to me, it’s just you’re asking for trouble at some point. And we’ll get the brunt of the 
regulation that comes down after that, and they don’t have to comply with half the regulations 
we do, and they don’t have to pay taxes, which completely changes their profile.  
 
Seems like if you back a dog in the corner …  
 
Well, what you’re seeing is a lot of family owned banks are closing or selling. I think you’re 
going to see a lot more bank consolidation because of the, I think – I mean, I hear rumors that 
people are actually going to give up their FDIC insurance. Now, I don’t know if that’s feasible, if 
people will put money in their bank if they’re money isn’t insured.  
 
I think people do try, but its – I don’t know if it’s because bankers don’t want to band together 
because we’re inherently competitive. I don’t know what the deal is. I don’t have a good answer 
for it.  
 
Interview No. 6 
 
I have been in bankng for 35 years. I have an accounting degree as well, and I’m a CPA. But I’ve 
never practiced. I’ve always been in banking. I was at Union Bank for 22 years  until it was 
bought out. Then I went to Local Oklahoma bank, then it was bought out. I worked there six 
years, and I’ve been here seven. I’m president and CEO here.  
 
Have you always been a state bank? 
 
No, we were a national bank and we changed about eight or nine years ago to a state, Fed 
member charter. We have the Federal Reserve and the state banking commission, which alternate 
examinations.  
 
That happened before you got here. Why switch? 
 
It was not due to overregulation or anything, but as a national bank, the capital requirements – 
and it wasn’t really the capital requirements, it was the amount of – the lending limits. They’re 
stricter with a national bank than they are with the state banks. You can do larger loans as a state 
bank, and that was one of the deciding factors, and also, the fees are less. So you have a lot of 
state chartered banks in Oklahoma.  
 
We had a really good relationship with the OCC. That was not one of the contributing factors 
here at all – it was just simply that we wanted to do a little bit larger loans to get our loan 
volumes up.  
 
Regulatory environment? Relationships? 
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Excellent, with both of them. I’m on the community bank council for the Federal Reserve in 
Kansas City, and we have real good report. 
 
Are there differences in how the state does their job and how the Fed does theirs? 
 
Any agency, you’re going to find differences. But they basically use the same guide lines and 
everything. The way they come in and do the examinations, they both do them differently, but 
you sometimes have that within an agency: depending on – if you have the Federal Reserve has 
called people in from other states, other districts, to work on exams, and having people from 
locations of the country makes a difference in your exam and in the way they look at things. So if 
you have someone who’s coming from an area where they’re seeing a lot of bank failures and 
everything, they have a whole different attitude than a regulator who’s only worked in the 10th 
district.  
 
Is there a difference between the FDIC and the Federal Reserve: 
 
Well, you know, we’ve not had a Fed examination – I’m also on the council for the FDIC – the 
community bank council in Washington. So I think the – from what I’ve seen, they’re really 
trying. Chairman Gruenberg is really trying to reach out: he sees the importance of community 
banks to their communities and to the banking system as a whole. I truly believe that. So I think 
some of the things that have been going on in the past, he’s truly trying to make the focus more 
of an overall risk to the system rather than being real picky about different things. But you know, 
you have different offices around the country, and they’re going to have differing issues. If 
you’ve been a regulator in Georgia and you’ve had all those bank failures because they started 
too many denovo banks in Georgia, then you’re getting ragged on because you didn’t see that 
coming. You’re life is not going well if you’re a regulator in Georgia. Hey, why didn’t you see 
that you had too many banks? Why didn’t you see that? So regulators get a bad rap because bad 
things happen. So the pendulum swings way, way, way too far to the right, and then they’re 
looking at everything, and making issues out of things that maybe they didn’t in the past because 
they’re being so criticized. I’m not justifying it, but that’s what happens. It’s done this twice: I 
was in the 80s in Oklahoma, and then I saw the last recession. So I’ve been through two major 
recessions in my banking career.  
 
Mortgages – another great example – what happens is the pendulum swings so far to the left, you 
basically had to pass a breath test – if you’re alive, you’re going to get a mortgage. That’s not 
right, those standards should never go that loose. And then people get them and can’t handle 
them and they default, and we have repercussions from that, and then the pendulum goes all the 
way over here, and very qualified people are struggling to get mortgages these days. It always 
happens, that’s just the way it is.  
 
Do you handle interactions? 
 
I handle them, but Janet Plouff is our cashier, she handles a lot of questions on operations. And 
then, Priscilla Qune, who’s our CFO, she handles investment type questions. In fact, it’s ironic, 
next week, we’re meeting with our representative with the Federal Reserve. We have periodic 
meetings where we just go to lunch and chat about how things are going. We send emails back 
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and forth to each other. If there’s something – and not necessarily something bad or good – if 
there’s just something different in our reporting, you know, the banks have to file quarterly call 
reports on the financial condition of the bank, and if there’s a number that’s a little bit out of 
range. As an example, we got a very huge deposit the last day of the year. There was nothing I 
could do other than tell them that our numbers were going to look skewed at the end of the year – 
because it’s new year’s eve, there just isn’t anything I could do with that money. So anyway, I 
just sent them an email and said, look, the call numbers are going to look a little strange, we had  
a huge deposit, it’s going to work its way out, but I just wanted to let you know about it.  
 
There are, I’ve found, I believe that there’s more, in my opinion, more positive interaction and 
communication between regulators and bankers than there previously has been. Because when 
my folks got in banking, they wanted to stick the regulators in the coldest, darkest, dampest room 
to get them in there and out. And I don’t think people have that – some bankers still do – but my 
theory has always been, get them the information, and get them in here, and give them 
everything they need to get their job and get out.  
 
How would you characterize your relationship with the agencies? Do they help or hurt? 
 
Well, both. But, the way the system works is, Congress makes the mandates and then its their 
responsibility to interpret the law and make it into the regulations that we have to abide by. And 
so, I mean, when you have the size of the law passed like Dodd-Frank, I mean, that is a hurdle. 
That’s a hurdle for them and it’s a hurdle for us. So, there was not – I mean, there was some parts 
of that that may end up being good, but for the most part, that was very onerous regulation on 
banks. Very bad, in my opinion.  
 
What proportion of your performance is influenced by the reg environment? 
 
You know, that’s really hard to identify. It’s really difficult to do that. We spend a lot of time and 
a lot of money going to classes, training our people. How many hours? It’s really hard to tell how 
many hours you spend specifically on compliance. Here at our bank, we have 37FTEs, we all do 
compliance. We all do it. We don’t have a compliance officer that that’s all they do. So it’s really 
hard for us to document that. Another thing that’s come into play – it’s very interesting – the 
advancement of technology. There’s this – kind of – crossing of the technology and the 
compliance requirements because we’ve been able to save on personnel because of technology, 
but at the same time, we’ve had to move responsibilities for compliance to those employees so 
we still have basically the same employees, but because of technology, they’re doing less 
banking, and because of regulation, they’re contributing more of their time to that.  
 
We spend a lot of time – every day, we have to do things – you know, when we open a new 
account, we have to do things because of regulation that we wouldn’t have done in the past, like 
getting all this information filled out so we know who the customer is. So every process that we 
have has been burdened with regulation. Every process we have in the bank. 
 
What about opportunity cost? Are there things that you’d be doing …  
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You know, if we didn’t have to do a lot of the – as an example: one of the things that we’ve been 
toying with is doing online account opening. And for a bank this size, that can be helpful for us, 
although we don’t need deposits or anything, but we’ve been thinking about – that we need to do 
that just to keep up with the technology and what our customers want. But, on the second hand, 
you have all these regulatory burdens on identifying the customer. So, you know, you have to 
make sure – you have to do all this inquiry and you have to use a third party service to validate 
that that person is who they say they are. And so, it becomes one of those things where the cost 
and the benefit – you know, it’s really more cost than it is benefit at this point in time because of 
the regulatory burden of just identifying who the customer is. 
 
Things you’ve quit doing due to regulation? 
 
Student loans. We stopped doing student loans because the regulatory burden is so onerous, and 
that is just wrong. It should be that students could come in here and get a student loan, it should 
not be the process. In my opinion, the government has made a huge mess of the student loan 
business. The average student comes out of college with $30,000 in student debt. Average. That 
means a lot of people are coming out with tons more, and a lot of students are coming out with 
none. So $30,000 – that’s a horrible burden to be putting on the youth of our country. When 
they’re starting out. And you have a lot of people who are going to be going into professions that 
don’t have high incomes to repay that. And here’s a perfect example of a product that, you know 
– one of the things that bothers me the most about regulatory oversight is instead of going to the 
agencies that were poorly managing student loan business, and saying, stop. You’re doing a poor 
job at this, we’re going to do something to cease you from doing these things. They just make 
rules that everyone has to abide by, and that’s wrong. That’s my biggest criticism of the 
regulators.  
 
Was that a significant … 
 
It was a good book of business for us. It wasn’t huge, but it was a good book of business. And 
the government kept getting more and more and more and more involved, and they kept taking 
that business away from us, and then all of the sudden, they made the regulatory burdens so 
onerous that we couldn’t do it.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
The law has been passed, but the rules are far from being written. And once they take a portion 
of that, and write the rule – OK, Basel III, on capital regulation, is 995 pages. That’s the rule. 
Well, it was stipulated in the law – it was part of that – how many thousands of pages of 
legislation, and now the rule interpreting that law is 900 and something – so we have thousands 
of pages …  
 
All these classes. We depend on third parties to help us. We depend on them. The OBA, the 
ABA, usually, when these rules come out, they immediately analyze them and put out a 
summary. Now, there was a summary put out with the new Basel III capital requirements, but 
it’s been misinterpreted. That’s why we’re having lunch with our Federal Reserve contact to see 
exactly – from a regulators standpoint – how that’s going to impact our bank. Because our 
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independent auditor sent out a summary, and then our broker sent out a summary, and those two 
summaries looked like totally different laws, and they’re analyzing the same law. But it looked 
like they had been written from two different laws. You have to be careful – you have to squint 
through all of this stuff and really dig into it and find out. I haven’t read 995 pages of regulation 
…  
 
There’s nobody here reading the rule books …  
 
No. And you won’t find it – even in the big banks, most people don’t do that. They may have 
attorneys on the staff that will do that. 
 
So the OBA and the ABA … 
 
And there’s tons of consultants.  
 
And classes and consultants. What else? 
 
We read all the time. We go to the meetings. Now, the Federal Reserve, one of the things that 
they do that I think is really good is that they have – I think they are semi annual meetings – and 
they bring in all the presidents and upper management of the bank in to a meeting and they say, 
OK, here’s what we’re seeing when we’re out doing the exams. We’re seeing these as problem 
areas in banks, or we’re seeing banks not doing this properly, or this is coming up, you need to 
do this, you need to start working on this. And those are very, very, very helpful. So that’s a 
positive thing the regulators do. And you know, that’s a positive thing the regulators do. And for 
the most part, they do try to help the banks. Another thing that they’ve done – and this came out 
of one of the meetings that I went to – the community banker depository council meeting – we 
were talking about this, and someone said, why don’t you put a guide, like if this regulation, if 
this only applies to banks $10 billion and over, put that up in the upper right hand corner so we 
don’t have to read it, because you’re reading it all the time. If it doesn’t apply to me – just put it 
in that stack. 
 
Ambiguity? Is it always clear? 
 
No. I just said – these two agencies – two different experts had a totally different interpretation 
of the same rule? 
 
Sometimes, you know, they try – there is a council – that when there is a regulation that needs to 
apply to all FFIEC – they try to issue a rule from all of the regulators. So, as an example, a lot of 
the rules for computer security, client/customer security – those come from the FFIEC, which is 
the agency that they use when it’s a – I would say, it’s when all of the different agencies need to 
issue one regulation, they do it through the FFIEC.  
 
How do you cut through the ambiguity? 
 
It is difficult. We rely a lot on third parties.  
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Difference between the written rule and how the rule is enforced? 
 
Here again, you get back to human interpretation. So, another example of that is: what the 
American Bankers’ Association has recently done is they formed an anonymous pool for bankers 
to anonymously report any areas that they felt they were harshly judged on in an examination. 
It’s national. And what we’ve found were there were certain offices throughout the country that 
were focusing on one point and so we took it to the regulators, and said, look, the Dallas office is 
really, really being overly aggressive on their interpretation of fair lending. And here are all your 
other field offices, and here’s the Dallas office. 9 out of 10 exams are getting this as a written 
violation. And that’s – that’s not the numbers, I’m just giving you a hypothetical – but only two 
out of 10 in these other offices, so, you know, FDIC, you might want to look at this office. So, it 
helps to point out the differences in the different regions, and because, you know, different 
offices – it’s just, you know, natural that you’re going to have different hot points. And we’re so 
energy driven here. Well, a regulator in New York, they’re not going to look at those loans the 
same way or have the same knowledge. Agriculture’s so big in the Midwest, and commodities. 
 
How have you gotten better at staying on top of the rules? 
 
It’s gotten harder, because there are so many more rules. But I think the agencies, associations, 
and every – the organizations that you belong to – have gotten better at getting in there and 
trying to provide information. Technology’s helped a lot, because there are all kinds of webinars 
that you can attend, so its easier to get quality information than it used to be. It used to be you 
have to spend all day at a class or read it your self or hire and attorney. So I would say that 
technology has helped tremendously.  
 
Software you use? 
 
Technology does help a lot. How hard it is for the vendors to keep up with all of this. So it’s 
really difficult and they’re constantly having to update and implement the software and a couple 
of times the regulators have had to delay the enactment of some of the regulations because the 
vendors or people simply could not get everything done in time.  
 
But some of the stuff they require, you know, it’s really challenging for the software companies 
to keep up with all the regulations.  
 
Day-to-day: how relevant are regs? 
 
Everything we do. Because they just changed all the appraisal regulations, they changed all the 
mortgage lending regulations. And like the student loans, someone comes over from the 
university and says they want a student loan, and we say, we can’t help you with that any more. 
Car loans. Fair lending has become a really big issue. You cannot – it used to, if we had a 
customer who had large balances with us and they wanted a car loan, we could give them a better 
rate and we’d justify it because they had large deposits with us. Now, the regulators want 
everyone to have the same opportunity – it doesn’t matter how good of a customer, it doesn’t 
matter if they’ve never opened an account with us. If they were to ask for a car loan, we’d have 
to give them the same rate we’d give the other person. It’s really causing – it’s more difficult for 
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us to manage a business – it’s a business decision, and it’s not intended to discriminate against 
that person, but that’s how the interpretation and law is being enforced.  
 
Decision options limited? 
 
Absolutely. They’re very limited. As an example: overdrafts. I will tell you that there are people 
who manage money by just writing the check and they’ll figure it out later. You’re not going to 
change that person. I don’t care how much Washington things that that person is being abused – 
it is a choice that they made. We are actually helping that person by paying their check and not 
returning it. If we returned that check, they have the opportunity to get into a lot of trouble. Plus, 
its going to cost them money, its going to cost them money at the store, but you cannot get 
people to understand in Washington that people – that not everyone manages their checkbook 
like they should, and that’s how they manage their money – through overdrafts. It’s a 
convenience, it’s a product. And they’re willing to pay for it – they’re not the ones griping about 
it. It’s the consumer advocates in Washington that are griping about it. It’s not the people using 
it.  
 
How do you know when change occurs? 
 
They do post the dates and everything, so you have to keep up with that. The regulators give you 
dates and timelines, and the ABA and the OBA do a good job of keeping you forewarned about 
when those implementation dates are going to come out.  
 
How aware of other players’ interests are? 
 
I have a good idea. We have meetings all the time. (Through the OBA). I’m on a couple of ABA 
committees, where we meet. We have roundtable discussions on how it’s going to impact you. 
All kinds of things.  
 
Are there differences between the bankers? 
 
The less you have, the easier it is to run the bank. That’s pretty much a shared vision by all 
bankers. That we have way too much regulation.  
 
I would dare say that every banker would say they’re over regulated. I would be appauld if you 
could find a banker – I would be shocked if you found a banker who thought it was not an 
overregulated industry.  
 
What types of interactions do you have? 
 
We have good interactions. I have no qualms with the regulators – I just have a problem with the 
regulations you have to enforce. I have no problem with the regulators.  
 
Proactive. Extremely proactive. Meetings. In face meetings. If you don’t understand something, 
you get down there and talk to them. I write letters – they ask for – they put something out for 
comment periods, I always write comment letters. I call congressmen. I talk to them about 
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legislation before its passed. I go to Washington and meet with congressmen. I am very 
proactive. Very proactive.  
 
Sometimes, there are times when I spend maybe three days (in Washington) doing very proactive 
lobbying. It’s lobbying on behalf of the banking industry. The comment letters. I’m also a CPA, 
and I also engage the Oklahoma Society of CPA’s banking committee and being very proactive 
and writing letters on behalf of the financial sector if a legislative issues does not look like it’s 
good for banking. I have that group write letters as well. 
 
Personal relationships … ? 
 
I know all the people at the Fed. I know the people at the state. I know people at the FDIC. I 
mean, next month, I’m meeting with Chairman Gruenberg. I’m really active in that.  
 
Do you see faces or nameless agencies? 
 
I dare say that if there’s anything that needs to be address, I have people I can personally pick up 
the phone and talk to? 
 
Are some interactions more interactive? Give and take? 
 
They’re all pretty receptive. Now, whether they take my suggestions or not is another issue, but 
they’re very open to at least hearing my opinion. By the way, all letters are public. If you write a 
comment letter, it’s public. I had a reporter from the Wall Street Journal call me because he read 
my comment letter and asked me questions about my letter, so you never know where it leads. 
 
How have you been able to improve – you’re the most active person I’ve talked to – have 
you always been that way? 
 
I would say there’s two ways to look at regulation. Are you going to just sit down and take it or 
are you going to try to shape it. Because you’re going to have regulation. But my position is that 
they need to understand how that’s going to impact my bank, and they don’t know that, so it’s 
my responsibility to tell them. And I frequently do.  
 
I’m much better than I used to be because I have just seen so much bad regulation come down 
that I feel like every banker ought to be as active – and bankers were not traditionally proactive, 
politically. Not traditionally. All banking – there were, Basel III, there were thousands of 
comment letters. Thousands of them on Basel III. They’re getting tired. They’re  saying, look, 
stop. No! No, we’re not going to take it anymore. We’re not going to let you sit there and ink all 
this stuff that adversely affects us.  
 
What do you to get rid of a constraint? 
 
A lot of them, if they’ve been enacted, there isn’t a lot you can do other than, I continually – if 
there’s just really onerous regulation, I talk a lot to the regulators when I go to these meetings – 
HMDA – it’s very, very onerous timewise. So I tell them, HMDA, HMDA – you’re giving us 
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information, it’s very difficult, it’s not black and white how you report it, and we need some 
relief on how this is done. So as a result of that – I was in a meeting – and so the regulators came 
and met with 10 banks from Oklahoma at the Federal Reserve to do just a Q&A to fill out 
HMDAs. Cause I told them, we have these cases that come up that don’t fit black and white, 
they’re grey, so we report them this way, and on examiner comes in and says, that’s how you 
need to report them. Then the next wave of examiners come in and say, no, no, no. And I say we 
did everything the first wave of examiners said. So I said, come on down, I want to show you 
what we struggle with, and so we gave them three cases, which they had to take back and get 
resolved with some of their higher up examiners to figure out how we should report those. But 
we got that in writing, of that’s how we report it. So those are the things that I, as a bank 
president here, manage. Because we were having a problem. Every time someone new came in. I 
said, look, we want to abide by the rules, but let’s make the rules the same. So how are we going 
to do that? How are we going to affect that for this bank. So they said, OK, we’ll send someone 
down, we’re going to do this. And so we’re going to – we have an agreement with that regulator 
as to how they’re going to look at our HMDA. And it’s not that we’re doing anything wrong. We 
were abiding by the law as we saw it, that every examiner that came in was looking at it 
differently, because it was a grey area. That’s the problem. Rules are not black and white, they’re 
grey. And that’s when you get into the problems.  
 
Sounds like its easier to change how the rule is enforced …  
 
No. Its easier to change the rule before it ever gets finalized. You have got in there first. Because 
– let me tell you, once these things come down, they are written in concrete. Once the rules come 
down. You can say, Oooh. This is a burden, this is a burden. And you’re not going to impact. 
Before it happens. That’s why bankers have become so proactive.  
 
Look, this isn’t going to help because – and they have a tendency to, when something’s bad 
happened in the banking industry – that’s when you get more regulation. And at the very time 
when the industry is at a critical point at helping with the recovery in a recession, you’re 
burdened with regulation. So that actually hampers the lending and the recovery of the economy.  
 
Have there been bills that have come up that you’ve been able to stamp down? 
 
There have been rules on a national level that we’ve been able to stamp down. I’ll tell you, there 
were some changes made in the Basel III. And that’s something you could read about, there’s a 
lot of information out there right now about how it was changed because of all of the letters that 
were written. So there was change affected in that regulation. There have been a few victories, 
but not many.  
 
Does a lot of activity happen at the state level? Are there reps …  
 
Yes. They usually run those through us. How’s this going to impact the banking industry. Not 
that they’re trying to write laws for us, but they’re kind enough – and I think that most of our 
legislators do that for each industry. They’re not trying to hamper an industry in Oklahoma by 
writing laws. Now, every once in a while, we’ll get a law that someone feels they were 
personally abused by some method that someone used or something, and it’s an individual and 
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they’ll go tell their legislator, and they’ll do some law that maybe is not very smart or – you can 
see where it came from, but it’s not going to be good law. And so we have lobbyists out there 
that read all the new legislation that stay out there while the state’s in session to try and keep 
something like that from happening.  
 
Then the commissioner has his own bill …  
 
He does, and we work with him on that. In fact, the attorney for the OBA submits language that 
would be acceptable by the bankers for the commissioner’s bill, and they frequently accept what 
we send in. They’ll send over what their thoughts are, and it’s negotiated. He is one of the better 
state commissioners. He really is. Other states – I mean they’ve got some jokers out there, so 
we’re really, really good. Having good relationships. And he does a good job – that’s why you 
have so many state member banks. He understands that if you overregulate this industry that it 
doesn’t help the industry. He gets it. And if he sees something that’s just an onerous, ridiculous 
rule, he helps fight it. I mean, he’s helped us on several different issues. Now, that’s always the 
case. There’s some things we disagree on, but if there’s something that just looks like it’s going 
to be onerous to the banks and not benefit the overall banking industry, he’s right there with us in 
the ditches. 
 
When you seek a rule change – are you reacting to a specific customer request? 
 
Well, you know, if you – well, like student loans. I can’t help students now. It’s a choice we 
made but it was because it was overburdensome with the regulations. We don’t do that many 
here at a community bank to go through all the training and mark all the compliance issues and 
everything to do the student loans. And the government’s basically taken that industry over. And 
I personally think they have made a real mess out of it. So that’s an example. It’s just that we 
can’t do things for our customers – our customers in general, not individuals. 
 
On certain – I don’t know that they’re asking permission. They’re just trying to see if a unique 
situation fits within the guidelines. Again, it’s one of those grey areas. We frequently recall on 
individual examples of grey areas to see if the regulators are going to come in and say it’s a 
violation, you shouldn’t have done it. It’s best to call first. It’s part of being proactive. And 
they’re real good: both the Fed and the state about being getting an answer. Each bank has a 
person that is their liaison with that agency, so you can call those people, and we do that 
frequently. 
 
Are banks supportive of each other when they’re facing a rule/reg problem? 
 
Sure. Oh yeah. Now, that being said, there is a major divide between the ABA and the 
independent community bankers’ association (ICBA). The ICBA was for Dodd-Frank, they said 
we’re going to get regulation, so we might as well try to shape it how we can. The ABA said 
absolutely not, we’re going to fight this to the death. I personally believe the ABA was right, and 
I dropped my membership in the ICBA because of their advocacy of Dodd-Frank. I thought it 
was totally off base. As an industry, we could have fought it. We were only one or two votes 
away, but the people who were on the fence in congress – they go, well one agency wants it and 
one doesn’t, so I’ve got free reign. 
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Brown Vitter …  
 
You know, what’s a big bank? What’s a small bank? I will say that the repeal of Glass Steagal 
gave the big banks a lot more opportunities for other income than community banks have. I 
personally think that was the tipping point in banking. And I think what was added to the system 
at that particular time was risk, and so I believe that – as I don’t have a number in mind – but I 
do believe that the large banks generally have been operating with like four percent capital. They 
won’t allow community banks with that, and the thought process is well, these big banks are so 
diverse, they have so many different industries, well, you have a major recession, everything 
goes down. So I do believe that they need to have equal or more capital because of the risk. I 
mean, that’s just dumb. But anyway, I’m – it was interesting – to me, that may have been the 
most (outside Dodd-Frank) interesting legislation.  
 
The comprehensive income is an issue from an accounting standpoint. The average person who 
looks at a financial statement does not understand comprehensive income. They do not 
understand that those are just book losses or gains. So where do you divide the line. Are the 
financial statements for only astute investors, or are the financial statements for everyone to 
read?  
 
How about boundary retraction? 
 
Not so much banker against banker as banker against others. And I’ll tell you a classic example 
right now: and I’m very proactive on this because it’s not good, it’s not good for the systems. 
Payments. (Credit unions – we’ll take them, too – they need to be taxed.) But the payment 
systems like Jack Dorsey and Square and all these other companies that want to come in and 
provide good technology – and I understand that. Consumers want that, but consumers don’t 
understand that when they have a paypal accont with money in it, that it’s not FDIC insured 
because the banking industry has done such an outstanding job providing a secure payment 
system. But you have all these ancillary payment providers that are not regulated or insured. And 
it will happen – one of these new startups is going to blow up and lose money and everybody’s 
going to go: Federal Reserve, where were you? You were supposed to be regulating all these 
people. So you have all these non regulated players who are trying to come into my space. And I 
have all these regulation burdens, and it makes my model so expensive. And that’s the same 
problem I have with credit unions – my model is more expensive. They’re doing the same thing, 
but I have the more expensive business model.  
 
There are a lot of startups that are going out to get venture capital to do these same type of 
payment systems, and one of them will fail or one of them will have a significant breach. We 
have all these regulations on our security, but they don’t – they have no regulation. It’s going to 
happen.  
 
What about the fiat currencies that are out there? The bitcoins? It’s a fiat currency, and they are 
regulating that. I believe that there are people who are manipulating the market on that. Because 
if you watch that, it goes up and it goes way down, and I believe that there are people who are – 
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because there are no regulations that can stop that from happening – I bet there are a lot of 
people who are making a lot of money on that.  
 
What’s your frame? 
 
I think it would be bitter about it. I’m bitter about it. I think its too much. There’s too much – the 
government has put so many regulations like, for, we have to monitor for money laundering – do 
you know we have 37 FTEs? Here’s a regulatory burden: we have one person that looks through 
our transactions of all of our customers all day long to figure out if we have anyone money 
laundering in our bank. Now that’s offensive. That’s her full time job. There is something wrong 
when you have, out of 37 people – we may do a better job of it than other banks. But it’s still an 
example of how – now, you can go down to this CVS store and buy 100 dollar gift cards off the 
rack and pay cash for them all day long, and no one’s ever going to ask you anything. Because 
you’re a nice looking, clean cut, young man. No one’s ever going to ask you a think about it. But 
you come here, and I have to ask you your birth day, your address, and your ID.  
 
It’s not – they put the burden on us because they can. There are mules that go around all day long 
buying gift cards to launder money. And they’re not – you know – it just goes undetected. We 
have to dedicate a full time person to review all of our transactions to make sure that people 
aren’t going over the limits that’s set. That’s a burden. That’s a true burden.  
 
And we have computer software that gives us the reports that looks at all the transactions – but 
we still have to do that. We have to report that to the government.  
 
 
Interview No. 7 
 
It’s a maze. It’s like the mouse is over here and the cheese is way out over here somewhere. And 
the maze changes. It’s like you’re a little kid with a crayon and the crayon’s been broken 
multiple times.  
 
They keep changing things so much. For example, it is the National Mortgage – like right here, 
we have a – this is our Intranet. So we go to the Web site. The NMLS resource center – it’s just 
like an acronym everywhere – well now, because of the Dodd-Frank Act, they call it the NMLS-
R number. It was fine just being a four letter word. Why did they have to go and mess with it and 
throw in the R? You didn’t need another letter. We still communicated what it was all about. So 
if you’re a brand new person that’s not been involved in compliance before, it turns out that we 
have more and more students each year that go to compliance school. So what compliance school 
is – this is – the OBA is a wonderful, wonderful resource. I’m sure you’ve found that out in 
talking to Janice Reeser. They’re awesome. This would be a binder you would get if you were a 
student. It’s hosted by the OBA. Most of your states have a state banking association – 
somewhere along the way, they will provide a compliance school.  
 
And generally, it’s going to be around a week long. For example, here’s the faculty, and the 
board. And this is the list of your attendees, so you can get an idea – what’s cool – kind of scary 
– is they, each year, you’re going to get a median age of how many males and females. What do 
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see there? A bunch of folks have been in compliance a year or less. They’re like, oh, my gosh, 
and it’s kind of humerous. As a board member, we can sit and watch these people – and see, 
here’s the little acronym thing – and what needs to be added this year. They’re smoking crack 
and adding things that we need to keep up with.  
 
Reg O: have you heard of that one before? Enron? Sound familiar? Golden parachute. Insider 
training. There are different controls and different things put in place, and reg O belongs to 
insiders and regulators.  
 
My federal reserve booklet looks like this – it looks like I’ve died on it (it’s so marked up) … 
The Dodd-Frank Act is now called the Fraud-Dank act. It’s a complete fraud. The sad thing is 
that the community banks like mine and like Jane’s … we didn’t screw all this up. We didn’t pull 
the wool over consumer’s eyes. We didn’t say sign here, wink, wink, and watch your mortgage 
go through the roof. So now, banks our size – I have eight locations, all in Oklahoma – about 
$530 million assets. We’re not  a ginormous bank, regulated by the FDIC – we’re not all over the 
country. I know my customers. I see them at Wal-Mart , you see them at the ball games. You see 
them at church. They’re going to hunt me down and find me if I rake them over the coals. And 
it’s not like the ginormous bank, where they’re just an account number. So fortunately, the folks 
that did all this crazy regulatory stuff – was a total knee jerk reaction to the sub prime stuff. We 
didn’t engage in the sub prime stuff. We’re not in a bubble in California or Atlanta or Chicago or 
these different places where they had insane increases in their property values.  
 
Well, in the 80s, Oklahoma learned what not to do. And so we said, we’ll pass on this one and 
that one. We’re going to live and watch these other fools and that didn’t learn from us.  
 
Oklahoma may be different … ? 
 
Very different. The oil thing happened. We’re like, this is – we’re watching this stuff melt down 
around us. We had very few banks fail. What’s ironic – those of us who’ve signed up for email 
alerts for the FDIC – Friday afternoon at 4:30 – look at who failed today. You’ll see, usually, one 
bank acquire another bank. It’s usually the smaller banks – either (rural) or some of those others 
areas I mentioned – like Atlanta or Chicago – that got hit with the subprime stuff. But some of 
these regulations that they’ve overreacted and thinking: these consumers have just been so 
affected by the predatory practices. For example, reg z – this is the regulation, this is the 
commentary. The big joke was that the commentary is longer than the regulation. What does that 
tell you? It’s complicated. It’s confusing. And if you print out the disclosures, the customer’s 
going to be like: honey, this makes no sense. Will you read this? And he’s like, I don’t know 
what it means. So a lot of this stuff has been confusing. Customers like, they don’t know what it 
means, just tell me what my house payment’s going to be, and how do I close the loan, and what 
do I need to bring to closing? That’s all I want to know. So that’s – all this stuff is consumer 
friendly kind of stuff, and we get all of that. This is the first thing you learn in compliance 
school. 
 
Banks are required to make sure nobody is laundering money through your bank – it’s fun. 
Everybody does – banks have to have an employee that watches to make sure that folks aren’t 
laundering money. You don’t have terrorist activity going on in your bank.  
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The thing is – the fear that we have of not doing it right – and the crazy thing is, the BSA 
regulations, they’re not even banking regulations. It’s pure law enforcement. So we have to do it. 
Car dealerships have to do it. Everybody has to do it. It’s a group of law enforcement 
regulations. There are specific parameters you have to follow that are specific to banks – like if 
you sell a cashiers check, you do a wire transfer, you have to document certain information a 
person’s identity when they open an account with you. You have to have procedures and 
policies. And in fact, the exam manual that the regulators use when they come to make sure I’m 
in compliance looks like this – it’s 443 pages long. This is the world of banking. Isn’t it 
awesome? It’s just like, we have nothing better to do. My staff is 3 people – my self, an assistant 
compliance officer, and I have one person that does HMDA. Full time. It is because – you know, 
we’re so afraid that if we get it wrong, there will be penalties. Why HMDA is so important is – it 
is the basis for the fair lending exams. And they’re so important, and HMDA data – we can’t 
discriminate against race, gender, ethnicity, religious beliefs, anything. You’ve got the fair 
housing act. You’ve got the fair lending. Fair lending is involved with everything. Cause if a 
customer walks through the bank and says, walks up to the receptionist and says, I’ve gone 
bankrupt about 10 years ago and I want to apply for a loan but I don’t think my credit’s going to 
be OK, and she says, Oh, honey, I wouldn’t even bother, I’ve impacted a customer but it’s not 
the receptionist’s job because she’s not trained to look at credit because she has no idea how long 
that information is going to show up on the customer’s credit report. That’s not her job. You 
can’t discourage loan applications. That’s specifically in the regulations. That’s a fair lending 
violation.  
 
So our job is to make sure that everybody in the bank knows about fair lending. You can’t 
discourage loan applications – everybody who walks through the door and expresses interest in 
applying for a loan – come on down! I’m Bob Barker on the Price is Right – fill them out, fill 
them out, fill them out. Get them to the right person and let them make the right decision.  
 
If you have customer contact – in fact, for this month, it happens to be fair lending training, and 
we actually have a session for the operations side of the employees, and then the lending. 
Lenders will get it deeper, obviously, because they deal with different parameters. Fair credit 
reporting act. When we pull a credit bureau and we deny a person based on that report, there’s 
additional information and disclosures that go along with that. That’s a huge thing.  
 
We’ve never had a flood in Oklahoma, have we? Think about Hurricane Katrina. Here’s an 
interesting statistic. If a person in one house in a block in a street of houses has a fire, generally 
how many houses are going to be affected? For sure that one house, maybe the houses on either 
side of it. If there’s a flood, how many houses are going to be affected? Think in recent news – 
so you’ve got all the stuff – they call it Frankenstorm – crazy, that was horrible – it wasn’t just 
one tiny area, it was a big area. It affects FEMA, it affects you and I. Because everything that 
costs you more, it costs all of us more. Lumber – it skyrockets nationwide. Not just in that little 
area.  
 
So Katrina was a devastating effect. All these hurricanes in the gulf, and along the eastern 
shoreline. What happens is if you decide you want to go purchase a home and get a loan at the 
bank, you have to do what is called a flood determination. We’re going to make sure – and we 
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have to pay a vendor to go look and make sure – that’s where all the costs of all these things 
come from – we have to make sure that the property isn’t in a flood zone. And they say, if it’s in 
a flood zone, you’re good to go, but you have to have flood insurance before you close the loan. 
So the customer has to go get hazard insurance to pay for the fire, get hits by lightening, or gets 
hit by a tornado. If it’s in the flood zone, it has to have flood insurance. So if the customer, along 
the way, decides not to pay flood insurance anymore, the bank’s now make sure the customer 
goes and gets their flood insurance. We monitor and track it and make sure they have flood 
insurance, or we get dinged by the regulators. Because FEMA’s like, we can’t afford to pay these 
people to rebuild their homes because they don’t want to get their flood insurance.  
 
Kind of like the BSA stuff – they’re using us as law enforcement. I never got deputized. I never 
got paid for it. But I’ve got to help find the bad guys. Flush them out of the system. I have to turn 
them in. I have to file a suspicious activity report, and a suspicious transaction report.  
 
It’s been there for a while, but the continued emphasis – you do it, you do it, you do it – and the 
flood thing has gotten worse and worse and worse because it seems like the natural disasters 
have gotten – they come in threes or sixes or something. So it gets shoved down to these newbies 
(in the classroom).  
 
What’s your background? 
 
I did the traditional role of I’m going to be a teller, and I was going to go to school and pay for a 
journalism degree. You know what – now, I couldn’t do it – they’re on crack, writing their 
stories. Get your opinion out. …  
 
Take for example, if you’re a student, and you might be doing an internship and being paid, you 
would not normally be paid in cash – a check, direct deposit, electronicially – if I start see you 
making $9,000 cash deposits every other day – you’re going to have to cut me in on your deal. 
Landscapers are high on the list – frequently they have undocumented employees. Frequently – 
like almost always. I heard one report that landscaping and hospitality are number one and two 
for a certain demographic of employees.  
 
You know, some of this stuff is kind of stereotype stuff – but sometimes, it just is what it is. And 
we see other activities, and we’re like, come on people. And then see publically traded 
companies – and I’m like, the country club, and the house on the beach in Florida – and you’re 
watching and reporting, and you’re like, this can’t be right. And then you see the stuff in the 
paper, and you’re like, crap, we were right. Dang it, there goes a loan, cause the dude’s got a 
loan with us. You just wish you weren’t right sometimes …  
 
There’s a lot of responsibility for the smaller community banks because we don’t have a staff – 
everybody in our bank would be the size of their compliance departments.  
 
So back to you? 
 
The bank says, you know, we’ll pay for finance classes. And that was easy – I’m changing my 
major. I became a supervisor – and finished my associates. Then I thought, I can’t be doing this 
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full time an going to school. So I finished my associates degree, and worked my way through 
different departments. And then I got done with that, so I went to southwestern bank, and moved 
to accounting, then loan administration. The beautiful thing about working in the smaller bank 
and a branch environment – you get exposed to everything. I’ve been exposed to the tellers side, 
the accounts side, loan administration, loan operations, accouting, moved into internal audit. Got 
my CRCM – which, its the certified regulatory compliance manager – it’s very highly coveted 
for a compliance professional – it’s almost like the CPA for the compliance world.  
 
Usually most job posting you see for compliance folks, if you don’t have it, they expect you to 
get it within the year. Many of your regulators will have it now, too. So I’ve had several of my 
FDIC folks go, hey, tell me about this. I’ve even volunteered to proctor the exam for folks who 
can’t make it to the national testing dates. So they’ll either have those at the ABA compliance 
conference or some of the national schools that they’ll have. Got involved with the OBA and the 
ABA and have been on the compliance board for I don’t know how many years now – I’ve been 
the chairman of the board; I’ve also been involved in the ABA’s annual compliance conference. 
It’s a compliance conference – we had almost 1600 people this year. So instead of your students, 
it’s expected to be an advanced level of compliance. We’ve got vendors. Consultants. Every 
regulator – CFPB, the OCC, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve.  
 
That’s some of the big stink about the regulatory stuff – if the regulators were doing their jobs, 
they should have seen this stuff. Hey, this doesn’t look right. And then, you have the whole ‘too 
big to fail’ issue – wait a minute, that doesn’t seem right.  
 
I went to graduate banking school at SMU – a very good program – exhausting. Very good, 
though. And I teach sessions at the OBA – I moderate the case study. And I spoke at the ABA 
conference.  
 
Have you always been a state bank? 
 
At one time, we were a national bank. OCC regulated. However, the cool thing about being a 
state, non member bank, being regulated by the FDIC – you have a higher legal lending limit. 
Which means we have a commercial customer, who wants a big, high-dollar loan, we can do it 
by ourselves without having to give part of that loan out.  
 
Were there regulatory reasons to switch over? 
 
Not really. Each regulator has a little bit of a personality or a flavor. Is that politically correct? 
Some banks despise the FDIC, and I’m just going to tell you, if you look at any enforcement 
action statistics, the FDIC’s up there. But they regulate the most banks. The smaller community 
banks. They have most of them. The big banks, Chase, Bank of America, OCC regulated. They 
have bigger banks but fewer of them. The OCC has an office in Chase, they have an office in 
CitiBank, they’re there all the time. That’d freak me out if I went down the hallway, and there’s 
my regulator – I’m not talking to you. But I have no problem picking up the phone and calling 
my regulator at the state or national office. Even Washington. They do not have the best 
reputation for dealing with specific issues. Each regulatory agency has the country divided into 
different regions. They’ve got the Dallas Region, the San Francisco Region … Dallas Region for 
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some reason has had a weird thing about some of the discriminatory issues. They’ll go off on a 
tangent – this is a hot button! – and we’ll go, no, we haven’t heard that from Washington. 
They’re really big on fair lending. We’re all just a bunch of bigots – and up here, what’s the 
deal? Well, hell, why aren’t Florida and … it’s just Oklahoma and Texas? That doesn’t seem 
right. So there’s a disconnect sometimes at the ABA – a small group of us visited with Mark 
Pierce – he’s the guy who’s over the department of consumer something, and he’s a little beady 
eyed guy – I don’t like him. And he thought he was going to pick information from us … hey, 
how are you all doing? He’s the new guy. New kid on the block. Scary smart, Harvard educated. 
And this is what I don’t like about the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: if you know 
anything about them, a big portion of their staff is department of justice attorneys. You don’t 
show up to an exam with a fleet of attorneys with you. They show up with all their bad guys, 
going, hey, we’re here to find what’s wrong. You just started off on the wrong foot. This Mark 
Pierce guy, and this is not derogatory – he’s a little kind of short guy, two big black guys with 
him – they’re all examiners. I was like, are these your body guards? What do you think’s going 
to happen here? We just finished lunch, and he’s thinking this is going to be a real friendly. It 
was bloody. I’m surprised he got out alive. People were getting angry because they were getting 
written up for things that apparently people inside the FDIC knew about – but the banks didn’t 
know about. In the past, there had been this information sharing thing, hey, we’ve changed the 
exam procedures – they’re on the Internet, so you can go look at them – you know we’ll be 
looking for this when we get there at your next exam. And all of the sudden, stuff hasn’t been 
updated in years. What’s the deal? So if you had an error ratio allowance on your HMDA or five 
percent, and suddenly, it got lowered to 3 or 2 percent in their little internal stuff that we didn’t 
know about, you’re just getting smacked stilly in the exam. We’re like, hey, you aren’t going to 
tell us this? And he would dance around the answers and he’s going to pull information from us, 
and he’s just getting beaned left and right – I got written up for this, I got written up for that – 
arrgghhh! – and he’s just like, time out. And suddenly, who turned the tables, and when did this 
become, ‘trust me, I’m here to help you,’ but it’s like, ‘we’re here to get you.’ When did this 
change? 
 
And the whole regulatory environment about eight nine ten years ago – all of the examiners were 
– they’d show up on sight to do an exam, and they’d look and look and look until they found 
something. And then, they’d recognize that that was just inefficient and a waste of everybody’s 
time. They’d pull out 50 to 100 files and just dig through them. What’s the point? You know 
there’s going to be something wrong in there. Some kind of technical violation or something. So 
they moved toward what’s called a CMS – compliance management system – and they looked to 
make sure did you have appropriate policies, procedures, monitoring, training. Those were 
relevant. They could rate you on each of those. And now, nobody’s come out loud and said, OK, 
we’ve moved away from that. But the whole consensus is that everyone – ok, you’ve got all 
these massive regulations from the CFPB, and what happened was – let me show you something 
– this will make some of this make a little more sense. This will be the CFPB’s Web site. One of 
my favorites. Although they’re not the primary federal regulator, I’m regulated by the FDIC and 
the state banking department – now that they, beginning July 2012, they took over from the 
Federal Reserve, 14 consumer protection regulations. But that’s the biggest chunk of what most 
banks deal with on the consumer protection side.  
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REG O, why would the not rename it? We’ve got two Reg Os. The Federal Reserve used to write 
everything, so the bankers would be familiar with the language, the commentary, the guidance. 
Everything was pretty consistent. I knew what to expect. If proposed regulation would come out, 
you’ve had like 20 days, and you’d have another year to comply. It’s not that way now because 
what happened, when the CFPB was born or hatched or landed from outer space. There’s not a 
lot of love toward the average banker to this bureau. Notice, it’s a four letter word? There’s some 
questionable letters in there we could do bad things with, but I won’t say that. They’ve made our 
lives absolutely miserable. And for no good reason. It’s costed – it’s adding to the bottom line, 
and what the average consumer doesn’t understand – it’s going to translate to more costs for 
every product that they will need from the bank. And that’s not what they presented themselves 
to do. They say, we’re the cop on the beat. No you’re not. You’re creating potential cases for 
DOJ attorneys to come litigate. That’s not going to help anybody. But what’s happened, a lot of 
folks thought, what a cool thing to be on the ground floor of a new agency. So folks from 
different agencies – they’re heavily recruiting – hey come join us. What a cool thing. Train 
wreck. I know several people who did that – one guy in particular left the OCC, was pretty high 
up, let’s go see what they’ve got going on over there. It’s disaster in there. They have about 3 
weeks of regulatory training. All of that. You can imagine the crash course – they recruit smart 
people – maybe booksmart people. But they didn’t have the banking experience. And they didn’t 
have an understanding of how the whole process works. They don’t quite know how everything 
flows. And they apply things in a different method, and they might skip the heart and the intent 
of the regulation in the first place. I’m programmed to go ‘heart and intent,’ you can’t just pull 
things out of a regulation. It has to apply to a specific area. You can’t misapply something. It has 
to apply to something – it’s got to all flow. So somebody comes and pulls one thing out of 
context, and I’ll go, did you miss the whole conversation about why this is what this is? 
 
I’ve heard horror stories from other CFPB examined banks, and they’ll get a three week notice 
and a list of hundreds of items – I have at least a month, and my list won’t be nearly that long. 
There’s just not a reason to be that way. You have to be a banker financial institution of $10 
billion or over to be regulated by the CFBP. Arvest is a bank in Oklahoma regulated by the 
CFPB.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
Oh my gosh. Let me give you a good example. Just yesterday alone, I probably said bad words 
yesterday. We got two emails yesterday – this is one of them, this is the other – so that one was 
at 2:07, and that one’s at 4:47. Really? 4:47. They pulled this crap the Wednesday before 
Thanksgiving. This is bizarre. So before they took control of all these things, the Federal Reserve 
would proposal a rule – here’s the comment period, when it ends, then you’d go, this is messed 
up, and I think you should change all of this. Of course, the ABA represents us very well. And 
so, they do comments at the ABA. They have form letters, and you can use those to submit those. 
We’ve written comment letters as well. The Fed would take into consideration logical comments. 
These people (the CFPB) don’t get it. We can’t decide if it’s a conspiracy, they don’t want to get 
it, they don’t care, they want to get rid of small banks? I’m becoming a conspiriacy theorist. We 
think they want to get rid of all the small banks to have only a handful of small national banks 
because it’s easier to regulate. Basel III, hmmm, how’s that working for them over there? Not so 
well.  
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Think of the cost. Think of the manpower. Think about it. Cause if they’re just trying to 
overwhelm with these regulations, we’ve heard more and more banks – are just walking away. 
They can’t do it. If they don’t have the staff. These are thousands of pages. 5,818 pages for the 
CFPB. It’s doubled since then. That’s the scary part – most of it hasn’t been written yet. The 
thing from the bureau: we think the customers should be more educated and allowed to shop. 
Ok? Customers are going to go shop for car prices. They’re going to look at the cars, look at the 
sticker. But the average customer is going to stick with their bank. This stuff was buried in 
another section – I’ve got to go look for this stuff.  
 
There’s no oversight. Here, have a blank check. Every other regulatory agency has a panel of 
oversight. Not them. They have jurisdiction of all banks over $10 billion. They can share 
information about their institutions with other agencies – it’s kind of creepy. Even though they’re 
not my direct regulator, if they become aware of a product that I have that they feel may 
somehow have a negative impact on consumers, they have the right to come onsight and say, let 
me look at your stuff. Then, I’d be calling my counsel.  
 
They have the reach because they now own the interpretation regulations. There’s nothing that 
can stop them. The 16 regulatory divisions for consumer protection has been moved to them (the 
CFPB). The bureau keeps issuing what they call, these little – small entity compliance guides – 
some of it is helpful, some of it just makes you angry. When they send crap like this out – here’s 
an example: they try to make all this stuff be helpful. This was issued yesterday – they did this 
back in April, there was no sense in me trying to digest all this stuff plus one, all that stuff in 
there, but wait, back in July of last year I had the previous regulation. It doesn’t ever end. 
Nobody can keep their head above water.  
 
So how do you do it? It sounds like you’ve gone a little crazy? 
 
I don’t drink yet, but I’m thinking about it. I eat a lot of chocolate.  
 
Cost of hours to implement. It’s unknown – because all the titles have not been implemented.  
 
Are you not offering products or services? 
 
We’ve not come to that point yet. Now, actually, we’re at the point of not offering balloon 
mortgages. Here is a dynamic that most small community banks deal with. A lot of your 
customers simply cannot qualify for a traditional, 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage. So they will go 
to their community bank, they may be self employed, they may not have the documentation 
required to get a secondary loan. I’ve known the customer. I’ve banked him for 25 years. He 
makes good money. He’s already paid his car loans as agreed. I’m going to make him a house 
loan – I just can’t do the fixed rate, and I can’t do the matched funding. Because of my interest 
rate risk, I can’t lock him in at a rate. I can get him a five year, with a balloon at the end. I’m 
going to renew that balloon, refinance him, and do that over and over and over. But he can’t get 
the loan anywhere else. So I’m needing – there’s like a niche market there for those customers, 
but the CFBP thinks of those loans as predatory. So you tell me, I’ve got to tell that customer, 
I’m sorry, that’s a predatory loan, I can’t do it. He’s willing to pay the higher interest rate. He 
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can’t get the loan in the secondary market. I need to offset my risk because he’s a higher risk 
customer. But they’re telling me that I can’t do the balloon loans.  
 
I want a qualified mortgage. So they created this big qualified mortgage thing – we want the safe 
harbor. Anytime you give them safeharbor, it’s bullet proof. It’s safe. There’s no litigation there. 
But if I had my 8 criteria that I had the ability to repay – all those customers that are left behind – 
those are my low to mid- income people, and they may be in minority classes. So I may just say, 
I’ll only do safe harbor mortgages.  
 
Back in the day, you’d have proposed rules, and then you’ll have final rules. Now, you’ll have 
proposed, interim, and final rules all in the same document. This used to never, ever happen. You 
have the Federal register 1, then you’d have the final. This is absolutely insane. They’ll keep 
changing the same rule over and over and over. This stuff goes into effect in January.  
 
So we’re not supposed to have a life. You’re supposed to read and read and read.  
 
Is that what you do? 
 
More than we should. We did already. So along with all the changes, we still have to keep on top 
of the existing regulation and make sure we’re working right. So the pile just keeps growing and 
growing and growing.  
 
Basel III – I’m not a European bank – I shouldn’t have to deal with that crap.  
 
Although it’s not exactly listed as a specific regulation, the Federal Trade Commission, section 
5, there can be UDAP (unfair practices) – there can be UDAP in anything – “Oh, I felt like I was 
abused” – if we intentionally mislead a customer into signing up for a product and the customer 
didn’t really understand what they signed up for, it’s not what they bargained for. That’s in 
everything. That can be in a deposit product, or a lending product.  
 
[Back on the CFPB issue] I get mad in principle. They should have listened to us the first time. It 
took them five months before this stupid thing goes into effect, and Oh, yeah, we think that what 
they were trying to do was legitimate – do you think we’re making this stuff up? That we’re 
lying to you? We know our customer.  
 
This whole thing is painting a broad brush on anything that looks, smells, looks like a bank – 
AIG, Merill Lynch – not a bank. I was in Washington DC when this stuff happened, and how the 
Wall Street Journal got to the door – I was afraid to open the door, because every morning 
another headline with another big investment bank failing. Hey, what do you do for a living? I’m 
a banker. You’d be afraid to say it out loud.  
 
How do you speak up? What are the sorts of activities? 
 
You get involved in the OBA – they have what’s called a contact banker program, so during 
open session at the state capital, we make sure there’s face time with – we’ll try to attend either a 
committee meeting – so that folks who’ve not been involved in that process before – who’ve not 
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reached out to their district folks have that time. That way, they’ll go basically break up in two 
groups and run up and down the hallways. That way, if you have a specific burning issue – 
you’re dealing with a citizen legislator – he’s not a banker. He needs to understand from you 
about whether there’s a specific issue up for a vote. So if we get a blast email from the OBA, 
today is the vote on – it is good, or its not good – we call. People need to understand that you 
have a voice – the whole country was founded on this – for people to become passive, oh my 
voice doesn’t matter – yes it does matter.  
 
Interview No. 8 
 
What’s your own personal background in the banking industry and your involvement at 
Valliance? 
 
My background – is a long one. Started when I was 16, and I went to work at First National Bank 
and Trust Company in their night transit department – worked after school. Actually started 
when I was 15 – I started in May, and I didn’t turn 16 until July and rode the bus downtown and 
then had a guy bring me home every evening. So I’ve been in this business continuously ever 
since.  
 
The biggest part of it was with First National. Actually, two different stints. The initial one, 
where I worked, and even when I was going to school, I worked in the summers and whatnot 
down there. And worked there until 1975, and then came back in 1988, when they were first 
Interstate Bank and stayed through First Interstate, Boatmans, Nations, Bank of America. Then 
left in 1997, went to work at Local Oklahoma Bank – actual, Local Oklahoma Federal Savings 
and Loan. I joined a group that was buying the bank and converting it from a thrift to a 
commercial bank. Sold that bank in June 04 to IBC, and that gave me the money to come over 
here and charter Valliance Bank. So me and a group of businessmen in Oklahoma City and 
Norman chartered this bank and opened in October 2004. Brand new charter. It hasn’t been done 
anywhere in the country lately – again, that’s a regulatory issue, but certainly, we were probably 
– we weren’t the last but we were one of the last banks to be chartered in Oklahoma from 
scratch.  
 
Why go with the national charter? 
 
The national charter, it was believed, was easier and quicker to obtain. And so we were chartered 
as a national bank and then two years later, flipped to a state.  
 
Why? 
 
Well, again, I think that for community banks, a state charter is really the best fit. You know, I 
recognize that the OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, they all have their field offices around and local 
people that they hire. But the state banking department focuses on one thing – that’s the state of 
Oklahoma. And they understand the banking environment. The bankers. The economy. So, I 
think for community banking, state charters are the best place to reside. I realize there’s banks 
that have been national banks for hundreds of years because of tradition, they continue to operate 
as national banks, but they’d be better served if they flipped to a community bank.  
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I think especially in rural markets, I don’t think a national charter makes a lot of sense, but you 
see a lot of them out there because back in the early 1900s, they got chartered as a national bank 
and they just haven’t changed.  
 
There was a day when, if you were a savings and loan – a thrift – and a nationally chartered 
thrift, you had to use the word ‘federal’ in your name – and a national commercial bank charter, 
you had to use the name ‘national,’ or have the ‘,n.a.’ at the end of your name. They changed the 
rules on – now, if you’re a bank or a thrift, you can use federal/national, whichever. But I don’t 
know if you’re a national bank, if you still have to use the word ‘national’ or ‘n.a.’ in your name.  
 
Regulatory environment? State commission / FDIC? Your relationships? 
 
Excellent. I mean, these guys enforce the rules. They’re like the referees. And, you know, it 
doesn’t work out too well for any sports to yell at the referee, so it probably doesn’t do any bank 
any good to yell at their referee either. Sometimes, you have to put on your mean eyes when you 
disagree with them, but you better have a good relationship with them. In fact, you know, they’re 
not just a regulator. They’re also a resource. They understand and know the rules, at least in their 
mind, better than you do, and I mean, if you have a question – I had a question recently, just two 
weeks ago, that I went out to the state banking department and discussed and got clarification – 
and it really changed my mind about something that I firmly believed for most of my career, and 
I realized I was probably wrong about that. I thought it was a black and white issue – it’s a little 
more grey than I thought it was.  
 
For example, we stress test our commercial loan portfolio, and when we put together our stress 
testing model, that was proprietary – I mean, you can buy stuff off the shelf – the problem with a 
small bank buying stuff off the shelf – all that stuff is really made for a bigger bank. And so we 
did our own deal, so we sent it to the FDIC and asked for their comments on it before we 
actually rolled it out and implemented it. So it’s not an adversarial relationship with your 
regulator. It shouldn’t be. Now, you know, and just like me, you may agree or disagree about 
how much regulation is a good thing and whether you’re being overregulated – that’s a matter of 
opinion. But, I think having a good relationship with your regulator is using them as a resource 
and try – I mean, they’ve got the power to beat you with a pretty big stick if you don’t comply 
with the rules. You need to have a good relationship with them and be able to discuss if you want 
to get up against one of those areas. 
 
Bear in mind, there are laws and then there are rules. And I view laws and rules in my mind like 
a highway. There are striped lines on a highway and then there are dotted lines on a highway. 
You’re not supposed to cross the striped lines. Those are like laws. You obey the laws. But the 
dotted lines – the dashes – those are like the rules, and you’re supposed to stay within those 
rules, but it’s OK to get out here and maneuver around back and forth. Because rules need to 
apply to certain circumstances, not just blindly – and that’s the one thing, I guess, I get into a big 
hoorang with a regulator, it’s because they are blindly following the rules rather than applying 
the rule to certain circumstances.  
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Scale. For Godsakes, why would you govern m y bank in the same way you govern Bank of 
America or Citibank. Scaleability is huge for me – you gotta be able to take what we do, which is 
pretty simple compared to those banks, and apply the rule to how I do business. And you’ll get a 
young regulator who’s just going to apply it across the line, like it is the law. 
 
The OCC as interactive as the state/FDIC? 
 
Aboslutely. I’ve never been regulated by anybody I didn’t like. We’re also regulated by the Fed 
because we’ve got the holding company.  
 
Are you the one person interacting? 
 
During examination, it’s across the board. Almost all department heads and even some 
supervisory staff will interact with the regulators. But bear in mind, that needs to be just a simple 
exchange of information – if there’s going to be any interaction, especially if there’s finger 
pointing or chest bumping, that’s done by me, typically.  
 
And in fact, they generally come in with me first to do a pre-exam interview, for the lack of a 
better word, and discuss the scope of the examination, they’ll ask me if there’s any areas of 
concern that I have as a CEO. And then, I generally don’t see them much, unless there’s a 
particular issue they want to discuss, or if our people think there’s something they want to 
discuss. And then they have the exit interview, which is very serious, because that’s where they 
go over the findings. Then they come in again with the formal report, which they report to the 
board of directors.  
 
Your interaction takes place outside the exam? 
 
Yeah.  
 
On the other way round – are there individuals there who you know and have personal 
relationships with? 
 
Just like, on this issue I had, there was no reason to go to Mick, I went and met with Dudley 
Gilbert. So, I mean, yeah, you’re going to go to the person who it’s appropriate within the 
organization to talk to.  
 
What do you think the role of regs on industry performance and your bank’s 
performance? 
 
Well, outside of the early 1900 monopoly and trust busting, I don’t really think regulation should 
have anything to do with financial performance. In fact, I think that’s one of the problems is 
when regulations get into areas that do affect financial performance. Now, regulation always 
affects financial performance from the standpoint of – there’s a cost involved in complying with 
regulation. So, that cost, that expense, that G&A expense is always going to be present at any 
company based on how vigerously they’re regulated. Our costs have gone up over the past five 
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years as a result of Dodd-Frank and what not. But when they start tinkering with how an industry 
money, that’s when I have a problem. 
 
For example, I had a real problem with the interchange fee laws that were passed, because that’s 
government price fixing. That’s saying that this is the maximum amount you can earn. It’s just 
like this recent talk about breaking up the big banks that’s like saying, well, a maximum size that 
you can grow to. You know, it shouldn’t be banks that are opposed to that. It should be every 
business because, OK, they’re applying it to banking today, they come from you today, they 
come for your neighbor tomorrow. Any regulation has this creep, it just seems to – and even if 
they said, well, this is just going to affect big banks, it trickles down to everybody, and then it 
migrates over to other industries. I look at this tree out there – how big can that tree grow? As 
big as it can? Because once it stops growing, it’s dying. To say that you can only grow to a 
certain size and if you grow to that size, then we’re going to punish you, I mean, my God, that is 
just – that flies in the face of the capitalist economy for sure. So I really get pretty vigerous when 
I see those kinds of things coming down the pike that are going to affect overall performance of a 
bank. I understand that there’s going to be a financial burden just, with any regulation. But when 
they start tinkering with your ability to earn money – they’re doing that right now on these 
mortgage rules. They’re driving small players out of the mortgage business because they have 
created rules that small banks cannot afford to comply with. And therefore, those small banks 
have to get out of that business, and that means that there’s customers in those market places that 
are now underserved. Who gets hurt the worst? They’re generally the people in the small rural 
communities. 
 
This is where I start drawing the line and fighting regulation. Just as too much money going into 
the mortgage business did what to values (up!)? Too little going into the mortgage industry, 
especially residentially, has just exactly the reverse/converse affect. It’s the same effect, just on 
the other side. It drives values down. If you wanted to buy a house – and this was just the way 
the world worked, and there was no mortgage industry, and you had to pay cash? What would a 
house be worth? Well, not very much, because people couldn’t afford to buy homes. 
 
So when you create an environment where you have – I’m not talking about cutting, I’m talking 
about slowing the flow of funds into the residential mortgage market, that drives values lower. 
What’s the commercial value of a rural community? What’s the enterprise value of a rural 
community? What are those businesses in that community worth? Not very much. The value in 
those communities is mostly almost historically in real estate. And when you hurt the value of 
real estate in those communities, you hurt the commercial value of that overall community. It’s a 
killer. Now, I said when they slow the volume of mortgage money – and I say that, hell, you can 
go online and get a mortgage loan. But here’s the difference. And I’m speaking now, not so 
much in my capacity as president of this bank, but as the former chairman of the OBA – I want 
rural banks and rural communities to thrive. I want rural communities to thrive. Not just survive. 
And the only way they can thrive is if there is a local bank – or I should say a local banker – 
there’s a local banker who understands the market who knows Chris and his family, cause his 
dad banked with Chris’ grandfather 50 years ago, who knows the players and is willing to take 
risks based on that knowledge and understanding. Some online mortgage guy isn’t going to take 
that type of risk. Oh here’s a really nice house on a really nice street in Laverne – yeah, I’ll make 
that loan. Here’s a doublewide trailer on 60 acres. Hunh unh. And you know what, there’s more 
276 
 
of the double wide trailers on the 60 acres than there are nice homes on quaint little streets in a 
lot of rural communities.  
 
So that’s where I stand up and start screaming is when the regulatory environment, either 
accidentally – bear in mind, regulations are just the result of laws that Congress passed – and just 
like Nancy Pelosi said, well, we need to pass this bill, we need to find out what’s in it. These 
guys don’t have a clue when they’re passing this crap, and as a result, what’s the FDIC and the 
Fed and the OCC going to do? They’ve been handed this law, now they have to write a rule. 
They may disagree with the law. They may think the law’s stupid. But they don’t have a choice. 
They now gonna have to write rules. And so that’s why we spend a lot of our energy at the state 
association and the national association trying to fashion – not to eliminate regulation. 
Regulation – you know, regulation is nothing more than the rules that business in this country 
plays by. You know what? I would even argue that back in the day, when there weren’t many 
rules, back in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the lack of rules did create some abuse, but it also 
created the environment that companies like US Steel and General Electric and Ford Motor 
Company were birthed into. Had they not been able to grow unfettered, almost as monopolies, 
yes – you know, Standard Oil got busted up – had they not been allowed to grow unfettered, the 
United States would not have been able to take a position as a world leader and superpower in 
World War 1 and in World War 2. Certainly, that’s what gave us the girth and the dominance in 
the world economy.  
 
Now, was Rockefeller abusive? Hell yes. Was Carnegie abusive? Yes. They took advantage. But 
had they not been able to build that kind of strength and girth and size pretty much unfettered 
without government interference, who knows where the United States would have ended up. 
Now, it’s just like the unions. There was a time and place for a unions. The roles have almost 
flipped now. Where management was abusing their employees and their labor, now, labor is – 
you know – if management doesn’t play footsie under the table with the labor leaders, then we’re 
going to shut down the plant. So it’s almost in reverse of what it was. You got to have rules to do 
business by. But in certain times rules go too far. And just like my example of what’s going on in 
the mortgage industry today, it depends on again, in response to one of the worst financial melt 
downs in this country since the Great Depression, the pendulum has gone too far.  
 
Now, ironically – and this is what I call the unintended consequences of regulation – the very 
people that the federal government would’ve liked to have seen be helped and assisted by some 
of the things they’ve done are the very people that got hurt. Let me give you an example. I use 
this example all the time – you’ll appreciate this. I’m sure you’ve probably run across it because 
they still enforce it vigorously today – it’s called fair lending. Well, who could be against fair 
lending? I mean, sure, we all want to be fair. And honestly, when the regulations were passed, 
there wasn’t a lot of hew and cry against it. When the regulation passed, it was passed to really 
protect one class of people – blacks. Asians weren’t considered a minority then. Hispanics 
weren’t considered a minority then. Women weren’t considered a minority then. It was back in 
the 70s, and blacks – Africans Americans now – were the ones that were being theoretically – 
and I’m certain in some situations were abused, taken advantage of, charged higher prices on 
loans, if they could get them. 
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So they passed fair lending. Again, you know, nobody was against fair lending when Congress 
passed fair lending, so now, we’ve got to write the rules here. Here’s the law, now what are the 
rules? Historically, when banks were examined, they looked at bank policy, and then they said, 
OK, does this loan apply and meet this policy? Yes or No? It was black and white, because that’s 
what they did. When they started to do the fair lending exams, here’s your policy, got that down. 
Here’s a loan you’ve made. I want to see how that compares to the loans that you’ve turned 
down. Have you turned down loans that look like this one that you approved? So then, why did 
you either make this one or turn that one down, viz a viz this? So now, we’re going to have to 
homogenize what we do. We’re going to have to treat everybody in every circumstance exactly 
the same. Now, especially, here in this bank, I can pretty much impose my will on the people that 
are right here under my thumb, and I can probably tell you that we can pretty much make the 
same kind of loans across the board because we talk enough. But we’ve also got a bank in 
Norman and we’ve got one in McKinney, Texas. Well, I can’t control what they do, so how I can 
control – how can I treat both these customers equally so that I either turn them both down or 
approve them both with total color blindness? Ah. Credit scoring. What I call black box scoring. 
Credit scoring’s not quite as simple as a lot of people believe. Credit scoring – a lot of people 
believe that their fica score on their credit report is what banks use. Well, that’s a component of 
what I call credit scoring, but they load all this information into the black box, including the 
FICA score, and of course, that’s big piece of it. And then, that black box scores that application, 
and either it does or it doesn’t pass. So, now you’ve got to set – OK, where’s the bar? How 
high’s the bar? The truth is, that took some practice. You had to make enough loans to know, 
well if the score in the black box is 100, so everybody over a hundred gets approved and 
everybody below 100 gets turned down, is that OK or am I having too many defaults, does that 
need to be 125? So there’s some experimenting. You know, you’ve got to fine tune. But, 
eventually, most banks adopted that type of underwriting. Who do you think got disenfranchised 
in that process? Who do you suppose had the lowest scores? What about people who have poor 
credit? People who don’t have longevity, consistent longevity in any jobs – which just happens 
to be African Americans as a percentage. So the very people that fair lending was passed to help 
get disenfranchised by fair lending because of the way it’s implemented. Congress had every 
good intention of helping the African americans. But when the rules got written, and even when 
the rules were written, they had every intention, even when they began those exams, they had 
every good intention. But when the banks responded to those exams and wondered how we could 
do this without getting our hands slapped, they had to come up with this way to treat every 
customer the same. And now, see, Dodd-Frank is causing even almost all the products to be the 
same. Where I might have a product over here for this low to moderate income household. But, 
oops, what about this guy? My point is this: follow this all the way through with me: now you’ve 
got this segment of the economy that’s disenfranchised by the regulation, by the – does that 
mean they just go unserved? Nobody’s going to step up and serve this segment of the 
community? Well no! Somebody’s going to step up and serve this segment of the community: 
and that was the birth of check cashers and payday vendors. And so, what became the catch all 
phrase – subprime lenders were essentially birthed in fair lending.  
 
So you can see the unintended consequences of regulation can really bite people in the butt, the 
very people that it was supposed to help. And now, we’er doing sort of the same thing with 
Dodd-Frank on the product side that we did on the human side with fair lending. You’ve got too 
many products here. Let’s just come up with a qualified mortgage. Let’s just come up with one 
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thing that everybody gets spoonfed. Well you know what? That doesn’t work for everybody. 
Because you’re different than I am and your best friend in school and our roommate at OSU is 
different than you are. We’re all different. And we all conduct our business differently. And 
think about the future. It’s really going to be different in the future than it’s been in the past. And 
I think people – today, it’s been fading for decades, but when somebody goes to work that’s your 
age for a company and stays with that company for 40 years – those days are gone. And so, since 
people are mobile, we’re getting weighted on at Buffalo Wildwings by a waitress – she’s 
probably 20, 22 – and we’re kind of talking to her, and she’s got back from Thailand – well, 
what were you doing in Thailand? Well, I worked over there for about a year and decided to 
come back because I got bored of it. Kiss my ass! Are you serious? I’ve never been to London or 
Paris. This 20 year old is going to Thailand? But that’s the world we’re living in, now. Does this 
piece of paper that the CFPB makes – now, spent over 10,000 pages creating – really work for 
everybody? And that’s a problem of what we’re seeing in Dodd-Frank – this sameness mentality 
– plain, brown wrapper products. It’s the special products for people who have special needs that 
get us into trouble. Here’ let the government, who knows everything about these industries figure 
out what’s best for your customers.  
 
Toward consolidation? 
 
Have you got the rest of the day? Don’t get me going down that road. Let me give you a great 
example. They have now penalized the five year balloon mortgage. All of the sudden, that’s an 
evil product. It’s served many rural communities for many, many years. But now, it’s one of 
those evil products. I don’t want to get too deep here. Interest rate risk management. You’ve 
studied, obviously, banks enough to understand that we fund our loans by borrowing money to 
fund those loans. And most – the biggest part of those borrowings come from you, who have 
deposits in the bank. And today, you know, in fact, dating all the way back to the seventies when 
they deregulated how much interest you could charge on different types of accounts – that was 
fixed by the government at one time. Since they’ve deregulated that, now most accounts bear 
some interest. Unless you’re in a pure free checking account, you’re going to be paid interest on 
your checking. So that’s our cost. That’s what we borrow from you. That’s our cost of borrowing 
from you. And today, that’s real cheap. But then, you can get a mortgage loan for three and a 
half percent. Now, if you’re a community bank, and you’ve just got a small loan portfolio – 
you’re not a CitiBank or a BoA – you have to be sensitive as to how far out what we call 
duration on the maturity scale we’re going to go. If I make you a 30 year mortgage loan today, 
and my portfolio – and that’s what community bank – that’s one of the problems with these new 
mortgage rules. It’s like the banker in Laverne tells me – well, I only make five or six residential 
mortgage loans a year. How can I afford to do all this for five or six loans? So, they’re keeping 
those loans – they’re not – they don’t make enough loans to package them into a security and sell 
them as a mortgage backed security. So they’re keeping them on their portfolio. And today, if 
I’m making three percent, and I’m paying you .2 percent interest on your checking, well, sure I 
can make money. Well, what’s the rate ten years from now? I’ve still got that 30 year mortgage 
ten years from now. It’s got twenty years to go. Am I still paying .25 or am I paying five 
percent? And now, I’m upside down. And when I get examined, I get examined for what they 
call interest rate risk, and as a community bank, I have to be sensitive to that interest rate risk. 
So, when I make mortgage loans in my community, I typically make five year balloons. That 
doesn’t mean I’m going to pull a mortgage out from under you at the end of five years. It just 
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means I want the ability to reprice based on my costs today. That’s the way business has been 
done in rural communities for centuries.  
 
Well, that’s a bad deal, now. So now, I can’t offer that product. So, consequently, you know, 
now, if I can only offer a 30 year product, well I’m – I’m out, because I can’t put that in my 
portfolio because the regulator’s now going to come in and say, woooo, interest rate risk! So, 
what does that do? Well, that drives it to a bigger bank that can package securities. Now. 
Whether that’s intended or unintended, I don’t know. The reason people kept telling you to see 
me – I’m one of the leading conspiracy theorists in the country. Well, let me tell you. Just like 
they’ve taken over student lending. They’ve taken over most of farm credit. You know, we’ve 
been talking about getting rid of Freddie May and Freddie Mac now for five years. You know 
how much Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are going to make this year? Net income? Its projected 
to be over 100 billion dollars. You know what the most money any fortune five hundred 
company has ever made in history? It was 42 billion dollars by Exxon about seven or eight or 
nine years ago. So this year, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are going to double the most money 
ever made by any company based in the U.S.A. And for five years, the government’s been 
saying – well, we need to get rid of them – they’re making so much money now, they can’t get 
rid of them. And you know what? They’re making so much money that they can say, you know 
what? It doesn’t look like a lot of this banks are serving the residential mortgage community in 
this country very well. But wait a minute! I can’t comply with your regulations! That’s not my 
fault. Well still, we have to protect those markets. So now, the Federal government does what 
they do with student lending. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can take all the mortgage lending in 
the country. And it’s easier if you make everyone scurry out of these smaller banks – now you’ve 
got a few big players. It’s easier to say – you guys, it’s a monopoly – we got to break this up – 
and so the government ends up taking the whole thing.  
 
Honestly, do I think they think about this? God, I hope not. But there’s a part of me that does. 
There’s a part of me that says, don’t listen to what they’re saying, look at what they’re doing. 
And if you look at what they’re doing – it’s kind of scary. Let me take this one step further, if 
you will – now, this is conspiracy theory – this isn’t real – don’t write this – Think back, you’ve 
seen this before, I can pull it up if you haven’t – have you seen the county-by-county voting in 
the last presidential election? You’ve seen it? Isn’t it amazing how, when you look at that map, 
especially if that map were on the wall and you looked at it from here, you’d think, well, 
Romney won. There’s more Romney than Obama! And that’s because geographically, Romney 
carried most of the rural areas and does. And the population centers, you know, they’re these 
narrow little areas – but by county, it’s just – it’s this big on a map, but there’s five million 
people in that county, like Los Angeles. It’s just one county, but it’s a huge number. Now, again, 
conspiracy theory – and in fact, you look at Texas – of course Oklahoma was all red – you look 
at Texas – north Texas, red as Oklahoma. Except right in the middle there – Dallas County was 
blue. All of these population centers tend to vote democratic. It’s the rural areas that tend to vote 
more conservatives. It’s the rural part of the country that filled in most of that red. Now, again 
we’re talking conspiracy theory – what if you’re a democratic strategist, and you say, 
demographically, we’re all ready seeing – and have for the last three or four decades – massive 
migration from rural to urban areas. And in fact, in Oklahoma right now, we’re – the number’s 
around sixty two percent of the population is urban. But they project in twenty years, that 
number will probably be as high as seventy five. So there’s already this migration. It probably 
280 
 
isn’t going to affect the presidential elections, but what would it do to county, state, local 
elections if you could hasten the migration out of rural America and into those urban areas? 
Where those conservative votes get diluted by this huge liberal population base? And one way to 
hasten that, statistally, communities that lose their local bank dry up and blow away in about 
twenty years. So what if you could force bank consolidation and either eliminate the banking 
services to these communities? Could that potentially hasten the immigration? Now, I don’t 
know. I don’t have the answer. I’m just saying.  
 
So, when you talk about, is there this covert thought that let’s force consolidation on this 
industry, let me tell you something – my last act, if you will, as chairman of the OBA – I did 
seven bankers’ night out – we ask bankers from that region to come in and we all meet together. 
And I ask, show of hands, who believes that the Federal government is encouraging bank 
consolidation? Just damn near every hand in the room (went up). I went on: who believes that 
it’s the Congress that’s encouraging that consolidation? Hardly a hand. Who believes it’s the 
administration and the bank regulators? Who believes that it’s the regulators that are encouraging 
this consolidation? There’s no question: you get this ya ya from the government that everybody 
that’s a player that deals with these people every 18 months and intimately and off and on in 
between, they’ve got this message somehow that those regulators want to encourage 
consolidation. So I would, again, say, I can’t hear what you’re saying because what you’re doing 
is so damn loud. And that’s kind of how it is right now.  
 
That’s a long answer.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
When you’re CitiBank or Chase or BoA, you take Dodd-Frank and all thirty thousand pages or 
whatever the hell it is, to the three or four of attorneys and paralegals that you’ve got – and you 
say, you guys read these and you guys churn out our policies and procedures we need to comply. 
What do I do? I mean, we got forty eight employees, I could hand out Dodd-Frank equally 
among all of them, and we’d still not get through all of it. So you do have to rely on your 
associations – the OBA the ABA – to tell you, we’ve sifted through this and this is what we think 
is important and pertinent to your bank. But it’s a joke to believe that any community bank could 
go through and understand everything that’s in Dodd-Frank. Bear in mind, there’s a lot of stuff in 
Dodd-Frank that doesn’t have anything to do with community banking. But, nevertheless, you 
have to proactively address some of that stuff, even though it doesn’t apply. You have to prove it 
doesn’t apply. If you don’t engage in proprietary securities trading, you still have to address that 
by proving that you don’t engage in that. Now, how do you prove that? Well, the way you prove 
that is that you’ve got a director from the board of directors that says, “Our bank does not engage 
in proprietary securities trading.” And of course, you’ve got your securities ledger you can show. 
Because banks do buy treasuries, or mortgage backed securities – they do buy securities. We 
own municipal securities. But we don’t trade them. They’re an asset in our portfolio just like a 
loan is an asset in our portfolio. Nonetheless, under Dodd-Frank, we still have to prove – and 
that’s just silly. But that’s the law.  
 
There’s a whole cottage industry, which has grown up offering services. In fact, we offer one 
through – the OBA – one’s based in Texas, one’s based here in Oklahoma. It’s just a package of 
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services that puts out Dodd-Frank alerts on any new regulation that might affect your bank. And 
they’ll come in and do audits of your bank and tell you, here’s what you need to do. 
 
Would you fair to say: you’re relying on other folks to tell you what the rules are? You 
don’t pay attention to the rule book itself? 
 
You know. How would you put this? You’re paying a whole lot more attention – and this is the 
first time I’ve ever answered this question – you’re paying a lot of attention to the rule book. If 
you’re an NFL or NBA team. Those coaches, the back office, even the players, know a lot about 
the rules are. When you start paying little league football and basketball, you know what the 
rules are. You pay attention and you apply the rules. But you don’t study and understand the 
rules to the extent that those NBA … likewise, I think small banks, small players, they look at 
the rules and they read into them and study the parts that really apply to how they conduct their 
business. And those, they understand, they pay attention to. The rest of us – they rely on 
somebody else to give them advice. And then, we have an auditor who comes in that we hire – 
it’s called internal audit, but in most cases, small banks will contract it out to a third party, even 
though it’s called internal audit. But CitiBank and Chase and BoA and Wells, they’re like the 
professionals. They understand the rules, and they write their own policies and procedures. 
Where we might rely on, hey we need a new policy for the qualified mortgage – we might hire 
somebody to do that. So it’s a canned product. And we’ll take the canned product and tweak it to 
meet what our needs are. We won’t just say, OK, we got it in the mail today, so let’s put it in the 
book. We’ll make sure that it make sense for our organization, but we won’t sit there and write 
one. Now, on things we do do on a day-to-day basis – we have a compliance person that does 
write most of our compliance rules, policies and procedures. You know. It just kind of depends 
on the size bank you are as to what level you’re actually reading and interpreting and writing 
versus relying on third parties.  
 
Ambiguity: the dotted line and the stripes … do you try to take advantage of that? Are you 
looking for ambiguity? 
 
Let me tell you something. Let’s just take consumer products, for example. I look at Chase. I 
think they do it about as well as anybody. They market about as well as anybody. So I watch – 
and what Chase does – I say, OK, maybe not today, maybe not next week, but down the line 
here, we’re going to have to have that product. So we’re not – I don’t – that would be what I call 
pioneering. And, you know, I always tell people, here at our bank, pioneers are the ones with the 
arrows in their backs. We’re not going to pioneer. We’re going to follow. Lewis and Clark can 
go blaze the trail, and we’ll go down that trail after a few people have followed. So we don’t 
typically go out there and stretching on a situation. So before I wound up with arrows in my 
back, I went out and talked to the state banking department: here’s what I’m thinking about 
doing, can you help me out? Now you know what they did? They said, Swick, here’s the law, 
here’s what you’re doing. What you’re doing probably doesn’t comply with the law. Exactly. 
But I understand why you’re doing what you’re doing, and it absolutely makes sense, and we 
would even tell you that that law, the way it is written is flawed. So what we’re going to do is 
this: we’re going to take this and care out this one group that you’re concerned about and we’re 
just going to set it over here and say it doesn’t apply to your legal lending situation. And we’re 
just going to agree that that’s what we’re going to do. 
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Now, there’s also a rule that says, once you make a loan, if at the time it was made, if it was in 
compliance, then nothing in the future that happens – loss of capital or changes of rules – can 
effect – you’re grandfathering – once you made the test, you’ve made it forever, even though if 
you were making the loan today, it wouldn’t make it over the bar. So I don’t have to worry about 
Mick Thompson and Dudley Gilbert getting killed in a car wreck and the new guy coming in and 
saying this doesn’t work. Also, your federal regulator has to go along with what the state says.  
 
So I covered myself in that situation even though the exact interpretation of the law – so I was 
outside of the white lines probably a little bit, but they granted me some leniencey just because 
they did what – going all the way back to the beginning of our conversation – instead of just 
blindly following the rules and regulations, they applied it to my circumstance. And said under 
that circumstance, you’re not creating any additional risk. So we’re OK with carving this out. 
They wrote me a letter, so I’m golden. But had I just gone out and done it, I would have been 
toast. Had they come in and said, wooooo! Here’s the rules, and this doesn’t comply. So I 
checked, just like the winery did. I’m at least grandfathered on what I’ve done. Now, if the same 
situation occurred five years from now, and the new guy at the state says, I will apply it or not to 
your circumstance. That drives me nuts. That means that anybody that can read at a fifth grade 
level can be a commissioner. Because if he’s just going to blindly apply the rules – 
 
The commissioners role is to employ discretion …  
 
Yeah. I would tell you yes. He is the senior referee. I had a debate out here over – when we make 
a loan, we grade that loan a certain grade – all banks – we all use different grading systems, A, 
B, and C, or one, two, and three – in our system, a 1 is just as pure as the driven snow. And a six 
is black is tar. So that’s the grading system that we use. And then, you understand what a 
CAMELS rating is? Your CAMELS rating gets determined by – at least your “L” – your loan 
portfolio – actually your “A” – your asset quality – gets determined by how you risk rated that 
loan portfolio. Now, they were going to downgrade us, and we did not see eye to eye on it. They 
were going to downgrade it to a five, which in our world, is one step out of the drain, and I felt 
like it should have been a three. And me and the lead examiner got into it – we just did not see 
eye to eye on it. And Don said, Swick, we’re never going to agree, but I could be wrong. What 
do you say if we call Mick, and I said, OK. So we got Mick on the phone and talked to Mick 
about the deal. And Mick said, frankly, from what you’ve told me without looking at anything, 
you’re both right, and that isn’t going to work out for anybody. How about if I send Paul Qualls 
– another examiner in the state – what if I sent Paul out to look at this file, can we agree that 
having a third set of eyes come out and look at that deal, and I’ll tell him – he’ll understand what 
the circumstances are. And will you both live by Paul’s decision? And then we both said, sure, 
absolutely. And he came out and graded it a 3 – hallelujia!. But my point is, that’s the role of the 
commissioner. To deal with those circumstances where bankers and examiners, field examiners, 
don’t agree eye to eye. And then, of course, he also has to deal with other issues like capital. 
 
Interview No. 9 
 
Background? Industry and the bank? 
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I started in banking in 1989 with the FDIC. I was a bank examiner for seven years. I traveled 
around the late 80s when banks were failing frequently. Mostly, I was doing examination 
supervision; I was really involved with liquidiation. Still, some banks were on the edge of 
liquidation when I went in. Primarily Oklahoma. We started when things got better here, 
probably 92, 93, then we started going other places that were suffering, like on both coasts. So I 
spent four months in CT, four months in NY. And then my last project with the FDIC was 
actually looking back at some of the failures and working through how those failures … What 
worked better for the agenency in dealing with failures? 
 
But that was my last project with the FDIC. Then I started here in 1996. I was hired here directly 
from the agency when I decided to get a real job and get into banking. I called two or three 
bankers I knew, and one offered me a job over lunch, before we even ordered, actually. I was 
vice president of the cashiers, which means – at that point, we were a lot smaller, we only had 
one office, and we didn’t have any ATMs. It was definitely a different bank. We’re in Purcell. 
We have about 30 employees. We have our charter in Purcell even though most of our HQ stuff 
is here in Norman now. But the bank has grown over time, so my responsibilities have shifted a 
lot. The bank grew from one office, we now have nine offices statewide. We were, at that time, 
probably about $55 million in assets, we’re now about $340 million in assets. The dynamics 
have changed greatly. I used to do everything from HR, to accounting, to IT, everything. Product 
development was under me. Now, I focus mostly on financial areas. The facilities are still mine, 
so all the branch construction has been under me. And also, I oversee IT, even though I have an 
IT manager who does most of the real work.  
 
There is a lot of compliance issues – with IT, obviously customer information being very private 
is a very big deal. As we go more into the internet, mobile banking, even scanning checks. Are 
those channels secure or not. So there’s a lot of issues, intrusion detection, audits, software and 
hardware tools we employ to keep our stuff safe.  
 
State charter bank always? 
 
It has been. We actually used to be FDIC regulated and state, which basically means it was a 
state non-member. Now it’s a state member, which means we’re regulated by the Federal 
Reserve.  
 
How long have you been a Fed member? 
 
Probably right after they hired me. Because they hired the only good FDIC examiner. (Just 
kidding). Probably 97, 98, we made the change. Once our commission improved at that point, we 
were – when Pat Mayes bought the bank in 1990, when he bought the bank he was basically on 
the verge of failure. He didn’t want to buy a failed bank – he could have waited and gotten pretty 
good assistance from the government had he done so, but he didn’t want to buy a failed bank. He 
bought it in 1990 and turned things around dramatically. Continued to turn things around when 
he hired me. But the classified assets were still fairly high at that point. You know where 
Hollywood theaters are now? All of that used to be real estate that we owned. Those loans went 
bad that we made on that real estate. So we got the real estate. Well, once we sold the last piece 
to Outback, he took us all to Cattleman’s Steakhouse in Oklahoma City to celebrate and took all 
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the officers up there. That was a fun thing, and it was a sign that, oooh, here we are, coming out 
of this. In 97, we build our first branch off of Highway 9. And after that, we started growing and 
taking off and doing well. 
 
How would you characterize your regulatory environment?  Interactive? 
 
The state banking inter – Mick Thompson is a former banker. He knows the drill. He knows 
what’s important and what’s not. The examiners who work with him are very good, very 
competent. We’ll be thinking about a new product or a new service – it might be – well, I’ve 
seen that before, and you might want to think about these things. They’re very proactive. They 
won’t tell you what to do or what not to do – they’ll tell you to – we’re not going to call them 
and say, we want to do this illegal thing or something that’s against regulation, so stuff that may 
be, as you said earlier, it’s not really regulated yet, will it be, is it something that might be, 
obviously, monitored by the CFBP. We’re very sensitive to consumer laws anyway. I’m a big 
free market person. If a bank is screwing you over, switch banks. There’s like 40 different banks 
here in Norman. Go switch. Use another one. So, if the regulator has to tell you how to protect 
the consumer and keep them from evil harms that the banks are doing, there’s something wrong.  
 
Do you have – how about the Federal Reserve – is it the same? 
 
The Fed is pretty cooperative. Probably not as much as the state. They lost the local examiners – 
the local examiners lost a lot of their autonomy, it appears, that may be because of the banking 
crisis of 2008 to 2010. But a lot of the governance and a lot of the decisions are made, it seems to 
be, out of Kansas City, obviously, our Fed district. And so, the local guys coming in and talking 
to us and working out issues, which has been our past history, now, there like coming and 
saying, well your --- may look like this, so you may need to do these things. We’ve had similar 
products before and we’ve never had to do it before, so why now? So it’s a little bit adversarial – 
but it’s not cooperative.  
 
They’ve got less discretion than they used to, maybe? 
 
That’s fair to say.  
 
In the 20 years – How do you think it’s changed?  
 
It’s kind of interesting, because it goes – I always think it goes in cycles. Back in the 80s, 
obviously, when I was a regulator, it was very focused on safety and soundness. Compliance and 
consumer laws, took a very much a back seat. They were like way in the back of the bus. And 
then, when things turned around in the mid 90s here, it’s when you started to see more bank 
secrecy issues, more real estate law issues, more compliance type stuff. In fact, probably right 
before I got here, we went through a compliance exam where we got reamed over flood 
insurance – and we didn’t have that many properties in flood zones. It’s something that just two 
or three years earlier were just a blip on the radar, and those loans were still there. So now, four 
or five years ago, safety and soundness was a big deal. But compliance was still there because 
some banks were bending the rules – mortgage companies were bending the rules – so regulators 
came in and said you’ve got to do this better compliance wise, in the meantime, you’ve got to 
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make more money because you’re having losses on the loans. Earnings pressure, capital 
pressure. And now the compliance stuff, and so it’s like, really? Its like you can’t hire more 
compliance people because they’re telling me to clean up my earnings.  
 
Different compliance examiners and safety and soundness examiners don’t seem to communicate 
very well. You’ve got one group telling you one thing and the other telling you something. The 
state does not really do anything compliance wise. Usually with a safety and soundness 
examination, at the state and Federal, they’ll do bank secrecy, which used to be a compliance 
issues.  
 
How do you interact? Is it all you? Or is it you plus others? 
 
It’s supposed to be me plus others. Based on my background, I’ve done a lot of it in the past. 
There’s another lady who now works for us – Penny is our COO – she’s an auditor in her past 
life. She was a CFO in her past life, so she’s done a lot of similar things to what I’ve done. Just a 
little different perspective. She’s also detail oriented. I’m not as detail oriented. That’s why she 
works real well where she is. She has a lot of interaction with our auditors – mostly our external 
loan review people. We have external auditors – we just got done doing their report. We’ve got 
auditors for IT – a lot of outside groups come in each year and audit different pieces of our bank. 
We kind of split it up …  
 
The proactive communication? 
 
Most of that will go through me. That’s what we have something going on right now in the bank 
that will require regulatory approval, and once we get ready to pull the trigger, we’ll call the 
regulators and say, here’s what’s going on.  
 
How much is performance influenced by regulatory environment? 
 
I guess we should couch with saying, again, I’m a free market person. To me, I don’t know – 
there’s probably some things that – basically, the regulators have inhibited us a great deal – I 
guess there’s no nice way of saying that. They have – there’s things that we have tried to do or 
would have done a lot quicker on the products and services side – instead, let’s think about all 
the compliance issues that go along with this. Now, instead of, what’s right for the consumer, we 
have to think about what’s right for the regulation, and then we can focus on what’s right for the 
consumer.  
 
You’re the first person to mention opportunity costs first. Specific example of a product or 
service that was slowed? 
 
We were one of the first ones to adopt overdraft privilege – where basically, instead of banks 
back many years ago when we started – we would literally go through the stack of bad checks 
and say, we’ll pay this check and not this check. And we would charge a fee regardless of what 
the decision was. Well, now that process got automated, where, assuming, if you came in and 
had an account here, we’ll give you a five hundred dollar priviledge. That says you can dip down 
below five hundred dollars, we’ll automatically pay. It saves you embarrassment, and it saves me 
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time. That’s one the regulators came back and said, curtail it back. And it used to be – we used to 
probably make 180 thousand amonth on NSF and overdraft fees, and now we make about 100 a 
month, and we’re bigger than we were. Not because we were cheating the customers. One, 
people are writing less bad checks. They’ve got mobile banking – they know what their balances 
are. But debit card transaction – you can’t allow that to overdraw the account unless you give the 
customer an opportunity to be notified that the debit card transaction will be rejected. So, how do 
you do that? How do you provide that notice? That creates the cost of technology to do that. We 
basically, some of these things we just couldn’t do. So again, we couldn’t allow that debit card 
transaction to create – even the possibility – so it just cut it off. 
 
Student loans? 
 
No. We never have done them. Don’t like them.  
 
Mortgages – people are complaining about that – getting out of the business.  
 
Actually, we did get out of the business. We used to have a full service mortgage department. 
We had probably, when I first started here, we probably had 10 to 12 people employed in our 
mortgage departments. Had a fair amount of loan originators out there – and people in the back 
room would package them and sell them to other investors. We still service some loans for 
Fannie Mae – we still have some old legacy loans – they have about an average of seven years 
on them, thank goodness. We used to originate mortgage loans. About two years ago, we kept 
downsizing them – basically originate, then you process it, gather information, then you 
underwrite it, and then you close it and make the deal. We eliminated the closer because we 
outsourced it. We eliminated the underwriter – outsourced it. We reduced all of our costs as 
much as we could – so could we outsource anything else? And we had a guy here who actually 
just quit the company – that he and I talked, I’d really like for you all to originate loans, and he 
said, we’ve been that road before and we don’t want to go down that road. I want you to have 
your originators in our offices – lease space from us. And if we have a customer who wants a 
mortgage loan, they’d go see Joe over there – and we’ll be out of the picture except that they’ll 
pay a lease rate. Legally, that’s all we can give – we can’t give a reference – that’s all fair 
lending. So anyway, they started doing that in November 2011. And they pay us a monthly fee 
and they now have assistants in a couple of our offices, so we get $4000 a month rental income 
from them. They are owned by a large construction company here in Norman and OKC. So 
we’ve gotten some of their loan business as well, so it’s far more profitable without any of the 
headache that comes along with mortgage lending.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
You just guess. (Joking). It is overwhelming. They have greatly enhanced the amount of work 
that we have to do. We have a lady that loves compliance, thankfully, and keeps following it for 
us. She does a great job, but we also – we used to have just her – she did all that. Well, she got 
burnt out. Her husband divorced her, and she moved to Dallas and took a job down there for a 
few years. So after a couple of years, she and I talked – our compliance had not been as good as 
it could have been – she still had family here, and she’s very much a family person, and she says, 
yeah, I can’t go back. And I said, yeah, actually you can. Now, though, she only does compliance 
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and operations compliance. She used to do all of our audits on compliance – now she just does 
the work. We have another lady who does bank secrecy and fraud. So now, instead of one lady 
doing multiple jobs, we have now probably six doing the stuff that she used to do just about 
seven or eight years ago. Is compliance a big deal? And require a lot of work – that’s how we 
deal with it – by devoting resources to focus on it. 
 
Those three books are what I used when I was an examiner. There ended up being a fourth one. 
Then, finally, it went digital. I can’t imagine how many books there would be now if it wasn’t 
digital. The ABA is a great resource, we use that a lot. OBA does an awesome job as far as 
providing us updates, information, or anything else.  
 
It seems like that’s sufficient – the bullet point changes they release: 
 
And a lot of it doesn’t apply to banks our size. Now, we have new capital guidelines coming out, 
Basel III, some of which applies to us and some doesn’t. And everything has a staggarded 
deadline – is this 2014 or 2015 – and as we’ve seen with health care, a lot of that could change 
anyway.  
 
Is there a difference between the written rule and enforcement? 
 
There probably is, because – I know, there’s probably been a number of times where, you’re like, 
really, we have to do that? And it kind of comes when regulators come in and say, well, you’re 
not doing this right – or one of our auditors – that’s usually when it gets caught because they 
come in more frequently. Vendor management is big with IT – and if we’re doing vendor 
management, and you have to do all these things with – and I keep an Excel worksheet, and 
there’s certain vendors I review their financials on – do I review every vendor? No. But based on 
what our auditors are saying, I have to do more.  
 
How often are you surprised by what you expected versus what actually happens? 
 
Over the last five years, a lot. With the economy the way it was – I think a lot of it isn’t surprise 
as much as disappointment. For example, the state came in and told us one way on what we’re 
supposed to do to improve. The Federal Reserve was here that year, said nothing, just agreed 
with the state. Said it sounds good. Next year, the Federal Reserve comes in, and they’re the lead 
regulator, they were there the year before, and they said, oh, well, you need to do this and this 
and this and this, too. And it’s like, we’re better than we were a year ago, and we have to do 
more? And yeah, we weren’t the lead last time so we didn’t think it would be appropriate to tell 
you that. It would have been handy had you told us that so that we didn’t go through all the steps. 
So, do they always follow along and are there surprises? Yeah, there are surprises. And 
fortunately in our case, we’ve had success in not having those big bad surprises in the long term. 
The Fed came in last month – while I was on vacation – there was some higher powers from the 
Federal Reserve that came to see us just because of they knew of our condition and how it’s 
improved, and they wanted to know how – they wanted to visit with a good bank – that had done 
the things we asked for? 
 
The surprises, are they happening more or less? 
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Less often. And it’s probably because we’re more in tune with staying in tune.  
 
How have you improved at knowing what the rules are? 
 
We really – it kind of goes back, first of all, to the associations and the information they’re 
putting out. We literally get a daily update from the ABA, that says, here’s what Dodd-Frank 
changes are coming up in the next week. And there’s usually three or four things – something 
like, I do hedging, so there’s something on hedging, so I’d better go look at that and figure out 
what’s going on with hedging. With capital rules, that affects everybody. So there’s always 
webinars, so many educational opportunities you can hardly stand it – I went to a CFO 
conference last month, and of the seven speakers, three spoke on the capital standards. So there’s 
a lot of educational opportunities – probably more so. But again, that goes to what’s the cost of 
compliance and following the rules. And is having an extra – having more methodology to 
calculate risk-based capital, which is one of the things that’s in there – is that really going to help 
the banks’ overall condition. Maybe? It’s debatable.  
 
Showing our compliance officer does well and staying in tune, keeping us informed, every week 
we have, for example, on Monday, we have officers loan committee, usually one of those 
meetings, she’ll come in and say, here’s what’s coming up, here’s what you need to be aware of 
– she communicates very regularly with the regulators on the compliance side. If we’re 
developing a new product or have a lending question – she’ll say, we got told this, what’s your 
opinion? And she’ll bring that back to the loan officers that are kind of on the front line.  
 
One thing we’ve done here – that other banks have probably done – we’ve centralized all of our 
loan document preparation. So instead of having a loan assistant at every banking center, we 
have three or four ladies and a couple of gentlemen, I guess, in Purcell, that are all centralized, 
and they prepare loan documents. They file the collateral. They do all of the backroom stuff to 
prepare those documents. And so, because you have a centralized group doing it all the time, you 
have a lot less room for error than if you have twenty loan assistants or loan officers that are 
trying to do it this way. They specialize in it. They know more about the lending rules and 
Shelby’s in that same area with them – and she’ll sit with them and interact with them quite a bit 
as far as, this is what we’ve got to do. 
 
We rely on our vendors. Our loan software vendor that prepares all of our documents – there’s 
certain – they actually have insurance that they will meet the compliance rules, so their 
documents are always changing, they’re always doing updates. There’s a lot of stops that ensure 
we do the best that we can.  
 
Software has really helped.  
 
How involved – the operational/strategic decision making – how involved is she or 
compliance – in those decisions? 
 
Pretty involved. She’s got the personality to be pretty involved. She is – like for example, we 
have a product unit that develops our products and services. So if we do a banking channel for a 
289 
 
mobile banking ap, she’s involved in that committee that helps design how it is implemented. So 
we bring her in from the start. We redid our entire deposit product offering. Well, from the 
brochures to the interest that’s paid to everything – she reviewed everything before it got 
approved and ready to be rolled out. And so, she tends to sometimes be a bottle neck, which 
irritates some people – but we’d rather do it right than have to redo it later.  
 
Of course, our marketing people are saying, they’re doing this, why can’t we? Well, it’s not 
right.  
 
About the interaction: What are your points of contact? 
 
Probably – I mean, it really depends on the bank’s condition. For example, three years ago, we 
had some asset quality issues that had to be cleaned up like many other banks did. So we got to 
communicate with them at least quarterly – because they wanted quarterly updates – what are 
your financials? What are the key ratios? One of our things was to improve our earnings – so 
they wanted to know what steps were we taking in our earnings. So we were meeting – not with 
them – but as an executive team, weekly for a little while, to talk about what we could do to 
reduce our expenses and to increase our earnings. So, and then we would report back to the 
regulators quarterly and say, here’s this test we took for the last quarter. Here’s things we’re 
looking at improving. Here’s things that will help. But now that things are more normalized, 
we’re really not on the safety and soundness side – probably not communicating that much. In 
fact, because of our last exam was really good, they’re going to come in – normally they were 
coming in every year – now they’re coming in every 18 months. For a formal visit. If we have 
issues that come up – like when we redid the product offerings. Obviously Shelby communicated 
with – there’s one who was like, can we do it this way? And so she communicated with the 
compliance regulator – so it’s more on an as needed basis. And probably – if that happens 
quarterly, I’d be surprise.  
 
So you’ve got contact initiated by the regulators, contact that’s initiated by you? 
 
That’s true. We do get contacted by the regulators from time to time. If they see something on 
our numbers – what’s this large – because everything is a open book – what’s this large recovery 
you have on this loan? Well, that was on this loan that we charged out two years ago, here’s why. 
It’s kind of like a little Q&A thing. Or if there’s – last year, there was a couple of times – there 
were some credit card breaches – last year and a couple of years ago – credit card breaches that 
were fairly large – so we get a contact from the Federal Reserve – did you know there were some 
credit card breaches? Is there any risk or credit risk at the bank for that? 
 
Do you think you’ve gotten better at this relational side of the regulation game? 
 
Yeah, I think so. I think so. Because, it used to be – you know – banks are very – way back, 
going back to my examining days – banks and examiners had a very adversarial role. When I 
first started – you called them on Friday and said, we’ll be there Monday. And you’d show up 
with a group of ten people in a town of five hundred people – and say, here we are to examine 
you. And you try to tell a banker, as a young guy – you try to tell a banker who’s been banking 
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for thirty years – this loan needs to be charged off, or you need to this or that – and he’s like, 
who are you?  
 
And now I’m one of those guys who complains about the hot shot kids. But the it is – it used to 
be very – a lot of examiners many years ago, were very adversarial. Now, my perspective is that 
they are much more congenial – they’re not friendly – but they’re open to listening to you. The 
challenge is – as I mentioned earlier – what you tell a guy on site may not make it in a report, so 
someone from Kansas City might say, you can’t say it that way – you’ll have to kick them harder 
than you thought. So – the state guys have been great. Most of those a fair amount of seniority. 
They don’t have a lot of new staff at the state. The Fed is seeing a little bit of turnover with the 
recent changes in the economy – the regulators tend to hire when the economy kind of starts 
having issues. That brings in new staff, which can be a great opportunity twenty five years ago 
(for me). 
 
How much input do you think you have in new rule creation? 
 
We have an opportunity to provide comment. That might be a good way of saying it. Like on the 
overdraft priviledge, we provided, Penny and I and others typed in comments and input and 
everything else, and talked to people about the rule. There’s a formal comment period with any 
rule that comes out. Basel III, I think I typed and sent in a comment. There’s a few others that 
I’ve commented on. Debit card interchange is another one.  
 
Are you involved in lobbying? 
 
I was on the OBA board for three years right when the economic crisis hit – 2008 through 2010 – 
something like that. So I got to go to Washington D.C., and I go every year to the capital here, at 
least once or twice, and lobby for different banking rules. And currently I’m on the government 
relations committee for the OBA. Some bankers, as you have found, are really vocal and not 
liking the regulators. And I’m not very vocal – I mean, they have issues and some challenges, but 
I don’t think the guys here are necessarily the ones that are creating the issues. So, and I think 
you’ve got to keep things in perspective and not make things personal, and some bankers, as 
you’ve found, they tend to take things personally. There’s just – they’re just paranoid. The 
politicians and others in Washington are – they get sucked in and drink the cool aid and 
everything else, but it’s not a big conspiracy to ruin our lives. If you feel that, get out of the 
market. Get out of the business.  
 
Are good at influencing rules? 
 
I mean, as an industry, I think we’re very good at it. I think, you know, especially during Dodd-
Frank and the debit card interchange and too-big-to-fail, I think the industry leaders, as you have 
probably seen, two big industry groups – the ABA and the ICBA – that do not work well 
together. And so, to have a split message from one industry, it’s just stupid. I mean, it just drives 
me nuts. I’m not an ICBA fan because anything that affects any bank affects all banks. 
Somewhere. Because I do business with larger banks, larger upstream banks. So their costs go 
up, my costs go up. And people just don’t seem to grasp that concept. Its like, Oh well, the big 
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banks are my competitors, so I don’t care what happens to them. And it’s just like, really? 
They’re your competitor and they could also be your partner.  
 
I think banks need to get along well, and I think the industry as a whole – I mean, we do have an 
impact and people do listen because we have a lot of – I mean, a lot of congressmen and ladies – 
are bankers – or not bankers, but they’re businessmen, and they’ve got to have bank loans and 
dealt with bankers – and not just ones that come up that take them to the country club and buy 
them dinner when they’re up in Washington, but they’re the ones who are in their homes, and 
they gave them a start or their parents a start. I think they recognize that bankers are trustworthy 
individuals – hey, they can call me up and ask my opinion if they want it. And we’re influencers 
in the communities, so if we’re not happy, we may voice that opinion when it comes election 
time, and we do. We had a number of banking organizations that created PACs and everything 
else over the past few years to voice that opinion in races that – Oklahoma has always been rural, 
pro-banking, pro-business. Well, other states are frustrated – this last year, basically a lot of 
smaller state associations formed a federal PAC, and they started trying to influence a lot of 
those other races. It’s like, Friends for Banking, I think is the one. Roger Beverage was kind of 
involved in getting it started.  
 
Lobbying – or advocacy for rule change – is issue specific? You don’t go out there and 
shoot a shotgun …  
 
No. And that’s why you need the ABA because there’s so many rules coming out with Dodd-
Frank, as a result of Dodd-Frank.  
 
The reason you care about one and not the others? 
 
If it doesn’t impact the bottom line or something we do on a regular basis … 
 
Banks’ different interests – does conflict happen, and how aware are you of other banks’ 
interests? 
 
I don’t know if they would agree that I’m fairly in tune, but I mean – I think with the committee, 
there’s probably about over thirty banks on there of different sizes. Everybody – there’s not 
many wall flowers in that group – in the governance committee – and they tend to voice their 
opinions, which is good. There’s one – and I actually got to meet on another issue with the state 
treasurer – and he told me he told me about something he tried to get changed, he got shot down 
by a lot of the large banks. As a community banks, I thought this would be perfect from us. One 
of the bankers from the larger banks – he brought it up at the governing committee and said, 
well, yeah, the state treasurer wanted to do this – and I said, Charlie, this would be good for 
community banks. And he said, why would this be good for community banks? We don’t want 
all those deposits – we’re flush with deposits. If you could find municipalities another option 
than putting their money in my bank – I’d be all for that. And he was, like, well I didn’t think 
about it that way. And I said, yeah, you shot it down before it got a hearing. 
 
The next time, he brought up something he didn’t know much about, and I had just visited with a 
guy about – and I said, what about this? And he said, well, we need to look more at that, don’t 
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we? We look at it a little bit differently. It’s just a matter of – you can influence things, it’s just 
about voicing your opinion. And being educated – if you don’t know what you’re talking about, 
keep your mouth shut. So I’ll just listen and try to learn. If it isn’t going to impact me or impact 
other banks like me.  
 
You know, we have a CFO group – there’s about 15 of us in banks around the state that aren’t 
really competitors, but we share ideas all the time. Like, hey, did you know this is coming up for 
a vote? How do you report this stuff? Or, do you have a policy about this? 
 
Boundary retraction? Do you tattle on other banks? 
 
I have before. I don’t remember what the specific thing was, however. I just remember seeing 
something they were doing, more in their numbers, and wondering, what is this? And so I called, 
basically, my regulator, and said ‘how are they doing this?’ and they said, yeah, we were 
wondering that, too. And that’s all that was said. I mean, I don’t know what came out of it. I 
don’t know anything else. I just put it out there. It made me feel better that they had noticed. And 
it made him feel better – maybe it made them act on it. 
 
Does that happen a lot? 
 
It doesn’t happen allot. It is (very collegial). You (competitors) don’t like each other much at all 
– they still serve the community. They do a lot in the community. And as long as they’re not 
breaking the law openly, they’re usually going to get caught by other people before they get 
caught by us. 
 
What about others outside the industry? 
 
Mortgage lenders that are non-bank mortgage lenders. Credit unions, too. Farm credit. Because, 
you know, agencies that were set up as government, quasi-government agencies, to help certain 
markets. Well, good Lord. Oklahoma’s got over two hundred banks, many of which are in 
farming communities. And then they create products that are not only – but they have lending 
products that are outside their normal – used to be like mortgage, fixed-rate lending – long term 
stuff that banks didn’t really want to do. Then they have that product for them. Now they have 
lines of credit. You can get this, you can do all your lending needs right here. And then because 
it’s a quasi government agency, there’s no taxation. So they can  do it at 3 percent where we’ve 
got to do it at 5. Credit unions: no real estate taxes, no sales taxes, no income taxes. Yeah, they 
should be able to offer a 2 percent car loan. Well, actually, we have a 2.49, but if you do auto 
debit, it’s 1.99.  
 
Is there any effort that you’ve made to throw barriers up to push back this mission creep of 
credit unions et al.? 
 
I mean, the OBA – of course, is very vocal against credit unions. We as a bank – we have a lot of 
– we did it more on the one-on-one basis as far as telling the customers – we don’t do a lot of 
consumer loans. We do some, but not a lot. And that’s more of the credit union basis. Anytime 
we hear that the credit unions are trying to expand their commercial or business lending 
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authority, we tend to make comments and to call legislators – you really don’t want to do this, 
unless you tax them. Let’s make it a fair field. We’ll not pay taxes – that’d be OK. 
 
Most of my FDIC buddies – they all use credit unions because they can’t bank where they 
regulate. So they go to the credit unions. And then, credit unions, they go in force. The NCUA is 
great at organizing thousands to go to Washington. It’s like – I went up there one time for the 
ABA government relations – we had maybe 100 bankers. And they had 3000 credit union 
members. And it’s just like – then you try to go see someone – and you stand at the back of a line 
full of credit union guys. Well, we represent the little people. I’m just like, yeah. Well.  
 
Frame? 
 
From a banker’s point of view? In a dream world? Or what it is? I mean, our bank, we really 
would like to have more of a free market system. We want to have people to be able to make 
loans and make deposit decisions based on what’s the best product or service for them. Yeah, 
give them disclosures, and not only disclosures – makes me think compliance and regulation – 
but give them the information to make that decision in a simple way. Our fee is X, their fee is X. 
Or we offer ATMs everywhere. And they offer it just in the state of Oklahoma. We’ll provide the 
services – you make the decision. As far as offering – I think regulations have their role – 
obviously, you should drive on the certain side of the road, or drive the speed limit (roughly), but 
there’s a lot of regulations – should there be rules about banks not disclosing customers’ 
information? Yes. Should the government dictate the font size and the layout of that privacy 
notice? Probably a little bit much. There is definitely a role for regulation. I’m also a believer in 
the bible, and there’s all kinds of rules and regulations in there, too. 
 
 
 
Interview No. 10 
 
What’s your background? 
 
My name is Ed Townsend. I’ve been in the banking business for 45 years. I went to the UT 
accounting program. I have a degree in economics. And I have a masters in financial accounting. 
Started with banking in first national bank in Dallas and moved up. … I started a bank. We 
started this bank from scratch. Denovo. Brand new charter. I applied for a federal charter. I 
wasted so many millions – got the charter approved in four months – which is the record time for 
a federal charter. I’ve since gone to a state charter. Opened the doors in June of 2008. Bank of 
Groves -- $121 million in assets, which is remarkable in a small community of this size. Grove is 
a fairly prosperous. I have something that is quite unusual in banking – I look at all of my major 
accounts – I have 1,167 accounts as of yesterday’s balance sheet that average – these are 
checking accounts, money market accounts – not CDs – that average over $51,000 average. 
That’s incredible. In fact, I’ve been in this business for 45 years, and I’ve never seen anything 
like it. 
 
It says that my customers – I’ll tell you the key – we’re the only locally owned bank in Grove. 
Number 2: you saw this building when you came in – and if you look at the environment – this is 
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not a typical bank building. The market appreciates a place to do business that they feel great 
coming in, you’re welcome. Sit-down tellers. You walk in the lobby, and one of those ladies will 
recognize you, they’ll call you by name. We’re established. We build relationships. 
 
His wife: Ed watches them as they come in, and they walk out and greet them – they’ve got the 
chairman and owner of the bank coming out and saying hello to them. 
 
The point is, the movers of small business – when you run a large corporate company – 1,000 
employees and thousands and thousands of customers, you can’t really provide service to that 
extent – but if you look at people that I have observed that are very successful that start their own 
businesses. They are deeply involved in the process, and you have to recognize that to succeed in 
business, it’s really simple: you’ve got to add value to your customer, and you’ve got to have 
people who appreciate what you do.  
 
Stanly Marcus – of Neiman Marcus – used to say: my father always said to me, don’t forget that 
in order for a good sale to exist, it must also be a good buy.  
 
I do not like working for somebody else. I like to create my own business, and I’ve been CEO of 
companies since I was 37 years old. I’ve found myself as an intrapraneur in corporate straight 
jackets. When I was working in my younger days – I thought I had better ideas – that’s a very 
frustrating feeling. So if you’re an intrapraneur, the advice I give is to discover that area.  
 
Wife: But all of your corporate training was very helpful in establishing the reputation that the 
regulators that allowed him to – they knew him as a person of integrity. They don’t give out 
charters like that just to anybody.  
 
You were a national charter originally – why switch? 
 
I did because the state charter – I know the state banking commissioner Mick Thompson – he’s 
more responsive to the needs of a state community bank. The office of the thrift supervision – 
became very bureaucratic and based on – I could pick up the phone and call the state banking 
commissioner. I’ve always run extraordinarily clean banks in my life. I’ve always worn the white 
hat. My banks are clean. I’ve never run a bank that’s not clean. 
 
Wife: Which was one of the reasons he was given the charter.  
 
Office of Thrift Supervision – we had the OCC, which issued the national charter, and we had 
the office of Thrift Supervision, which issued savings bank charters. I started with that charter 
because my initial strategy was to be more of an investment-driven bank rather than a 
community driven bank. And the state banking commissioner is much more friendly for banks 
like what we’re trying to do. 
 
I’m not a federal reserve member. I do have a holding company because I wanted the ownership 
of the company in one place, and I distributed part of that to my daughters.  
 
Relationships with the regulators: 
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Extremely well. We’re state. And then we’re examined by the state and the FDIC alternatively. 
The holding company is examined – the holding company is the only purpose to own the bank – 
and I did that of the distribution of ownership. I didn’t want to distribute the bank stock. That’s 
the reason for doing that.  
 
We are a non-member bank.  
 
First of all, Mick Thompson is a great banking commissioner. Dudley and those guys are very 
supportive and very helpful. I’ve had a longstanding relationship with – it is very constructive, 
but the banks have to be very respectful of the regulatory process for this reason: we have to 
understand that the reason why we operate is because we have FDIC insurance. Without 
insurance, I couldn’t leverage 10x, so I put in one dollar of capital, I can get $10 in assets. Well, 
that carries a level of responsibility. So I’ve never felt it was in any way an adversarial 
relationship with the regulators. In fact, my experience has been if I see a bank having 
adversarial relationship with the regulators, 95 percent of the time, it’s the bank’s fault. There’s 
something wrong with a bank, or they’re not doing what they should be. My culture: we will do 
things precisely as they are required to do them – it’s a religion. I have a full time compliance 
officer. All that person does in a $121 million bank – she makes sure we comply with every 
aspect of regulation; that we comply with every part of the bank secrecy act. And I am very 
respectful of that process. Our relationship with the FDIC is extraordinarily good. We had an exit 
interview two months ago – it was almost embarrassing how complimentary they were. It lasted 
25 minutes. The exit with my competitor – the meeting lasted five hours, and it was not friendly. 
The bottom line is: we do what – I understand – I’ll tell you – banking is the greatest, because 
the bank doesn’t know when it’s Monday or Sunday – if you’ve got positive interest income, it’s 
earning 24 hours a day. And as long as you pay less interest than you receive. In our case, that’s 
approaching $4.5 million. It’s a great business. So the process of being regulated is easy.  
 
What proportion of your performance is influenced by the regulatory environment? 
 
Well, I can tell you – the direct cost of regulation and everything I have to do with audits, outside 
audits, compliance person, costs me about $100,000 a year. Everything. Five percent, minimum, 
of my profits are consumed by just that one aspect of that. If you look at this idiotic Dodd-
Friedman, Dodd-Frank bill – I don’t like Frank – take, for instance, the overdraft issue. If you 
overdraw our account using your ATM card, we are not allowed to charge you an overdraft fee. 
But if you overdraw by writing a check, we are. So you know what that does? It causes me not to 
give ATM cards to people that I think have marginal accounts. And so they lose the benefit of 
that. I mean – I have no choice because they create exposure. And we have to be compensated – 
we will lose some money in those cases. We’ve gone off overdraft charges – but if I can’t get 
compensated, why should I give an ATM card? I had one person – they didn’t want to open an 
account, but they wanted an ATM card. I said, you really have to have an account with an ATM 
card, we just don’t give those out.  
 
Opportunity costs –  
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I’m the kind of banker that stay in the cream of the market – and I’m very risk adverse. I 
wouldn’t consider subprime lending or anything like that. So I really haven’t felt that constrained 
from an opportunity stand point – because I really don’t want to expand beyond a relationship 
with you – I’ll finance your home; I’ll finance your cars; I don’t want to do exotic commercial 
vehicles. I don’t like financing accounts recieveables, inventory, and process. What is inventory 
and process worth? Nothing. I learned the lesson from retail in New York – a guy was 25 years 
old – he must have been a millionaire at the time – and he took me around his warehouse and he 
was with a wholesaler – he said, Mr. Townsend, let me show you why my business is less risky 
than a retail business. He pointed at a box – he would have 20 hats in there. 
 
My issue with regulation is that they cause to spend so much effort just meeting those regulations 
that it probably keeps me from doing more of what I should be doing – serving my customers. 
And then, I would probably avoid some – you know, consumer lending is something that I try to 
avoid – I focus on a limited number of deals because the regulatory process here can be pretty 
burdensome. Maybe we would do more of that – but I haven’t really felt it because it’s not been 
in conflict with my conservative strategy that I use for this particular bank. 
 
When I was running a $10.5 billion bank, I would feel differently because I would leverage out 
more to other areas.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
Oh man. I don’t. And I don’t think anybody does, and I don’t think the state bank commissioner 
does. You know, when Obamacare deal – the Affordable Health Act – it’s like 2200 pages: the 
regulations that follow it are now, I’ve heard, 25,000 pages. The same thing is going to happen 
here – it becomes almost impossible to know. So we focus on the major issues. That’s why I 
have a full time person that tries to stay up with how does it impact home lending, and those 
things. But it’s almost impossible for anybody to keep up with any aspect of it. It’s chaotic – it’s 
ridiculous.  
 
And yet you seem to be very good at conforming to regulatory expectations. How can you 
do that and not really know what the law is? 
 
I know what the major law – its not that we don’t know what we’ve got to do. But if you – seven 
books – now come on, who can keep up with that. Here’s the issue: when you let in on a home, 
you’ve got to give certain disclosures and limits on what you can charge and all of those things. 
Of course, all of those major items, we are very much aware of. Bank secrecy act, we are very 
much aware of all of the issues. The critical issues – the banks have to incorporate it in their day-
to-day operations. But if you go back here, and you try to sell this piece of real estate and it has 
this element in it, how can I get it done? You’ve got to go to the book and then read the 
regulation that applies to that particular transaction that you want to do. I mean – day-to-day 
business, I have to know how to do it. I have to know the policy on funds availability; all my 
disclosures; the period you have to set aside for somebody to change their minds – but if I have a 
transaction that is literally out of pattern, I have to go to the computers and check all the regs. 
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Is there a difference between what you understand a regulation to be and the way they 
enforce it? 
 
There are occasions in – I would say – it happens at every institution – when they get a 
compliance exam that something is not meeting the expectation of the regulators. And for the 
most part, if it’s not willful, the regulators – and the institution has a history of good compliance 
– then you can generally work those things out.  
 
Have you ever been surprised by a regulator? 
 
Not in any major way. I’ve been at this business for so long, I know if I’m doing something right 
or not.  
 
How relevant are regulations? 
 
I’m not conscious of regulation on a daily basis. After you do this for so long, it almost becomes 
second nature. My cashiers, though – they have to be – it’s the way in which you design your 
processes – it becomes routine work. At my perspective, I’m looking at 6 months, 12 months, 18 
months ahead.  
 
The only shaping that you can do – I’ll only do things as we are required to do. As banks, we 
really can’t shape the regulatory environment. 
 
What are the routines you use to be aware of regs? 
 
If I make you decide to make you a home loan, I’ve got to give you good faith disclosures. I’ve 
got to comply with all the requirements. I can only charge you X numbers. Once I make it, I have 
to give you a recision period in which you can change your mind. I’ve got to make sure you have 
flood insurance if you have to have it.  
 
We use outside auditors – BXK – does our compliance. And whenever these issues come up, we 
also use them to train our people. We go through extensive training of our staff. Of our board. 
BSA – in particular – because BSA has huge criminal and cost implications, so we do a lot of 
that. But I have a person who I send to seminars and stay up with the Oklahoma banking 
association puts on these things that cover the major issues. It is a full time job, even for a $121 
million bank. We’ve got a full time person. And I’ve got a very, very knowledge person – high 
cost individual – to do that work. So it’s constant.  
 
Regulatory regime is about relationships – what are your points of contact? 
 
Banks generally have an officer that is appointed by the FDIC that is responsible for that 
particular bank, and it changes from time to time. Our situation is someone out of Tulsa – I’m 
not sure exactly who it is at this point – but we make a point generally, if there are any issues that 
come up that look a little bit different than what they should, when we file our call report, I’ve 
always in the past called them. I called the state banking commissioner occasionally, hey, things 
are going well, and I’ve got this or that issue, you see our assets changed by this amount for this 
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reason. So I maintain a proactive – really the calls are more initiated by the bank than by the 
regulators in our case. That is not always the case – depending on if you’ve got a bank that’s in 
difficulties. In some cases, they’ll put a regulator on board. Absolutely. They’ll put a cease and 
desist order – they could have somebody inside the bank. And I’ve seen that happen.  
 
You know, we are a minority bank – I was born in Brazil, so I’m Hispanic. My daughter is 
Hispanic. Russell Perry. David Durett & Chris Turner (First State Bank on Northwest Highway  
-- connection with Swicky).  
 
Have you gotten better at maintaining relationships? 
 
Yes, I have. I was a public company – I had shares – we sold the company for $385 million – we 
paid $183 million for it. As CEO, I’ve become proactive at doing that. I think it’s important for a 
CEO to have a relationship with the regulators. I’m a relationship builder anyway. I’ve found 
that when you have problems – you just let the regulators know, and 95 percent of the time, 
they’ll work with you very well. It’s not an adversarial – and these guys that are just trying to 
make a living – they are not the cause of the problem. It’s the idiots in Washington that are the 
cause of the problem.  
 
Framing 
 
Respectful, and knowledgeable that it is a required process. There is nothing wrong with 
regulation that is designed to create safety and soundness within the industry. The problem is the 
overreaction by naïve people who think you can solve a problem by adding books and books of 
constraint. The final result is to reduce the serve you can profitably and effectively provide to the 
customer because, if nothing else, it’s not only very costly, but it becomes a danger zone, almost, 
because you can slip and get fined big time. So you avoid those issues. It’s an attitude – it’s 
culture – culture defines attitude – and the culture is established the leader, the top. And you 
can’t have good culture if the CEO doesn’t have the right perspective – because that’s where it 
begins. And particularly in this case where the CEO and the owner are the same. Here, actively 
involved in the institution. The culture that I establish in that regard is – we will do what is right 
and what we’re required to do and we will maintain cordial relations and we look at the 
regulators as partners. That same culture then flows through different things – the way we treat 
our customers. We treat our customers and will provide the best service in the community. It 
starts with hiring. You hire people who fit in that culture. You come in the lobby and you see 
people laughing and you see customers coming up in here. We don’t start a bank from scratch 
and build it to $121 million in eight years in a small community unless you meet the needs and 
you’re responsive and you do it right.  
 
Wife: There’s a great desire to be good citizens as well.  
 
Interview 10b 
 
How do you know what’s the rule book? 
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To be honest with you, I have not looked at the 165 page reports they provide. We actually go 
through a compliance company – RBK – this is what is called a compliance masters group, and 
he is a speaker for OBA – so Maureen would be, Jack Holtzkenecht. He takes those reports from 
CFPB and breaks them down and makes them English. Then he provides training to us every two 
weeks. Other than that, it’s too difficult for somebody to read through. And it’s just me.  
 
We do sign up for emails through the FDIC, and they will send us information. But I haven’t 
found it as informative as Jack’s points. Like I said, he puts it in terms that are understandable 
and kind of does away with the unnecessary stuff.  
 
Your bank is very good at playing by the rules – which is funny because nobody really 
knows what the rules are. Are you ever surprised? 
 
There have been small instances, but nothing major.  
 
Are you surprised by how efficient this process is? 
 
I’m not surprised because the interpretation the FDIC and the CFPB leave – they don’t provide it 
in terms that you can read it and understand that’s how it is. Every person interprets it 
differently. There’s actually FDIC examiners that will tell you the same thing. And we also know 
that through – we’ve been regulated by the state, and they may say something differently, but 
thankfully, its not been major. But sometimes – an examiner comes in and they disagree with 
you, you can actually talk through it and they might see that there is room for different 
interpretations.  
 
What is the role of experience? Do you have to experience an examination/enforcement 
before you really understand what the rule is? 
 
Yes. Sometimes. 
 
Does that cause problems? 
 
It takes a lot of training, and different venues. We do learn a lot when examiners come, but for 
the most part, we’ve been lucky and learned what we needed to learn. And then, when they get 
here – for instance the regs that changed in 2010 – when they came, we were telling them how 
certain things should be. We were ahead of them. I’m not sure how it happened, but it was true. 
But also, when I came into compliance – I didn’t really understand how all of this worked. I 
didn’t understand how this was a rule, and the guidance, and proposals. And that’s what gets me 
the most – when a rule has been finalized, and then a proposal on the same rule comes out. I feel 
comfortable with Jack and his compliance masters group. I don’t know where I would be without 
him.  
 
How do you incorporate rules into your day-to-day? 
 
That’s what, actually, we are going through right now. Since I’ve become the compliance officer. 
Since May, we’ve had a reg change to Reg Z, which went into effect on June 1. With Jack’s 
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help, we had a group meeting every two weeks – he provides the training materials for us, 
minutes for our board, upper management update, and as I get familiar and am quite sure on 
those, then I send it to our board of directors as a training session for them. And then we have a 
loan compliance meeting, and I handle the training. With the new regulations that are kind of – 
we’re working on right now. They’re pretty major. So I haven’t figured out exactly how I’m 
going to handle these. And RBK is actually coming in in August and helping us with two of the 
major changes that are happening. These will affect how we do loans. We do a lot of balloon 
loans, and they are making it almost impossible for banks to do that. The ability to repay rules – 
it’s just very – it’s scary. Thankfully, we have until January to be in compliance. But we are 
working on it now. I feel like the other ones that are coming down – like we have to provide an 
appraisal to a customer three days before closing. There’s actually some more changes coming 
this fall on HUD and how we disclose fees to customers and how we put the fees in our systems 
to affect the APR. And if these are over a certain percentage, then you have this type of loan, and 
then you have to do this other stuff.  
 
For instance, with Reg B, certain aspects of Reg B are only compliant on consumer loans and 
another aspect of it is on all loans. Same thing with Reg Z and Reg X. And thankfully, they have 
been mainly created by Jack. I’ve gone in and added some stuff.  
 
We have loan committee, loan compliance meetings. Internal audits. Every committee and audit 
committee is different. But as far as loans – everybody is involved. We’re still small, but we’re 
growing at a rapid rate. But you’re not going to be successful if your loan officers don’t know 
what’s going on. Fair lending – every person in the bank receives that type of training.  
 
Training is regular? 
 
There are certain regs that require regular training.  
 
 
 
Interview 11 
 
Background? 
 
I was going to OSU and – just to give you a quick history – I was living in Morrison. You know 
where Morrison is? My wife was a teacher, and she was required – being a teacher at that time, 
you had to live in the school district. So we moved to the school district. Had a little bitty bank. 
Just absolutely small bank. Which was Citizen’s State Bank, which has two branches now in 
Stillwater. And now, the banker there was acquainted with me because I was active in the 
community, and asked me to go and work for him. At that time, I had no businesses course, no 
financing courses, I was going to be a psychologist. So I explained to him that I had no 
background whatsoever, and he says, fine, that way I teach you the way I want you taught. And 
so, I went to work there, worked there for about 3, 3.5 years – Stillwater National came calling. 
So I went to work for Stillwater National. I spent about 2.5 years there. Then, my previous boss 
in Morrison called me up one day and says, “I want to come by and see you on a Sunday 
afternoon,” which was highly unusual. So he drove down to Stillwater and told me that he was 
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buying a bank in Holdenville and he wanted me to become president and CEO of that bank. I 
said, ‘Why? I’m 28/29 years old?’ – I’ve had six years of the banking business. And I probably 
don’t know what I’m doing, but I think I do. And so, I went to Holdenville and was there for 
about 17 years and – and for a couple of years I did some consulting – then about 18 years ago, I 
came here. I’ve been here ever since.  
 
In the same capacity? 
 
Yeah. My first six years was employee, assistant vice president, vice president, and then my last 
39 have been as CEOs.  
 
Shawnee bank started in 1984. If you were going to charter a bank and figure out when the worst 
time that it would be to charter a bank, it would have been 1984. And so the bank was chartered 
in 1984, was filled up with loan participations we had up in an Oklahoma City bank. Bought part 
of loans from an Oklahoma City bank. That bank got into trouble during the 1980s. And  a lot of 
their loans were not good. And so, this bank had bought a lot of those loans, and so this bank got 
into financial difficulties The charter and the original owners of the bank were local guys who 
wanted to charter a bank, and they wanted to own it. And they did. Now that they had it, they 
didn’t know what to do with it because of the challenges that were out there. At that point, they 
went to the Citizen Pottawatomi Nation. One of the board members lived across the street from 
the chairman of the tribe – and they went and asked, would you all have an interest? And so the 
bought controlling interest in 1988. In 1994, the opportunity to sell presented itself, and the tribe 
went ahead and purchased 100 percent of the bank, so they have 100 percent ownership of this 
bank. 
 
Why national over state? 
 
Frankly, all of my 40 plus years have all been under the national bank – except for the 3 years in 
Morrison. But I have observed, over the years. Regulators go through cycles. So those state 
banks that are regulated by FDIC and the state banking department, or a state bank will be 
regulated by the state banking department and the Federal Reserve, depending on the situation. 
The Federal regulators historically, whether it was the FDIC, OCC, or the Federal Reserve, are 
more challenging to deal with. Why is that? My observation and my believe is that the state 
banking department – most of the examiners have been here in Oklahoma, grew up in Oklahoma, 
know the Oklahoma way of doing things. They are more familiar with their bankers. They don’t 
have turnover, or go to Dallas to Washington. Or from Kansas City to Washington. So you’ve 
got a little more continuity. Sometimes the state banking department is given credit for being 
more realistic. I don’t know if that’s the case. I’ve always had good relationships with national 
bank examiners. Has there been a time when I didn’t want to pop somebody’s head off? Yeah. 
Don’t put that in there.  
 
But overall, my experience with regulators have been fairly positive. In the 80s – the regulatory 
environment in Oklahoma, Texas and Louisiana, where the perfect storm took place. 
Commercial real estate, agriculture, energy, all went to hell in a handbasket at the same time. 
And so banks were failing right and left. Some would say that part of that was caused by the 
heavy handedness of the regulators. And in some cases, I would probably say that as well. So 
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Generally, too, with the local regulators from the Feds, they generally come and stay as well. 
They are – and you are able to develop a relationship. Now, when I say ‘develop a relationship,’ 
does that mean they’re going to cut you some slack? No. But at least you’re able to sit down and 
have a discussion and be able to have a hearing. 
 
More and more national charter banks making the switch … 
 
With First National Bank? I would say that’s something you always keep at the back of the mind. 
You’re not – at some point, you’ve got to make some type of a business decision. Whether it 
warrants going ahead and making a charter – but we would probably save five to 10 thousand a 
month if we switched over. 
 
Probably be a financial decision. 
 
Who are your regulators? 
 
We are subject to the OCC. (No FDIC). The CFPB hasn’t filtered down to us yet, and I’m 
extremely thankful. 
 
How would you characterize your relationship with the OCC? 
 
With us, I think it’s very good. And even – you know – we’ve known them for a long time. They 
know us. We know them. Again, just because we know each other doesn’t cut us any slack 
whatsoever, but I think if they tell me something, I know enough to know whether that’s correct. 
If I tell them something, I think they know that as well, too. 
 
What’s your compliance mechanism? 
 
I ultimately have that. For example, the OCC calls each CEO on a quarterly basis and after they 
get our UBPR – our uniform bank performance report – they take a look at that and see if there’s 
any variances that they have questions about. So they’ll call up and want to talk about the 
variances. They’ll want to talk about any new products or services that you may want to start 
giving out – not giving out – but selling to customers. They want to know what our loan activity 
has been. If we’re doing anything in the loan area that historically we have not done, and we may 
not have the knowledge, they want to know that. They want to know how the audits are going. 
They want to know about personnel – have we had any changes in senior management. Those 
are some of the things that are going on.  
 
What portion of performance is related to regulation? 
 
On the income side – or on the expense side? (Both.) Some of the things that I have seen that 
have caused problems – and this would be a problem, whether you were a national bank or a 
state bank. One thing is, our overdraft fees have dropped off dramatically. And that’s because the 
customer has to opt in, so to go – the costs to go out and visiting with a customer and saying, 
here’s what we perceive as the pros for having overdraft, here’s what we perceive as being 
negative, so you need to take a look at this – if you feel like this is something that is worth the 
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price you’re going to pay if you have overdraft protection, then you need to opt in. If you don’t, 
well, just forget about it. So that changed overnight. Some banks have done a very good job of 
calling all of their customers and getting them to – getting an opportunity to explain to them why 
the overdraft protection is good for them. You know, we may charge them an overdraft fee, or 
the vendor can charge them a fee, the DA can charge them a fee. In the long run, our $25 is much 
cheaper, but the Federal government in its infinite wisdom has decided something differently. So 
that’s one area.  
 
I’ve got several of my small western Oklahoma banking buddies that are saying – we are no 
longer going to give real estate loans. We don’t have the capability – of escrowing the funds – of 
complying with the rules that are coming down. So I’ve said, hey there isn’t going to be anybody 
in your community that does those types of things, and he said, that’s right. 
 
So there are several products and services that are affected. That affects income. Those areas that 
affect expenses – we have a compliance person, a compliance officer. We have an external 
auditor who comes in and checks on those aspects of it. We have, what we call an outside 
internal auditor who comes in and does - -generally on a monthly basis to make sure we do 
everything. We have internal auditors who – well, we have external auditors who come in and do 
compliance audits. Then we have loan review people who come in. So the cost – I have never sat 
down to make that determination, but I would guess that the cost for this small bank is probably 
$300,000 to $500,000 a year, just on the expense side. That we would do things differently if we 
didn’t have that. 
 
Has that changed significantly? 
 
Yes. Yes. For example. And I know that there are some banks that are – but the large majority, 
and especially the community banks, realizes that if you don’t take care of your customer or if 
you intentionally cheat that customer (or unintentionally) the reputational risk is already going to 
kill you. So you live and die by your reputation in a community. And so, when we used to do 
home loans, when I first got started in the business – we had a promissory note, a mortgage, and 
we required a title policy, and we required insurance. And now, how thick it is for a home loan is 
probably a quarter to a half-inch think that they have to sign.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
What makes you think we do?  
 
I’m getting that idea.  
 
It is extremely difficult. And so what you have to do is you have to take it in bites. And you’ve 
got one person who’s the expert over here – well, who is the ‘proposed’ expert – and you’ve got 
another for this group and that group. Even with that being said, they have other things they have 
to do as a banker. And to keep up with that is just absolutely mindboggling. That’s one of the 
reasons that we have so many audits and so many exams and so many people looking over that to 
make sure – if we don’t, we’ll have to lock the door. There’s a lot of those laws that are 
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obviously – even if there’s obviously no intent to circumvent or to hurt anybody, you don’t get 
do overs.  
 
Rely on the OBA? Other external sources? 
 
Very much. I would say every small community bank that doesn’t have a staff of attorneys – I 
would say most, if not all, will utilize those services.  
 
How much of your time is spent reading the actual law? 
 
Well, being the CEO – I can pass that along. Which I do. For a lay person – a non attorney – 
reading the actual law is tough at best. And so, you really have to spend most of your time 
utilizing third parties to do that for you. Now, does that ean that you don’t do that? No, some of 
my compliance people will sit down and read the laws. If their interpretation is the same as the 
ABA or the OBA, and in most cases, it is. But again, with the thought that there are no do-overs, 
you better make sure verify those things.  
 
Take the Fair Lending Act. How does your bank handle that – you might have a 
compliance officer who organizes training.  
 
Well, you have to set up some parameters and put some procedures in place. Your compliance 
people and your lenders have to sit down and develop that. And hope like that you don’t have – 
UDAP – unintended disparity AP – I mean, what you did you didn’t intend for that to harm 
anybody, but it may have harmed somebody ten rows down, and so, it’s just gotten so ridiculous 
– it’s unimaginable sometimes.  
 
Would you characterize any of the regulations – or the enforcement of the regulations – as 
vague or unclear? 
 
No – when the regulators decide to enforce it, it’s very clear. And you better listen and you better 
take notes. Yes, for the obvious reasons that a regulation doesn’t give you – or a procedure – or a 
policy – does not give you every possible scenario. And I relay this – I’ve done some strategic 
planning for another organization here a while back – and whether our strategic planning 
process, they talked about the third-party that came in that helped us and came in. They talked 
about the commander’s intent. Back in World War II, on D-Day, the largest battle that there’s 
ever been in the World – was planned out with extreme detail. They ran gasoline lines and oil 
lines from England to France so that all of the ships and everything and airplanes could have 
adequate fuel. So they have – the regiment had a plan – and the company had a plan – the 
platoon had a plan – the squad had a plan. They had plan after plan after plan. And if this plan 
went wrong, then each one of those entities had a plan to handle that. And what they found out in 
World War II is once the battle begins, all those plans went to hell in a handbasket. And so, what 
they wanted to do – the Army developed, and I think they still use this – what was the 
commanders intent. So the commanders intent was to take this hill or take this ship or take this 
whatever. And then, when their initial plan went awry, each commander knew what the intent 
was and started making decisions and making commands trying to figure out how to get to the 
commander’s intent.  
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So, with that being said, with all those policies and regulations, you can’t use commander’s 
intent. Even though you think you know what needs to be done, there’s always somebody there 
second-guessing you. So although that law doesn’t address every issue, that policy doesn’t 
address every issue, and the procedure doesn’t address every issue, you still have to be right. 
Regulators are historians. They make a list of what has happened.  
 
Materiality?  
 
I don’t know if the OCC nitpicks you as much as it is their perception of what the law says and 
what they’re held accountable for is what their perception is – it’s CYA. And, you know, this is 
what they’ve been told, this is what came down from Washington, to Dallas, to Oklahoma City 
and down into the field. So I don’t know how much discretion they have when they’re in a bank. 
 
Conform to the intent – are you ever surprised by your conformance and what the 
regulators say when they come in? 
 
Yes. It doesn’t happen a lot because anytime there’s a change, we start doing quite a bit of 
research, and a lot of times, what we will do is we will call regulators and say: this is how we 
interpret this. Are we going down the proper path? And a regulator historically has been trained 
to say, well, we’re not going to tell you how to do this. So for example, there are loans from time 
to time you get a loan that you really would like to make, but it doesn’t come in compliance – 
not compliance compliance, but strictly from a safety and soundess perspective – it really has a 
lot of hair on it, but you feel like the individual that’s involved is of good character, has a good 
business plan, he may not have a bunch of capital, this may be a fairly new business – you just 
go down the risks that are out there – and we’ve analyzed the risk, and we feel we understand 
what the risks are and that we want to do this anyway. A lot of times, we think, well, if we do it, 
an examiner’s going to come in, they’re going to classify it, they may charge off part of it, they 
may cause us to have to reserve (loan loss reserve), all that stuff affects our bottom line. So 
sometimes, we’ll call up the examiners and say, what do you think? When you come in here, 
what are you going to look at it? They’ll say, we can’t tell you whether to make it or not. So 
finally, you get to the point where you don’t tell them. If it’s a little bit risky, and you make that 
decision about whether you’re going to make it or not and you just face the consequences.  
 
In all honesty, I understand where they’re coming from. They don’t want to walk in here, and the 
loan’s gone bad, and they don’t want us to say, well, you told us to do this. 
 
How fore-to-mind is the regulatory environment when releasing new products and 
services?  
 
Yes. And any product or service our officers come up with goes up to the senior executive 
officers, and we look at it. It also goes to compliance. It also goes to the auditors. And it just goes 
on and on. And honestly, the cost just continues to go up just to do your R&D. 
 
How have you gotten better, or first National being aware of what the regulation is? 
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I don’t know that we have gotten better. I think we all have always done a pretty good job, but 
with that being said, it’s easier to get better when there’s three sets of rules – it’s easier to 
comply with three sets of rules instead of 3,000 rules. It’s become more complex. And we work 
it harder. And we spend more time. I always thought back in the good old days, where we never 
had any compliance issues – there wasn’t anything to comply with. We just went and took care 
of our customer. The other side of it is, I look at the most regulated industry in the United States 
is the banking industry – second most regulated would probably be – I’m guessing – is the 
medical profession. And it comes to my mind that the legislature and maybe to some degree the 
consumer – but the legislature and the politicians – their priority No. 1 is the financial services 
versus healthcare and health services. That’s one thing that receives the most attention, and 
unfortunately, the banking industry as a whole is the one where this is looked at. All this shadow 
banking stuff – it’s been left to fall through the …  
 
You talk about the relationship that you develop overtime … the points of contact – what 
are they? 
 
Well, on a quarterly basis, a telephone call. And then once every two years, the OCC historically 
has had a CEO meeting, and so they have the folks up from Dallas, and we sit there and talk 
about banking issues and what their hot buttons are and what we could expect to come down the 
pike. So they initiate that. After the exam – and there are issues they want us to address – there’s 
either telephone calls or emails. The OCC also has a directors meeting each year, generally in 
Oklahoma, they have them nationwide, that they initiate so that the directors have some 
understanding or feeling about what the occ is talking about. I go to Washington on a regular 
basis, as part of the OBA, and we go to the OCC and visit with them. Since we are a minority 
owned depository institution, every two years the FDIC, Federal Reserve, the CSBS, and the 
OCC has a big session inviting all the minority owned financial institutions, and so I think that’s 
every couple of years as well. I try to go to that. So that’s – try to keep really abreast of what the 
regulators are thinking and doing.  
 
What are the differences between what you do and what the average banker does in terms 
of the relationship. 
 
I’ll tell you a story. Back in the early 80s, I had never ever had a problem with regulators. The 
bank was well run, well managed, never did have a problem loan, had good relationships, and we 
just did what we needed to do to make money and take care of our customers and do it legally. 
I’m trying to remember – Penn Square failed July 5, 1981 – my next exam was February of 
1982, the examiners walk in, they go upstairs to our room. They get there at 9 in the morning, 
and I walk up to introduce myself to the examiners. They’re there on a Monday morning, so I 
released myself to get the pleasantries in place and gather information for them. I tell them, well 
tomorrow is my regular board meeting – I’ve got board members coming in from all over the 
state, and I know you’re going to want to visit with the board, so if you gave me a rough idea of 
when you want to do that, I cancel my meeting and they can just meet with you guys. The 
regulator says, and I quote: “You might as well go ahead and have the meeting tomorrow with 
the board, because your next board meeting will be in Dallas.” Now, anytime the board has to go 
to Dallas, you’re in deep doo-doo. They’re going down there to be chastised. He’d been there 15 
minutes and hadn’t looked at a single thing, but his mind was already made up that there was a 
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problem. And lo and behold, before the exam was over, our next meeting was held in Dallas. So 
we went down and were chastised – they put banks on memorandas of understanding. Generally, 
those MOUs will last anywhere from 12 months to 2 years. If you’re extremely fortunate, you 
get off in 12 months. It 6 months, we were off our MOU. 30 days after we’re off the MOU, the 
Federal Reserve comes into the bank to exam the holding company, and comes to my office, and 
says, boy, there must be something wrong here – it says here that you were on a MOU. I said I 
was. He said, why? I said, to this day, I don’t know. He said, you went on and off in 6 months. 
That never happens.  
 
So in the 1980s, the relationships between bankers and the regulators was absolutely abysmal. It 
was – the regulators felt like every banker was dumb and was a crook. And because of that, we 
bankers did not feel very kindly towards them as well. So during that period of time, I learned 
that if you get into a pissing contest with a regulator, they can piss longer and harder than you 
can. And if they get tired of pissing, they’ll bring in the reserves while you’re still standing there 
trying to get a stream going. So with that, I made a conscious decision to make sure I have a 
relationship with them. I’ll do my darndest to try to do what they asked me to do – if I disagree 
vehemently, I’ll try to sit down and work it out.  
 
Does that old attitude still exist? 
 
I have heard comments that it does. My observation has not been so much that because – in 
Oklahoma – most of the banks in Oklahoma are rated 1s and 2s. So when it really gets 
adversarial is when those attitudes develop. And if, you know, if you’re a 4 or a 5 rated bank, 
you’re teetering. And so, the regulators – my observation has been, if you’re a 4 or 5 rated bank, 
they don’t give you a whole lot of time before you have to rectify the problems and salvage 
anything. But in Oklahoma, we only have had 4 banks fail since 2009, maybe. And the rumor is 
three of those failed because of fraud.  
 
Do you see faces / or is it a faceless agency? 
 
I see faces. I’ve delt with the IRS and the IRS just takes it to a completely different level.  
 
An inverse relationship between the hostility of regulators and the amount of regulation?  
 
My observation would be that if you went to the individual examiner who comes into banks and 
does exams, that they’re response is, we don’t know how in the hell you’re going to do this – 
there’s so much regulation. We as regulators are struggling with this. So they are struggling 
mightily because of the volume and trying to figure out what is right and what is wrong.  
 
And I would even guess that even all the way up to DC, there is some of that going on. Or a lot 
of that. They’ve been given a mandate by congress that is just absolutely mind boggling to them 
as well as to us. And they’re trying to figure out how to do it – they don’t like to go to capital hill 
and have a senator or a representative start chewing on them. And their bosses don’t either.  
 
Have you been able to loosen a constraint? 
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We try – if we’re trying a new product or service or trying to help somebody and we come up 
against a road block, we try to figure out, well, if I can’t do it that way, can we do it this way or 
that way? And so we try to legally find our way around it.  
 
(On Lobbying). Oh. Tremendously. I’m a past president of the Oklahoma Bankers Association, 
and I started going to Washington DC to effect legislation back in the 1970s. And I go there and 
I served on the American Bankers Association Political Action Committee. And so – and also, 
when the ABA and the OBA sends out a missive as to we need your support for this particular 
bill – the last one I got was last week about credit unions and the tax exempt status – and that 
goes out to my employees as well – asking them to send letters and emails to representatives. To 
our two U.S. senators and our representative. For the most part, the state legislature are pretty 
well attuned to banking issues and they have some really good knowledge. They also have a 
close relationship with their local bankers. And so the local banker and the state rep may have 
coffee on Saturday morning to discuss issues. And for the most part, the Oklahoma congressional 
delegation – they have real close ties with the bankers in the state. Now, you get to California or 
Massachusetts, and it’s different. I look at the state house – the state legislature – and I see more 
of a difference between urban and rural than I see from Democrat to Republican.  
 
Have there been any successes at loosening? 
 
There have been a number of successes. The ABA, from a Federal level, has done an amazing 
job. The OBA has done so statewide. One of the things the OBA has done on numerous 
occasions, particularly right after I got into – about the time I got into the banking business – 
they had the uniform commercial code, and the uniform commercial credit code that was 
developed for the lending industry – the banking industry – which also flowed to the shadow 
bankers as well. They developed a code that would benefit the consumers as well as not be so 
onerous with banks. And they worked hand-in-hand with the legislature to do that. That piece of 
legislation has held true for the last forty years. Some of the other things that take place – there 
are – from a state standpoint – there are numerous occasions during a legislative session where 
some entity wants to have a law passed that will help them. One I can think of is the tow-truck 
operators – and all they’re looking at is from the standpoint, here’s how this is going to affect 
me, and then they introduce legislation, and the bankers, say oh my gosh, here’s what it’s going 
to do to us. So the OBA, along with the bankers, will sit down with that industry and say, lets see 
if there’s something we can do to solve your problem that won’t be egregious to us.  
 
This happens at every legislative session at the state level – killing more legislation rather than 
introducing legislation. Now, on the congressional level, there are very few times that I can think 
of that the senators and the congressional delegation has not – we haven’t been able to sit down 
and come to some type of compromise that they can live with and we can, too. It’s incumbent 
upon us to try to take care of them and take care of the constituency.  
 
How about constraining? 
 
Of course, our big focus right now is credit unions. It’s been credit unions for 30+ years. Since 
I’ve been in the business. Credit unions are very successful in their lobbying efforts. Most of the 
legislators in DC bank with their credit union at the capital. I don’t know that we’ve been 
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particularly successful. We’ve been successful in some areas, but that’s still a work in progress. 
Eventually, it will happen, because it just does not make sense to give them a tax exempt status. 
Now, there are other areas that we’ve made some headway, and it’s on those mortgage brokers 
that were out there. The CFPB, if they will concentrate on shadow banking, that’s going to solve 
a lot of problems. Because those of us who are regulated on a day-to-day basis, not a 12 or 18- 
month basis, we’re not out there doing those types of things.  
 
Do you guys tattle on each other? 
 
I have never done that. Now, I’ve wanted to. Because I see them doing some real crazy things or 
things that I consider to be improper. I figure that when the regulators come in, they’ll see it and 
take care of it. And if they don’t, they’ll wind up getting their button cracked somewhere.  
 
What’s your bank’s attitude toward regulation? 
 
We talk about this with our folks frequently. And those who have some grey hair and have been 
in the business for a while realize that – and that’s our management team – that’s the way its 
going to be, and that’s the way it’s always going to be. If you get up there and joust with 
windmills, you’re not going to survive. It is what it is. Let’s figure out how to do it right. Let’s 
figure out how to work with it. Let’s go home at night and be able to lay our head on the pillow 
an go to sleep. We might not be able to go to sleep out of worry of the next thing, but it won’t be 
because we’re doing something wrong and we’re worried that they’re going to catch us. My 
people realize that they just can’t do anything improper.  
 
 
Interview 12 
 
What’s your background 
In 1992, I’d been working for banks – 1992, I started working full time in my own company. The 
idea was to – banks need a certain set of knowledge, and it’s expensive to hire somebody with 
that, whether it’s compliance, or internal audit, or whatever, the expertise is fairly expensive. 
Smaller banks really have a lot of trouble cost-justifying – it makes sense and in the early 90s, a 
lot of banks were realizing that it’s OK to have somebody come in from the outside and help you 
out. Part of that, they really felt uncomfortable with – back in the 80s – anybody who wasn’t an 
employee or under their umbrella looking at some of their documents. I look at board of directors 
minutes, payroll records, and all kinds of stuff. Some of the most intimate parts of their 
operation. But that was scary to them. But at that point, they decided that maybe we could be real 
careful and have somebody help us.  
 
What is the philosophy you bring into banks? 
 
The important thing is to develop systems that will be repeated over and over again. And it’s not 
a matter of – you don’t want people to have to think about what are the regs, what do I have to 
do when something comes up? Do you want to build a system and a set of procedures so that 
they are just doing the same thing. And then you’ve got to make some changes when regulations 
change. That’s basically what I do – is help them install procedures. And the other thing, you’ve 
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got to have somebody who looks at what they’re doing periodically. There’s things – you can 
hire new people who, for instance, came from a place where they were trying, and it wasn’t 
good. You can have changes in the regulation. You can have people who – one of the worst 
things is people think, we shouldn’t be doing this. And they are right. But efficiency is not part 
of bank regulation. I mean, that’s the other side. So they are more efficient and maybe even 
better customer service, but it’s in violation of some regulations. They’ve done something they 
think is smart and good and they’re proud of it, but unfortunately, it’s not something that they 
can do. It’s important to have somebody to come in who really knows what’s going on. Believe 
me, stay on top of this stuff is several hours a week, just reading all the new stuff. And go to all 
the seminars – I do at least 40 hours of CE a year. To keep on top of this stuff. Even then, I get 
surprised. You never know. 
 
Anyway, I have these checklists and these procedures that I use. Then my personal knowledge. I 
come in basically, what I do is I do kind of do what bank examiners do. Looking at this. But I do 
it from the bank’s perspective and not from the “I’m going to catch you doing something 
wrong,” which is the examiner’s perspective. I understand there’s things that are a concern to the 
banks that the examiners don’t necessarily worry so much about. For instance, class action 
lawsuits – if you violate consumer regs and you’re doing it on a systemic basis, you’re open to a 
class action lawsuit. Which to me, is a much bigger worry than some examiner getting a little 
upset about something. And I’m looking at – and I have found those, you know, where they’re 
doing stuff that could get them in big trouble. So that’s kind of my job that I do. It’s worked out 
well. 
 
Are there banks that use you as their compliance department, or are there banks that use 
you as a stop gap? 
 
I don’t really think it’s possible for me do compliance for a bank.  
 
You need somebody there every day to make sure things are done right. But those people can’t 
evaluate themselves. Now, you can’t proofread your own stuff and do a very good job of it. You 
can do it, but it’s hard to really evaluate your own performance. You think you’re doing 
everything right, but something’s snuck by you. So what I do is I help them adjust to changes 
and implement new procedures. Alright – if I see something the bank examiners are – I see 
something bank examiners are looking at or focusing on, then I let them know ahead of time, hey 
this is a new hot area – fair lending, or whatever – we need to make sure you’re ready for them. 
And to the extent I can, I save them from being caught by surprise. That’s one of the things that 
bank examiners do is they’ll decide, OK, let’s start looking at community reinvestment act or fair 
lending – and they don’t announce, hey, this is now our new emphasis. You find out by hearing 
the horrible things that happened to somebody else. So I try to help my banks with that. But 
sometimes, they will still get caught. They might be one of the early ones, so there’s not enough 
warning.  
 
Fair lending is a good example. When they decided they’re really going to emphasize fair 
lending and push banks to implement stuff that really isn’t in the regulations, but their 
interpretation requires you to do some stuff – they would come in and just beat them up. 
Threaten them with bringing in the U.S. attorney. Some people get fired because they’re not 
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doing what the examiners invented. The new thing. It’s like – you probably heard the story about 
the regulator who’s talking about, we’ll do what the Romans did, you walk in and the first five 
guys you see, put them up on a cross, and after that you don’t have any trouble. That was 
actually the way Romans would conquer cities. There was a case where some regulator had a 
bunch of his people, and he used that example, and it got recorded. This is how you implement 
this. I think this was the EPA – but they all go to the same schools. If they crucify five banks, the 
word spreads like wildfire. Oh man, we’ve got a new deal here. They’re interpreting this in a 
different way.  
 
But for a while there, they went to the board really chewed out the board. The board doesn’t like 
to be chewed out – those guys are not used to somebody talking to them mean, you know? So 
anyway, that’s a good example. Hopefully, I can same them from that. I try to. One of my banks 
got nailed early on, when I didn’t know about their new deal. Only one of them – not the rest of 
them. 
 
How do banks keep up with the rules? 
 
The Oklahoma Bankers’ Association is really pretty good about that – about providing seminars 
about new reg changes and the ideas for procedures, how to implement them. There’s a web site 
that I find very useful – it’s BankersOnline.com – it is actually a national deal, but it’s a local 
group that does it. A lady named Mary Beth Guard is head of that. She started that company and 
is affiliated – or at least consulting with – the OBA. And quite a nice lady.  
 
Are there differences between good banks and bad banks in terms of knowing when rules 
change? 
 
There are a few banks you’ll run into that go out of their way to prick the examiners. Or 
deceiving the examiners. They think it’s all ridiculous.  
 
Even now? 
 
Oh yeah. I don’t do business with them. You try to identify them. Because eventually, they’re 
going to get in trouble, and if I’m in the vicinity, I’m going to get in trouble too. 
 
Having a compliance problem is not as bad as having one and lying about it. Or trying to cover it 
up. It’s kind of like cheating on your taxes. You can get away with it. But if you ever get caught, 
it’s really bad. Don’t want that to happen. There’s a few like that. Most of them are trying to do 
what’s right, but they’re also realizing that there’s – how much money you have to spend on this. 
An they’re trying to balance the budget with doing what’s right. So there’s a limit. Some of them 
will give a little too much emphasis to the budget. Trying to save money. They’ll end up with 
problems. Some of them, frankly, spend too much on compliance. Part of that is they think – you 
know, part of their personal pride is they want to have an outstanding rating. Not a satisfactory – 
an outstanding. Well, an outstanding will cost you probably $50,000 to $100,000 a year 
additional expenses. And it doesn’t get you anything as a far as I’m concerned. A satisfactory 
rating will get you anything you want. Unsatisfactory – then they start pressuring you. They 
won’t let you open a branch or acquire another bank or put an ATM somewhere. 
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And then, once you get an outstanding, then the pressure’s on to keep that outstanding. If you 
lose that outstanding, heads are going to roll. Everybody’s scared to death – then, once you get 
an outstanding, you never know. One examiner can give you an outstanding, and another 
examiner can come in and they don’t give anybody an outstanding. You can’t get one no matter 
what you do. But rarely do they give them an unsatisfactory. Most banks are satisfactory.  
 
How much is on the banker’s attitude? Is it all about attitude? Or are there actual things 
they try to do, but they’re just not doing it good enough? 
 
In a bank, there’s a bunch of people. The senior management may have one attitude, but the 
person actually doing it may have a different attitude, you know? Sometimes, you run into banks 
that at the senior level, it’s not worth their time to do compliance. Somebody else can take care 
of it. But then you get down to the actual compliance officer, and they have a lot of personal 
pride. They work real hard even though they aren’t getting great pay or support. They just 
personally have to do it right. That’s just the way they are. I like working with those people. I’d 
like to see management – senior management – at least be knowledgeable about the general staff 
and knowledgeable about what it takes to do well. Ultimately, if it doesn’t go well, they end up 
paying a big price.  
 
Let’s say you’ve got two different banks: both are equally committed to compliance. One 
bank does it better than the other? What are the activities that that bank is doing different 
than the less good bank? 
 
Hiring me is a good start. Having a consultant.  
 
Are there banks that don’t use consultants?  
 
Yep. There are. And there are some banks like that that do pretty good. But those banks are 
examined at a different level. The bigger bank in town, boy, you’ve got to know everything. And 
by bigger, we’re talking, maybe, over 100 million in assets. But there’s other banks out there that 
are 20 to 40 million. Well, like the guy in Laverne. They have under 20 employees. And they cut 
them some slack. They just don’t have the resources. So they try to help them. Rather than 
punitive, it’s kind of a ‘let me figure out how to help you do this.’ There’s some of that that goes 
on. The success is really in having somebody’s who’ve been at it a while. You spend a little 
money to keep them trained. Send them to a seminar to stay up on stuff. And they’re willing to 
read the stuff that’s coming out – spend a little time every day reading this stuff. And they’re 
willing to communicate well with the employees – at least well enough with the employees so 
that they know what they’re supposed to do and what the negative aspects of not doing it are.  
 
Do you see differences – back to the same two banks – the better banks have experience? 
 
There’s some banking certifications you can get. 
 
Are those people better? 
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Oh yeah.  
 
What about attorneys?  
 
It’ll certainly help in terms of reading and understanding the laws and regulations. That’s 
important. But the key is implementing it. And then steering it. You’ve got to get the procedures 
in place and do them in such a way that they’re easy to repeat over and over, and get people 
trained. Monitor it. The JD person probably would be in a bigger bank and be funneling this stuff 
to somebody else who actually implements it. They’ll help them understand it – that’s where 
they could come in.  
 
Some of these regulations are really complex. But maybe 50 percent of it isn’t even relevant to 
your bank because you’re the wrong size or because you don’t offer the products. Whatever. 
You’ve got to narrow it down to what’s important to you. Your bank. Turn it into an easily 
repeated policy and procedure. Implement. Train people. And follow up on it regularly.  
 
When a new rule comes down – what’s the flow chart? How does that turn into a process? 
 
New rules start off as proposals. They send that out – everybody sees it. If you have a problem 
with it, you get to comment on it. Nowadays, they get thousands of comments on these things. I 
mean, people are very defensive. They get lots of comments. And make modifications. Then it 
comes out as a final rule. Usually what they’ll give you is some time – maybe several months – 
before it actually becomes effective. You can do it immediately, if you want, but you don’t have 
to do it.  
 
So you’ve got the final rule out there. That’s where the OBA – there’s various organizations that 
will put together seminars that you can go to that tells you what good procedures would be and 
how to implement it. You’ll get sample forms and things you can use in your bank. So that’s a 
good place to go. I go to a bunch of OBA stuff.  
 
Where do banks get their own policies and procedures? 
 
I don’t see many banks sit down and write their own stuff. There’s also a national organization 
out there on the Internet. I think it’s called BankPolicies.com. If you go to bank policies – they 
literally have policies and procedures for everything in the bank – job descriptions, everything. 
But they’re not free. By far. But you get it and you get it in the Word format, and then you put 
your name in and modify things and fix it the way you want to and so it’s like 95 percent is done 
for you already. There’s another – a group called Pringle – she’s an attorney, Laura Pringle – she 
put together a – it’s basically a policies book that you implement the policies and it’s like a 
couple of 3-inch binders. I mean, it is serious stuff. Next to impossible to read.  
 
I think it will work for some people because it is so much volume. My opinion on policies, board 
policies, is they should be as simple as possible. And you should know the difference between a 
policy and a procedure. And a lot of people don’t. They’ll just use the two words together. You 
think, after a while, it becomes one big word. And there’s a big difference.  
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I’m a newbie: what is, for the record, a policy and a procedure? 
 
A policy is a general statement of what the bank directors – it’s a board policy – what the board 
of directors wants. What they expect. And it basically says, overall, what the concern of the 
policy is. It gives – assigns responsibilities to people – and it assigns ways to report back to the 
board that it’s been accomplished. So it should be – and I always think when I’m doing a policy 
or looking at a policy – you don’t want to put something in there that the board will have no 
earthly idea about whether it’s happening. And then, that will become a tool – or a noose, 
actually – for the regulators, who will come in and say, here’s your policy, and it says you’re 
going to do this and you haven’t been doing this for years. What’s the deal? 
 
Are policies attached to regulations?  
 
They can be. There’s a loan policy. A loan policy says what amount of loans you’re interested in. 
Things that you don’t want. Who’s got the authority and the responsibilities – that’s a long 
policy. But you might have a regulatory policy like truth in lending. And that talks about how 
you’ll want to implement and make sure the regulation is in place. If you don’t watch the 
examiners, they’ll try to make policies into procedures. I don’t know where they went, but they 
don’t know the difference. You’ve got to be really careful. But if you do policies that are short 
and summary and get to the point and have all the components but don’t get down into “so and 
so’s going to do this” – stay out of the details – then you have to follow through with procedures. 
Then you have to say who’s going to do it. Who’s responsibility. Quite often, the board has the 
ability to … there’s other deals called guidelines, but those are kind of rare now.  
 
Procedures are how the policy is implemented.  
 
Exactly. It gets down into the daily activities. Who’s responsible for doing this. What steps 
you’ll follow. You can make it very detailed. It doesn’t have to be very detailed.  
 
What’s the difference between a good and bad procedure? What gets you into trouble 
there? 
 
A bad policy is either – it doesn’t fully address the area that it’s written for, or it goes into so 
much detail that it’s going to end up being a problem for the board. Because this is the board’s 
policies – they approve these things, they’re actually supposed to read them. I promise you, you 
give a board a three-ring binder full of legalese, I don’t think you could make them read it. Some 
of them will skim it, but they’re not going to read it, then they’re going to approve it, then 
they’re going to be on the line. A board of directors – they’re held responsible for everything that 
happens in the bank. Not only are they getting in trouble with the examiners, they are financially 
responsible. Based on your size and your capital and so forth, you can only make loans a certain 
size. If you go over that lending limit, the board can become the guarantor for that excess. They 
can be forced to pay if the limit is exceeded by a million dollars, the board gets to pay that 
million dollars. If you have a policy that is a consumer reg, and it is typically violated, they can 
assess civil penalties against the board members. Then, if the bank fails, they’re going to sue half 
the board members. So there’s financial liability that most board members don’t appreciate.  
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Good procedure and bad procedure? 
 
It could be too detailed. It needs to be written in clear, easy to read language. Not a lot of 
complex sentences. Not a lot of huge words. Procedures, the regular line people can have a copy 
of the procedure that relates to their job, and they should be able to read it and understand it. Be 
trained on it. It is almost like a recipe in a recipe book. Even though you might give five people 
the same recipe, stuff may not turn out exactly right. But if they didn’t have a recipe book at all, 
it could turn out really bad. You’ve seen recipes where you’re like, what on earth is that?  
 
Two equal banks. Both eager to comply. Both have procedures in place. One bank is better 
at following its own procedures than others. What’s the difference? 
 
Probably turnover. Some banks have a lot of turnover. And everytime you have turnover, it’s like 
a new day. So you get somebody new in, even though they go, I’ve worked at banks for ten 
years, and you say, Oh, great, this guy knows what he’s doing. Well, did the other bank know 
what it was doing? He might be thoroughly trained at doing it wrong. So you’ve got to watch the 
new people really well. It becomes almost muscle memory. Know how to interact with 
customers. Know what not to say. That will be big part of it.  
 
Support from the senior management. Here’s where something important comes in. There is a 
conflict between customer service and complying with regulations. And those banks that 
emphasize – community banks in particular – really emphasize customer service. We want – if at 
all possible, we want to do what this person wants, you know? And they will bend over 
backwards to do that. So you have somebody, say, you have an internal control that requires two 
people to sign something, and the customer goes, I don’t have time for that, I’m late for my 
appointment, but I need this now. So they will violate procedure to do customer service, and then 
try to cover it up later in someway. Get somebody to sign it. So that’s a conflict, and I’ve never 
been able to totally resolve that.  
 
Does that happen a lot?  
 
It does. It is a significant problem. Because the regulations are anti-customer service. And the 
internal controls – some people, I’ve told them, look here, internal controls are your basic stuff 
you’ve got to be able to do. If a customer came in there and said, well, I don’t have time for this 
– go in the vault and get what I need and let me get out of here. You’re not going to let them do 
that. At least I hope you won’t. That’s not a good idea.  
 
Sometimes, they do things that are just as bad that violate internal controls. For example, wire 
transfers. I know a bank that had a customer who was a doctor. Busy, busy, busy. He told them, I 
want to be able to call you or send you an email to do a wire transfer and I don’t want you calling 
me back to confirm it. I don’t have time for that. So you get an email, which anybody could 
send, it could even be with his signature at the bottom, and it looks great, you know? And you 
send that wire out, it’s like handing money out the door – it’s not coming back very easily. So, 
they got an email from the doctor, who wanted $75,000 sent to Hong Kong. And they’re like, Oh 
crap, we’ve got this doctor who says, don’t call me. And we got a letter from him that says, don’t 
call me. But still, the doctor doesn’t send money to Hong Kong, and most of his wires are two or 
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three thousand at the most. This is a little suspicious. Customer service – he said, don’t call him, 
he’s busy. They sent the wire out. Internal controls – granted, we’re not supposed to do this, but 
this is unusual, I think I need to get some confirmation. It’s too big. It’s going out of the country. 
I think we need to talk to him. Well, it was fake. And they could have forced him to take the hit, 
since he had told them not to call them. They took the hit, and the employee got fired. But she 
was doing what she had been told to do – but she should, at the very least, have gone and talked 
to the manager and said, you know, this is unusual.  
 
You set dollar limits. There is bank discretion in that. If you call back and confirm it, you’re 
much less likely to have a loss. So banks decide how much of a loss. They do have insurance, of 
course, but they usually start at $25,000 and up from there. And even 25 thousand worth of 
deductible, the insurance policy will say, you have to do a call back. If you don’t, you don’t have 
any insurance.  
 
I do transfers. It’s one of the things I do. I pretty much insist that they pick a dollar amount – 
whatever they’re comfortable with. If you don’t do a callback, you’ll eventually lose that money. 
Pick a dollar amount, pick an amount you’re comfortable losing.  
 
Are there differences between turnover and senior management support? 
 
You go into a small town in Oklahoma and the best job in town for a person who may not have a 
high school diploma is at the bank. But sometimes, they don’t pay much over minimum wage. 
So the turnover would be because the pay is smaller. Maybe if there’s a competing bank in the 
town, then you get a little bit of stuff going there. If there’s a grocery store, the store will hire 
them as cashiers. So if you don’t have much competition, the wages are going to be very low.  
 
And then there’s – are you familiar with Bank First – big. I think they have 80 locations. It’s 
huge. It has offices all over the place. And a lot of little towns. And they do some things really 
well. They allow a lot of autonomy. These local areas. They kind of got – from an operations 
standpoint – it’s centralized – but from a lending, community involvement, it’s more left to local 
communities. The Rainbolt guy, who’s the head of it, I was at a talk he gave, and they were 
asking about his training budget, and he says, we don’t do training. We just look around, find 
some other bank and hire their people. And he was proud of it. So if you’re near a BancFirst, 
you’re going to lose your employees. You get them all trained, and bam, there they go.  
 
Back in the 70s. There was a gentlemen’s agreement – you would not interview somebody who 
was currently working at another bank. If they wanted to interview with you, they would have to 
quit first. 
 
How much is automated? Procedures? 
 
Oh man, it is so automated. It’s called platform system. And it’s available for loans and all kinds 
of loans – mortgage loans, commercial loans. And it’s a cool deal. Fairly intensive. But pretty 
much all the banks have it. So you sit down and input on the computer the application and what 
the guy’s looking for and the computer spits out all the appropriate forms for that particular kind 
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of loan, and then it gives you a laundry list for what you have to do. And it ends up in a credit 
file some place.  
 
Do you work with state and national banks? Are there differences? 
 
Yep. I can give you my personal opinion. There’s two banking – federal agencies, the FDIC and 
the OCC – and then there’s the Federal Reserve bank. And they do state charter banks that are 
members of the Federal Reserve Bank. Because of their purposes, I think causes differences in 
how they interact with banks. The purpose of the FDIC, when you get down to it, is to protect the 
fund. The FDIC fund. That’s like having your home insurance agent come out and look at your 
house and see if you’re doing anything you shouldn’t be doing that might catch it on fire. Look 
at this, your barbeque is too close to the house. We’ll have to write you up. Also, they’re very 
interested in consumer stuff. Consumer regs. They are pretty heavy handed when it comes to 
consumer stuff. Particularly if you’re talking about fair lending, fair housing. They’re one of the 
ones that just really crucify the bankers. And they get caught every once in a while going too far. 
They will just shoot out there and do something off the wall crazy.  
 
The OCC. They seem to think they’re to protect the overall banking community. Which would 
be the economy. The banks. They need to do a better job on the big banks. They can be pretty 
rough also. Safety and soundness exams. Fairly sophisticated. Well trained people. Most of them 
are personalities. I joke about – on their applications at the bottom is, do you have a personality 
disorder. If you put ‘no,’ you’re out. Sorry, we gotta have that personality disorder. That’s just 
one thing you can’t train somebody for. No matter how much training you get – you just can’t 
train it. It’s a talent. Just gotta have it. Some of them are pretty good. I think they’re smart. Pretty 
good. Rough as can be. If you get crossways with them, man, they’ll yank your board down to 
Dallas and take them to the woodshed.  
 
The Fed. They are actually – the Fed is run by the banks. Their objective is a smooth running 
financial system. For the country. They were interested in the consumer regs, but they’re really 
more likely to help you – to help a bank comply. Figure out ways. Give them suggestions and 
alternatives. Teach them how to skin a cat. Even the big banks. They will do that with. They’re 
much more likely to be like a consultant than an examiner. Unless, there is an unless – if you 
ever tell them you’re going to do something, and you’re lying about it, and they catch you, it’s 
like – there’s a big mark under your name that never goes away. You might as well change 
charters because you got thrown into the big bad guy category, and they look at their file every 
time before they come out to the bank, and the last file in there says, ‘this guy won’t do what he 
says, so you can’t trust him.’  
 
 
Interview 13 
 
What do you do? 
 
What we do originally the company – a little bit of a background – the company started out as 
loan review, which has nothing to do with the regulatory side. It’s more the credit quality. So 
we’re kind of half and half – half loan review and half compliance. So on the compliance side, 
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that really started picking up in the early 1990s. They decided to kind of go off – I came on in 
1999. And we’ve really grown it since then. Several reasons: a lot of the regulatory changes. The 
banks that have us come in, what we typically do is we just audit their real estate loans, their 
operational – like Reg CC and different thing s – we try to find the problems they have before 
the examiners come in. There are three regulatory agencies – the OCC, FDIC, and Fed – and all 
three of them are very very big proponents of the bank having audit. It doesn’t have to be outside 
audit, but most of our community banks – cause our bread and butter are the smaller community 
banks – we work for some larger ones, but our main focus is our community banks. They’re not 
going to have the people with the expertise or the time. Because everybody wears a lot of hats. 
So we come in, usually, we’re in a bank three times a year, doing audit. A loan audit, an 
operations audit, and the BSA is another side. They use that to let them know what their 
problems are. The good banks, as you were talking about, will take our audits, figure out the root 
cause – that’s a really big deal – and then fix it. So that those problems don’t happen.  
 
Usually, all through three of the regulatory agencies are pretty good – they want the banks to find 
their problem. If we go in and find a problem – even if it’s a big problem – if the bank has 
corrected it by the time the agency comes in, they will not usually cite them for that. So that’s 
where we come in. Very beneficial. If we find it and the bank corrects it, the examiners will not 
hold that against them. Now, if we find it, and the bank doesn’t do anything about it, then it’s 
almost worse. Because then, you knew you had a problem but you ignored it. Versus, we just 
didn’t know.  
 
Are there banks that ignore it? 
 
Yeah. There are. I’d say 90 percent of our banks don’t. Because you have to assume that if a 
bank is going to spend the money to have us come in, that they take this pretty seriously.  
 
We’ve evolved, and we’re really trying to evolve even more now, because there are all these 
changes. The banks are having to evolve as well. We’ve been offering more services – maybe a 
little more hands on at some of the banks. It just depends on what the bank wants us to do.  
 
Kitchen nightmares question: what’s your philosophy? 
 
I don’t know that we have a philosophy necessarily. We just know that there are certain things – 
and I don’t want this to sound like that we only do things that we know the examiners are going 
to like – but if the banks do the things that the examiners like, that means the bank is clean. And 
that’s why the examiners like them. You know what I mean? So it kind of all fits together. 
Obviously, the banks want a clean exam. But they also want to do things right. Our big thing 
when we go into a bank is we don’t just go in and audit – that’s kind of, I think, what sets us 
apart from some of the other firms. We actually, we kind of look at it that we’re in this with the 
bank, and we want to do everything that we can to help them. So we go in. A few things that a 
bank has to have is they have to have some way of determining, this is kind of the Gordon 
Ramsey, there are certain things you just have to do. You have to make sure that you understand 
why those issues happened in your audit. You need to be able to correct them. You need to have 
a reporting mechanism to the board. Our reports go to the board. And really, that’s pretty simple. 
If the bank has good policies and procedures, which we test, and so we’ll let them know if 
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they’re good or not. Any problems they fix. And then report that to the board, then that’s kind of 
like Gordon Ramsey going in there and changing the menu. That’s all they really need. 
 
Now, the hard part is having the personnel sometimes that can do that.  
 
What is the relationship between a regulation and a procedure? 
 
They’re connected. You have all of these regulations and some of them don’t have letters, but 
you have all of these regulations. So let’s just take a really easy one, like Reg CC – funds 
availability – that tells you when you make a deposit, when your funds have to be available for 
you to use. So the bank would have procedures on Reg CC. And it’s going to start off with what 
their policy is. The bank can make these funds available tomorrow or in two days – that’s what 
the reg will ask. So first they’ll decide that. And then their procedures should be written in a 
manner than an employee or management can look at it and know how to follow the 
requirements of the regulation. So if the bank has good procedures, then they should be able to 
follow those. Some banks will have really really detailed procedures, some not so much. If you 
have really really detailed procedures, but you’re not following them, it doesn’t really do you 
any good to have really really good procedures.  
 
What is a policy? What is a procedure? 
 
Okay, well. A policy pretty much says, usually, they’re kind of generic – the policy will say, tell 
the board, we’re going to comply with this regulation, and then the procedures say how we’re 
going to do it. So the policy will have for every regulation, will kind of have different 
requirements. For example, on Reg CC, there are some things the bank can decide. So that’s in 
their policy. Our policy is going to be to do this or to do this. Some regulations, you don’t have a 
lot of leeway. So a lot of the policies are as simple as, the bank’s going to comply. And then the 
procedures will actually say how.  
 
Are there policies you don’t have to have procedures for? 
 
Yeah. You’re going to have … every bank is different. The larger banks will start having sort of 
these enterprise wide policies and risk assessments, which are a big deal. But that’s a big deal on 
a compliance, regulatory side. But you would, if you didn’t so something, you would just kind of 
mitigate that out of your deal. 
 
What’s the difference between a good and bad policy? 
 
Well, you know, there are certain things – and this is kind of funny because some examiners 
won’t even look at policies and some of them completely focus on policies. A good policy is 
going to be pretty detailed as far as its going to explain everything it needs to, and it’s going to 
be accurate. That’s where we see policies mess up a lot – there’s been so many regulatory 
changes. You may have a policy that says, here’s what we’re going to do, but this isn’t even 
what the reg requires. Obviously, that’s not a good policy. Your compliance program can really 
be as good or as bad as you want it to be. I’ve got one bank – they’re really big on – they want 
their policies and procedures to be good, so they actually have a schedule and every policy gets 
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looked at annually. For any changes, updates in the reg, things like that. Other banks, you know, 
may not ever look at those policies until something changes. It kind of a hodgepodge.  
 
Two exactly the same banks – why does one bank look at their policies and why does one 
not? 
 
You know, it’s really goes back to management and personnel. You’ve got – I will say, most 
banks the management and board probably don’t care a ton how things get done as long as they 
get done. But I don’t want to take anything away from the boards – the boards are active – but a 
board doesn’t really want to know how you can hold a deposit. They just want to know that 
we’re doing it right. So some banks will have employees that are just very black and white. 
Those are usually the banks that have the really good written out policies and procedures because 
there’s some one who is just that type of person. A lot of times, banks won’t look at their policies 
until an examiner looks at it and doesn’t like it. The one thing that’s a little bit different is on the 
BSA side. BSA is – the policies and risk assessments on BSA is a big big part of the audit, 
actually. That’s the one act that every bank has really good BSA policies, procedures, risk 
assessments. Because it is really looked at as part of your program. Some of the other 
compliance regulations maybe not so policy and procedure driven. A lot of the examiners will 
take a “proof in the pudding” approach. If they go in, not a lot of problems, they really aren’t 
finding any systemic issues – then they don’t really – they’re going to assume the policies and 
procedures are pretty good because everything’s getting done. What usually will happen – they’ll 
find a problem, then they’ll go back and say, well, either you don’t have a good policy on this, 
you don’t have good procedures, and that’s why this happened. That’s how most of them 
function.  
 
Banks have the compliance operation as they’re willing to pay for.  
 
It’s not just paying, it’s just all those resources. Money’s obviously one of them. It’s just going to 
cost some money to have us come in or to hire a compliance person. But other resources, like 
time. And things like that. Board involvement. We have some banks where the board is 
extremely involved, and I go to a lot of board meetings because the board – they don’t want to 
know all the little details, but they do want to know, are we OK? I have other boards, but they 
don’t go into it. But of the banks that we do work for are the banks that take it pretty seriously, or 
they wouldn’t be paying for us to be in there. So most of the banks that we deal with are 
probably at this end of the spectrum. Except, we pick up a lot of banks because they’re in 
trouble. A lot. And then, that’s sort of what we do is help them. Most of the new banks that we 
pick up right now – because we’ve got the market pretty saturated – so a lot of the new banks 
will be those that have not been using us. 
 
The small banks that don’t use your type of services, are they in trouble, or will they soon 
be in trouble? Can they do it on their own? 
 
It’s possible. Where we’re starting to see banks have trouble right now is with the new stuff. 
Because, if – well, you talked to Amanda at Bank of Grove? Let’s just use Bank of Grove for an 
example. They just moved Amanda into that position that she’s in. Before that, they’ve always 
done a really good job. They’ve been pretty clean. Before that, they kind of separated it out a 
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little bit. Carla did some of the operations stuff. Amanda did some stuff, but there wasn’t really 
that one compliance person. So let’s just say that it was still like that. Well, all these new 
changes come down because there’s a lot coming. Who’s responsibility is that? Well, a lot of 
times, that’s not really defined. And so it gets missed. We’ll go into banks sometimes and 
something will have changed six months ago, and they’re not aware of it. Because there’s not 
that person and that’s their job. So now, that’s Amanda’s job, but it’s a pretty big focus of hers. I 
get an email from Amanda about every other day. But she’s wanting to – they want to do it right. 
And you want to make sure you’re not missing anything. So that’s where we see – had they not 
moved Amanda into that role, they would just – we have other banks where somebody’s sort of 
responsible for compliance – that’s where its hard for the banks because compliance is not a full 
time job at a lot of these banks. I’m talking about where that’s all you do is compliance. It’s not. 
But there are times you have to spend all of your time on it. So what ends up happening is you 
have somebody at the bank who does a good job on their other things, so they get kind of stuck 
with the compliance responsibilities, too. But that’s not all they do, and so it just kind of gets 
pushed to the side because they’re busy.  
 
In these small towns – you grew up in Laverne, and you go work at the bank as a teller, 
and then suddenly, you’re in charge of making sure nobody’s laundering money – and you 
may not have a college degree, and you’re put in charge of a part of a regulation – and you 
can’t read it … how much of an issue is that in these community banks? 
 
That’s kind of where we come in. Now, I will say on the BSA side, usually, a teller – that’s what 
the BSA side is so policy and procedure driven because you’re not going to have a teller that 
you’re paying eight dollars an hour responsible for that. But they’re the ones dealing with the 
cash. SO you have to have procedures in place that every single teller follows that will trigger 
something if its off. That’s why its so important because, I mean, a lot of the BSA stuff does fall 
on your tellers. And you’ve got a huge turnover – they’re not the college graduates – you’ll have 
a few, but most college graduates maybe start as a teller but they want to move up. So there’s a 
constant turnover. But yes, in the smaller banks, that’s one of the reasons I think we’re 
successful is because not only is it cost-effective to hire a full time compliance officer, you’re 
not going to find somebody in Grove, Oklahoma, that knows compliance. There’s not 
compliance people just walking around the streets – you have to grow them. Amanda – 
something else – not very many people like it at all. Amanda, acutally, for whatever reason, 
really really likes it. So she’ll do really well. Most people, I guarantee you, if you went to OBA’s 
compliance school, and you ask them, how many of you guys are doing compliance because you 
like it and how many of you are doing it because your boss came to you and said, you’re going to 
do compliance. You’ll see one hand over here and 28 hands over here. Nobody wants to do it. 
Which is one of the problems we have in hiring people. Nobody wants to do it.  
 
How does the perfect compliance department work? 
 
Perfect compliance department – in my mind, and they’re all different – the perfect situation 
would be that you have a compliance person here who’s sort of responsible for everything, but 
they’re not responsible for doing everything. And then you have each business unit – your new 
accounts people, your loan officers – they’re responsible for their compliance in their areas. And 
your compliance person helps them figure out what they need to do and how to do it. But she 
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can’t go and do everything. So you’ve got to have some of these people. And management has 
got to support this compliance person. Because, lets say, you have a loan officer that just refuses 
to do things right. Well, this compliance officer has no control over that. And then you have an 
audit that comes in – and the compliance officer gathers the audit and figures out if we have 
problems or not, and if she does, then sometimes it’s because your procedures aren’t good, 
sometimes it’s training. A lot of times, it’s internal controls. Flood is a violation that is regulation 
that we see tons of violations in, and it’s finable, so it’s a big one. You can be issued fines for 
flood. So, you know, if you have a situation where your loan officers are closing loans without 
flood insurance, that’s a big violation. Somebody has to be able to say, why is this happening. If 
the loan officers are going to do this, then we have to make it where they can’t. So, loan 
documents aren’t going to be prepared unless we have proof of flood insurance. Somebody has 
to do that. If nobody’s doing that, this will just keep on happening because loan officers will 
keep closing without flood insurance. So you have to be able to figure out those stop gaps, and if 
you don’t have that person that management supports, then it doesn’t get done.  
 
It’s not rocket science, it’s just figuring out where your problem is and then reporting to the 
board – we have this problem, here’s what we’re going to do to fix it, and hey, look, it worked, 
then it’s done. We do tracking reports, where it shows, here’s the issue, here was our root cause, 
here’s where we fixed it. And then you always test it – you can’t just say, we fixed it, without 
validating it. Once it’s validated, you show the board it’s closed. And that’s what we do. So your 
board can look and say, you know, hey, we’ve had these eight issues open for a year now, what’s 
going on? That’s a problem. Or a board will say, hey, look, we had eight issues, and they’re all 
closed, good job. 
 
Root cause. That’s a big buzzword. 
 
How many banks in OK have compliance officers? 
 
Full time? I don’t know. I would say the banks we do work for – I’d say, the ones that are 
probably getting close to $500 million are starting to get full time compliance officers. Below 
that, maybe not so much. BOK, a bank that size, they have a whole compliance floor. They have 
people who are a little more specialized because it is so big, instead of having a compliance 
officer, you’ve got this one big person, but you’ve got people who are specialized, like in 
HMDA … cause you have to.  
 
At the smaller banks, what’s the compliance solution? The guy who can’t afford the 
compliance officer? 
 
Us. We’re a big part of it. There’s other companies like us. But if they – and that’s one of the 
things we’re really trying to evolve into helping more. We’ve got some things that we’re 
working on because next year’s going to be bad for the banks. There’s major changes happening 
on January 14. So, you know, we’re trying really hard to – I’ve had banks that have called and 
asked if I would go out and speak to their management. So they can make an informed decision. 
A lot of times, the compliance people in the smaller banks, they’ll sort of know what’s 
happening, but they don’t have time to – and a lot of times, you need – sometimes, you need 
third-party validation. Compliance officer can say something, we come in and say the same 
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thing, and everybody’s like, oh, OK. We do that a lot, too. But the banks, you know, the banks 
that I’ve visited so far are the banks that are pretty much on the ball. They know they’ve got all 
these changes coming. They just want to be ahead of the curve and have us come out. The 
smaller banks, we’re a big part of their compliance program. We implement the audit, but – all of 
our people are really really good about, OK, you’re messing up on this, but we’ve seen other 
banks do it this, this and this, and it really seems to work. So we’ve got an advantage because we 
see so many banks. We know what works and what doesn’t. And we’ll have banks all the time 
email and say, we’ve got this problem, have you seen other banks with this problem? 
 
A new rule comes out – and a bank has to develop a policy and procedure? How does that 
process work? 
 
In a perfect world, your compliance officer or whoever’s responsible for that – you know, the 
thing is, the qualified mortgages, is just part of Reg Z, it’s already a regulation that’s out there. 
So you’ve already got your Reg Z policy, so you don’t have to make those changes. But 
normally, when there’s a compliance change, it doesn’t really affect the whole bank necessarily. 
Like, for example, in 2010, we had major changes on RESPA and Reg Z. But it was disclosure 
changes. So really it didn’t affect everybody but those people who were preparing those 
disclosures. So those people went to training. You have your software that gets updated. You do 
all that. These changes that are coming up in January management’s going to have to decide: do 
we want to make qualified mortgages or not? So this is a little different because this actually 
requires management to make some decisions and possible change everything they’ve been 
doing up to this point. They just came out in May or maybe it was June, with an exemption – 
they’re giving us 2 years on the balloons. If that hadn’t have happened, then we’ve got banks that 
were literally going to have to completely change everything they’ve been doing. The regs start 
coming out, somebody’s staying on top of them, a lot of time’s they’re calling us and asking us 
about them. Once we know for sure the reg is official – that’s a problem, they keep changing – 
we’ll start sending out emails to our clients. When we’re in there doing audit – we’re like, 
remember, in January, this and this is changing – so the banks use us for that. And then, a lot of 
times, your final procedures don’t get put into place until the reg is already changed and you 
actually have to start doing it. Because what looks good on paper may not actually work, which 
is one of the things that whoever’s making all these regs are not realizing. Things sound great on 
paper, but you can’t implement them.  
 
Usually, like when I’m doing policies and procedures for a bank, my procedures are usually 
pretty – take the reg, and see what you have to do. And that looks good on paper, but that doesn’t 
mean that everyone’s going to understand it or follow it. And until you actually start doing it, 
you don’t realize we need – there’s a piece missing. It doesn’t just – come January 1 next year, 
everyone’s going to have these new procedures and everything’s going to be hunky dory. 
 
How much of procedure testing involves examinations? 
 
At a good bank, not much. Because you should be catching that before your examiners come in. 
And that’s actually one of the things that the examiners look at as part of a good compliance 
program is how well you’re staying up on the new changes, and if you’re ready for them and 
things like that. If they come in and you haven’t – it shows a weakness on management’s part.  
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I’ve heard folks say exams can be a learning process. 
 
You’d hope that it’s not much, though. I mean, seriously. But yes, there are things – and 
depending on – there are some examiners out there that are great and really want to help the bank 
and things like that. There are some examiners that don’t feel like that’s really their job – their 
job is to make sure the bank is doing it right. 
 
Again, two same banks: new rule comes down. How are they different in how they develop 
procedures. 
 
If they’re both committed to conforming, they’re both going to do OK. Where they don’t – that’s 
the …  
 
OK, so let me ask it this way. A CEO or bank president – how does his attitude turn into 
action? 
 
He either has to spend the money to hire somebody and give them the time to do it or hire 
someone like us. Intentions are – it really all comes down to allocating those resources. They 
have to. And then they have to be willing to do it. I mean, we have gone into banks where the 
compliance officer would be pretty good and she’s doing everything she can. Management 
refuses to do anything. Those are usually the ones that end up with bad compliance exams.  
 
When a bank’s policy fails – why? 
 
Either training. Because no one knows how to follow the policy. More than often though, it’s 
probably no one wants to.  
 
What do you mean? The employee in the trench will just ignore the rules? 
 
That’s probably 50 percent of the time.  
 
And it’s because we’re talking about a certain type of employee? 
 
No. I mean, I can just go out here and say the loan officers are a big part of the problem, and they 
are. But – and we pick on them – the reason that you have people just not doing what they’re 
supposed to. A lot of times, especially at the smaller community banks, the loan officers, the 
account reps, whoever, their primary job is customer service. They are there to do whatever they 
can – a lot of times, the regulations are counter productive to that. Even though the regulations 
are supposed to be out there to protect and help the consumer, a lot of times, the loan officers 
feel that they can’t help their consumer the way they want to and still stay with it. So a lot of 
times – and I say loan officers because probably 80 percent of all violations are on the lending 
side. But a big part – it’s because, not so much that the loan officers just refuse to do it but 
they’re focusing on helping the customer and that compliance piece is very very secondary.  
 
Is there a conflict between …  
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A lot of times there’s a conflict. A lot of times, it’s just the last thing on their mind. The really 
good banks – the loan officer, if this is their job, compliance is here (higher than their job). 
Where either the loan officer or the loan department, it’s a very big concern. For example, we 
have a bank – Citizen’s Security in Bixby – and I go out there and do training four times a year. 
It’s non negotiable. Every loan officer is there. Management is really making that – letting those 
loan officers know that this is part of your job, and it’s a priority. Whereas some banks, the loan 
officers, maybe that’s not a priority.  
 
It’s a big part of it. And it’s hard to – I mean, they’re all different. I can give you really good 
examples of what banks do bad, but I’m not going to name any names.  
 
What’s the role of automation and technology? 
 
You know, on some of the regulations, a lot. On some, not too much at all. And you can – you 
know, on the BSA side, you can really automate a lot of that process. It is expensive, so a lot of 
the smaller banks aren’t going to spend that much money to automate. You can actually buy anti-
money laundering software that runs with your mainframe, and if you personally never have any 
cash transactions, and all of the sudden, you have a big cash transaction, it’s going to kick out on 
the report that that’s unusual for you. On the lending side, we have software that prepares the 
loan documents. And, you know, it’s pretty useful because in theory, you go through and tell it 
what type of loan, and then it does all the documents that you need for that specific loan. You’re 
not having to know everything. Problem is, nothing’s black and white, so there’s always 
something. 
 
Where are banks getting policies and procedures from? 
 
You’ll have a few banks that will have some crazy person in the bank that actually likes writing 
them, and they’ll come up with them on their own. Usually, you know, the Internet is full of – I 
don’t know what banks did before the Internet – but the Internet has tons of resources and things 
like that. We have policies and procedures that we actually provide to banks. But usually, 
whoever’s responsible for those will find an sample policy or they’ll buy a sample policy and 
then tailor it to fit. There’s companies out there that do policies. You know, usually, like the 
ABA has policies. There’s all kinds of places out there. And then, you bring it in and tailor it to 
fit your bank. Because the reg itself is the same for everybody. So you can – so you just 
customize the policy or procedure based on how you’re going to do things.  
 
When new regs come out, how do banks know what they are? How do you know what’s in 
the rule book? 
 
What happens. Dodd-Frank is out there now. 897 pages. I do know one lady at one of our banks 
who has actually read it all. She’s one of those I was telling you about who really gets in there – 
most everybody hasn’t read it. Me included. Usually what you do is – there’s so much stuff out 
there that will start coming – the FDIC sends out bulletins. The Fed’s really good about sending 
out bulletins. The OBA has classes constantly. There’s something somebody’s told you about – 
Banker’s Online – it’s a huge resource. They’ll start doing seminars. You just start going to these 
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seminars, and you start figuring out – not just with seminars but emails from us and people you 
talk to – you’ll start figuring out that out of these 900 pages, this part here is what we need to 
comply with. Sometimes they get missed. But usually, somehow it just all – bankers talk a lot – 
there’s a lot of – a president will get an email and take it to the compliance officer and, are we 
ready for this? And she’ll say, yeah, or I don’t know what that is. But almost everybody’s going 
to use some sort of third party. Whether it’s somebody like us or whether they’re just out there. 
And that’s why it gets missed a lot. Unless you have a full time compliance officer researching 
and stuff, things can fall through the cracks. 
 
There were some changes in 2009 on the protection notices, and we’re still going into banks and 
seeing that they’re not doing that. When examiners come in, this is also a misconception, when 
examiners come in, they don’t look at everything. They do a very risk-focused – all three 
agencies do it differently – they send out questionnaires on things like that ahead of time. 
They’re not going to be at your bank for eight weeks, so they have to prioritize. They’ll do stuff 
off site. Very low risk. If they looked at something in the last exam, and it was fine, they may not 
look at it this time. So sometimes, the banks, because we will go into a bank and we’ll find a 
problem, and that’ll be the first thing they say – the examiners didn’t say anything about it. But 
maybe they didn’t look at it because they were focused on other areas. Sometimes, it’s hard to – 
the examiners can’t look at everything either. The banks can’t rely on that. 
 
Are you hearing a lot of stuff about arbitrary enforcement? 
 
Oh yeah. But that’s always been the case. And it’s not even – it’s just like the banks. Well, let’s 
just use the … the FDIC and Fed do it different from the OCC. The OCC has examiners that go 
into banks every 18 months. And they look at everything, including compliance. So they have 
examiners that look at compliance but aren’t strictly compliance examiners. They’ll do other 
things as well. The FDIC and Fed have examiners that have 100 percent compliance examiners. 
That’s all they do. So let’s just take the Oklahoma City FDIC office – there’s 12 or 13 
compliance examiners down there. Well, that office has procedures of how – just like a bank 
does, but each examiner is going to interpret those procedures or prioritize a little differently. It 
can change – your exam can change from examiner to examiner. In a perfect world, that would 
not be the case. Not so much vague – but very open to interpretation.  
 
We see a lot of different interpretations between the FDIC and OCC and FDIC and Fed. A lot.  
 
But they’ve got different missions.  
 
They do, but that’s not a big deal for the bank. But for us, that’s very hard, because we have to 
know – there are certain things the FDIC looks at in a compliance exam that nobody else does. 
So we have to make sure in our FDIC banks are doing the things they should be.  
 
Everybody has mentioned the “relationship.” What do you think about the role of the 
relationship. What are the best practices for doing an exam? 
 
I actually really think that how you handle yourself during that compliance exam has a lot to do 
with the outcome of it. If the examiners come in, one of the first things they do is meet with 
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management. That’s one of the very first things they do is have this management – but it’s 
usually president and CEO, but the board is welcome to come. They will sit down with 
management, and they will ask them things – you know, like, what is your compliance program? 
What sort of resources do you apply to compliance? They will really drill down. If that 
management doesn’t have a clue, it sets the tone. There are – not as much now – but a lot of 
times, your president and CEO, they’re not involved in that. And so, they don’t really know. And 
that’s not good. The whole point of the interview is to see how much management is involved.  
 
The only way that you’re going to have a successful compliance program is if you have support 
from management. So they’ll start with that. And if management doesn’t have a clue, that exam’s 
not going to go very well. So let’s say, management’s like, yeah, we’re really on the ball. Well, 
then, the examiners are going to go into that bank assuming that this bank is trying. They’re 
making an effort. So if we find something, you know, people are human. At least we know 
they’re trying. If they get the impression that management doesn’t care, then it’s a whole 
different exam. It’s like anything else, if you go to the store and the little girl at Wal Mart ringing 
you out is super friendly and super nice, if she makes a mistake, you’re going to be like, hey, you 
made a mistake, she fixes it no problem. But if that person is rude and lazy, you’re going to be 
all over her.  
 
While the examiners are there, they want to get out of there, too. They don’t want to be there for 
four weeks. They want to get in and get out in a week. So you want everything to be available for 
them. You want good communication. You want to be able to ask them questions – and them ask 
you questions. Then outside the exam, you know, there’s nothing wrong with calling an 
examiner and going, hey, we’re thinking about starting this new product. Can you tell me things 
we need to be aware of if we do that? Examiners love it. They would much rather the bank be 
proactive, than start this new product and have these problems and the examiners didn’t know. 
The examiners want to know that you’re committed and that you’re trying.  
 
There are banks out there, though, that you never call an examiner. Because that just throws up a 
red flag. I don’t care – examiners are people, too. Just like the Wal Mart thing – if you go into a 
bank that keeps you standing in the rain for two hours, you’re going to go in there with a pre-
conceived attitude. But you know, we do, too. But if you go into a bank, and I really try to – I do 
a lot of training at banks – and this is one thing that I try to get across to them. If we go into a 
bank, and everything is just a mess. Their documentation is sloppy. You ask someone, they don’t 
really seem to know what you’re talking about. Then you’re not going to give them the benefit of 
the doubt anyway. And if you go into a bank, and everything is pretty well documented, it’s 
pretty easy to follow – people may not know everything, but at least they seem to know what 
you’re talking about. And then you find a problem, you’re going to give them the benefit of the 
doubt. 
 
All these regulations are written for little round pegs and round holes. That’s how they’re 
written. None of the community banks fit into that. The regulations are not written for the types 
of loans that we do in community banks. For example, the good faith estimate that came out in 
2010. Construction loans are not – you don’t have to do a good faith estimate on a construction 
loan. The good faith estimates, you cannot actually properly disclose a construction loan on a 
good faith estimate. Can’t do it. Because it doesn’t allow you to have anything other than P&I 
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payments. Good faith is not set up for that. So that’s where a lot of the problem comes in. We 
have to do these things, but the regulations are not set up for us to do them. So you see banks 
start to – they don’t have a choice. Whoever comes up with the regulations never worked in a 
bank.  
 
 
Interview No. 14 
 
What’s your background? 
 
Been with the bank for 17 years. It’s a small community bank. A family bank. A lot of the bank 
employees are also shareholders. Kind of a dying breed to watch the numbers and figures. When 
I came back with the bank – was originally with the lending – but just so happens with the fewer 
numbers, you also have to wear one or two other hats. So through attrition and just really 
continuing to gain knowledge and understanding of the compliance, I’ve found myself being in 
that compliance position and handling that for about the last eight to ten years. So I’ve seen both 
sides of it. When there wasn’t a whole lot of changes to the compliance side, to now, with the 
recent piling own, we’ll call it.  
 
Do you have a law degree?  
 
Nope.  
 
Compliance certifications?  
 
You know, for a lot of – of course, there’s the industry seminars, classes. Oklahoma State hosts 
the compliance school each year. I have not – whenever each year or each cycle, when you have 
a compliance examination with your primary regulator, they want to see a resume and the 
qualifications of the person sitting in that position. You don’t need a law degree to understand 
and enforce – the regulators do the enforcement. But you do have to be able to implement and 
have your own system, to not only comprehend them. A lot of times, they’ll give these recaps in 
annual seminars going back. The OBA really hosts probably – you want to say, 100 percent of 
them – but they sponsor a lot of those seminars that will do a compliance recap of what came 
into play in the prior year, as far as what’s coming up. So they try to give you the English version 
– or the Clif notes version. And those are helpful. There’s just some things that you do need to be 
aware of that they don’t necessarily impact your bank or operations.  
 
Your experience just here in Carney? 
 
Yes. Just banking here at Carney.  
 
FDIC and state commission? Are you a Fed member? 
 
We’re a non member. State chartered bank.  
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How would you describe your regulatory environment? Friendly, supportive? More as 
road blocks? 
 
You’re probably working with two different segments with the FDIC right now. You have the 
old guard, and then there’s a new face, which is a lot of the newer examiners that are being 
commissioned. And probably – there’s two different philosophies. Some view themselves as 
probably the – they do have some pretty strange tactics. Whether it’s burnout. A lot of the newer 
examiners have a different perspective on what their role should be. They are a lot more helpful. 
They want to see banks achieve compliance, especially in the areas of consumer, mortgage 
lending. That’s getting a lot of attention. And that’s their job, and their role, and their function in 
the banking environment.  
 
Do you see a difference between the state and FDIC? In terms of tone? How they see their 
jobs? 
 
Probably what happens, whether they’ll admit it or not, is kind of your compliance history. If 
they’re coming into a bank that has issues with compliance, they’re going to be a little more 
alert, on their toes. It’s going to take a while to get their comfort level up. You’re dealing with 
two different sides. What I’ve seen over – not only being in compliance, but I do handle a lot of 
(probably 90 percent) of examiner contact when they’re in the bank to help facilitate the exam 
and being the tip of the spear for management and field their questions and concerns – safety and 
soundness really doesn’t care, from an examination standpoint, for compliance. Compliance 
really doesn’t have a whole lot of concern for safety and soundness.  
 
The best way to illustrate that is probably through overdraft programs. A lot of banks are 
probably acknowledging that a good source of revenue – if properly managed – they receive a lot 
of scrutiny from the compliance side. You won’t get the same viewpoint of an overdraft 
program. There’s not a whole lot of uniformity, or consistency, there.  
 
So the safety and soundness exam can say one thing, but the compliance guys come in and 
say you’re scamming people. 
 
That’s a very good way of – safety and soundness wants it because it’s a good source of income. 
Compliance highly scrutinizes it. There are right ways to do it – but I’d say a lot of banks are 
probably misleading about it. We can speak freely about it because we don’t operate with any 
overdraft protection programs. So it simplifies it for us. If people are overdrawn, we don’t put 
them through the ringer for it. So hey, the compliance guys like it. Safety and soundness guys 
will say you’re missing out on lost revenue and you need to find a way to get it. And they’ve said 
– without mentioning names of specific examiners – but there’s a lot of them who’ve sat there 
and said, I’d charge them as much as I could everytime they went over. That was their 
interpretation of it. The compliance guys want to see you do it – once again, that’s their role – so 
there are different tones.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rulebook?  
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You really have to subscribe to some professional services that go through and will refine – the 
mortgage lending laws – and you’ll get all of their overviews. You have to tackle it in small 
bites.  
 
So the OBA? Others? 
 
ABA’s a really good source. There’s other more specialized groups, I guess, that kind of – 
bankers networks … Jack Holzknecht. He was an examiner for a long time. He’s got a pretty 
good ear to the ground as far as how to take these regulations, refine those, really pull the meat 
out of it. Other than that, when they’re being written, I guess really, they’re very difficult to read 
and comprehend when you get a 25 or 26 page sentence. It really is tough.  
 
Do you rely on consultants? Audit? 
 
For years, our practice didn’t change and really the interpretation and expectation on the 
examiner’s side has. They view it more and more as you’re grading your own work if you’re 
doing your own audits. And you know, that’s not necessarily completely true. As the compliance 
officer, you not only develop – you interpret, you develop, and you implement your own policies 
and procedures. Why on earth you need, then, somebody else outside of that – of their own 
examination – to do an interim audit, it’s just another way of, I guess, increasing that 
transparency of the compliance department.  
 
Yeah, I am supposed to grade our own work. So that statement is true. Their job, then, is to grade 
us from the examination side. Why we need to slip in another audit in between there, the size and 
scope and complexity of our institution, is a little bit of overkill. Nonetheless, we will probably 
have to kick that in sometime next year. Working in an independent audit. And it’s unfortunate, 
because you’re going to pay a baseline fee, so we’re probably going to have to work in some of 
the consumer compliance elements, but let’s say the BSA plus the OFAC. There’s a whole lot of 
different elements to the compliance program, but these audit firms may say, you know what, for 
$15K, we’re going to need to do two or three so you get your money’s worth. So you want us to 
look at your money laundering compliance procedures as well as your mortgage lending 
procedures. And on top of that, your account opening, your denials, your fair credit, your unfair 
practices. Well sure, you know, it’s like a buffet. If I can pick six or seven things I want you to 
look at, and it’s going to cost the same as if you were going to do one, let’s do six of them and 
make somebody happy.  
 
You’re not using those folks now? 
 
Right.  
 
Would it be fair to say that you probably rarely sit down with the actual code and read the 
law? 
 
Right. Because – your FDIC will send you – they used to send out these paper manuals. Six or 
seven forms. These guys, back in the day, used to haul these things around. Some of them still do 
– the difference of young examiners, who are savvy on their laptops – but we have some 
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examiners who flip through the onion skin pages and say, here’s what I’m talking about. You 
have to read it three or four times to get his interpretation of it. You can discuss – a lot of times 
during the examination, you have an opportunity to explain to the examiner, this is how I 
interpret it, and this is why our bank has this practice. Sometimes, you can see where, OK, if 
they remove themselves out of the examiners chair and put themselves in the bankers chair and 
see how that law would be applied. I think to say that your best option of learning those rules and 
regulations is to go to these seminars. And really, it’s because they’re going to cut right to the 
meat of it and cut right to the chase.  
 
Do you do seminars? Or someone else? 
 
It’s myself. A lot of the smaller banks – they’ll have the one or two individuals that are 
responsible for compliance, and those are the ones who attend the seminars. We’ll bring those 
manuals and binders back and touch base with the other employees and the board of directors on 
the relevant issues and relevant topics. Because you really – to grab that manual, or let’s say that 
huge binder – you’re not even going to get through it without wasting a lot of time. I’ve often 
wondered why they’re so lengthy, the laws, but I think it comes back to how they’re – I think 
really the burden of reading those are the ones that are voting on it. The lawmakers should read 
them. I think that should be a requirement. A lot of them say they don’t.  
 
There’s no oversight. The CFPB has no one watching.  
 
That’s another problem. Their branching off and they’re forming this new enforcement. 
Technically, there’s supposed to be direct enforcement over the mega banks. They do have 
writing authority on some regulations strictly – and there’s a reason why they took them over. 
There has been failure on the side of the Federal Reserve board on writing Reg Z. They took that 
away from them and handed it to the CFPB. And it does need to be rewritten. It needs to be 
clearer. It’s way too long. They butchered it. They never line through items. It’s just grown and 
piled on. So that’s another thing that makes these lengthy regulations -- there’s just still old 
garbage in there that hasn’t kept up with the practices, but also the products that are available.  
 
When you get a compliance exam, what makes you successful? What are they looking for to 
give you good marks? 
 
Really, your procedures. Your oversight. They’re not so much interested in setting down and 
standing in the corner while you open an account. They just want to see what your controls are.  
 
It’s taken me 14 interviews to figure out: policies and procedures. It’s all about the 
procedures, isn’t it? 
 
Yeah. You can get the policies. We can go back in the vault and look at our policy files. Stand up 
files. And show you 52, for instance, I think we have from 52 to 56 written policies, just for 
operations. Ethics policy all the way up to consumer lending policy. You can have those. They 
may be covered with an inch of dust. And if they just go by that – they need to see not only do 
you have those and your board approves these policies to operate under. Examiners want to see 
that you’re enforcing those to an effective level. In other words, we operate much differently 
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than a Wells Fargo, even a branch. Just based on the products. We can have – not really vague or 
watered down policies – we just don’t want to have super restrictive policies that get violated 
every day you open.  
 
What makes a good procedure? 
 
Probably the knowledge – probably more than one way to answer that – your employees, that are 
in that compliance role of implementing your program or your procedures, they have to have a 
pretty good understanding of what the overall rule is but how your bank is enforcing that. If you 
don’t have that, you really don’t have anything other than just a habit. A lot of times, your habit 
– yeah, you want to have a little bit of that – it needs to be second hand in knowing which 
disclosures to offer. What makes a good procedure? Probably you’ve got to have a well trained 
staff – they have to have a working knowledge of it. And they have to understand your bank, too. 
Because, you know, you can understand the regulation and know that a lot of that is to provide 
the customer. Now, whether or not you’re required to verbalize it to the customer, no. You can 
hand them a stack of disclosures and be complaint. You’ve given them all the information. But it 
does help, I guess you can clear up a lot of potential issues by going over some of the high points 
with the customer with that particular product. But your employees can do that unless they really 
understand what it is and what their role is. 
 
Why might a difference occur between what you do and what the procedure says? 
 
From somebody – human nature, I guess. You really don’t ever get the shortcutting – I can’t 
really say that. But there could be a misunderstanding in the communication of the application 
process. And a lot of times, it can be documented. I can give you an example. Let’s say you’re in 
here to buy a mobile home. Sounds pretty cut and dry. Yeah, your intent – or the reason of your 
application is – but either, if through timing – let’s say you’re late for work and you just wanted 
to get an application and go – maybe you failed to provide or I didn’t ask: is that mobile home 
going to be attached permanently on land, and let’s say, for instance, you said, well, yeah it is. 
Well, I failed to ask you, are you going to own that land, or are you just going to own the home. 
So throughout the course of that little interview right there, I may have not given you every 
disclosure that you would need because once the point of that – when dirt becomes part of the 
collateral, not just the structure, especially with motor homes, there’s different laws and 
regulations that apply. Now, if you tell me, on a follow up call, that actually, I own it – really 
I’ve been paying on it, and I have a loan on it somewhere else – OK, are you just refinancing 
what you owe, or are you going to borrow some money to pay off some student loan debt? Then 
we just stepped in it right there on the student loan side – but if we’re using your home to secure 
that student loan debt, then we don’t have to provide you with the student loan right to rescission 
and disclosures, but we do have to give you other disclosures. Now, since that was your primary 
home, I’m really making you a refinance loan – and if the purchase of that loan is not to finance 
or refinance that purchase, then I’m not allowed to obtain government monitoring information on 
you as far as what your race, ethnicity, sex – I can’t get those. I’m prohibited from obtaining 
them. Whereas, if it’s for a home purchase, I’m required to get those. So you can see where an 
examiner can go, OK, all he sees is the purpose of the loan was to buy a mobile home. And it 
technically could have been to refinance, not only the purchase price, but a majority of those 
funds, and that’s how they determine what the purpose is. 
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Then you can look back: OK, I can see where the summaries of these regulations can come in 
handy, because that particular scenario that I just discussed, probably seven or eight piles that 
you could have stepped in along the way, unless you have a true understanding of it. So you have 
to be able to pretty much know the requirements and the regulations all the way through. You 
can have a compliance concern, a violation, unintentionally, through just misunderstanding the 
application process.  
 
How much of that is automated? 
 
Its usually between the ears. Some software programs, there’s more of a static – more of a 
dynamic documentation program. It builds the program based on the elements that you plug in. 
So it’s kind of the garbage in, garbage out situation, that if you don’t give it the true purpose, and 
if its – there’s some general parameters that you answer, and then it will steer you on that. But 
Compliance One is a WaltersSkewer product, a very big company, not only handling lending 
compliance solutions and document platforms – they do offer a lot of forms and probably 
compliance resources for a lot of industries – medical, for example. That particular product, it’s 
evolved over the years. The program that we used to be on really did the thinking for you. You 
would tell it it’s a 1 to 4 purchase, you’ve got a compliant loan, as long as you go with the 
checklist it gave you. It’s become more – a little bit easier to make a mistake in the 
documentation through these newer programs. I think it’s just because they’re trying to take on 
too much. Too many states. Especially this particular service vendor, because it’s nationwide, so 
there’s a lot of different forms there that you may need to pull in for Oklahoma.  
 
Turnover? 
 
It depends. It really depends if you’re on the providing side. Let’s say you’re a – and you’re 
speaking of turnover in terms of losing a highly trained employee. That’s what’s going to make, 
in banking, really a very employable individual – someone with some compliance knowledge. I 
don’t need to be highly trained on what’s coming out in three years. I’ll get that. These timelines 
– a lot of these things have already been passed. These laws – they’re going to come into play on 
a timeline. They’re introducing them and phasing them in. If you have an ability to digest the 
requirements and implement them, you’re going to be a very employable person in the banking 
industry – or in any kind of industry, hospitals for instance.  
 
Yeah, you do have a concern. You don’t want to invest a whole lot of time and training and 
education without some contracts on those employees. The compliance schools are not cheap. 
And compliance implementation and those positions within a bank, particularly, are not for 
everyone. It’s an acquired taste. There’s been some duties I’ve dolled out, and I get them right 
back. Because it’s easier to just do them. I’ve been there – I’ve seen the shortcuts. It’s easier to 
do that, but it’s so much easier to just do it. You don’t have to agree with it. That’s where you get 
into trouble. If you get employees that don’t really agree with, lets say, on the bank secrecy side 
– the requirement is that if you have an account today, and let’s say you zero it out, you’re no 
longer a customer as of when that midnight comes over. Your customer relationship with us 
terminated. And you come back in and say, you’ve known me for ever, and I’m going to go on a 
vacation, and I need a thousand bucks. I’m going on a roadtrip. OK, I knew you yesterday, but 
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now you’re a new customer. So we have to go through that. So if you have employees who see 
that as a ridiculous requirement, they’re like, well, I won’t go through all of the procedures to 
document that person. That’s been around for 10 years – the Patriot Act. But those requirements 
– initially, some people have some issues with. Come on. You’re the same person you’ve been 
for 15 years. Why do we have go through this now?  
 
To illustrate that point, I guess if you have employees that don’t – it goes beyond understanding 
– if they don’t believe in or think it’s a requirement. If they use their own discretion. So you have 
to be very careful to put your procedures in place so that your employees aren’t allowed to do the 
thinking on what applies and what doesn’t. You tell them that it applies, you do it, or you’ll 
probably be better suited in a different profession.  
 
Sometimes compliance means that you can’t give customer service.  
 
Bankers probably tend to try to use that as a last-ditched effort – would someone please throw us 
a lifeline. The truth of it is, you can do it. Everybody knows you can do it. You can really do 
everything, you can implement everything. I can tell you some really bad information and smile 
throughout it, to where you feel like this guy really does care. So I can tell you that yes, we can 
close your loan, and we’re going to go through a long process to get there. And you’re going to 
have to provide more information that you can ever possibly dream of. And we’re going to put 
that information in the file folder. And a lot of that is going to be for examiners. The more paper 
the better, that’s the way they look at it. In other words, we may have had the approval 20 
documents ago. We’re good there. We have to take it to a different level to demonstrate to 
another set of eyes that are totally objective to look at it and say, OK, I can see why they said 
yes. And the documentation is the same way. The only problem is that these regulations is that 
they cannot make the consumer read them. They try. Otherwise, they’d put the signature line at 
the very front on the very top, and that’s as far as the customer will go. 
 
They look at them, but they’re not reading them. They do a study and they try to find out what 
percentage, you know – and depending on what study – in these controlled environments, when 
they’re observing customers, sure they’re reading them, because they want their 10 dollars at the 
end of the day. But the consumer consumers, who try to help these regulations, as far as what 
information to put in the disclosure, where the signature lines could be. They’re over thinking it. 
If they would just put a simplified version of what needs to be in there, a signature line for the 
acknowledgement, regardless of where it is – but evidently, these are confusing topics to 
borrowers, outside what the interest rate is, what’s the payment amount, and when it’s due. All 
the rest of those terms and conditions are not going to apply to nine out of ten borrowers. 
 
When a new rule comes down – how do you write a policy and procedure for it? 
 
We’ll go directly to the escrow. That’s the most recent one that we’ve had to employ bank wide. 
On paper, it sounds very simple. That’s a good idea. You should have the bank collect that each 
month and then pay it in full when it comes due. What you run into is that maybe somebody 
starts paying on the halves or partial payments. That escrow is where you take the requirement, 
the law, regulation, you figure out, OK, this is what we need to do, how do we introduce it here, 
and implement it? It takes procedures. It takes training. Not only with your lending staff, but 
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your tellers and those that are receiving payments. And then also, you’ve got to have – not really 
an audit going on, but some accounting going on. At this point, we probably run about 45 escrow 
accounts, and over a 3 year period, that’s a lot to have taken on and to implement, so you’re 
handling those monies. So you get up to the tens of thousands of dollars. You have taxes that 
come due at the same time of the year. Your property taxes are paid out in September. But you 
have the other 365 days of the year where insurance comes due and premiums need to be paid. 
And you need to implement that part of the process. Not only the disclosure to the customer. You 
have to collect the money – initially, to start out with – and also on a monthly basis. And then, 
you’ve got to, sometime throughout a year’s period, get that information to the customer in the 
form of a statement. So here’s a copy that I’m going to send you. This is where it gets really 
confusing to the consumer. They receive a copy of their initial escrow account. They receive a 
copy – which the initial escrow account statement is a projection – then you have the actual, and 
then the forecasted. So they’re getting three different statements. If you receive that in the mail, 
unless, they’re just – you know – huge crayon or something’s highlighted at the top – it tells you 
which statement is which, but there’s some confusion there, and I think a lot of people just throw 
their hands up and say they’re at the lender’s mercy, I hope they’re good guys and ladies. I hope 
they’re honest. I hope they’re handling my escrow account the way they should be.  
 
But how did you develop the procedure? 
 
Just manually. Really. Through a discussion.  
 
You’ll sit down and right your own? 
 
Oh yeah. We just – usually a little brain trust meeting of those that are going to be handling it. 
What’s the simplest way to put the requirements into place. Let’s get to point A to point  B the 
shortest route. Not make it very difficult. We talk about it, and we write out those procedures. 
Present them to the board. And then it becomes the plan, policy, and procedure.  
 
Pull them offline? 
 
It depends on the personality, probably, of that compliance officer or department or their board. 
Or the scope or size of their bank. It may be more difficult to just take a legal pad and pencil and 
get it done in an afternoon. It may take more doing on their end. They probably feel compelled to 
copy a larger institution’s procedures. A lot of smaller banks will take the bigger institutions 
templates that have been posted on line and water them down. But the worst thing you can do in 
those situations is to have one that’s too encompassing. That’s not relevant to your size of bank. 
Examiners will spot that in a second.  
 
Escrowing was kind of one where there’s clear cut rules on that. But let’s say, your requirement 
on the qualified mortgage side. That one’s going to be pretty much cut and dry. It’s going to be 
based on percentage, whether it’s a qualified mortgage. So most banks ought to be able to draw 
out their own procedures and make sure they’re compliant with that. Now, if they have branch 
lending, if they only have mortgages that can be originated in certain offices, then that’s going to 
be a little bit easier and more refined. I guess, really, the ones that banks feel compelled to short 
cut and either buy or borrow off of these networks and chat rooms are probably the ones that 
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they’re really running behind on or they have an exam coming up in a week or two, and they 
need to get something on the books, or in the cabinet, or in the policy file. They’ll short cut it.  
 
You’ve got a six or seven page liquidity policy, which is not really on the compliance side, but 
that’s a policy that most banks have to tailor way down because that’s a reflection of your 
balance sheet and your accounts. Your liquidity is really unique to your institution, so you really 
can’t use someone else’s. We had a situation to where we did borrow some crisis scenarios from 
some other banks and really were having a difficult time coming up with these crisis scenarios 
for certain elements – like a contingency funding plan. And the reason why it was difficult is 
because we operate on about a 60 percent liquidity, which means that we’re not very loaned up. 
We have a lot of investments, and just because the loan demand is historically low here. And 
then those in smaller communities that borrow from you, usually, they don’t want to pay you a 
lot of interest, so they try to pay their loans back quickly. So we didn’t really have any liquidity 
crisis scenarios that we could think of. So we had to reach out and say, OK, we’re not going to 
run out of money overnight, unless there’s a bigger picture issue, like a run on banks. That’s not 
an isolated occurrence, that’s a national wide ordeal. No plan would even help you then. That’s 
where we had to get out on these sites and say, for a small bank, can we see your contingency 
funding plan crisis scenarios.  
 
Relationships. 
 
Well, it goes more on not so much a relationship but a reputation. They do keep separate little 
secret files on the bank, on the employees, on the staff. Is this person easy to sit down and talk to, 
or is he difficult? So the personality of that – you have to be able to establish a good report with 
the examiner just because you’re going to be discussing issues that are going to be critical. 
They’re going to be – not really accusatory, but some are, they’re trying to make name for 
themselves – you don’t ever want to really just get off the track with an examination team just 
because … some banks probably view it as an adversarial relationship. You know, we’ve never 
taken that approach. There’s been exams that have probably not gone as well based on our policy 
or our procedures. But whenever they can peel back the layers of that onion to figure out, well, 
this is why the bank does it – maybe they got off the interpretation – but they were consistent and 
they enforced that regulation incorrectly, but they went to a T all the way through. So they can 
see that you have good procedures, so they know it’s not a difficult fix. They go back to the very 
beginning, tweak a few things, and then just handle it the same way, but do it this way. They 
have a pretty good comfort level. I don’t really know when a bank can get off on a wrong foot. I 
think a lot of times it’s more unintentional. But I can certainly see how it happens. You’re 
dealing with a human element. You’ve got to have a banker that’s in a good mood. But then you 
also have examiners that have to be as well. It’s, a lot of times, personalities get in the way. And 
that’s where that examiner in charge really has to step in and say, you know what – to an 
examiner – we’ve had those situations where they’ve pulled an examiner aside and said, you’re 
really going beyond what the scope of the exam is. 
 
Do you use examiners as a resource? As a type of consultant? 
 
Really, the things, from our perspective, that we’ll bounce off them are more on the safety and 
soundness issue. You guys are going to criticize something when you come in the door – 
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everybody knows that – you have to find something, or you’re not doing your job. We don’t 
want to draw attention to this area, but we want to point out that this is how we’re going to 
handle it. This has changed. Bankers are inclined to do that. You guys are writing the rules. 
We’re on an unknown playing field. We’re at your mercy. We’ll throw this out there, and say, 
how is this going to be handled by you guys. The FDIC – you really have to have a good 
relationship with your compliance examiners to get a response. They try to respond, but the 
examiners that are out in the field. They’re already on to the bank, and they won’t respond to an 
email. The golden rule is: get it in writing. Everyone will tell you – Jack HOlzknecht, Mary Beth 
Guard – anyone who has been in that role or handles it: if you don’t have it in writing, you don’t 
have it. So if you get an interpretation from an examiner on a regulation, and you do something 
based on that response, you’re better off to put a copy of that email right in the very front of that 
loan file. So they can see, this is how they did it, and this is why.  
 
You have to be creative on how you obtain those – unless it’s cut and dry. But if they have to 
give their interpretation – a lot of times, the people will assume the regulators have read these 
regulations. They haven’t. They either haven’t had a chance. Or it’s not on the hot topics list. To 
give an example – back in 2010 when the new HUD settlement changed – December 31 was the 
deadline for the requirement, however, we had an examination in the first couple of weeks in 
January, and the examiners in the field said, you know, point blank, have you closed any real 
estate loans with this new statement? They didn’t even wait for a yes or no. It was “Because we 
haven’t had any training in that, and we’re having to scan and email and fax over to headquarters 
or the field office so they can look them over.” So they had no idea. They’re out in the field to 
enforce it, and it is a requirement, it’s just they hadn’t received all the proper tools.  
 
Everybody knows they do it – they usually run about 3 to 6 months behind on the 
implementation. Now, they’re all up to speed on it, and it’s very easy for them. So there was a 
couple of months there when certainty, certainly on the bankers side – there’s a massive change 
– and a lot of heavy handed rules coming down – but yet, it was very poorly written. The Q&A 
section on the HUD website on the new form – they had to remove it because it got up to 300 
questions. So if you have a well written instruction, you wouldn’t get up to 300 responses to the 
Q&As. So they just removed it. They stopped it. Eventually, they took it off because it was just a 
disaster. It was tough – you go to these little seminars or webinars now on properly completing 
the HUD settlement statement at that time, and you were getting so many different points of 
view. If you went to one sponsored by a closing company, it was this and you got this feeling. 
Then you’d go to one the OBA puts on, and you’d go, well gosh, we’re going to quit doing real 
estate loans. No one can do this. Then you get back to your office; you start plugging it in; you 
just realize it takes a little more time. Nobody likes it because it was different.  
 
And bankers aren’t the only ones guilty of that because they have to read everything, and they 
have to know it, too. They’re right there along fighting that battle.  
 
Cost? Expense & opportunity cost. What about expenses? 
 
It’s unfortunate, and the shareholders and the board would probably like to hear that I spend 
more time on the money making elements of the bank. Unfortunately, I don’t. That’s where the 
smaller institutions suffer. In this particular setup here, I make 90 percent of the loans, but I’m 
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also the compliance officer. So how do you juggle those responsibilities? Compliance comes 
first. I want to sit down with the share holders and safety and soundness – they want to hear that 
the compliance is done and everything’s good, but let’s get back to the money side.  
 
On my percentage – I probably spend about 80 percent of my time on compliance. For someone 
in a bank that just has compliance responsibilities, you’d want to hear that they spend 100 
percent of their time on compliance. But when you have 5 different titles, because that’s what I 
carry. Compliance is a daily obligation, but it doesn’t always take daily oversight.  
 
What about the monitoring activities, like with BSA? 
 
Yeah, those are done on daily. Your tellers have to be knowledgeable about what amounts 
trigger documentation.  
 
What do you spend on compliance? 
 
Our situation, you probably have to factor in lost opportunity or lost income – but just a dollar 
figure, hardline cost, on seminars, say about $5,000 a year on training. That doesn’t include, 
necessarily, your software programs, that you pay maintenance fees, and your licensing. There’s 
another $3,000 for renewal. If you’re going brand new with a software system, a platform that 
will give you those documents, you’re going to spend about $12 to $17 thousand dollars because 
it’s based on asset size. To get into the banking industry right now. Say you used to bake pies for 
a living and you want to get in and start a bank, you’re going to have to factor a lot of cost to get 
up and running. You’re going to have to assemble a staff, who get trained by somebody else, and 
that person’s going to know that that person is pretty highly educated in that field, and they’re 
going to demand a pretty good salary. And compliance is one of those things that you really do – 
it’s almost like security on the IT side – you can be as secure as the amount of check you want to 
write. You can be as compliant. You can be rated a 2 or an adequate on the compliance ratings 
side – that gets you by. You’re making examiners happy. You have fairly good program. You 
may be a little bit behind in some areas, but it’s your goal – it’s on your timeline to get it 
addressed. But to be strong in all three areas, you’ve got to put some effort into it. The 
examiners, I think,  appreciate it when they can see on the bank side that they really do strive. 
What’s the intent of the bank? Is it to get by, or is it to be helpful and good to the customers and 
be compliant? You can achieve both, it just takes a little more effort. 
 
Any opportunity costs? Products/services you’d offer that you don’t? 
 
We’re more stubborn than that. We will continue doing it and we will take the hard road. 
Because, we’re not in a market or an area that we can really afford to cherry pick what we want 
to do. Mortgage lending is an easy one that we could have kicked aside. Banks bigger than us 
have done this – two or three times our size have just abandoned mortgage lending because they 
didn’t want to deal with the requirements. It’s still one of the best investments in the market for a 
lender. But you’ve got to have an idea what you’re going to replace that with – if you’re going to 
get rid of 50 percent of your loan portfolio and not originate those loans any more, what are you 
going to put in its place to make money? 
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What’s the difference between you and the bank in the panhandle that has ditched loans? 
You’re in the same type of community – but you decide to make a go of it and they 
haven’t? 
 
It’s really, what are you going to replace that with? And, are you servicing your customers and 
your community by abandoning a certain product that’s needed everywhere? They look at it 
from, not only, what we need to survive, but what does your community and your core base of 
customers need? Because if we only made Mercedes automobile loans here, we wouldn’t be 
servicing what a majority of our customers needed. Your examiners would see that, too. And that 
would be more from the CRA – the community reinvestment act – is the bank really servicing 
the community where they’re taking their deposits. So that’s another issue the panhandle bank 
would have to answer. I’ll take your deposit, and I’ll loan it out at another branch location, but 
I’m not going to make you a home loan because we stopped doing that. And there’s not really 
any discrimination there, but there’s other issues when you abandon a product. You better have a 
pretty good reason and be able to illustrate that it’s not profitable.  
 
The burden’s on the bank to illustrate how that’s not profitable. Because you’re likely to 
encounter some fee income. You’re likely to encounter some other business products. A 
checking account is considered – it’s mislabeled, it’s not free money, because you don’t pay 
interest – but the cost of maintaining a checking account is a cost. But you can get that money 
and invest it in other things. A bank would really be hard pressed to say, just because we didn’t 
want to mess with it anymore, that’s the truth. Now they could probably pain a scenario to where 
it didn’t look profitable to do it, but they’d be hard pressed, the further you got into it, to show 
that it wasn’t profitable. Now, if you just say, you don’t have the staff or you can’t devote that 
many resources, in most examinations, regulators aren’t going to argue that much because they 
know it’s a burdensome task. Now, if I made 50 loans in a year that were all non-compliant, that 
had fines attached to them, and I had a bunch of Reg Z violations, which are tied to money and 
compensation and reimbursement-based fines, that could really be a non-profitable situation. So I 
could see how the bank is going to say, we’re going to stop doing it. And the regulators would be 
in agreement. They’ll give you a cease and desist order to stop doing it until you get better 
training. We’ll tell you when you can get back into lending.  
 
Interview 15: 
 
Banks switching over to state charters. Have you thought about that? 
 
It’s always been a national bank. It’s been a family-owned bank since 1919. And there was a 
time there when he was thinking about switching over to a state bank several years ago but 
decided he would just stay a national bank.  
 
Regulated by the OCC.  How would you characterize that relationship? 
 
There was a time that they put us in with Wichita, one of the banks in Alva was switched up 
there. When they were switching territories around. Most Oklahoma banks were still out of 
Oklahoma City, but they put us into Wichita with the OCC up there. And that was different. 
We’re fixing to have an exam here in a couple of weeks. This will be our second exam with the 
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OCC back in Oklahoma City, and it’s much better to be examined by the Oklahoma regulators – 
they know Oklahoma. The one that’s usually the head of the group that comes here as bank 
examiners – Kyle’s been here.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? 
 
Just by reading and by staying up on some of the legal briefs, newspapers that we get. Or OCC 
will send out bulletins. Of course, there’s no internet banking here. There’s no online. All of our 
posting is online. The compliance that way, we don’t have any of that extra compliance. Through 
the BSA, we’d know all of our customers. Anybody can walk through the door, and we can call 
them by name.  
 
For a small bank, it’s really difficult. Of course, this is kind of a low-technology bank. Simple in 
nature. So there’s a lot of that stuff that doesn’t apply. But we know what we have to deal with 
and the regulations that go along with that. I get lots of emails from the OBA, ICBA, community 
bankers, you know. And they pretty much keep you up on what’s coming. I depend a lot on 
examiners. I really do. There’s no way that a small bank can keep up with it. The big banks have 
a hard time keeping up with it. A lot of times, I’ll just wait for an examination and wait for them 
to tell me. Well, you know, yeah, I can get that done. We can do that. But boy, I sure wasn’t 
aware of that. Which is true. That’s generally the case.  
 
I don’t read through regs. If I have a legal question, OBA has legal staff. You can go there. Other 
banking organizations have the same thing. There’s legal stuff that comes out every month, in 
the OBA newspapers that they send out. Legal issues – those are easy to keep up with, you 
know. But it’s literally impossible to sit down with and go through regs. It really is. I generally, 
through other sources, I can get what I need. Generally speaking. Sometimes, like I said, we just 
have to wait for examiners to tell us.  
 
Do you use consultants? 
 
We have an internal auditor – she audits all the various functions of the bank. We also, about 
every 18 months or so, we’re also on a schedule with our internal auditor. Well, they do pretty 
much just a director’s audit. We can get by with it, and it meets OCC criteria. It’s just a 
director’s audit. And it doesn’t go into – those CPAs – they don’t deal with bank regs, you know. 
And whether or not we’re complying, they just do a basic director’s audit of the bank. 
 
So the examination is your consultancy? 
 
That could be.  
 
Do you think examiners’ attitudes have changed? Does that help them help you? 
 
They’re going to help. Where banks get crossways – we’ve always gotten along fine with 
examiners. And now, we’ve been back and forth – we were with Wichita for a while, and now 
we’re back with Oklahoma City – they can be awfully difficult. Particularly with banks that have 
problems, you know. They’ll sure – they can sure be tough and difficult. But a bank like this, and 
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there’s a good many of them around the state and this area, and don’t have a lot of classified 
loans and inventory on their books, repoed inventory and other real estate owned and all that 
kind of stuff. So those banks, it’s a little different. They treat you different. We’re among the 
safest banks in Oklahoma as far as classified loans go and general safety and soundness. What 
you asked a minute ago about my background – I graduated OSU in 72 with a BS in wildlife 
management.  
 
You’ve been doing a good job. 
 
Lisa has a business degree. She worked at a bank at Jet before she came here, and I kind of stole 
her. I went to Texas with the parks and wildlife and came back here.  
 
Why not a state bank? 
 
There was a time when we looked at changing to a state charter. In fact, I don’t’ really want to 
say anything against the state banking department – but I just ran into problems with them. I 
terminated the process, and this bank has always been a national bank. Started as a national bank. 
National banks are, to my way of thinking, a cut above state banks. I think the Oklahoma 
Banking Department is good in what they do, but I just think it would have been a big mistake if 
I would have followed through with it. There are some advantages with a national bank charter. 
There’s advantageous both ways. I’ve always kind of held the opinion that you get what you pay 
for, and I’ll leave it at that. 
 
Best practices for examinations? What do you do well? 
 
Compliance and policies are a big deal. Compliance with the various regs that we’re required to 
– takes annual approval of those – there’s a certain list of them, of important regs. Interest on 
deposits. Privacy. BSA. Reg O – for officers and directors. CRA, lending limits. There’s about 
ten or twelve regs that they usually hone in on to make sure you got your annual. BSA – anti 
money laundering. And then, in addition to that, it’s going to be loans, documentation, 
inspections (livestock and equipment), cashflows on larger borrowers, tax returns, financial 
statements, filings, lien filings, that sort of thing. IT – our computer operation, our mainframe, is 
always a big one. IT would be separate from compliance issues, for the most part. They just, 
want to make sure that you’re electronic operation, your computer operation is safe.  
 
Procedures are important? What’s a procedure? 
 
On complying with it?  
 
Yes.  
 
There’s a policy in place to comply with the reg. For the most part. And the examiners always 
want to see these policies. We want to see copies of your policies. There’s a loan policy, an 
investment policy. Lots of other policies. Policies that cover other things besides compliance.  
 
But the procedure? 
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Well, yeah, but in reality, we don’t do that. In practice. A small bank has advantages over larger 
banks. We deal with people we’ve delt with for 30 years. They walk in my office, one on one, I 
type it up, and out they go. You don’t find that in the larger community banks, like in Enid. 
That’s just the way it works here. We don’t have to go through – now, with a new borrower, yes, 
we run a credit report, and go through the whole thing. Tax returns, bank statements, we have to 
keep that updated on everyone, for the most part. But those things like that, we’ve done it so 
long, we have a loan committee. If there’s a loan that we have, for some reason, need some 
additional input on it. And all new borrowers go the loan committee. For the day to day lending, 
there’s not a lot of decision making unless it’s something out of the ordinary. 
 
We don’t make mortgages – now, we’ll make agricultural mortgages on unimproved land. We 
don’t make any home loans. No residential. We had to get out. We used to make them – but with 
the meltdown and everything, they just made it so difficult, I had to get out.  
 
On procedures, again. 
 
They want to see them written down. But not particularly – we’ve got a loan policy, a general 
loan policy that is our guide – the types of loans we can do. How much in general terms we’ll 
loan on something. But it’s general guidelines like that. Yeah, they want to see it in writing. But 
as far as checklists – we know the liens we’ve got to file. We know this. We know that. You just 
do that. In addition, it’s in the policy as well. 
 
What’s the difference between a good policy and bad policy? 
 
Well, it’s got to just meet their criteria. And they’ll tell you. If something’s missing, trust me, 
they’ll tell you. That’s the only way I know to answer this question. If it’s a bad policy, you’ll 
hear about it. There’s certain things they want to see in there, and they’ve got to be there.  
 
Are there regulation changes on the horizon that you’re having to develop new 
procedures? 
 
No. Not really.  
 
So when Dodd-Frank gets passed, it doesn’t affect you too much? 
 
Not too much.  
 
What’s the reason for that? You seem to be copacetic with the whole thing. 
 
Well, for the most part. But there’s some truth to that. I wonder if Washington isn’t trying to put 
a lot of the small banks out of business. Yeah, I think that’s a given. So I’m not – in that regard, 
well, I’m just not a big a fan of the U.S. government as I used to be.  
 
Is it because of the products and services you’re offering – that they’re the same, so you 
don’t run into a lot of constraints? 
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That’s true. We don’t have internet banking, so there’s a whole range of things that we don’t 
have to deal with. We do provide basic products, debit cards, and that sort of thing. But there’s 
no e-banking. That gets us out of a lot of stuff. The bigger banks are just into so many different 
other things. They have fiduciary capabilities, trust departments, lots of other stuff. Our 
examiners are good. They look at everything. But the bigger banks are so much more complex. 
They’re into so many different things. Different investments. Different product scenario.  
 
How much performance is related to the cost of regulation? 
 
In a way, its had a huge impact over the last five years. With interest rates – what we can go out 
there and get, like overnight fed funds are like .2. The artificial pushdown on the rates for this 
long a period has definitely impacted our earnings. We’ve continued to make money, but it’s 
sure been nothing like what we used to do, under just a normal type of interest rate. They 
artificially push those rates down. They create bigger problems down the road. There’s going to 
be a reckoning one of these days. It’ll probably be pretty bloody. 
 
Are there products you’ve quit offering? 
 
Well, of course, the mortgage loans come to mind. That was a compliance issue. We had some 
mortgage loans pending when they came down with the regs, and I just ended it. I really can’t 
think of anything else in particular.  
 
Overdraft? 
 
Oh, that was something we had to deal with, and we did. We have a overdraft protection program 
set up. On the consumer side, that was a big deal, and we had to comply with it. It was some 
effort to do that, but we got it done.  
 
Conflict between customer service and compliance?  
 
Yeah, you know, I’m sure there are those cases where it has some effect. But I don’t know. I 
would say it was minimal. 
 
Relationships? 
 
Well, yeah. If you have a question about something, you can pick up the phone and call. They 
may have to go to their legal department, and they generally say, let me check on that. But they 
do. They will. You want a good report with them. OCC is our regulatory agency, so they’re our 
examiners and our regulators. We don’t really deal with anybody else. We don’t deal with those 
people.  
 
What about the relationship during the examinations? 
 
You want to be straight forward and very truthful with them. We just try to treat them like 
anybody else. Like our customers who come in the door. They appreciate that. When they make 
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their request or tell you need to do something, you do it. You don’t give them a hard time about 
it, you know? Certainly, you can stand up for yourself if they have a question about a loan and 
they don’t like something, it’s up to you to defend it. You don’t just roll over. We just try to be 
nice. You’re defeating yourself if you approach it any other way.  
 
I’m sure there are bankers that give them a hard time. I would think so, that there would be. I 
would say probably the banks that have other troubles, there’s more of that.  
 
I heard a story once, not that long ago, it was here in Oklahoma. They went into the bank, and 
one of the cocky kind of loan officers just popped off. Said something like, we always charge 
women and minorities more. Something – he was just popping off. He was being sarcastic – oh 
yeah, we discriminate. And oh my gosh, he said that to one of the examiners, and they threw a fit 
and put that bank on all sorts of regulatory difficulties. They can kick me out of the bank. They 
are all powerful.  
 
Do you see a lot of consistency between exams? 
 
I think both. Typically, there’s a lot of consistency, but examiners do what they’re told. They do 
what Washington tells them they have to do. So they’re under the same thing, basically, from 
Washington that we’re under with them. 
 
How receptive is the OCC to what you want? 
 
You just do your best to defend it (a loan rating disagreement). In the end, you just accept their 
classification. And in most instances – and it goes back to, is this bank safe and sound or not? – it 
goes back to that. If they classify a loan, yeah, I can see some deficiency there. I generally – oh 
back, there was a time when we didn’t do cashflows. And I kind of had a problem with them on 
that, when we were at Wichita, and it’s like, oh, gosh, we’ve known these people for 30 years. I 
see it every day. But still, you’ve got to have livestock inspections, machinery inspections, you 
need to do cashflows. Well, you know, eventually you do it. But you kind of mitigate it if you 
can. We have a $100,000 limit – anything larger than that, we have to do a cashflow on that. 
That’s placated them, and they’re fine with that. That’s in our loan policy.  
 
How have you gotten better at doing compliance? 
 
You know, you just get a feel for it over time. Regulatory guidance and requirements, you have 
to change with those. The hot topics, there’s always a hot topic. Something like the mortgage 
loans, and those always come along. So you just – I guess you just gain that over time from 
several different directions.  
 
What’s the difference between you and that small community bank that closed due to 
regulation? 
 
Banking has changed. It’s tougher. Everything has gotten tougher. The regulatory burden – that’s 
probably – you finally reach a point where you go golly, this small community bank, the 
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regulatory burden and the costs associated with it has reached the point to where it is too difficult 
for us to continue and you sell out. That’s the biggest issue without a doubt.  
 
Why are you still here? Why haven’t you sold out? 
 
I’ve got a good compliance officer and a good vice president. In our simple banking is certainly 
an asset in that regard. So far, we’ve been able to handle it. It’s tougher, yeah. A lot of things are 
tougher. But we’re not in that group of banks that just can’t do it anymore. I survive OK. Lisa 
and I – here we are in our little world, and we do OK. But if I went to Oklahoma City with some 
bank, I probably wouldn’t survive.  
 
What’s your attitude toward regulation? 
 
There’s no question that banks are overregulated. There’s always that knee jerk reaction out of 
Washington. When some big bubble comes up, they’re going to fix it, and all they end up doing 
is screwing it up. And they end up doing the exact opposite of what their intent was. They just 
make it more difficult on the customer. Just like us – we used to do a lot of mortgages here in 
down. We didn’t have any foreclosures. We’ve taken over maybe two houses in thirty years. One 
was a trailer, one was a home. But it’s, yeah, the regulatory burden is huge. 
 
Does it serve a valid function? 
 
Certainly it does. But they always overdo it. Always. They always overdo it. They try to fix 
something and end up making it much more difficult or worse. That’s my opinion about that.  
  
 
Interview 16: 
 
This is my first savings and loan. Are you subject to the same set of regulations that 
national banks are? 
 
The same. In fact, The bank across the street has examiners right now, OCC, and they’re the 
same set that just did us a month or so ago. They’re there now.  
 
What’s your background? 
 
I’m president of the bank. Been here 31 years. Came here right out of graduation from Oklahoma 
State. Double degree in accounting and ag economics.  
 
Do you have a CPA? 
 
No.  
 
Have you always been at this bank? 
 
Yes. 
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Is it a family business? 
 
No. We’re a little bit different form of animal that you’ll find compared to other commercial 
banks. We’re a mutual form of ownership. I don’t know if you’ve come across that or not. It’s 
similar to like a coop, in that we’re owned by our members, or our people who do business with 
us. So there’s no shareholders.  
 
In terms of your regulatory environment? The OCC – is anyone else involved? 
 
The OCC is our primary regulator. Every bank is also subject to FDIC because they provide 
insurance of accounts. They ultimately have the right to come in an examine us. But they’ll 
accept whatever the OCC says. 
 
Would you say the folks at the OCC tend to help, hurt? 
 
I guess, kind of neutral. And not just the OCC – the regulatory environment is overwhelming, 
and it’s getting worse by the day. There is another agency, it’s relatively new, again, every bank 
is subject to, and that’s the CFPB. They are just going wild writing regulations. And it seems like 
we get emails – and every little bit, your email will ding, and it’s something from them that 
they’ve written a new regulation. For small banks, in particular, it’s getting to be overwhelming 
and just hard to manage. Larger banks that have a staff that handles compliance, it’s still got to 
be overwhelming for them, but at least that’s their job everyday when they come to work. That’s 
compliance. Whereas, a small bank, we’ve got to wear a lot of hats.  
 
How does compliance work here?  
 
I do a lot of that myself. I try to pass off some things. Try to help out. It’s probably not as 
structured or formal as it would be in a large bank. We address things as they come down the 
pike. 
 
Do you deal mostly with them? 
 
Yes. Part of that is, we’ve just hired another young man here, it’s his third year, in those three 
years, it takes a long time to get up to speed, so he’s still relatively new at the process.  
 
How do you know what the rulebook is? 
 
We don’t.  
 
Everybody keeps saying that.  
 
Nobody knows. The congress that accepted it didn’t know what was in it. Part of it is you have 
education things – you go to seminars. You read periodicals and things of that nature, and they 
tell you the things that they’ve gleaned out of it that are really applicable to us. And that’s what 
we have to rely upon. 
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Of your time, how much is spent reading the law? 
 
I don’t know. Five percent, maybe.  
 
So you do do some. 
 
Yes, I have to.  
 
In terms of knowing what the rules are, what are some of the other things you rely on? 
 
I get a lot of emails. We’re members of various trade organizations. The OBA, the regional trade 
organization called Heartland Community Bankers, and we’re members of the ABA. All of those 
duplicate the same task of sorting through things. And the things that are relatively important. So 
it’s emails, seminars. Periodicals that come across the desk. Things like that.  
 
The OBA does regulation workshop once a year. How much of that do you participate in? 
 
Usually two or three a year. On different topics. 
 
Regulators themselves put on workshops. Do you use those? 
 
A little bit. To me, their’s aren’t as helpful as some of the others.  
 
What about consultants? 
 
Well, we don’t have any outside consultants. We’ve just – just the trade organizations. And of 
course, the people they use for these seminars are consultants.  
 
What about folks like Jack Holzknecht and Mary Beth Guard? 
 
Well, Mary Beth Guard is a free service through the OBA. He’s actually part of – I think it’s the 
same one – if it’s the same person I’m thinking of, his firm is called Pegasus, and there’s at least 
three people who are speakers, regular speakers, that are part of that firm. I’ve listened to Jack, 
and I’ve been to several of his seminars, and another guy who does BSA.  
 
New rules come out – are there other ways you know about new rules? 
 
Like I said, these speakers and these periodicals. 
 
In terms of your performance, what portion is influenced by regulation? 
 
The main thing is just taking our time. Expense wise, I don’t know if you can put a number to it. 
Being kind of informal, we just have to address it. There’s things they won’t let you do and real 
restrictive on normal business. 
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Are there products and services you’d be offering if it weren’t for regulation? 
 
Right now, I wouldn’t say that there are. There are some that we currently offer that are 
jeopardized, but it looks like we’re going to be OK on. Some of what they’ve thrown out would 
really be devastating to us if they go through. 
 
Do you do home loans? 
 
Yes. 
 
And January, qualified mortgages hit. 
 
Yeah.  
 
In terms of compliance, and say the examination, how do you succeed at the compliance 
exam?  
 
All these regulations that we’re talking about – they come in. One of the things that has changed 
with OCC is they don’t necessarily look at everything when they come in. They expect – well, 
let’s go back to your previous question about expense – we are now required to have quarterly 
audits by an outside firm. And so we have to pay for that, and it’s fairly substantial.  
 
Compliance audits? 
 
Yeah. We were with a prior regulator, being a savings and loan. There was an office of thrift 
supervision and they went away, and the OCC took their place for us. With OTS, they would 
look at all those regulations and things themselves. OCC comes in and says, we don’t have time 
for that. You’ve got to hire these outside auditors, and so we have people who come in quarterly 
who look at – there’s a long list of regulations, and they’ll take this many this quarter, and then 
another group the next quarter, and so on. We have to pay for that. And then, when OCC comes 
in, all they basically look at is that company’s reviews.  
 
The OCC – does that enable them to focus on safety and soundness? 
 
They say so. They contend that frees them up. 
 
How long has this been the case? First time I’ve heard that OCC requires audits. 
 
It was new to us, but they say they’ve always required it.  
 
I’ve only recently figured out that policies and procedures play a big role.  
 
Oh my.  
 
Nobody brings them up. Maybe it’s because they’re taken for granted. Help me as a guy 
who’s trying to figure it out. What is a policy? What is a procedure? 
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That’s just a list of policies (pointing to computer screen). And it goes on and on. And every time 
they come in for an exam, they want a new policy, or they want something added to it. You 
know, it gets pretty ridiculous with things that you would just ordinarily do through the course of 
business. To me, the downfall of policies is that the only people who read those are the 
examiners. And that’s about the only time they look at it – is at exam time. From exam time to 
exam time, every 18 months, they sit stale. Granted, I can see where what they’re wanting you to 
do is to write down what you’re going to do and what you’re not going to do, and if you do 
something that’s not in that policy, they’re going to hang you with it.  
 
What’s the difference between a good policy and a bad policy? What makes them smile? 
 
They’re always going to find something. That’s their job. They’re going to find something. Of 
course, no bank can disclose their ratings, but we’re a highly rated bank and I can say that they 
are always going to find something. That’s just the nature of things.  
 
But specifically – what’s a good policy? What don’t they like? 
 
Like I say, if you have an investment policy, they’re going to want you to have certain limits on 
where you will invest your money. That you’re only going to invest so much in this company. In 
other words, you’re not going to have all your eggs in one basket. You’re going to have limits on 
your margins. Interest rate risk is a big thing that they’re concerned about. So they want you to 
have monitoring policies and procedures in place to do that. And if you get outside those 
guidelines, they’re going to want to know what you’re going to do to fix it. Same with capital. 
Every bank is required to have a certain level of capital. Say you have to have a capital plan, if 
you started losing money and got down to low net worth, they’re going to want to know what 
you’re going to do to fix it. 
 
When do you make a mistake? Why would you go counter to your policy? 
 
Well, you’re just human. Human error. It’s like, I’ve heard people say, if you don’t make a 
mistake, you’re not doing anything. There’s going to be mistakes made. Generally, if your 
examiners are good, they’re not going to write you up for a mistake. They’re looking for an 
overall program that’s out of whack. One of the policies that’s the most scrutinized – it’s just a 
huge deal – is the BSA. That, again, is one if they come in and find some little deal that you 
haven’t done right, the program itself says they’re not supposed to be critical of that. If the whole 
process is out of whack, they’re going to be highly critical, and they can even fine you.  
 
Procedures, then, are where the rubber meets the road. What’s a good procedure and a 
bad procedure? 
 
I guess, just one that leads to the wrong results (would be a bad procedure). If you have decent 
procedures in place that’s got checks and balances, it’s going to work at the end of the day. Then 
it worked. If it doesn’t work, you’ve got to change that procedure and figure out a way to make it 
work. One of the things that helps us here, I said we’re a pretty high rated bank, we’ve had a 
longevity of people. Even though we’re a very small bank, me and the president across the street 
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– even though we’re competitors, we’re friends, and we talk – and he for some reason has gone 
through a cycle of losing people. And it’s just frustrating, you know, because, then, if you don’t 
have the people who’ve had the experience and gone through this, and you’re trying to teach not 
just one but several people at the same time. It’s easy to not have those procedures in place.  
 
I imagine turnover would be a big issue.  
 
Yeah, it can be good and bad. And sometimes, the longer we’ve been here, the longer we get 
ingrained. You don’t want to change with what the regulator’s telling you to do.  
 
Do you ever ignore policy in favor for customer service? 
 
Not a lot. To me, I think a lot of times, like you say, it helps being in a small community where 
you do help people. That way, like making loans, you have a pretty good handle on who you can 
trust and who you can’t. Of course, that’s what the regulators want is good procedures for 
approving people and part of that is knowing them. 
 
When a new rule comes down – how do you develop policies/procedures? 
 
A lot of it is just – language, what you find out – you learn what examiners are looking for. And 
they’re wanting to see the same terms that were in that regulation. So a lot of it is just going 
through there and picking up what they’re saying, and you know you’re going to be OK if you 
use their language, it’s going to work.  
 
So you write them yourself? 
 
Yep. 
 
Have you ever thought about pulling them offline? 
 
I don’t know. I think it could be, but you know, I guess, to me, examiners – if I was an examiner, 
I’d frown on that, because, you know, if you’re just using a cookie-cutter type deal, it’s not going 
to be appropriate for every bank. Our policy should be different from those across the street, to 
an extent.  
 
In the time you’ve been here, have you gotten better at policies and procedures? 
 
I hope so. Over time. I don’t know if – just to get – it has got to be so many more. The president 
who was here before me, we just talk about how much it’s grown and they never take away 
anything. It’s just everything has expanded.  
 
Any tangible ways in which you’ve gotten better? 
 
I think just experience, you know. And learning what the examiner’s looking for. Of course, 
every examiner comes in – is a little different. And they come in looking for something different. 
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We’ve learned that with – like I mentioned, we had OTS, and OCC is different. They look at 
things differently. You have to look at things in the way they’re going to be looking at it. 
 
Consistency between examination teams? 
 
Again, going back to OTS – because we’ve only had OCC exams so far … 
 
How long did OTS go away? 
 
Just about three years ago. Like I said, we’ve only had two OCC exams. Just finished one a 
couple of months ago. The one before that was 18 months prior. Prior to that was OTS. To 
answer your question, OTS was awful about being consistent because those teams came from all 
over the United States. The last OTS exam we had was a team from California – they knew 
nothing about farming or agriculture or anything like that. It was a fiasco trying to explain why 
we did what we did. I’ll say this for OCC – the two exams we’ve had so far, they have been 
more consistent. They come out of Oklahoma City, for the most part, and even the people have 
been consistent.  
 
Do you think your OTS experienced prepared you for compliance? 
 
No. It just made us bitter. Bitter instead of better. Because they’d just – they didn’t understand. 
And trying to put a square peg in a round hole. 
 
Ever think about turning to the state bank commission? 
 
In fact, we were a state chartered institution, and we were having to pay, at that time, OTS, we 
were having to pay OTS for examinations and we were having to pay a state fee as well. So we 
got to thinking, why are we doing this? So we dropped the state and we’re just now a federal 
association. So I’m not really familiar with doing it the other way because I think those people – 
if they’re state chartered banks, they’re still having to pay OCC, I think. You know, they may not 
have to pay – it may be different when we were with the OTC instead of the OCC, because of the 
OCC and being state chartered are kind of being the same thing. But we actually were a state 
charter institution and switched the other direction and saved money doing it. 
 
Who do you go to when you have disagreements with the OCC? 
 
It hasn’t been a problem for us because we don’t really have any problem loans, to speak of. If 
we had bad loans, like in the 80s – the 80s were a whole different ball game. 
 
Relationships? Your past good compliance? 
 
I think it surely helps, but I still think they come in. Part of what seems to be the deal, because 
there are no big issues, they start nit picking. They feel like they’ve got to find something. If they 
just walk out of here and say, great, they’ve got people to answer to, too. And it’ll look like they 
didn’t do their job. So they start nitpicking little things that shouldn’t amount to anything. 
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How do you handle that? 
 
It’s kind of frustrating. Not kind of. It is frustrating. Those things – they don’t come easy. It takes  
a lot of work to make sure everything’s run well. When they start nitpicking, you think, we work 
pretty hard at this. It’s frustrating.  
 
Are you proactive in communicating with regulators? 
 
Yeah. We check with them on things that may be questionable. We’ll call before we do 
something. We don’t want to come in at exam time and have them say, oh, you shouldn’t have 
done this. We want to know ahead of time. 
 
You don’t ever want to surprise the regulators. Have you gotten better at it? 
 
Yeah. I think just – that’s the way I was brought up with the prior president. It’s just kind of a – 
we’ve always, oh, I use this as an example from way back. There was a guy’s name – he was – 
Jack, another Jack – he was an OTS examiner, and he was known to be real hard nosed. But his 
sister lived up here in Aline, and she did business with us, as a matter of fact, and through his 
recommendation. He came in and just knew that we operated clean and when he came in here, it 
wasn’t a big deal. But a lot of other people thought he was just a bear. Was real hard to deal with. 
So we have always tried to do the right thing. That doesn’t mean examiners don’t find something 
that they can pick at or complain about.  
 
What are some of the best practices of exam time? 
 
Just having – they’ve always got a laundry list of what they want to see. Have those available for 
them. Easily readable and accessible. Things of that nature. 
 
Who handles the interaction? Other employees? 
 
Really not. This last exam, there was six of them and if one wasn’t in the door, there was one 
waiting at the door.  
 
Are there other folks – do you do training with staff? 
 
There is some. With all the regulatory change, that’s something we’re going to have to enhance 
and formalize. There are programs, and banks already do it. You can go on now and take a little 
test and watch a little video and take a little test. We’re going to have to implement that, get it 
going. Our training’s been less formal, and that’s something they want to see.  
 
Write a procedure or policy? How do you do it? Especially with the ambiguity? 
 
Oh just dig a little deeper and go to a seminar or something. Not all of that is applicable to us. 
 
Would you use the examiners as consultant? 
 
353 
 
That’s not really good. You’re looking for problems if you do that. If they go in there and you’ve 
done a lot of things wrong – some of them can be devastating because there are monetary fines. 
 
Are there products and services that you offered and don’t offer now? 
 
No. I don’t believe so. Of course, we’ve always been pretty basic. We emphasize home loans. A 
lot of the smaller banks in this area will recommend their customers to us. It’s been part of our 
expertise. We have to do it (it’s a large part of what we do).  
 
Is the CRA a big part of that? 
 
It’s not a huge thing to us, again, because we have so many loans, it’s such a big part of our 
business. It’s already there. For other banks, it might be more of an issue than it is for us – 
because it’s a big part of what we do. 
 
How active are you?  Do you lobby?  
 
That’s not my cup of tea. I don’t even like local things like that. I’d rather stay here in office. 
 
Do you participate in comment periods? 
 
I’ve never written a comment. Sometimes, there will be drives and encouragements from OBA – 
they’ll send us out a form letter to send to our congressmen. I’ve done that before. I got to 
thinking, maybe those can’t be very useful because they’re getting the same letter from everyone. 
 
What is your attitude toward the role of regulation?  
 
I know why – or I feel like I know why these things happen – is because there’s a few that go 
crazy doing things they shouldn’t have done in the first place. Somebody’s pushed the limit, so 
out comes a law. That’s the way it is with banking and everything else. Someone’s pushed the 
limit, so we have to be subject to it then. 
 
Do you feel like regulation is punishing/consolidate banking? 
 
I do, I guess. It’s not something I lose a lot of sleep about. But I think that – and it’s probably 
true in every – again in every facet of business. The fewer they have to look at, I think the 
government would like to slim it down, get more control of things. But that’s going to eliminate 
jobs in the long run.  
 
And kill local communities.  
 
I was at a meeting just a few years ago, not too awful long, it was in Oklahoma City at the 
offices of MidFirst bank – they’re a savings and loan as well – they’re the largest in the state, one 
of the largest banks in the state. And the meeting was at their office, and it was with 
congressman Lucas. And there was just four or five bankers there. The president of MidFirst – I 
appreciated what he said – because that’s part of the thrust was it looked like they were trying to 
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eliminate all the community banks. And he said, I’m not going out to Fairview and putting in a 
branch or going to these other small towns. There’s a need for those small banks. Like I said, I 
appreciated what he had to say. He wasn’t going to be out here to help those people, so better do 
what you can to keep us here.  
 
He would have to – or someone would have to come out here. 
 
I don’t guess they’d have to.  
 
The biggest thing about credit unions to me is, something banks have been lobbying for ever 
since I’ve been in the business, is their tax free status. To me, there’s no legitimate reason, when 
we’re needing tax money, that they get a free ride. Because they’re legitimate competitors of 
banks in every way.  
 
How about farm credit? 
 
They’re also a competitor. You don’t hear so much about them and their tax status and things – 
of course, they’re a direct governmental entity, whereas credit unions, you know, are doing their 
own thing.  
 
Do you think your S&L experience in the 80s made you better? 
 
Well, yeah. It’s surely helped. We were like a lot of other banks – we were just one notch from 
survival at that point. There was – the president then – if you were me, would you be looking for 
something else, and he said, you gotta stick it out. And I guess I’m glad I did. Things have turned 
around. I think it would have turned around for a lot of failed banks, banks that they took under. 
If they had given them a little more time – if they were good operators, they surely could have 
determined the good operator from the bad. If they were a good operator, their bank would have 
turned around because real estate turned around. But there were some that were just loose 
cannons and had to be taken out.  
 
In those days, regulators had a beef – thought bankers were crooks. That’s different now. 
 
I think so. Yep. It surely has. There’s always bad apples in every bunch.  
 
 
Interview 17 
 
What’s your background 
 
I went to NEO here in Miami for two years, and I was doing business management. And I started 
working as a teller and just backup to the cashier, doing whatever was needed. I went to Missouri 
Southern, finished up my degree in business management, and right after that, I started auditing 
when I was already working here. So our president moved me into an auditing position, so I 
audited this bank and the bank in Wyandotte, which the president owns. And the cashier – the 
COO – retired, I took over as operations officer. Back in 2010. 
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Compliance part of your duties? 
 
We all play a role in the compliance. However, our president is the actual compliance officer. 
And then – like I said – we have committees that are assisting the president in making sure that 
all the compliance options are met.  
 
State bank – so state and FDIC? 
 
Yes. We actually governed and audited by the Federal Reserve bank as well, and we are a state 
bank, so we get reviewed the Oklahoma State Banking Department as well as the Fed.  
 
So you’re a Fed member. No FDIC? 
 
Yes. We do not get – we are a state bank that’s chartered, so we have FDIC coverage, and we 
have opted in to participated in FDIC coverage, but we are not regulated by the FDIC. We’re 
regulated by the Federal Reserve. So that is a little confusing. If you tell people you’re not FDIC, 
then they think coverage because that’s all the FDIC is known for is their insurance. The 
regulators are the state and the Fed. 
 
Is it true the state commission doesn’t care about compliance? Just safety and soundness? 
 
The Oklahoma commission is going to do more safety and soundness exam, but in saying that, 
everything that goes into safety and soundness is compliance based, so you cannot get away from 
the compliance issues. Compliance is a big role, and we get criticized on compliance areas even 
on the state exam. But the Fed – they will nail you on compliance issues. In a harder, more direct 
fashion than what the state banking does. They will – I mean, they will – they’re the ones that 
you have to worry about. The state is more there to make sure that you’re operating at a level that 
is satisfactory, that they don’t foresee any problems. The Fed is the one that can pack a punch 
and can either fine you, can give you a cease to exist order – they’re the ones that you really have 
to worry about what you’re doing in compliance. 
 
Have you always been a state bank? 
 
Yes.  
 
Always a Fed member? 
 
Yes. Since I’ve been here – since like the end of 2007. I don’t know before that. I’m pretty sure 
that we were always the same. We appreciate the knowledge and the almost the help that we can 
get from the state institution. Before you get to that federal level, they’ll come in. They’ll make 
sure everything is good to go. Give us a little prep, and tell us what we need to do. If there are 
any recommendations, then we get audited by the Federal Reserve. A lot of times, they’ll hold 
together. The state will come in and say, this is what we recommend. And it falls in line a lot 
with what the Federal Reserve is going to say anyway. It is nice to have that.  
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Part of the state’s mission is to help? 
 
Nope. They come in and do an exam. During that exam, they will give you recommendations. 
They know what the Fed is looking for, even more than what we could ever know, because 
they’re in that area. That’s their expertise is auditing and examination.  
 
I’ve heard that the state commission can be used as a consultant. 
 
Yes. That is true. Because they’re kind of the supreme authority on what’s going on. And 
whatever they say, you pretty much have to comply with. Especially in the compliance side. We 
have to comply with what the Fed says. And one of the things as a small institution that we’re 
able to do – like I said – H.C. (the president) can be the head of the committee, but then 
compliance as it affects operations, that is my department. Compliance as it affects lending, 
that’s our loan officer’s department. Compliance as it affects IT, that’s our IT department. And 
so all of us, if you take all five of the different areas that we’re looking at in an exam, then we 
will all use our knowledge about what’s going on in our specific area, report back to H.C. as the 
compliance head, and then he will have a greater understanding of how the bank is meeting all of 
these specific areas. That has been a lot more beneficial when it comes down to exam, because 
they break it apart. When they come in and they want to know how we’re meeting all these areas, 
they want to know how operations is day to day, how loans are meeting with compliance, how 
IT, how security. And so, when we do it that way, he has more direct information from each 
department coming in. H.C. can make a better determination of what our bank overall – that’s his 
realm as president. He wants to know 10 years from now, what we’re looking at. He is a broad 
spectrum, whereas I am a day to day person. I’m looking at this is what I’ve got to do each day 
to make the bank balance. So he gets a little piece from each member of that committee, takes it 
back, and makes a broad decision about First State Bank compliance overall. 
 
We feel that these committees, that the members and how we’re breaking it apart, is the most 
effective way for a small bank to manage any compliance issue. Because compliance is so broad. 
But so important. It’s a really broad topic, and you have to break it apart, in my opinion.  
 
You can be as good at compliance as you want to be – just depends on what you’re willing 
to pay.  
 
What they’re saying is – what my president tells me – he tells me from the beginning – is you 
cannot hardly get a 1. They are going to give you 2s. The only thing that you can get a 1 in is 
something that is mathematical. Say, liquidity. Ratios. Alco ratios, liquidity ratios. Things where 
it’s a mathematical formula and you either have it or you don’t. It’s pretty hard for them to give 
you a 2 if you meet the criteria. Everything else, they’re going to give you a 2 more than likely. 
That’s not, you know, necessarily how it happens. But that’s what he’s always told me. So he 
says we strive – we still though, at our bank – strive to get a 1, but we are not disappointed when 
it comes back at a 2, and we’ve been working as hard as we can. Because it is very difficult to 
get a 1 in all of those areas. And so, what we decide is that we will work as hard as we can to 
achieve the 1, but we’re not going to be, you know, put down, we’re not going to feel like we’ve 
been defeated if we get a 2. I know what they’re saying – the paying for it thing is real. Because 
we are small, we have a dedicated number of funds that we can use. Those funds have to be 
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allocated among, you know, to get resources for the entire bank. If we spent the money, like they 
said, for a compliance department, we would have to hire three additional people, and we would 
have to have auditors in here, internal controls, and different people. Our loan officer acts as our 
internal control officer. That’s not only because he wants to – that’s not because he wants to but 
because that’s all we can do. We have to have internal people who are going to perform these 
roles because we’re going to function without that cost break. I understand what they’re saying – 
if we wanted to try to get a 1, which we might not ever get anyway, we would have to hire 
additional people. And they’re already telling us at the Fed level that we’re spending so much on 
employees. We want to tell them that’s because you guys are making us to comply with all these 
regulations that are impossible. So it’s impossible for a small bank to allocate the funds needed 
in all these different departments. So we’ve decided that we will do the best we can. We will 
strive for the 1, but if we get the 2, we almost expect it. Because we just don’t have the funds. 
We don’t do home loans – this is something you might want – we don’t do those because the 
compliance section of it is too tough. We can’t make any money. So we just have to cut our 
losses some way.  
 
It’s funny you say that the Fed says you have too much labor expense. 
 
They want you to increase profitability. But they want you to decrease – but it’s a lawsuit 
waiting to happen. And we’re not going to fight those battles. We have a $20 overdraft, and 
we’ve been told time and time again – everyone else is going to $27, why don’t you go to $27. 
And we say, well, we’re not going to do it. Because you’ll get criticized, one side or the other. 
What you can take – you have to balance it. It’s honestly like a skill: how much criticism can we 
take in this area and how much can we take in this area? You can’t go to a three. If you’re really 
high in one area, and you’ve got 1s, keep those ones there – don’t get criticism in that area 
because you don’t want your other area to fall to a 3. And that is how you have to work as a 
small bank. It’s not what you want to do. But you definitely don’t want to take extra criticism 
just to make a dollar. That’s not worth it. 
 
How do you do compliance – and tie your answer to a specific regulation. 
 
Well, generally speaking, what we do – we take a look at all the regs upfront, and that’s 
something that H.C. and myself look at together, and we have a lot of training, and we get 
packets and briefings on any changes that have been make. You know that up front. We get 
yearly updates – sometimes biannually, as needed. But we take those regulations, and we put in 
place a policy. Everything in our bank is done by policies. So we have a policy to meet Reg C, to 
meet Reg Z. We have policies – all types of policies. If it’s not in our policy book, then we have 
a policy that – it doesn’t even make the book – but it’s still a policy. We still write it up, how 
we’re going to meet with this. We have checklists. We use tables.  
 
What do you mean tables? 
 
Like – what is required for a loan to meet this regulation, say on the loan side – you have five 
items this way, and you make sure that you check off on a table that you gave them the notice, 
that you gave them the disclosure, that you mailed it out, that the customer sent it back, that you 
gave them this ample opportunity. All of the items that are required to meet a regulation are put 
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into that table, and all you have to do is check it off. You get either a checklist or a table for each 
specific regulation. Each department does their own. Loans have to meet reg A,B, and C. We 
have to do D, E, F. You divide them up. Then we make sure that the person who’s over that 
department is making sure that each one is met. Every loan gets a loan checklist now. Everything 
has to be checked off there. Every new account that’s opened has a checklist of the items, now, 
that we have to meet. The new accounts secretary has to check those off before it comes to me. 
Same thing with all of our, stop pays get under some of those regulations, all the daily operations 
stuff, and we just put together a system that works in each department. Pretty much, now, it has 
to be a check list. It has to be a table. Something visual. Because you will miss it. If you try to 
read and interpret that regulation, you will not do it. You will not ever meet what you’re wanting. 
They want to see each section of the regulation broke apart in a table.  
 
And it’s where regular people can read? 
 
Exactly. We put it in those terms. There’s a lot of resources you can get Online that you can print 
samples off of and make it custom to your institution. BankersOnline. Places like that – you can 
get all of the resources that you want. It is there. The banks that are struggling are the ones that 
are just not doing it. If you are trying, and you are doing something, when they come in to 
examine you, they are going to give you some prop for just, hey, you got the table, you’re trying 
to use it. Maybe you didn’t interpret it the same way we did at the Fed, but at least you’re trying 
to meet everything that you can. The ones that are in trouble just don’t do it. 
 
The tables / figures. Those aren’t procedures are they? Just tools to follow? 
 
Tools to meet the procedures. The procedures are outlined in the written policy. And we go a 
step farther and identify those procedures as step-by-step tables, items, checklists, things like 
that. Just to make it – like you said – if I have a 18 year old teller, I want to make sure that 18 
year old teller, who doesn’t know the regulation, so I have to give them something, you tell the 
customer A, B, and C. Only A, B, and C. And you have to write down that you told them these 
things. You don’t tell them that if they structure a transaction in a certain way that they’re going 
to tell. You only tell them what I tell you to tell them. Things like that. Because – not everyone 
here has the banking background. That’s something else that you have to – I’m having to take 
compliance here at this level and all the knowledge that I know and break it apart so that anyone 
off the street that gets hired as a frontline teller, seriously, can meet the compliance requirements. 
Because they are not exempt. It is not Nikki has to have compliance for her bank – it’s everyone 
in First State Bank has to operate at this compliance level. That’s really important. That’s what a 
lot of examiners do not understand – they’ll say, well, do you know what section 8 is.  
 
They’ll go ask a teller that? 
 
No. They’ll be talking to me. And I’ll say, yes, I understand that. And they’ll say, why do you do 
it this way? And I’ll say, that’s what I told them – because how am I going to – they don’t know 
what that reg is. They’re not required to know what that reg is. They’re only required to meet the 
procedures that I put in place to meet a compliance rule.  
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Has there been a change that you could walk me through – how you develop a 
policy/procedure and then make the tools? 
 
Let’s use funds availability. Funds availability always said that we are going to give someone 
available $100 when they have a hold on a check, we’re going to give them $200 now. Now we 
have to give every person $200. All we do – and most of the changes are this easy – when they 
change something. They rewrite an entire reg just to say $100 to $200. That’s all you get out of 
it. Once you break it down and figure out what they actually did – that’s a good one. On that 
policy, Reg C – we’re going to say, now it’s $200. So H.C., as president, he is in charge of 
rewriting the policies. He goes to our policies and procedures and how we’re going to deal with 
this. And he will say, OK, from now on, we have to change all notices, we have to change 
everything to $200. He changes the policy, procedures, brings it to me, and says, Nikki, this is a 
change that’s going in effect. We notify customers. This is the new change as of, you know, this 
date, our bank is going to be under this new regulation. We change all of our print outs, all of our 
hold forms. Everything like that. And then, we do a training, in house, of all the tellers, telling 
them, you know, now you have to give them $200. So that’s a basic one, but honestly, that is an 
actual one that changed. Most of them that are changing are not actually changing an amount like 
that. That was a huge change. We actually have to give the customer $100 extra. That affects 
everyone in our bank – all the tellers, all the accounts people, myself included, that affects 
everyone in the bank. Most of the reg changes are going to be things that do not affect the tellers 
and the customers directly. Most of them are going to be like a change that says your ATM now 
has to be handicap accessible. You have to – that’s a new thing that’s going on, you have to be 
able to plug in headphones so they can use their headphones if they want. It has to talk to them. 
Our ATM wasn’t talking to people. You have to make it talk to people. If they can’t see, they can 
hear all of the prompts. Things like that. Those are just things you just have to upgrade your 
software. Upgrade your hardware. But when you get one that actually says, hey, from now on, 
you’re going to give them $200, you have to go from senior level down, and do that. And so 
that’s what we do. He rewrites a policy, gives a copy to me, we talk about the changes that have 
to be made. I make all the operational changes. And then we train. Then we require that our 
tellers attend just an in-house briefing on every regulation change that affects their job.  
 
The loan people, they go to outside training. They go to outside meetings, from the OBA. 
Because their’s are so in-depth with the loans. They’re too indepth for HC and I to just tweak a 
policy. They go to the training. They bring back packets of information of how. They pretty 
much give you a procedure at the meeting. Say, this is what we – they give them a breakdown, 
like, in your bank, this is what you’re going to have to change. These are the steps you’re going 
to have to get in place. They don’t tell you exactly, make a checklist. But they tell you, this is 
basically what the reg is saying. They break it down for our loan officers and president can 
understand it. And then, they do the same thing when they come back. The training is just 
different. Instead of starting with HC and moving down, we actually start with an authority on 
the subject. 
 
All of us, in our different committee, go to these annual or semi-annual meetings and get all the 
knowledge we can on compliance issues. It’s called Compliance Roundup is what the OBA does.  
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There’s a lot of grey areas in lending. On operations, if it says $200, it’s $200. Lending is a lot 
more challenging. I was in lending before I did compliance.  
 
How does the committee structure fit in to say, how, on the day-to-day of compliance? 
 
We use online technology a lot. We email back and forth. When there are – we sign up for a lot 
of email alerts. From OBA, from Bankers Online, places like that. Anytime something is going 
to affect us, HC and I and Danny all get an email that says, hey, this is happening today. Then 
HC emails me or Dannie, whether operations or lending, and says this is what is coming. We 
need to read this. We need to be aware of it and note down the date of when it’s due. When 
we’re going to have to be in compliance with the new change to the reg. From there, we can set 
up a meeting of that committee to get everything in place. It does happen – it happens 
instantaneously now because we all get alerts. One of us will be contacted from HC. He has to be 
the head of compliance, so he will send the alert to me, saying this is happening today, did you 
get the email? If not, he forwards it to me, and says read this. Then we do a plan of action. 
Technology has made it where no we’re alerted right away.  
 
Do you rely on all these other consultants? 
 
Yes. Mary Beth Guard. Holzknecht. Pegasus. There’s also Pegasus. He’s a training guy, too. We 
do have an audit team that is outside, and it’s Folker Data, and they do a BSA audit and an IT 
audit. And when they do those audits, they do hit the compliance issues with BSA. My 
operations side more. They are outside. We hire them to come in and check everything. They 
check new accounts. They check pretty much everything I do operational. On the lending side, 
we have an auditor that we’ve hired an auditor – she does not work at the bank, but she comes in 
once a month and checks the loans. We still do business loans – if they’re commercial, you have 
to have insurance, they have to have RESPA. Mortgage in the jacket. All of those kinds of 
things. And it’s checklists – she goes through and checks everything. So we do have a few 
people hired to assist us in finding any problems with our actual procedures and making sure 
procedurally we’re hitting it. But when you’re just talking knowledge about what’s going on, we 
don’t really hire a lot of people for that. We rely more on HC getting information. There are so 
many sites out there that are free. So many update classes. They’re going to tell me ahead of time 
in the next six months, be looking for this to happen, this to happen, and this to happen.  
 
On the compliance audits? Are those required? 
 
Yes. The Fed doesn’t tell you exactly what you have to have in that regard, but they do say you 
need someone looking at it. Someone has to look at it. They don’t say we have to hire a specific 
person. But you have to have an internal control. That is straight from – Oklahoma state and the 
Fed will tell you – you have to have an internal control program. You have to have an internal 
control officer. Then you have to have someone auditing the loans. Outside of the department. 
Someone has to be looking at those. They’ll flat out tell you that, so we hired a lady. Then they’ll 
also tell you that you have to have an audit, and they want to know the last date of your audit for 
these certain areas. BSA. For IT. For all these things. So they don’t tell you specifically how you 
have to meet these requirements, but they are all required.  
 
361 
 
When you have a reg come down – that’s ambiguous? 
 
We actually like to call. We’ll call and get some of the knowledge and the insight from someone. 
And what they usually do is they give you a contact – she’s an examiner, she’s going to be in 
charge of my bank. If I have any questions, I’m supposed to call her. They’re going to be coming 
in, and the best person to get your information one is going to be the one who’s critiquing you.  
 
So she’ll also be your examiner? 
 
Yes. She’s an examiner, but she might not be on the next exam. They just appoint you a regional 
person that works for the state banking department. They’re all examiners. They appoint our 
bank a specific contact, and we can use that contact as much or as little as we want. But the more 
you use that contact, the better understanding you have of what they’re looking for. With 
Brooke, I can call her and say, this is what I read, so how do you want me to implement it. And 
she’ll say, this is what we’re thinking for our exam. How we want to see it happen in the bank. 
She’ll also tell me, but I bet you need to go one step further for the Fed and include this, this and 
this. Because she’s already talked to the Fed. When she gets an email saying this reg is changing, 
she calls the Fed. She has a contact at the Fed. The Fed says, OK, in Oklahoma for a bank this 
size, we’re going to require this, this, and this. So she knows. It’s a chain – everyone gets the 
same update on the reg changing. It’s just that you follow the chain of commands – if you need 
to go through the state then the Fed. Then get all the information from that person that you can. 
It’s all free! Contact them – it’s free. Do not make up your own policies and procedures. That’s 
what banks do that kills them. They make up a plan. They try to interpret the regulation like they 
want to. They interpret it terribly. Because the Fed does not say everything clear, so folks will 
say, Oh, I think they want us to do this. Just call them. Call them and say, how would I do this? 
 
Would you ever call the Fed? 
 
Yes. I have a good contact relationship with the state, so they’d usually be my first. But I call the 
Fed help line. We call whoever we need. If it is something that Oklahoma state says – that we are 
not there yet, we don’t even know what they want, it’s too far out – we also get emails about, 
before they’re even put into place, we can make suggestions. We can put in comments – you can 
make comments on the exam, on what you think. You can make comments on the regulation. 
Things like that. We’ll get a lot of emails, comment on this and tell us what you’re thinking and 
tell us how it’s going to affect your bank. We do talk with the Fed, but the state breaks it to a 
point where I can understand it better.  
 
What about the bank that doesn’t have it written down (Nash)? 
 
They will be criticized. A bank cannot operate out of – I’ve been told this several times – you 
cannot operate unless it’s in black and white. They don’t care if you do it every single day – and 
they’ve told me that in the past – you do a lot of stuff that you don’t document what you do, and 
you don’t get credit for that. And we do above and beyond what is required – we might check 
accounts every day where some banks check every month. And she says, give yourself the credit. 
They will be criticized for not having a black and white checklist or something where they can 
go back and say, this is what they did. They don’t care if you do it 10 times a day, if you don’t 
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write it down, they don’t care. They will be criticized for that. The only reason that they have not 
been shut down is because they probably talk their way out of it. They probably talk their way 
out of it – they probably convinced them that they’re doing it somehow. And I guarantee they 
have more procedures than what they think they do. A typed up paper on my computer telling 
someone how to do my job = procedures. A typed up checklist on the tellers station that says to 
check the ID, check this and that = they will accept that. You don’t necessarily have to write at 
the top of the page: this is the procedure for Reg Such and Such. If you can prove and put 
together a case in everything in your bank, they’ll accept it. They’re not here to shut banks down. 
They want banks to grow. But they will be criticized for not compiling.  
 
Do you feel like there is some benefit for experience? Does the examiner give the 
experienced person slack? 
 
Because I’ve been in the bank for about six years, I have learned as I go what to do and what to 
say and what not to say. And so in the beginning – I don’t think that they think that you know 
less, and I don’t think that they intentionally change their exam procedures based on experience. 
But, because of experience, you do know what to tell them. I know more this year what to tell 
and what not to tell than last year. Not that we keep anything from them, but you don’t want to 
get yourself in trouble over something that’s not an issue. And that’s what you’ll do in the 
beginning because you’ll say, I don’t really know. You don’t say, I don’t really know. In the 
beginning, you might say, I’m not sure what you’re talking about. No! That is not an answer. 
They have always told me that I run this bank in a tighter, in a more black and white, like I was 
telling you, and more of a procedural fashion, that they like than a lot of people that have been 
there a long time. Because I have to – I don’t have that experience, so I have to make sure that 
everything is done A,B, and C. So they actually like to examine me a little bit better than they 
like to go to HC. HC just tells them, I know what I’m doing. It’s worked so far. And you don’t 
have anything to criticize because we’ve been doing this. And I look at him, and I’m just like, 
you’ve got to be kidding me. How does he get by with that? And I’m like, no, let me find the 
documentation that he’s talking about so I can get it to you so that they don’t explode. But he can 
get by with that. Like you said – some people can get by with that because he has a history of, 
you know, doing X, Y, and Z. I have to prove that I’m doing X, Y, and Z. You know what I’m 
saying. You do learn a lot. You learn more and more. But the only way that I can do my job 
effectively is if I know what is required. And you know, so somewhere you have to get the 
information. You have to be pulling that information. You have to be using it. Because it is – it is 
all about the rules. It’s all about following the rules. So yes, in a way, they might try to be harder 
on you if you’re new. I don’t think they try – but it might seem like it’s a little harder – but it’s 
only because you do not know how to handle their questions. And it’s nerve wracking. 
Especially in the beginning. Because it’s your first time and you think they’re out to get you. But 
after my fourth year, I’m like, OK, whatever. I own this exam. You guys work for me. And you 
guys work for me. They’re trying to help me. But in the beginning, you’re scared and like, 
they’re going to shut us down. Now, I’m like, here’s what I do and you tell me what else you 
want me to do to be better. I prove to them now that we’re better than what they’re giving us 
credit for. That’s what my job is now. At some point, you get comfortable that you know as 
much as they do. I do this every day. I know more about my bank than they do. I know my 
customers. I know what I’m doing. I don’t know how many years it takes everyone else, but after 
being here for a few years, I thought, no. I know what I’m doing, and I’m not going to let them 
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intimidate me. I’m going to prove to them that I’m doing more than what they ask. And that’s 
how I approach it.  
 
Eventually, you’ll know more than they do – because they rotate out.  
 
Definitely. That’s how I felt last year. We do come across people who are new. They’re new, 
too. They have new people too. I mean, I just shred them. I just shred them. She comes in and 
says, well you have to … and I’m like, where did you get that. That’s not required! You just tear 
them apart. I had one girl almost crying. They just don’t – because you cannot bring attitude 
without knowledge to back it. You cannot have that attitude without the knowledge to back it. 
And she learned pretty fast that she better know exactly what she’s talking about because HC and 
I will not go for anything besides what’s written. That’s important.  
 
How do you know what’s in the rule book? But maybe that’s not a good question because it 
isn’t an issue? 
 
All you have to worry about is the changes. Our bank is founded on a platform of regulations 
that make the whole bank work. The only think that we are concerned about – that’s why it’s 
called a “Roundup” not “Compliance A to Z.” It’s just rounding up the last year and anything 
that’s changed and how do you build on the regulations. I cannot tell you every regulation. But I 
can tell you that it’s wrong for me to go out there and do certain activity. I can’t quote you every 
regulation in the book, but I can make this bank run just by what I have been trained from people 
that, you know, that have got some regulation background. And that’s what important. You don’t 
have to know what they all are, but you have to know that you’re operating in a way that is 
conducive to those regulations, and all you have to worry about are those changes. That’s it. Just 
the updates. You aren’t required to know it all. You can’t know them all.  
 
Has something changed? Did Dodd-Frank, CFPB, and all that affected what you do? 
 
No. Not too much. Like I said, a lot of the regulations, the changes do not affect us directly. A lot 
of the regulations are because large banks have so much trouble. And if you fall – if you are 
under $50 million in assets, and you’re in a small bank category, a lot of times, those regulations 
are not going to affect us. Another thing, like I told you, we’re not doing the home loan side for 
purchase. That takes out a lot of the regulations that we have to meet for that. So we have to 
follow all regulations, but a lot of them are just not going to apply. They aren’t going to affect 
our day to day operations. Because of our size for one. But because of the services we provide, 
too. 
 
You all seem pretty relaxed about the situation. Small banks. Middle sized banks seem to 
be freaking out. What’s the difference? 
 
Because once you get over that threshold, everything applies. Pretty much.  
 
Asset threshold? 
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Yes, but not just that. There’s a lot of different thresholds that change you from a small bank to a 
medium sized bank, and every agency is going to give you a different number. We use $50 
million as a general guideline, and we are a very small bank, and we’re a community bank, 
which is a little bit different. We’re not a state bank, which is a little bit different. We aren’t 
commercialized. We’re not Chase. But once you get in that realm where everything applies to 
you, you do have more responsibility. You have more to uphold. The other thing is: they don’t 
understand – if they’re worried about stuff, it’s because they have a lack of understanding about 
what they need to do. They’re not writing new procedures and policies correctly. They’re 
department is lacking. They’ll have a compliance department, if they’re that big. They’ll have 
people who, all day long, that’s what they do. And I think, sometimes, all they’re seeing is the 
reg. If you separate it out and I have one team that all they do is the regulations, they would go 
crazy. Because all I do is I take the pieces that I know I have to have and I just stick them into 
play and say, ok, we’re fine, we’re doing it. And I think they’re concentrating so much on getting 
them to the letter, and they’re trying to do all of them at one time, and they’re trying to do it at 
such a high level, like I told you, that senior level, that compliance level, that they’re not looking 
at all you have to do is make a checklist, give it to the teller, and have them do it. They’re trying 
to make it into something it’s not, and it’s because they have a lack of understanding of how it 
actually works in the bank. And that’s why you do not want to separate compliance from your 
operations. You don’t want to separate it from your employees. You don’t want to separate it 
out. And that’s why we love the committee. If they had a committee that actually worked in their 
bank that actually saw this stuff every day, they could put it into play. Instead of looking at it in a 
broad spectrum on paper, they would actually know how it enacted inside their institution. And 
that’s what’s missing – there’s a link missing. I worked for IBC here – they were so 
disconnected. Disconnected, disjointed, is the only way to describe that bank. The whole thing. 
No one was on the same page. No one knew what was going on. And we never heard the word 
compliance. We never heard the word operations. We never heard anything. We ran a deposit 
through a deal and gave a customer a receipt. We were no more a part of their planning, of their 
procedures, of their policies, than one of my cashiers. We were a cashier. And they never once 
told you about regulations. You never heard anything. How do they expect those people to 
understand what they’re supposed to be doing, what they’re supposed to be complying with if 
it’s never even spoken. And I worked there like seven months, and I wanted to pull my hair out. 
Exactly like what you’re saying with those middle banks. It’s a disjointed feeling. I worked here, 
and I understand banking. There, I knew how to give a customer a receipt for a deposit. Here, 
you understand banking. You work it every day. Compliance is your life. Operations is your life. 
Lending is your life. You are so in tune with what’s going on. Every person that you ask of my 
tellers, when you tell them, what’s a change that’s been done here lately, they may not tell you 
the reg, but they’ll tell you every change I’ve made in the last year because that’s what they have 
to do. We were told nothing. A computer screen would pop up and say, you have to give the 
customer $200 and put a hold on the rest.  
 
They try to automate everything.  
 
They tried to? 
 
But the teller doesn’t always have to do it. Okay, X, escape, enter. They don’t know what they’re 
doing. They don’t know what that means. They don’t know, oh, you know – I know this, I was 
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18 years old – and you’re typing in, like, oh, it says something about, we probably ought to get a 
secondary ID because this person’s over $10,000. You have no idea about a CTR. All you know 
is a screen pops up and you have to ask them for their driver’s license. If someone asked me 
what it was for, I wouldn’t know. All I’d know is that I have to put in their driver’s license 
number. That is wrong. And that’s, like you said, why they worry about compliance because they 
are trying to take that – they’re trying to automate it into a system that is going to not let their 
tellers make a mistake. You know, they print out reports and forms every night. They don’t have 
to do any of this. We look at it by hand. We look at our BSA stuff by hand. Our currency 
transactions. I look at it by hand every night. My tellers – if you say CTR to them – they know 
what they’re filing. They actually file the report themselves. They know what the requirements 
are. They know what the law is. I had none of that at IBC. It was the most disjointed place you 
could work. They separate it and raise it to such a level – and senior management – you never 
even hear the word compliance. I mean, that is a problem. It might work for them because it’s th 
only way they can automate their system. To hire that many employees and have that many 
people working and to do the number of transactions they have to do in a day. But I guarantee 
you, if they would train them even a little bit on the actual principle of banking, that they’d be a 
lot better off. Because when I went there, I learned how to use a scanner. That was our training. 
You learned – you know – how to count money. That is not banking. And that’s a problem. 
That’s why we are so – that’s why they get in so many lawsuits. Why they lose so much money. 
They make money, too, that’s why they’re always under criticism. Chase, BoA, IBC – money 
laundering problems with them. But that’s why they have so much trouble, because they’re not 
training people banking. They’re just not doing it. And I would never go back. 
 
So a large – the volume – it’d be nice to automate it.  
 
I guarantee you, one push of the wrong button, you get half of the forms they need. And you do 
not know – I worked there – because they do not know. It’ll give you five forms instead of ten 
because they hit the button. And they never know. My lady that opens a new account, she gets so 
much training that she should be able to open it by hand. She should know what forms she has to 
give them by hand. Compliance One is great – it’s going to print out the forms for her, but if it’s 
wrong, my people know. Their people don’t. That’s the difference. We have the same 
capabilities that they have, but our people are knowledgeable. I’m not saying we’re the best ever 
– I’m just saying at small banks, that knowledge is common. We don’t have that kind of system 
that’s going to do everything for us. We do it by hand, and you learn so much more. When the 
examiners come in, you don’t say, our software does that. We say, I look at them every night, 
this person and this person and this person – I check them all. That’s where you get a difference. 
And they’re rated a four – a three or a four – and we’re going to get ones and twos.  
 
What portion of performance is influenced by regulation? 
 
You are talking about regulation – our expense for compliance is going to be right here (legal 
and professional expense) – we have legal and professional, and then we also have our director’s 
fees, which they tie into compliance. Our board of directors, they have a meeting tonight – every 
month they have a meeting, our memberships and subscriptions, our legal and professional, and 
our director’s fees, and our public reports expenses. Those are where you’re going to find 
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compliance items. The legal and professional is all of our auditors. Then your public reports 
assessments, that’s your FDIC, things like that. Then you’ve got a little bit up here.   
 
What about top line? Opportunity costs? What aren’t you doing that you’d like to be 
doing? 
 
We would like to do purchase loans. We would like to do house loans for purchase. And we are 
unable to do it. One of the other major things is we have to service charge our customers for 
checking accounts, and we have monthly service charge that goes from $6 to nothing, depending 
on their balance. We do have an over-40 free checking, but for the vast majority, we’re having to 
service charge. And that is because it costs us so much for those programs to run. We have to 
have the Compliance One program, and we have to surcharge our customers. We have not 
increased overdrafts, but I would like – a lot of banks give free checking. We’re unable to do that 
at this point with all accounts because we have such a cost invested in the software. And it takes 
us so much time and energy to maintain an account. So those two things are a big thing.  
 
Did you used to do homeloans and drop out? 
 
Yes. We did.  
 
When did you quit? 
 
I think it was about 2011. The escrow – we started doing that. We set up savings accounts 
instead, and we just made deposits with their monthly payment in their savings. The deal was 
just too many regulations – too much compliance. It was mainly when they started changing 
RSPA – the truth in lending. When they started changing the right of recision, reg Z – instead of 
changing all of that where you had to do so much, it just got to where we couldn’t comply. We 
didn’t have – we have a president, and he was making our house loans. Well, the president of 
your bank is so busy that he can’t do this. So all he does now is business purpose, rental houses, 
properties, because they don’t require you to do as much of the checks. And because you actually 
just showing that they’ve got the income they need to cover it, they relax it. But just in the last 
few years, right when I first started, we did home loans all the time. We couldn’t make the 
money, though. They gave you a limit on how much fees you can charge. Origination has to be 
this much of a percent of the loan. And they want you to do that in two hours where it was taking 
us two days to put together a loan. All the ratios they wanted. They just couldn’t make the 
money.  
 
Was it a big chunk of your business? 
 
We lost interest income, of course. Because you’re talking 20-year, 30-year notes instead of five 
or six year auto. We lost a lot of interest income. It was not a huge portion of our business, but I 
would venture to say 20 percent of interest. That’s a big deal. But we have recovered a lot of that 
because we’ve had to learn how to make up for that, and so one of the things that we’ve done is 
we’ve offered a new car loan rate that was lower than what we had before – to try to entice 
people to borrow more. We also started a big commercial line. We started trying to get people to 
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borrow for their businesses, and so we supplemented not having the house loans with having the 
big commercial side, which still gets you the 20-year interest, a little bit of higher rates.  
 
We lose a little, but we’ve replaced it because you have to. You can’t lose money. 
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